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Abstract
In central cases of switch-reference, a marker on the verb of one clause is used to indicate
whether its subject has the same or different reference from the subject of an adjacent,
syntactically related clause. In central cases of logophoricity, a special pronoun form is
used within a reported speech context, to indicate coreference with the source of the
reported utterance.
Descriptions of the switch-reference systems of particular languages often identify
particular uses of the switch-reference markers as 'unexpected', 'aberrant' or 'exceptional'.
In this thesis I start from the premise that these unexpected uses form a functionally
coherent class, and argue for this by presenting data from a wide range of languages. I
then propose a unified account of switch-reference within a grammar formalism which has
a Discourse Representation Theory semantics (Unification Categorial Grammar). This
account attempts to incorporate these functional extensions of switch-reference markers.
Finally, the relationship between switch-reference and logophoricity is investigated and the
DR Theory account is extended to handle logophoric systems.
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Note
The text-formatting program used to produce this thesis has an occasional problem with
footnotes; the reader is therefore warned that a line at the bottom of a page can mean
'footnote approaching on a subsequent page'.
Chapter 1 Switch-reference phenomena
1.1. Introduction
Switch-reference and logophoricity are types of anaphoric linkage across clause boundaries
which cannot be adequately accounted for by the Binding Theory. In central cases of
switch-reference, a marker on the verb of one clause is used to indicate whether its subject
has the same or different reference from the subject of an adjacent, syntactically related
clause. In central cases of logophoricity, a special pronoun form is used within a reported
speech context, to indicate coreference with the source of the reported speech. This thesis
gives a detailed examination of the two phenomena and proposes an account for them
which is formalised in Discourse Representation Theory.
The major concern of the thesis is the functional complexity of switch-reference systems.
Switch-reference markers have a much richer range of functions than just indicating
obligatory co/disjoint reference. I will show that switch-reference systems are inextricably
linked with the marking of temporal meaning as well as nominal meaning. I will then
consider a range of apparently aberrant uses of switch-reference markers which have been
reported for many languages. I will argue that unexpected uses of 'same subject' marking
can be explained if we revise our definition of the switch-reference relation to take account
of agentivity. The unexpected uses of 'different subject' marking which occur in fact
represent common and systematic functional extensions of switch-reference systems which
should be accounted for by any comprehensive theory. My proposal is that the functional
complexity of switch-reference systems can be accounted for if one regards switch-
reference as having the clause rather than the NP as its semantic domain and as indicating
agreement or dis-agreement between parameters of the eventualities described by the
clauses it relates. I will show how this idea can be captured formally within the
framework of Discourse Representation Theory, as embedded within the grammar
formalism, Unification Categorial Grammar. A detailed illustration of the claims about
switch-reference and of the proposed account will be given by providing the beginnings of
a formal account for the switch-reference system of the Papuan language Amele.
A number of subsidiary concerns are addressed by the thesis. The most important of these
is the relationship between switch-reference and logophoricity. In chapter 1 I argue that
although switch-reference and logophoricity are functionally similar, may be regarded as
ends of a continuum, and may be related historically, there is nothing to be gained by
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attempting to subsume them one under the other. Having presented the account for
switch-reference, I then return to the consideration of logophoricity in chapter 6, and
propose a formal account for it within the same theoretical framework. I argue that the
mechanisms used to account for switch-reference and those used to account for
logophoricity are of the same kind.
The thesis falls into two main parts, with the first three chapters concerned with detailed
but informal presentation of the argument and the final three chapters concerned with the
presentation of the formal accounts of switch-reference and logophoricity.
In this chapter I give a typological survey of switch-reference phenomena which shows
that the 'canonical' conception of switch-reference, upon which previous theoretical work
has been based, is unrepresentative of the data in various significant respects. I start to
build up a comprehensive description of the range of switch-reference phenomena which
occurs crosslinguistically, and the criteria of adequacy to be satisfied by any comprehensive
theory of switch-reference. This leads to a reconsideration of prevalent ideas in the
literature about the kind of thing switch-reference is and how it should be handled
formally. This description is further developed in chapter 2, where the range of aberrant
uses of switch-reference markers is considered, with detailed description of data from
Imbabura Quechua, Eastern Pomo, Lenakel and Amele. Then in chapter 3 an informal
theoretical conception of switch-reference is argued for which attempts to satisfy these
criteria.
General theoretical accounts of switch-reference, as opposed to descriptions of it in
individual languages, or crosslinguistic descriptive typologies, are relatively rare. Giv6n
(1983) and Haiman (1983) consider some theoretical issues in switch-reference from an
informal point of view, and these will be reviewed in chapter 3. The only formal accounts
which have been proposed to my knowledge have been Finer (1985a, b) and Tsujimura
(1987). Since Tsujimura's account only became available at a late stage in the preparation
of this thesis, I shall have virtually nothing to say about it here. Like the account proposed
in chapter 5, hers uses a Categorial Grammar. Finer's account is formulated within the
framework of Government and Binding Theory, and it will be briefly described and
evaluated in this chapter.
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1.2. The canonical conception of switch-reference
The sentence pairs in (1) and (2), from the North American language Mojave and the
Papuan language Usan, are examples of switch-reference.
(1) a. nya-isvar-k i:ma-k
when-sing-SS dance-tns
When he- sang, he- danced.
b. nya-isvar-m i:ma-k
when-sing-DS dance-tns
When he^ sang, hej danced. (Mojave; Munro 1980c: 145)
(2) a. ye nam su-ab isomei
I tree cut-SS I_went_down
I cut the tree and went down.
b. ye nam su-ine isorei
I tree cut-DS it_went_down
I cut the tree down. (Usan; Haiman & Munro 1983b:xi)
In (la) the subject of the first, subordinate clause has the same referent as that of the
second, matrix clause, and to indicate this, the 'same subject' marker -k (homophonous
with one of the tense markers) is used in place of tense on the verb in the first clause. In
(lb) the 'different subject' marker -m is used to show that the subjects have disjoint
reference. Note the absence of independent subject NPs.
The clauses in (1) are intransitive; (2) gives similar examples with transitive clauses. In
(2a) the same subject marker -ab is attached to the verb of the first clause, to show that the
subject is coreferential with that of the second clause. In (2b) the different subject marker
-ine is used to indicate that there is disjoint reference: in fact here, the subject of the
second clause is coreferential with the direct object of the first clause.
Henceforth, the abbreviations 'SS' and 'DS' will be used for same and different subject
markers, and 'SR' will be used for 'switch-reference marker', subsuming SS and DS. The
clause marked for switch-reference, which is usually a subordinate or dependent clause (in
a technical sense of 'dependent' which will be explained below), will be referred to as the
'marked' clause, and the other clause in the relation, which is usually an independent
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clause that can stand alone and carries tense and other inflectional categories, will be
referred to as the 'controlling' clause.1
Notice that while switch-reference marking is necessary to disambiguate the subject
reference in example (1), where both subjects are third person and there are no lexical
NPs, it is not necessary for disambiguation in (2). It is this characteristic of switch-
reference marking which has led it to be seen as a syntactic phenomenon rather than a
discourse or pragmatic phenomenon: it is pervasive and regular and continues to operate
even when non third person NPs or fully specified lexical NPs mean that it is not
necessary for reference resolution. See Finer (1985b:38f.), Munro (1980b:2f.), Haiman &
Munro (1983b:xi) among others for support of this argument.
The tree diagram in (3) gives a surface syntactic analysis of (1). The question of whether











Switch-reference was first defined by Jacobsen (1967), although certain of the phenomena
of interest had been identified in American Indian languages earlier than this. See Kroeber
(1911) on Yuki, Hoijer (1949) on Tonkawa, and Oswalt (1961) on Kashaya.
Subsequently, switch-reference systems have been identified and studied in a range of
American Indian, Non-Austronesian and Australian languages and in a small number of
1 See Jacobsen (1983:152ff.) for a historical survey of terminology. Although most widespread, the ab¬
breviations 'SS' and 'DS' are not entirely satisfactory, since they beg the question of whether the NPs related
are always subjects.
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African languages. Haiman & Munro (1983a) is a collection of papers representing a
general typological survey; Jacobsen (1983) is an updated survey of switch-reference in the
languages of North America; Austin (1980, 1981) gives a typological survey of switch-
reference in Australia; and Longacre (1972) canvasses switch-reference in the languages of
Papua New Guinea. Information on switch-reference in African languages can be found in
Wiesemann (1982), Comrie (1983) and Sim (1988).
I shall not be directly concerned with the origins of switch-reference systems in this thesis.
Their apparent diversity is reflected in the homophony exhibited in a significant number of
switch-reference systems between switch-reference morphemes and aspectual markers,
tense morphemes, case inflections and subordinating clitics. See Jacobsen (1983), Givdn
(1983) and Haiman (1983). There is some evidence for an element of areal diffusion in
the development of switch-reference systems. The geographical distribution of switch-
reference in North America exhibits clustering in two areas, centred on the South West and
Great Basin culture areas, and on coastal Northern California; the larger Northern and
Eastern areas lack it. Languages central to these clusters also have a greater 'committment'
to switch-reference than more peripheral languages, for example in the number of pairs of
switch-reference moiphemes they have and the range of syntactic environments these may
be used in. See Jacobsen (1983:172f.). Similarly, Austin (1980, 1981) has described the
areal diffusion of switch-reference across diverse languages in Australia. Outside the four
geographical areas mentioned above, only isolated and qualified reports of switch-reference
systems have been made. For example, Nichols (1983:esp.245) describes switch-reference
like systems in some language families of the Northeast Caucasus.2
From the extensive literature on switch-reference one can distil an idea of the canonical
switch-reference system, as one which meets the following formal and functional
conditions.
(1) The Locality Condition
The switch-reference relation holds between just two clauses. The relation between
the marked and the controlling clause is a local one, i.e. the clauses are linearly
adjacent.
2 Some investigators have focussed on the formal and functional similarities between switch-reference
and other grammatical phenomena, for example Givon (1983) argues that that switch-reference is just one man¬
ifestation of a general reference-tracking function while Haiman (1983) compares it to coordinate reduction in
other languages. Such perspectives have led to occasional suggestions that 'switch-reference systems' can be
found in some Indo-European languages like Persian, Latin and Ancient Greek, as well as in Turkish (eg. see
Haiman & Munro 1983b:x,xiv; Haiman 1983).
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(2) The Dependency Condition
The mariced clause is syntactically and semantically dependent on the controlling
clause. Either the marked clause is subordinate to the controlling clause or marked
and controlling clauses are in a clause chaining construction. In a clause chaining
construction a string of 'dependent' medial clauses is followed by a final
'independent' clause. The medial clauses are typically mariced for switch-reference
but lack some or all of the verbal inflection characteristic of independent clauses,
such as tense, mood, agreement etc. The final clause is not marked for switch-
reference but does have finite verb inflection, and this is assumed to apply to the
entire clause chain.
(3) The Realisation Condition
Switch-reference is mariced by contrastive suffixation on the verb of the dependent
clause. The order of the two clauses is mariced followed by controlling.
(4) The Subject Condition
Let us introduce the term switch-reference pivot for the two NPs which are
related by switch-reference marking. The switch-reference pivots are the surface
syntactic subjects of the mariced and controlling clauses. Even in languages with
some degree of ergativity, the pivots seem to be Nominative-Accusative subjects
(Austin 1980:27,36-7; T. Payne 1980:67).
(5) The Functional Condition
Switch-reference functions to signal obligatory co/disjoint reference between the
pivot NPs.
An abstraction with this profile, or one very similar, seems to have considerable
psychological reality for researchers working on switch-reference, whether they are
engaged in describing a particular language, giving a typological survey of the
phenomenon or attempting to develop a formal account for switch-reference. For example,
Giv6n (1983) opens with the statement: 'What I propose to do in this paper may displease
some aficionados of the traditional view of switch-reference' (p.51), and concludes by
saying: 'the narrow "canonical" definition of switch-reference [...] has severe pitfalls
attached to it' (p.79). Many other researchers make very clear statements about
'canonical', 'classical', 'real' or 'true' switch-reference; for example see Jacobsen
(1983:151), Haiman & Munro (1983b:ix); Nichols (1983:259) and Munro (1980b:2). They
may also identify 'non-canonical' systems, and may note, like Heath (1983:130) that
'sporadic departures from this norm' will be disregarded.3
3 I should point out that in the typological literature there has been a fair amount of concern over where
the limits of switch-reference phenomena lie. Not all researchers would agree with the conditions listed above,
given that all of them abstract away from exceptions.
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It is obviously in the nature of an abstraction to have exceptions, and it is therefore
unsurprising that the canonical definition presented above reveals just a fraction of the
wealth of data and range of instances of which it is claimed to be representative. Some of
the diversity in switch-reference systems is due to the interaction of an underlying
functional phenomenon with language specific choices in areas such as constituent order,
and this will be discussed in more detail in section 1.4. However, there are important
ways in which the particular abstraction with which many researchers appear to be working
fails to represent the data adequately, which we shall consider in sections 1.4 and 1.5.
These have significant implications for any general theoretical account.
In illustration, Finer's (1985a, b) 'formal grammar of switch-reference' is based on a very
restrictive notion of switch-reference which is readily shown to be unrepresentative.
Before proceeding I will briefly consider his account, which is formulated within
Government and Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981), specifically that version of GB
proposed by Aoun (1981, 1985, 1986), and called 'Generalised Binding'.4 Finer's account
is open to a number of criticisms for the unjustified assumptions it makes about switch-
reference languages. Some of these criticisms are general ones which stem from his
acceptance of the canonical view of switch-reference, and these will be of most concern to
us here; others are specific criticisms which may be subject to correction within the GB
framework and which I shall have little to say about. For other critiques of the account
see Tsujimura (1987) and Roberts (1988).
In brief, Finer assumes that switch-reference is a syntactic phenomenon, to be accounted
for by the Binding Theory at the level of S-structure. He assumes a canonical notion of
switch-reference identical to that defined above, except that he adopts an even more
constrained version of the Dependency Condition, which we shall refer to as the
Hierarchical Adjunction Condition: the syntactic relationship between the two clauses is
»
restricted to hierarchical adjunction, i.e. it is a subordination relationship and
complementation, coordination and intersentential relationships are excluded.
Canonical switch-reference is superficially similar to other syntactic binding relations, such
as those between reflexive pronouns and their antecedents, in its conformity to the Locality,
Hierarchical Adjunction, and Functional Conditions. However, it differs from them in that
the relation of c-command does not necessarily obtain between the NPs in a switch-
4 Finer (1985b:53,n.l7) also suggests that a generalised binding account may work for logophoric sys-
reference relation. This is illustrated in (4), where an R-expression like Joan in the most
deeply embedded NP might be set equal by a SS marker to the NP in the matrix clause; if
the two were in a c-command relation this would violate Principle C of the Binding





NP; VP Agr; SSi
Agri
NPi Agri • • • DSi
d) NPj Agrj .SSi
In consequence, the referential possibilities allowed for by switch-reference must be
accounted for indirectly. To solve this problem Finer follows Aoun (1981, 1985, 1986) in
postulating a generalised binding theory which allows the extension of the Binding
Principles to A' (nonargument) positions; he also needs to assume transitivity of indexing
between COMP and INFL/AGR. (4) is the structure Finer considers most plausible for
switch-reference examples; note that it has a subordinate marked clause embedded within a
matrix controlling clause. He includes a VP node, but notes that this may not be
appropriate for some of the languages in question, although he claims it would not affect
his account (see Finer 1985b:44,n.l0; but on p.52,n,16 he seems to acknowledge that it
would make a difference).
5 C-command is a structural relation defined on tree geometry. The definition of it which Finer
(1985b:48) assumes, from Belletti & Rizzi (1981:145), states that a c-commands P iff neither a nor P dom¬
inates the other, and the first maximal projection dominating a dominates p. Normally, two conditions must
be met before it can be said that an element a binds an element P: a must c-command P and a and P must
be coindexed.
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On this account, SS and DS are abstract operators which occupy COMP, i.e. they do not
have morphological realisation; they are attached to the verb in the same way that elements
in AGR are normally assumed to be cliticised to the verb at the level of Phonological
Form. SS is an A'-anaphor and DS an A'-pronominal. The reason given for choosing to
place SS and DS under COMP, out of several possible analyses, is that as we shall see
below switch-reference morphemes often mark additional meaning such as temporal and
logical relations between the clauses.
Finer claims that a subordinating morpheme found in COMP forms a discontinuous
constituent with INFL/AGR: equivalently, COMP and INFL/AGR are joint head of the S'.
The governing category for SS and DS will be the matrix clause; the superordinate S'. This
is possible because Finer does not allow S to be a maximal projection. The governing
category must contain the element in question, a governor of it, which is the
COMP_INFL/AGR of the matrix clause, and a SUBJECT accessible to it, which is the
AGR of the matrix clause, on the assumption that AGR may count as a SUBJECT.6
Now for the transitivity of indexing relation. AGR (along with TENSE) is a realisation of
ENFL, the inflectional component of the sentence; it is an empty pronominal governing the
subject NP and assigning case to it, and as in most formulations of GB, its presence is
dependent upon the presence of TENSE. Agreement between subject and verb is handled
by a rule which coindexes AGR and the subject NP, this coindexation to be interpreted as
constraining the two to be compatible in the relevant features of person, number etc. Since
AGR indexes the [NP,S], and since, given the relation between AGR and COMP, these
two share indices, then COMP and [NP,S] share indices.
SS is an A' anaphor which means that it must be bound in its governing category by an
item in an A' position. It will be bound by the upper COMP and thus indirectly bound to
the upper subject NP indexed i. The DS A'-pronominal must be free in this governing
category; thus it is explicitly NOT bound to this NP.
6 The notion of government assumed (Finer 1985b:48) is that defined by Belletti & Rizzi (1981:123):
a governs y in a configuration like [p...y...a...y] where:
(a) a = X° (= a lexical element),
(b) where 0 is a maximal projection, if <)> dominates y, then either 0 dominates a, or $ is the maximal projec¬
tion of y,
(c) a c-commands y.
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There are certain difficulties of a technical nature for this account If AGR is possible only
when TENSE is present, and this account of switch-reference relies on transitivity of
indexing from COMP to the NP via AGR, then the account will run into difficulties in
many switch-reference languages, since switch-reference marking is normally incompatible
with tense marking. Problems will also arise in languages where the value of [NP,S] and
AGR cannot be identical due to the presence of object agreement marking on the verb as
well as subject agreement marking, or due to complicated subject-verb agreement facts,
such as occur in Hopi (see Tsujimura 1987:17). Also, Finer argues that the SR markers
are part of COMP, but really there seems to be no good reason for this (see Roberts
1988:47, Tsujimura 1987:14 for some discussion). Finally, it is not clear that the switch-
reference morphemes are best analysed as attached to any node in a phrase structure tree;
such an analysis is particularly problematic for languages with multiple or discontinuous
switch-reference marking, such as Kashaya (Oswalt 1983) and Amele (Roberts 1987); see
Tsujimura (1987:24) for relevant discussion.
However, these are minor problems compared with the fact that many of the assumptions
which Finer makes about switch-reference turn out not to be generally true. In this thesis I
argue that whereas if one takes the canonical definition of switch-reference, it seems
promising to account for switch-reference as syntactic binding, in fact switch-reference
cannot be handled this way, because the canonical definition crucially misrepresents what
has to be accounted for.
1.3. Violation of categorial iconicity
Because switch-reference has the formal property of being marked on the verb, but the
functional property of tracking the reference of NPs in the clause, it is said to involve a
violation of the Principle of Categorial Iconicity, whereby a disinction is normally
marked on the category to which it applies semantically (Haiman 1983, 1985; Haiman &
Munro 1983b:ix). The crucial assumption here is that the category to which switch-
reference marking applies semantically is that of the pivot NP.
It is this combination of formal and functional characteristics, which for many researchers
makes switch-reference 'exotic' (Haiman & Munro 1983b:ix-x; Finer 1985b:35) or 'weird'
(Haiman 1983:105). This is also for many the individuating or defining criterion for
switch-reference, which distinguishes it from other formal devices with similar reference
tracking functions. On this view, then, there is a natural class of functions concerned with
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tracking the reference of NPs, and these may be realised formally in a variety of different
fashions, depending upon particular synchronic and diachronic characteristics of the
language. The implication is that the function performed by a switch-reference system
might just as well have been performed by a reference tracking device marked on the NPs
themselves, in fact such a situation would be more 'normal'. Even Givdn (1983), who
does not accept the primacy of structural characteristics in distinguishing switch-reference
as a separate and identifiable phenomenon, still maintains the view that functionally, it is
not interestingly different from other referential tracking systems. Of course, this view is
formally encoded in Finer's grammar of switch-reference, where switch-reference is a
binding relation between NPs which just happens to be mediated by other elements of the
clause. Finer has to assume that switch-reference information starts off in the ultimately
unrealised constituent of COMP, which allows the syntactic/semantic information
encoded by switch-reference to transitively percolate through onto the subject nominals of
the clauses, while the phonological information ends up appearing on the verb.
Without denying that the reference tracking function of switch-reference systems is
primary, I wish to make two points about these ideas. Rather than seeing switch-reference
as a way of getting certain indexing relations on NPs, I propose that we see it as saying
something about the clause via saying something about the verb.
First, I will show that the claim that switch-reference violates categorial iconicity and is
therefore weird, is a fundamentally misguided one. There are two parts to the argument.7
First, suppose we accept the premise that switch-reference marking semantically applies to
the pivot NPs in the related clauses. There is a well-motivated typological distinction
between head-marking and dependent-marking morphology, such that any grammatical
relation between a head constituent and one of its dependents may be marked on either
(Nichols 1986). Some grammatical processes are biased crosslinguistically towards one
type of marking, for example the relationship between subordinate and matrix clauses is
normally marked on the subordinate clause. But for most processes, which kind of
marking occurs depends, crudely, on whether the language has chosen the head-marking or
dependent-marking option. Switch-reference languages tend to be head-marking, with
complex verb morphology. They also tend to be 'pro-drop' or 'null anaphora' languages,
where due to a rich verbal agreement system, subject NPs and often other NPs are freely
7 Although Haiman (1983) makes this claim most explicitly, he does try to reconcile switch-reference
phenomena with the iconic tendency by showing that switch-reference is historically an outgrowth of 'familiar'
linguistic processes.
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omissible (Hale 1983:7). The fact that referential relations which hold of an argument of
the verb are mariced on the verb itself seems to be an unsurprising consequence of these
typological choices. The second part of the argument challenges the assumption that
switch-reference marking is semantically in the domain of the pivot NPs, and claims
instead that its semantic domain is that of the clause. Further development of this argument
must wait until some of the functional complexity of switch-reference systems has been
explored.
The second point I wish to make concerns this functional complexity. In this chapter and
the next I will show that, whatever the historical origins of switch-reference systems are,
synchronically they often exhibit a functional complexity which is very similar across
switch-reference languages, regardless of what area of the world they come from, and
which appears to be related to the fact that they are marked on the verb.
In summary, I take the position that the fact that switch-reference marking occurs on the
verb, or at least not on the pivot NP, is indeed criterial to distinguishing switch-reference
systems from other reference tracking systems, but that this does not make switch-reference
weird: rather, the formal realisation of switch-reference marking is in fact intimately
connected with the range of functions which switch-reference systems encode. I shall
show that the Functional Condition defined above is inadequate as a characterisation of the
functions of switch-reference, and I shall argue that a more adequate characterisation, if
taken seriously, will lead us to revise our ideas about how switch-reference should be
accounted for theoretically.8
In section 1.4, I give a condensed but relatively comprehensive tour of the formal
complexity of switch-reference systems. This section has two aims. One is to bring out the
importance of typological characteristics of the language for the shape of the switch-
reference system. The other is to show that the formal conditions on canonical switch-
reference misrepresent the data in important ways, and that Finer's account is thus
8 It is a question for further work, within a framework more strictly concerned with Universal Grammar
and language typology, to consider whether it is some other typological characteristic of these languages which
leads them to mark switch-reference on the verb. If switch-reference is just a particular device, determined by
other characteristics of the language, to fulfill the ordinary function of referential tracking, one would expect to
find some such explanation for it being marked on the verb, although such an explanation would not be incon¬
sistent synchronically with there being a functional pay-off from this marking. Likely typological characteris¬
tics might include constituent order, head-/dependency-marking and pro-drop/null anaphora characteristics, or
Capell's (1965, 1969) distinction between event and object orientation in languages. Jacobsen (1983:173) sug¬
gests that all languages have the potential to develop switch-reference, although he also hints that there may be
structural prerequisites which need to be satisfied before this is possible.
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inadequate as a comprehensive theory of switch-reference. Exceptions to the Realisation
Condition are relatively unimportant and are a function of other typological characteristics
of the language. However, the Locality Condition, although correct for many switch-
reference languages, is not generally correct, and as is already obvious, the Hierarchical
Adjunction Condition has only very limited applicability: thus, switch-reference relations
do not seem to be candidates for a syntactic binding account based on configurational
notions of binding. Finally, the Subject Condition is also wrong for many languages, in
two major respects: non-subject NPs as well as subjects may be pivots in some languages,
and in many switch-reference languages, a notion of agentivity is criterial in defining
switch-reference pivots.
In section 1.5, I review the functional complexity of switch-reference systems and show
that the Functional Condition is too simple. This is important not just in what it tells us
about how we should regard switch-reference; it also indicates once again that a binding
account is inadequate, and indeed that any theoretical description which fails to take
account of non-referential functions of switch-reference systems is descriptively inadequate.
Finally, in section 1.6 I consider two other types of phenomena which have been likened to
switch-reference - obviation and logophoricity.
1.4. The formal complexity of switch-reference systems
Dependency relations between marked and controlling clauses
Even from the little which has been said about switch-reference so far, it is clear that the
strict form of the Dependency Condition subscribed to by Finer - the Hierarchical
Adjunction Condition - cannot be true. I said in 1.2 that the two canonical types of
syntactic relation which occur between marked and controlling clauses are the relation of
hierarchical adjunction which holds between a subordinate adverbial clause and its matrix
clause, and the dependency relation which holds between clauses in a clause chain. (1)
and (2) above are examples of the adverbial type and the clause chaining type respectively.
The first type is pervasive in the languages of North America, and the second type is
pervasive in the languages of Papua New Guinea, although both types occur in languages
from other areas as well (eg. Longacre 1983 discusses a South American clause chaining
language and Nichols 1983:245 shows that chaining occurs in languages of the Northeast
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Caucasus).
Clause chaining languages tend to be verb final. The relation between clauses in a clause
chain is usually assimilated to the relation between overtly coordinated clauses in
languages such as English, and sometimes is compared to the relationship between separate
sentences in a paragraph. Clause chains may be very long (up to 20 clauses per chain are
noted by Davies 1981 and Roberts 1987, 1988). The question of whether the relationship
should be assimilated to coordination or subordination, or distinguished from either, is
discussed in some detail in chapter 5, where I conclude that the dependency of the medial
clauses on a final clause for tense and other verbal inflection distinguishes them from
coordinated clauses, and propose that they should be seen as fitting somewhere between
subordinate and coordinate clauses in the taxonomy. Whatever they are, it is clear that
they are not in a relation of hierarchical adjunction. The following example of a clause
chain construction is from Amele (Roberts 1987:101).
(5) ija Malolo uqa na ka
Is Malolo 3s of_POSS car
jic ana-g na ono nu
road mother-3s_POSS at there for
sum-ud-i bi-biligin ne-ce-b
wait-3s-PRED S IM-be-DUR_1 s_DS come_down-DS-3s
tobo-co-min belo-w-an
climb_up-DS-ls go-ld-YestP
While I waited for Malolo's car there at the main road, he came down,
I climbed in, we two went off. [101, (Text 7); 238, (396); 297, (583)]
Apart from subordinate adverbial clause constructions and clause chaining constructions,
switch-reference systems may relate clauses in a wide range of different construction types.
As well as other kinds of subordinate clauses such as relative clauses and complement
clauses, switch-reference may mark overtly coordinated or paratactically related clauses.
Switch-reference in American Indian languages tends to mark adverbial subordinate
clauses: often this is the only kind of switch-reference marking which occurs, and it is
almost always possible whatever other types occur. However Jacobsen (1983:167,170-1)
shows that all the other possibilities listed also occur in some North American language.
He suggests (p. 171) that we should recognise two broad categories of (American Indian)
languages with switch-reference: those showing only, or primarily the adverbial clause
type, and those marking also paratactic and other clause types. The latter most clearly
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include Muskogean, Yuman, Washo, and perhaps Hopi, which interestingly are also
languages with fully isolable switch-reference markers (see below). In the literature a
distinction is rarely made between coordinate and chaining constructions: for a variety of
languages in which switch-reference is marked exclusively in these kinds of constructions
see Franklin (1983), Haiman (1983), Longacre (1983) and Lynch (1983), and for some in
which it is marked over both coordinate and subordinate clause boundaries see Munro
(1983). Gear cases of switch-reference in coordinate constructions which are not clause
chains are noted by Gordon (1983:98) for Maricopa and Austin (1980:26-7) for
Pitjantjatjara and other dialects of the Australian Western Desert language. In the latter,
switch-reference is marked by independent morphemes which also encode the conjunctional
element of meaning. See example (6).
(6) palunyalu junku junku nyangka nyuma
and-SS put-FUT put-FUT and-DS cake-ABS
purlkarriku ka paalku ka jilka
become and-DS cook-FUT and-DS child-ABS
ngamu ngarranyjamaalpa
near not_stand
and (they) would put (it) out and the cake would spread and they
would cook (it) and the children would not stand by.
The formal complexity of some languages with switch-reference marking is attributable to
the fact that separate sets of switch-reference morphemes may occur for different kinds of
clause relation. Thus in Choctaw and Chickasaw (see Jacobsen 1983:167, Munro
1983:223), there is one system of endings for paratactic clause combinations, and another
used in adverbial, complement and relative clause constructions. Similarly, different
endings may be used for different types of subordinate clauses, as in Hopi, where there is
one system for adverbial clauses and another for relative clauses (Jacobsen 1983:167).
The only likely candidate for a truly universal restriction on the relationship between the
two clauses is that the controlling clause is never syntactically subordinate to (or more
generally, dependent upon) the marked clause. Haiman & Munro (1983b: xii) say: 'we
have no explanation for this puzzling restriction, which is anomalous in both functional and
structural terms' (functionally anomalous, because subordinate clauses tend to be used to
establish or restate the givens in a discourse, and so, they say, would be ideal controlling
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clauses; and structurally anomalous, because while reflexivisation satisfies the same
restriction, there is a structural explanation for it in terms of the principle of strict cyclicity,
a principle which cannot apply to clauses in a switch-reference relation). However, if
Roberts (1988:46,59) is correct, Amele switch-reference does marie a superordinate clause
with respect to a subordinate clause in one construction type.
If one takes a finite verb to be a necessary and sufficient requirement for sentencehood,
one might assume that clause chains constitute single sentences. This is not an
uncontroversial assumption: see Longacre (1972) for the claim that while subchains occur
which correspond to sentences, clause chains which encode sizeable discourse level chunks
are better seen as paragraphs. However, if we do make this assumption, switch-reference
does not appear to cross sentence boundaries. Rather, the widespread device of the
recapitulation clause allows the switch-reference marking to be carried over from one
sentence to the next In these cases the first clause in a new sentence is a recapitulation of
the final clause in the previous sentence, and is marked for switch-reference in such a way
as to connect the final clause of the previous sentence to the first full clause in the new
sentence. Recapitulation clauses may simply repeat the final verb of the previous sentence,
or they may contain what is sometimes called a 'utility verb'; some special reduced form
which stands instead of the previous full verb and which is usually based on a verb 'to be'
or 'to do'. In some languages the recapitulation device is so pervasive that it does not just
connect sentences, but connects individual dependent clauses within a clause chain - this
happens in Kewa (Franklin 1983).9 Example (7) is from Amele (Roberts 1987:89); the
recapitulation clause is in bold type.
9 'Dummy' recapitulation clauses are also sometimes referred to as 'anaphoric particles', a term intro¬
duced by Hoijer (1949) and adopted by Jacobsen (1983) among others. Jacobsen states that 13 out of 33
North American switch-reference languages have such dummy clauses, and notes (p. 169): 'This is a useful
device because otherwise speaking one of these languages demands an unwonted amount of foresight, as one
must think ahead regarding whether or not the next clause will contain the same subject before completing the
clause at hand. These particles will allow one to stop, and then, especially if one has not foreseen a switch of
subject, to start up again.'
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Sain leih dana age jo eundec
time some man 3p house that_kind
ben ca cehe-gi-na. Od-i-me-ig cuamu ijed
big with build-3p-Pres do-PRED-SS-3p room three
0 wal oso eu odi gahe-gi-ne.
or four ENDEF that like break-3p-Pres
Sometimes the men make one of those houses bigger. They divide
it into three or four rooms. [89, (418)]
Finer (1985a:ch.V) does give a tentative and inconclusive discussion of switch-reference in
complement clauses and in coordinate structures in a section on 'residual problems' for his
analysis. Coordination is a relatively intractable problem for an analysis in terms of
syntactic binding, and Finer concludes that for that some types of switch-reference
constructions, linguistic principles other than binding may be involved, although he does
not identify these.
Violation of the Locality Condition
Although there are no languages in which switch-reference is exclusively marked between
non-adjacent clauses, there are two important types of case which violate the Locality
Condition.
The first type is relatively trivial. A phenomenon described as 'clause-skipping' occurs in
some switch-reference languages. This term has been used for a number of different kinds
of phenomena, but most commonly clause-skipping happens when switch-reference
relations are restricted to hold between clauses in a particular syntactic relationship. If a
clause at a different grammatical level intervenes in the linear string between the two
clauses in the switch-reference relation, then the switch-reference marking will appear to
'skip over' the intervening clause to mark the true controlling clause. For example, in
Amele (Roberts 1987, 1988), a language which will be considered in more detail in
chapters 2 and 5, switch-reference relations hold between clauses in a clause chaining
construction and (with one or two possible exceptions) do not hold between matrix and
subordinate clauses. Subordinate clauses normally precede their matrix verb in the clause,
so that if a controlling clause contains a subordinate clause, the switch-reference marking
on the preceding clause in the clause chain clause will appear to 'skip' it, i.e. the SS or DS
marking will not relate to its subject but to the subject of the next clause on the same
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grammatical level as the marked clause. Subordinate structures may themselves be
complex and include switch-reference relations, making for a rather complex linear
structure. Examples of clause-skipping in Amele will be discussed in chapter 5.
There is some indication that the important difference between clauses marked by switch-
reference and clauses skipped over in clause chaining languages has to do with the
temporal structure of the discourse. The switch-reference marking on medial clauses in
clause chaining languages of this kind normally indicates in addition whether the temporal
relationship between the eventualities (in the sense of Bach 1981) introduced by the
clauses is one of sequentiality or simultaneity. The eventualities introduced by
subordinated clauses are not normally part of the temporal sequence in this way, and are
more likely to represent 'background' eventualities related to the others by logical or causal
relations (see Hopper & Thompson 1980 for the 'foreground'/'background' distinction).
Thus, Franklin (1983:41,44-45) describes clause-skipping in Kewa as occurring when the
clause chain is interrupted by a 'subordinating' particle specifying some distinct
interclausal relation such as reason-result, thesis-antithesis or cause-effect. In the example
he gives (his example 16) a clause whose subject is different from the other clauses in the
chain is skipped over by switch-reference marking because use of the subordinating marker
rabu 'time' indicates that it has been 'shifted off the time line'.
The description 'clause-skipping' has been misleadingly applied to another type of
phenomena which will be mentioned in 1.5 and discussed in some detail in chapter 2; i.e.
cases where the controlling clause is an impersonal construction and SS marking is used
regardless of the referential relation between the two pivots.
In the second type of violation of the Locality Condition, the switch-reference relation does
not mark each clause with respect to the adjacent clause in the sentence, but rather marks
each clause in a sequence with respect to a focus clause which is usually the final clause
in the sentence. This happens in Kashaya, and it was work on this language which led
Oswalt (1983) to make a distinction between two kinds of switch-reference marking,
sequential and focused. Sequential marking is the kind described above and is illustrated
in figure (8a); focused marking is illustrated in figure (8b). The different results produced
by the two systems for the same sequence of clauses are shown in figure (9), where
subscripted 'o' marks the main verb. These diagrams are based on Oswalt (1983:277-8).
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NPj NPj NPj NPj NPj
Sequential: v4ds V3SS v2ds vjss Vo
Focal: v4ss v3ds v2ds VjSS Vo
In sequential marking, a marker for switch or retention links each adjacent clause. In focal
marking, each subordinate clause is checked against one focal main clause, rather than a
neighbouring clause. Oswalt (1983:279f.) gives convincing arguments that Kashaya
exhibits focused marking. As he notes, as a result, it is more common than not that
successive clauses marked with DS suffixes actually share the same pivot. The domain of
the focused marking in Kashaya is the entire sentence, but nested focal domains may
occur, eg. with quotation, and in such cases clause skipping of^ kind described above
occurs. Recapitulation clauses are anaphorically related to the focal clause of the previous
sentence, whether or not it is the final clause. Example (10) illustrates focused switch-
reference marking in Kashaya (Oswalt 1983:279).
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(10) Mensiwem mu saqaac-ed-em, ma7u ?ul tubiyiic-ed-em,
then that wear-DUR-DS, now then start_out-DUR-DS,
mu sihta-7em 7amaatii sihta cahnoc-iid-u
that bird-SBJ kind all bird
Then, whenever he put on [his feather coat], and then started out, the
bird - all kinds of birds - would sing out.
Here, the first two verbs are both marked with the DS morpheme, despite the fact that their
pivot NPs are coreferential, because both have pivots disjoint in reference from that of the
final focal clause.
It is possible that this type of switch-reference marking is actually just one manifestation of
the kind of clause-skipping described at the beginning of this section, that is we could
argue that each of the marked clauses is actually subordinate to the final clause and so is
properly marked with respect to it. Then clause-skipping would involve either a symmetry
of first and second marked clauses both of which seem to look forward to the same
controlling clause, or subordination of a second marked clause, which is thereby shifted off
the grammatical level on which a first and third clause are joined. In either case, the type
of example given in Kashaya would seem to present problems for the account proposed by
Finer.
Realisation and constituent ordering
I noted in 1.2 that in the majority of languages switch-reference marking is by suffixation
on a dependent clause which precedes the controlling clause. This is a function of the
constituent ordering characteristics of switch-reference languages, which tend to be OV,
and usually SOV. Implicational universal tendencies are such that languages with this
pattern of clausal constituent ordering will tend to prefer suffixation to prefixation and will
generally order modifiers before heads. Unsurprisingly, when switch-reference occurs in a
language which does not have (S)OV word order, the ordering characteristics of the
switch-reference marking also alter. Thus, the Austronesian language Lenakel, which we
shall consider in more detail in chapter 2, has SVO constituent ordering, and switch-
reference marking is by prefixation with the marked clause following the controlling clause
(Lynch 1983).
The further typological generalisation has been proposed by Haiman & Munro (1983b:
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xiif.), that there is an interaction between constituent order and the type of syntactic
relationship between the clauses. The claim is that where the relationship is one of
subordination, potentially either order may occur, regardless of the other constituent
ordering characteristics of the language - although in fact the most likely order is that the
marked clause precede the controlling clause. Where the relationship is one of
coordination - which for these authors is mainly clause chaining relations - the order is not
free but is tied to the order of affixation, and thus to constituent order more generally. If
the marking is by suffixation, the marked clause precedes the controlling clause, and if it is
by prefixation, vice versa. There is considerable support for the second part of this
generalisation in Austronesian and Non-Austronesian languages, cf. Haiman (1983:106)
and Lynch (1983). There is also considerable evidence for the first part of the
generalisation. In most North American languages (Gordon 1983, Comrie 1983, Oswalt
1983) the marked subordinate clause precedes the controlling clause. In most Australian
languages (Austin 1981) it follows it.
In some languages where the relation between the clauses is one of subordination, both
orders may occur. The order may vary freely, as in Chickasaw (Munro 1983) and
Kashaya (Oswalt 1983), or it may be dependent upon syntactic and semantic factors, as in
Imbabura Quechua (Cole 1983), which has two switch-reference systems, with marked
adverbial clauses of time etc. preceding the superordinate controlling clause, and marked
subjunctive noun clauses of purpose etc. following their superordinate controlling clause. A
particularly good example of a language in which the linear order of the two clauses is tied
to syntactic and semantic factors is Maricopa.
In Maricopa (Gordon 1983), three classes of marked subordinate clauses occur
distinguished on the basis of their syntactic and semantic relationship to the controlling
clause, and the linear order of the two clauses depends on which class of relationship they
are in.
The first and most basic class of marked clause must precede the controlling clause and
expresses a relationship of temporal ordering or loose conjunction of the eventualities
described in the clauses. The second class can be ordered either before or centre-
embedded in the controlling clause, and in this case the marked clause either serves as a
core or peripheral argument of the controlling clause, or modifies one of its constituents.
Finally, there is a class of marked clauses which can be ordered either before, centre-
embedded in or after the controlling clause, and which are used to express the reason or
cause for the eventuality expressed in the controlling clause. All these types of clause take
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the same set of switch-reference markers, and there is no special indication of their
semantic or syntactic relationship, other than the ordering constraints.
Again, switch-reference marking in Maricopa is with respect to the matrix clause,
regardless of linear order. This results in seeming aberrations as clauses may be 'skipped
over' by the switch-reference system. Thus in example (11) (Gordon 1983: 93), the first
clause expresses a relationship of temporal ordering and must precede its controlling
clause, which is the final clause of the sentence; between these two is a clause of reason
and both subordinate clauses are marked with respect to the final clause.
(11) 'iipaa-ny-sh nya-vaa-k 'ayuu '-rav-m ny-wik-k
man-DEM-SBJ when-come-SS ESTDEF 1-hurt-DS 3/1 -help-ASP
When the man. came, he.- helped me because I was sick.
L *
Violation of the Subject Condition
Two kinds of violation of the Subject Condition occur, and both present problems for
Finer's account and also place additional requirements upon the kind of syntactic account
we should give for switch-reference.10
First, in some languages NPs in other grammatical relations appear to be involved in the
switch-reference system in addition to subjects. For example, Warlpiri (Simpson 1983) has
a complex system in which objects as well as subjects of the controlling clause may be
related by the switch-reference morphemes to the subject of the following marked
infinitival clause. The four morphemes with their meanings are given in (12).11
(12)
(i) karra: the subject of the marked infinitival clause is coreferential with the
10 It is usually assumed that for any particular language judgements about subjecthood can be made on
the basis of independent syntactic criteria. It is important that this should be possible in switch-reference
languages because often in these languages control of switch-reference itself is used by researchers as an indi¬
cator of subjecthood. Sometimes identification of subject is straightforward, as in Maricopa (Gordon 1983:84),
where the subject is marked with the case suffix -sh and the verb agrees with it in person and optionally in
number, and also agrees with the object. But sometimes difficulties arise with the definition of subject in some
of the languages considered, and these will be mentioned where relevant.
11 The Warlpiri system has been described as an obviation system and analysed in terms of syntactic con¬
trol. See Simpson & Bresnan (1983). It would clearly be of interest to investigate the relationship between
switch-reference marking and control phenomena, but such an investigation lies outside the scope of this thesis.
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subject of the controlling matrix clause.
(ii) kurra: the subject of the marked clause is coreferential with the object of
the controlling clause.
(iii) rlajinta: the subject of the marked clause is coreferential with that of the
controlling clause, and the event described by the controlling clause is an
'accidental' consequence of the event described by the marked clause.
(iv) rlarni: the subject of the marked clause, if non-overt, is the same as the
oblique dative argument of the controlling clause.
Similarly, Jacobsen (1967:256-7) notes that the North American language Capanahua has
six DS suffixes, two of which imply the identity of the subject of the marked clause with
the object of the controlling clause, and one of which implies the identity of the object of
the marked clause with the subject of the controlling clause.
In other languages the pivot NP in one of the two clauses is allowed to bear any
grammatical relation; it is only important that the pivot NP in the other clause be subject
This happens in Yup'ik Eskimo (Woodbury 1983), where any NP in the controlling clause
may be distinguished by the switch-reference system. It is also noted for Gokana (Comrie
1983), where any NP in the marked clause may be the switch-reference pivot - subject
object or even a possessive adjunct of an argument of the verb (i.e. having no grammatical
relation of its own to the verb) - and the pivot in the controlling clause may be a non-
subject NP provided that it has the thematic role of 'source'. However, as we shall see in
1.6, it is not uncontroversial that the Gokana system does represent switch-reference, rather
than logophoricity.
The second type of violation of the Subject Condition is where a notion of agentivity is
implicated in the definition of the switch-reference pivot for the language. This will be
discussed in some detail in chapter 2. Essentially, in many languages, it is not simply
syntactic subjects which are related by the switch-reference system, but agentive syntactic
subjects: this is indicated by the fact that when the controlling clause is an impersonal
construction which lacks an agentive subject, the switch-reference marking is SS regardless
of the fact that there is no coreference between arguments of the two clauses. The switch-
reference system thus uses DS marking for a new agentive subject, and SS marking to
indicate that no new agentive subject has been introduced. Nichols (1983:247) notes a
related phenomenon in the languages of the Northeast Caucasus. Here, the switch-
reference pivot seems to be identified as the 'most subject-like' NP on the basis of
topicality, animacy, agentivity, affectedness etc. rather than on the basis of surface
syntactic relations or morphological case.
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In some languages, it seems that switch-reference may even be a relation between agents
per se, rather than agentive syntactic subjects. This may be taken as a claim that the
switch-reference pivot is semantically defined in such languages (eg. see Roberts 1987), or
it may be assumed that a syntactically defined notion of agent is involved (eg. see Oswalt
1983). It is hard to find clear examples of this type however. This suggestion has been
made for Eastern Pomo by Foley & Van Valin (1984:119ff.,345) and for Amele by
Roberts (1987:292), but I shall show in chapters 2 and 5 that in each case although
agentivity is implicated, the pivot must be defined as syntactic subject with additional
thematic constraints. A more likely candidate is Kashaya, a language related to Eastern
Pomo. Oswalt (1983) claims that its switch-reference system is best described as
indicating relations of coagency or disagency. Again it is not clear whether this is the best
analysis. It relies upon assuming that agents which are unexpressed throughout long
stretches of text are nevertheless somehow 'present', and that it is these which trigger
switch-reference marking. Evidence for this is that in at least some cases, verbs apparently
agree with these unexpressed agents rather than with subject-marked nominals. It is also
possible that KaingSng provides an example: Wiesemann (1982: 45) reports that
grammatically the subordinate clause in this language cannot have a subject, just an agent
encoded in an instrumental PP; it is this which is the switch-reference pivot Although this
observation must be explained, it is not clear that the notion of agent is more helpful here
than, for example, a notion of deep subject.
Finally, it is sometimes said that switch-reference pivots should be defined as topic NPs,
rather than as subjects or agents. Normally a pragmatic notion of topic seems to be
assumed here. Giv6n (1983) takes a theoretical stance on this point. He says (p.68):
'Traditionally, the term switch-reference has been applied almost exclusively to subject-
switch [....] There is nothing wrong with this traditional practice per se, since the main
vehicle of topic continuity in language is indeed the subject'. But, he says, it is better to
take as a basic starting point the more general notion of topic. Thus he treats switch-
reference as a device for indicating topic continuity or discontinuity. Once again, it is hard
to find a clear cut example of a language in which the pivots are topics rather than
subjects, although clearly there are close and well-established links between the two. We
are reminded of this by switch-reference marking Bantu languages such as Noni and Bafut
(Wiesemann 1982), where the disinction between SS and DS marking is realised partly by
different tone patterns, with the pattern for DS marking predictably being the tone for
focalised forms while the SS morpheme has consecutive tonal marking.
Finally, as Heath (1983:131) points out, we must consider the role of switch-reference
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marking vis-^-vis non-pivot NP relations as well as pivot NP relations. Given an
intransitive+transitive verb sequence such as NPj came, and NP2 saw NPthe switch-
reference system, whichever clause it is marked on, not only provides (direct) information
about the reference of the subject of saw, NPj, but also (indirect) information about the
reference of the object of saw, NP^: if the switch-reference marking is SS then NP^ will
be unlikely to be coreferential with the subject of came, NP,; and if the marking is DS
there may be a strong implication that it will be coreferential with NP^, depending on how
many referents have previously been introduced.
The special status of subject in Government and Binding Theory means that it is difficult
to extend a binding account to handle cases where object NPs are referentially marked by
the switch-reference suffixes. In particular, there is no provision for sharing of indices
between object NPs and AGR, and as we saw above, if there was such provision this
would just mean that neither [NP,S] nor [NP,VP] was strictly identical with AGR. Finer
(1985b:52) does propose an analysis for the Yup'ik Eskimo data, which relies on a
definition of object as [NP.VP]: this NP is still in the correct position to be c-commanded.
However, this kind of account is only possible when the object is in the marked clause and
the subject in the controlling clause; when the object is in the controlling clause and the
subject in the marked clause, as in Capanahua, the relation of c-command does not hold.
Furthermore, it is not at all obvious how he would handle the data in Warlpiri, which is a
non-configurational language in which positions such as [NP,S] and [NP,VP] cannot be
defined (Hale 1983). Further complications are introduced by the fact that a notion of
agentivity is implicated in the definition of pivot for some languages. Although GB does
make provision for the assignment of thematic roles, it is not obvious how or where these
could interact with the Binding Theory in order to correctly select switch-reference pivots.
Position of the switch-reference marker
Sometimes switch-reference is marked elsewhere than on the verb.
Examples have been proposed in the literature of languages in which a switch-reference
relation appears to be marked on the pivot NP itself: if these are cases of switch-reference,
they of course no longer represent a 'violation of categorial iconicity', and would perhaps
be difficult to distinguish from other types of reference tracking device. In such cases
there is often some question about whether switch-reference is involved or some other
functionally similar system such as obviation or logophoricity (see 1.6) - or indeed a
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system in between the two which may be in the process of development from one to the
other. For example, in Kaingdng, a Brazilian language described by Wiesemann (1982), the
switch-reference markers appear to be pronouns, and marking is restricted to the third
person (see below); this makes the system look very like a logophoric one although the
pronouns do not seem to obey the normal logophoric restriction to reported speech
contexts.
The switch-reference morpheme may also be an independent morpheme, usually situated
either at the clause boundary or in the position for sentential particles. See the example
from Pitjantjatjara given in (6) above. Another clear case seems to occur in Pima, where,
as Langdon & Munro (1979) show, the marker is an independent morpheme which appears
to occur clause finally; although this morpheme apparently developed from original verbal
affixes (Hale 1980), synchronically, it need not even occur adjacent to a verb. A further
complication in Pima is that international and syntactic tests suggest that the markers are
now constituents of the controlling clause, see Haiman & Munro (1983b: x,xv).
Given attested developments of this kind, and given that in verb final languages the
switch-reference morpheme will ipso facto be clause final, it has been suggested that at
least in some such cases it should be regarded as an independent clause final particle rather
than verbal inflection (eg. Comrie 1983:22-3). Such decisions obviously presuppose more
general questions about how we can distinguish between free elements and cliticised or
affixed ones. Whether the morpheme is clause final or verb final, one could maintain that
the crucial defining characteristic of switch-reference (as compared with other devices used
for referential tracking) is that it is NOT marked on the relevant NP, but rather is a
characteristic of the entire clause, and so is marked either at the clause boundary, or in the
position for sentential particles, or on the head of the clause, the verb. The wide range of
functions which we shall see are characteristic of switch-reference systems supports this
analysis and shows that we should take the switch-reference marker to operate over the
whole clause. If one still wants to characterise switch-reference as involving a violation
of categorial iconicity, then at least it is no longer so surprising that this should be the
case. If we do not take some such stance, it may not be possible to give a structural
definition of switch-reference which effectively excludes all other such devices.12
12 Comrie (1983:23) makes a similar suggestion for a more neutral characterisation, although he doesn't
explain why this should be such an important distinguishing characteristic of switch-reference or what if any
functional consequences it has. See chapter 3 of this thesis for further discussion of these points.
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Complexities in the systems of markers
Formal complexities which occur in the systems of markers fall into three categories. First
we have restrictions on the scope of application of the switch-reference system. Second
we have various asymmetries which come under the heading of differences in markedness
of SS and DS morphemes. Finally, switch-reference systems may differ in the degree of
'isolability' of the switch-reference morpheme from morphemes marking other distinctions.
The final type will be discussed in section 1.5, since it concerns the range of associative
meanings which may occur with switch-reference systems.
Some switch-reference systems are said to be restricted to the third person, such as Gokana
(Comrie 1983, Hyman & Comrie 1983), Kaingdng (Wiesemann 1982), and Eskimo
(Woodbury 1983) However, I have already said that the first two systems may be
logophoric, and the Eskimo system is often described as an obviation system; such a
restriction in person is the norm in both logophoric and obviation systems, whereas I know
of no uncontroversial examples of switch-reference systems which behave this way.
Person hierarchies may interact with switch-reference in more subtle ways, as we shall see.
If they do occur, restrictions to third person should not be surprising, since as Haiman &
Munro (1983b:xi) point out:
Whether or not switch-reference is indicated by verbal concord or a separate
category, it is redundant where either subject is first or second person, and
necessary where both subjects are third person. We may therefore expect to find
languages in which switch-reference is limited to the third person ....
Asymmetries between SS and DS markers are normally explained in terms of markedness,
with SS tending to be the unmarked and DS the marked option. Differences most
frequently occur in the formal complexity of the markers themselves and in the number of
markers of each kind which the language distinguishes.13
Crosslinguistically, either SS or DS may be 'zero marked', although there appears to be a
preference for the former. In his typological classification of switch-reference languages as
to the number of markers their switch-reference systems have, Jacobsen (1983:168) notes
that out of 33 North American languages, 8 clearly or possibly had just one marker rather
than two, with the implication that in all cases the absence of this marker (i.e. the zero
13 I will not be concerned with the problems surrounding criteria for markedness here, but will take it as
a matter of formal complexity only.
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option) indicates coreference. The languages include Washo, Seri, and the Jamul and La
Huerta dialects of Diegueno. Jacobsen says that in his data there is no clear case of the
reverse, a single marker of coreference the absence of which indicates disjoint reference.
However such cases do occur: as in Kate (Longacre 1983:187) where at least one of the
two DS markers is zero (SS simultaneous = huk; SS sequential = ra; DS simultaneous =
ha; DS sequential = 0). Similarly in Lenakel (Lynch 1983), where SS is marked with a
prefix but if the DS option is chosen the 'marked' clause simply appears as an independent
clause, with normal finite verb inflection and no special switch-reference morpheme.14
In a number of Papua New Guinea languages, verbs may be marked with 'anticipatory
subject' agreement, i.e. agreement in person and number with the subject of the following
clause, possibly in addition to agreement with the verb's own subject. Anticipatory subject
markers clearly themselves provide information about the relative similarity or difference of
the two subjects, but they normally occur in conjunction with switch-reference marking as
well, and are sometimes taken to be part of the switch-reference system. In such
languages it is common for both SS and DS verbs to have anticipatory subject agreement,
and for DS verbs to have an additional overt marker, thus in the Kanite language of New
Guinea, only DS isovertly marked, by a morpheme -ke (plus anticipatory subject
agreement), while SS verbs just have anticipatory subject agreement. In some languages
such as Hua (Franklin 1983:40) anticipatory subject agreement is restricted to occur with
DS marking only. This is an instance of the further generalisation that where both markers
are overtly realised, the SS marker is often less complex than the DS marker formally. SS
markers are often smaller than DS markers and DS markers may consist of the SS marker
plus some other element. Thus, Haiman (1983:106-7) notes that in all the (Papuan)
languages he discusses, same-subject marking verbs are morphologically less complex than
different-subject marking verbs.15
Many switch-reference languages have multiple sets of markers, with additional elements
of meaning being distinguished as well as SS or DS. Such systems are often asymmetrical
in that SS and DS markers are not strictly paired as to these additional morphemes - 19 out
of the 33 languages Jacobsen (1983:164-6) looked at were asymmetrical. As Jacobsen's
14 Jacobsen (1983:168) himself mentions that a single DS marker occurs in Klamath and in Northern
Paiute, although it is possible that its absence does not regularly indicate SS.
15 Givon (1983:77-8) claims that this size-differential parallels the normal relation between
stressed/unstressed or independent/zero pronouns (see chapter 3). As we shall also see in chapter 3, Haiman
(1983) too emphasises this characteristic in his argument that switch-reference is often a historical development
of a gapping system.
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typology indicates, some of the asymmetrical systems show a numerical preponderance of
the DS markers, such as Eastern Pomo, Tonkawa, and Shoshone; and others, of the SS
markers, such as Maidu, Papago, Hopi and TubatulabaL
In this section we have considered in more detail the four formal conditions on canonical
switch-reference listed in 1.2: the Locality Condition, the Dependency Condition, the
Realisation Condition and the Subject Condition.
We have seen that the Realisation Condition largely holds, since switch-reference marking
is normally on the verb or an independent sentential particle. However, we have seen
numerous ways in which the syntactic typology of the language, and the syntactic relation
between the marked and controlling clause, may affect the relative order of the two
clauses. We have also examined a range of complexities which may occur in the system
of markers.
Violations of the Locality, Dependency and Subject Conditions have more significance for
formal theories of switch-reference. If such a theory is to claim generality it must address
cases of 'focused' reference such as Oswalt describes for Kashaya, cases of switch-
reference holding between coordinate and chained clauses, recapitulation clauses, the
involvement of non-subject NPs, and implication of agentivity in the definition of pivots.
All these pose problems for Finer's account.
In this thesis I am most interested in giving an account of the functional complexity of
switch-reference systems, and the languages for which the account is proposed do not
exhibit focused reference, coordinate switch-reference or involvement of non-subject NPs.
These will not therefore be considered any further. However, the account proposed does
handle clause chaining, recapitulation clauses and implication of agentivity in the definition
of pivots.
1.5. The functional complexity of switch-reference systems
In this section, and in chapter 2, I shall be concerned with the deficiencies of the
Functional Condition. Much is made of functional parallels between switch-reference and
other grammatical devices in trying to determine how we should account for it, cf. Finer
(1985a, b) for example. However, as Heath (1983:130) points out, we first need to make
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clear 'what we take the functions of switch-reference to be'.
Before moving on to talk about additional functions which switch-reference systems
typically fulfill, a few notes are in order concerning the implications of the statement that
SS maiking indicates coreference and DS maiking indicates disjoint reference between
pivot NPs.
First note the general need for caution in interpreting anaphoric relations between NPs as
relations of obligatory coreference or disjoint reference, as for example has fairly
consistently been done in Binding Theory approaches. To start with, the NPs involved in
an anaphoric relation need not be referring expressions. For some discussion of this and
other problems see Gabbay & Moravscik (1973), Bach & Partee (1980), Evans (1980),
Nunberg (1984) and Roberts (1984), among others.
More importantly, there has been some controversy within Binding Theory accounts, which
is also relevant more generally, concerning whether any syntactic constraints of disjoint
reference are required. NPs disjointly indexed by the Binding Theory, such as two NPs in
the same clause, may sometimes corefer 'accidentally', although they are not in a relation
of stipulated coreference (the speaker must intend the two to corefer) as defined by Postal
(1971). Cases such as these have prompted researchers such as Dowty (1980) and
Reinhart (1983) to propose the universal that languages have devices which constrain two
NPs to be coreferential, but do not have any devices which constrain two NPs to have
disjoint reference, although a pragmatic principle may exist which means disjoint reference
is preferred in certain environments: thus the interpretation of a personal pronoun and some
other NP in the same clause as having disjoint reference is due to a pragmatic principle
which states that given a way of stipulating coreference, cooperative speakers who know
the two NPs corefer will use it. See also Lasnik (1976, 1981).
I mention this controversy because it has a bearing on the interpretation of DS marking,
and vice versa. Thus, switch-reference data at first sight provides a counterexample to this
general approach, as DS marking is usually taken to indicate stipulated disjoint reference;
certainly this seems to be the way Finer (1985a, b) takes it On the other hand, the chain
of argument followed by Dowty and Reinhart may lead us to reconsider the correct
interpretation of DS marking, and indeed there is some indication that a less restrictive
definition should be given. For example, Nichols (1983:247etc.) says that in a number of
languages of the Northeast Caucasus, such as Chechen and Inguish, DS marking verbs
have what she calls 'Open Reference', signalling indifference as to the referential relation
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between the two pivots rather than specified non-identity. In addition, we shall see some
examples in chapter 2 of the use of DS marking when the pivot NPs actually corefer, but
something else in the situation changes. A less strict definition of DS would allow these to
be grammatical cases and the different interpretations of DS marking presumably would be
determined by various pragmatic principles.
However, Saxon (1984) has shown relatively conclusively that it cannot be a universal that
languages place no restrictions of disjoint reference on anaphoric expressions. She
describes just such a restriction which holds in the Athapaskan language Dogrib, where
disjoint anaphors occur which have the same distribution as reflexives. See also Caroll
(1986) for similar cases. Furthermore, we shall see that the interpretation of SS marking
vis-ii-vis DS marking is actually much more complicated than either of the two possibilities
discussed so far, and in particular the converse case may occur where DS marking seems
to stipulate disjoint reference and SS marking is used otherwise. Thus, Nichols
(1983:247etc.) also presents examples of switch-reference like systems, in Lak and Dargi,
where it is the SS marker which has Open Reference and DS marking is taken to indicate
strict disjoint reference. Furthermore, the definition of SS and DS markers needed for
languages in which SS marking is used with a following impersonal controlling clause
seems to conform to the same pattern, as we shall see in chapter 2.
In this section three topics will be considered: plurality in switch-reference pivots,
additional meanings expressed by switch-reference markers and violations of the Functional
Condition.
Plurality in switch-reference pivots
All the examples considered so far have been ones in which both pivot NPs have been
singular. Where either or both pivots are plural, a relation of referential overlap or
inclusion may hold between the two. The range of cases which occur is represented
schematically in (13), where NPm stands for the marked clause pivot, and NPc stands for
the controlling clause pivot. I shall refer to the referent(s) of a pivot NP as its pivot set.16
16 I have not included in (13) the cases where both NPs are plural and refer to completely overlapping or




(i) NPm properly includes NP£ eg. {a,b,c} => {a}
(ii) NPm is properly included in NP eg. {a,b} c; {a,b,c}
(iii) NP and NP intersect eg. {a,b,c} n {b,c,d}
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There seem to be few universal restrictions on whether SS marking or DS marking is used
in such cases. Crosslinguistically, SS may be used in all three types, which makes a
defintion of the switch-reference markers in terms of coreference between pivots seem less
plausible.17
Let us begin with cases of inclusion and set aside the intersection possibility for the
moment. Wiesemann (1982:55) has proposed the following implicational universal to
describe the potential for SS marking crosslinguistically.
NP = NP > NP_ => NP„ > NPm c NPm c mem c
That is, in all languages SS is used when the pivot sets are coextensive, and there is no
language in which SS is used where the marked pivot is included in the controlling pivot,
if it may not also be used for the reverse case where the controlling pivot is included in the
marked pivot.
Thus, for some languages, SS marking in cases of inclusive reference is symmetrical, in
that it occurs in both case (i) and (ii) in (13). This possibility has been noted by Jacobsen
(1967:244), Longacre (1972:14), Langdon & Munro (1979), and others. Oswalt
(1983:276) gives examples from Kashaya and Comrie (1983:26ff.) from Huichol. The
examples in (14) are from Huichol (Comrie 1983:26-7).
(14) a. Taame te-haata7azia-ka, nee ne-petia
we 1 PL-arrive SS I
When we arrived, I left.
b nee ne-haata7a-ka tanaiti te-pekii
I SG-arrive SS together
When I arrived, we left together.
17 As noted by Finer (1985b:52ji.l7) and Chomsky (1981:283-7; 1986:207,n.23), subset and intersection
relations also complicate a coindexing formalism for anaphoric relations. In his account of switch-reference,
Finer proposes a system of dual indexing to express such relations.
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More frequently, SS marking in cases of inclusive reference is asymmetrically allowed in
case (i) but not in case (ii). This is the case in Amele, where use of switch-reference
marking in cases of inclusive or intersecting reference follows complex rules that are
described in chapter 5 (Roberts 1987: 294ff.). This is also the situation in Diyari (Austin
1981:316-7) as examples (15a,b) and (16) illustrate.
(15) a. Nhulu nganthi pardaka-ma warrayi, thanali
he-ERG meat-ABS bring-PART AUX they-ERG
He brought the meat for them (i.e. him and others) to eat.
thayi-lha
eat-IMPL(SS)
Nhulu nganthi pardaka-ma warrayi, thanali
he-ERG meat-ABS bring-PART AUX they-ERG















They (all) went so he could see you.
The final possibility is that SS marking should be symmetrically disallowed for all cases of
inclusive reference. This is noted for Pima by Austin (1981:317ji.l0) and for Huallaga
Quechua by Weber (1980:53), who gives the following examples.
(17) Chaya-pti/*r-nchi qoyku-shaq
arrive-DS/*SS-l+2 give-lFUT
When we (inclusive) arrive, I will give it to him.
(18) Qam-ta apari-pti/*r-:-pis manam chaya-shun-chu
you-ACC carry-DS/*SS-lp-even not arrive-1+2FUT-NEG
Even if I carry you, we will not arrive.
In many languages the possibilities are more complicated since there may be a choice
between SS and DS for one or more of the three cases in (13). Thus in the related North
American languages Maricopa (Gordon 1983) and Mojave (Munro 1980), and in Kashaya
(Oswalt 1983:276), either SS or DS may be used for both case (i) and (ii). The Mojave
examples in (19a,b) are from Munro (1980c:145). When a choice is possible, it often
seems to be conditioned by whether speakers wish to present the two pivots as the same
given the particular situation being described, although Langdon & Munro (1979) note
wide variation between speakers of Mojave as well.
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(19) a. 'ava-th '-ivaa-k mat '-kuunav-m
house-dem 1-anive-SS recip 1-talk-tense
I came to the house and then we talked (together).
b. 'ava-th '-ivaa-m mat '-kuunav-m
house-dem 1-arrive-DS recip 1-talk-tense
In other languages, choice between SS and DS marking is partly dependent on the person
of the pivot NPs. Thus in Kewa and certain other Papuan languages (Franklin 1983:46), in
cases (i) and (ii), either SS or DS may be used if the two subjects are in the same person,
but DS must be used if they are different person: that is, when there are two degrees of
difference between the two NPs rather than just one.
A choice between SS and DS is more likely in case (iii), where the pivots intersect. Thus
in Amele, either SS or DS may be used in such cases, unless the controlling pivot is first
person, in which case SS must be used.
To return to the points made at the beginning of this section, languages clearly differ in
which of the two switch-reference markers has the stronger requirement on it: languages
such as Pima take SS marking to indicate strict coreference, and DS marking indicates not
strict coreference; other languages seem to take DS marking as indicating strict disjoint
reference, and SS marking less strictly, as indicating inclusive reference.
Additional meanings expressed by switch-reference markers
It is very common for other elements of meaning to be signalled by the switch-reference
markers in addition to a relation between switch-reference pivot NPs.
Most common is temporal meaning. Switch-reference markers are usually in
complementary distribution with finite inflection, particularly tense, and so they themselves
may be distinguished either for absolute tense (situating the eventuality in time relative to
the time of speech) or relative tense (situating the eventuality in time relative to the
eventuality of the controlling clause). Marking of relative tense is by far the most
pervasive of the two, and where it is marked, the most common contrast in both North
American and Papua New Guinea languages is between sequential and simultaneous
eventualities. Nichols (1983:245) notes similar contrasts in clause chaining Caucasus
languages. More strictly, it seems to be a universal constraint that the eventuality in the
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dependent marked clause is never posterior to that in the controlling clause, so in practice,
this distinction is between simultaneous and anterior relations (cf. for example Oswalt
1983:268). Where the range of clause relations which may mark switch-reference is
restricted in a language, it is often restricted to temporal adverbial clauses, which are
temporal by virtue of the additional meaning in the switch-reference markers, or to clause
chains, which also almost always involve relative tense. An example of such a clause
chaining language is Kate (Longacre 1983:187) See (20a-d).
(20) a. Fisi-huk na-wek
arrived-SS/SIM ate-he
As he arrived, he was eating.
b. Fisi-ra na-wek
arrived-SS/SEQ ate-he
He arrived, then he ate.
c. Mu-ha-pie kio-wek
spoke-DS/SIM-they wept-he
As they spoke he wept.
d. Mu- -pie kio-wek
spoke-DS/SEQ-they wept-he
After they spoke he wept
The switch-reference system in the North American language Kashaya has distinctions for
both absolute and relative tense (Oswalt 1983:269). Of the six pairs of suffixes marking
SS/DS, one pair indicates simultaneous or alternating action, one indicates that the
eventuality of the marked clause sequentially precedes the eventuality of the controlling
clause in the present or past, and a third indicates that the marked clause eventuality
sequentially precedes the controlling clause eventuality in the future or conditional. The
other three suffixes are normally taken to be past tense, but may be specified as future by
coocurring with the future tense suffix already mentioned. Similarly in the Uto-Aztecan
language Huichol (Comrie 1983:19) there is a pair of suffixes SS/DS for simultaneous
eventualities, and two pairs signalling that the marked eventuality is sequentially anterior to
the controlling eventuality, one for past and one for future tense. In Wojokeso, a Papuan
language (Longacre 1983:192) the switch-reference marked medial verbs distinguish
simultaneous from sequential relations, and also mark two tenses, nonfuture vs. future.
Similar tense contrasts are indicated in Bantu languages by Wiesemann (1982).
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Where absolute tense distinctions are made, they usually just distinguish non-future from
future tenses, regardless of the fact that finite inflection in the language may incorporate
very complex tense distinctions. Thus, final verbs in Wojokeso distinguish six tenses. The
tense of the marked verb must agree with that of the controlling verb. For some languages
it seems preferable to analyse this distinction as a realis/irrealis mood distinction, as in
Amele (Roberts 1987: 239, 275; 1988: 50).
It is common for switch-reference paradigms encoding distinctions in temporal relations
between eventualities, to also incoiporate distinctions in the logical or epistemic relations
between the two clauses. These relations usually have to do with expectation, causality,
condition or contrast, and mark meaning distinctions normally translated into English by
expressions such as: if, because, so that, but, although, in spite of, nevertheless, in order
to, presumably, resulting in, providing, etc. Thus in Kashaya, the three pairs of markers
not specifically marked for tense indicate counter-expectation, inference, and inferential
counter-expectation. Rather unusually, in some dialects of Kewa the simultaneous and
sequential SS suffixes distinguish benefactive from non-benefactive actions as well
(Franklin 1983:42).
Sometimes additional aspectual information may be marked as well, such as distinctions
between progressive and completed action, or habitual and non-habitual action. In Kewa,
the simultaneous markers also distinguish between 'split' and 'unit' forms, depending upon
whether the action is perceived as separate from or united with the following action
(Franklin 1983: 42). Similarly, the Papuan language Fore distinguishes three categories:
sequential, simultaneous, and a third category of 'association', which relates two verbs that
are considered to represent parts of the same process (Longacre 1983:188).
When additional meanings of these kinds, or other kinds to be discussed below, are
signalled by switch-reference markers, the markers are often referred to as portmanteau
morphs, and indeed they may derive historically from separate morphemes. However, the
synchronic situation is such that the original separate morphemes are no longer isolable,
and in any case, there are interesting asymmetries between SS and DS markers with
respect to their associative meanings which would need to be explained even if the morphs
were isolable. Clearly, though, there is little difference functionally, in whether temporal
or logical information is encoded by a morpheme adjacent to the switch-reference marker,
or by the marker itself.
Certain interesting asymmetries between SS and DS markers occur with respect to the
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marking of temporal relations. Where absolute tense distinctions are marked, they are
more likely to be marked on DS morphemes than on SS morphemes, which reflects a
general tendency for DS-marked clauses to show a greater resemblance to independent
clauses than SS-marked ones. Longacre (1983:187-8) notes a number of languages, eg. the
Papuan language Managalasi, where of the quadrants in the diagram below, all but SS/SIM





It is harder to make generalisations about the asymmetries which occur in the marking of
relative tense. It is quite common for the simultaneous/sequential contrast to be restricted
to only one kind of marker, SS or DS, but it is not clear whether one of the two kinds of
restriction is more prevalent. For example, one might expect more distinctions for DS
marking again, but it seems that no such generalisation can be made, and in fact the
reverse tendency may apply. Thus, Wojokeso (Longacre 1983:188) overtly distinguishes
simultaneous/sequential only for DS markers (in fact, in Wojokeso, SS is zero-marked, and
the simultaneous/sequential distinction for SS is understood just on the basis of the lexical
items in the sentence itself and the sense of the immediate context). In contrast, in Kewa
(Longacre 1983:41; Franklin 1983) the simultaneous/sequential distinction is obligatorily
indicated in the SS paradigm, by the invariable SS suffix which Franklin refers to as a
portmanteau morph, but in the DS paradigm the temporal relation is not obligatorily
marked, although special markers of simultaneous/sequential ordering may be added to the
person-number suffixes. Likewise in the South American language Ancash Quechua
(Comrie 1983) the SS morphemes mark the additional aspectual distinction between related
(-r) vs. unrelated (-shpa) events, but only one DS marker occurs (pti plus subject-verb
agreement).
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Apart from these asymmetries in the marking of temporal and aspectual meaning, switch-
reference languages tend to exhibit what Longacre (1983:198) calls a a 'naturalness
assumption' regarding the association between SS and DS marking and simultaneous and
sequential ordering. SS marking tends to be taken to imply sequentiality of the
eventualities being described, which seemingly reflects an expectation that successive
actions will be perforated by the same person, or perhaps that actions performed by the
same person will normally be performed in successioa Conversely, DS marking tends to
be taken to imply simultaneity, which apparently reflects an assumption that actions which
overlap are performed by different people. This pattern is illustrated in the figure below.
It is important to remember here that in both cases we are dealing with actions or more
generally eventualities which may be presumed to be already situated within a relatively










For example, in Tunebo, a Colombian language, a verbal suffix -r indicates temporal
sequentiality and same subject reference, and a suffix -yat/-t indicates temporal simultaneity
and different subject reference. Longacre (1983:198) claims that for this language the
distinction between simultaneity and sequentiality is more basic than the SS/DS distinction:
while the SS/DS distinction holds in the unmarked situation, granted explicit marking by a
nominal, -r can be used with a disjoint subject referent in the following clause, and -yat/t
with a same subject referent.
Another South American language, Guanano, makes the same assumption as Tunebo but
differs from it in that there is a completely unmarked type of clause chain construction for
which the naturalness assumption holds, and another type of clause chain construction
which explicitly employs switch-reference in connection with marking other relations, both
temporal and logical. These are called the implicit chain and the explicit chain (Longacre
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1983: 199f.).
The Guanano implicit chain consists of clauses with unaffixed verbs followed by a final
clause whose verb is fully inflected. Interpretation depends on the lexical items in the
chain and the surrounding linguistic context: if these factors point to eventualities in
temporal succession then all the verbs of the chain are considered to have the same subject
referent; if the lexical and contextual factors indicate eventualities in temporal overlap, they
are considered to have different subject referents. A chain which encodes temporal
succession, and hence SS, is often of three or more clauses in length, while chains which
encode overlap, and hence DS, are typically binary.
The Guanano explicit chain has an overt switch-reference system. In its basic form, a
clause whose dependent verb is marked with a switch-reference suffix is followed by a
clause whose verb is independent. The explicit chain is a restricted structure as compared
with the implicit, which can involve a long sequence of clauses. Longacre (1983:201-2)
proposes the following explanation: 'Apparently, it is not felt neccessary to marie overtly
switch-reference over such a long sequence; rather for such sequences the implicit chain
takes over'. Explicit chains may embed within implicit and are often resorted to so that
local ambiguities in discourse may be resolved, or to encode one of a number of specific
logical and temporal relations.
This 'naturalness assumption' is not an absolute universal by any means, since there are
plenty of languages in which both temporal orders are marked for each of SS and DS,
though I know of none in which the opposite association is made, i.e. of simultaneity with
SS and sequentiality with DS. Longacre (1983:187,206) claims that while the naturalness
assumption is common in the languages of Northern South America, it has not been
observed in languages of Papua New Guinea: 'Or, to put it another way, I have not seen
in Papua New Guinea a switch reference system that makes the switch reference system
dependent on and subordinate to temporal concerns' (p.206). The Guanano implicit chain
superficially resembles a construction which is found in some languages of Papua New
Guinea: the 'stripped down clause chain', where medial verbs occur with only minimal
inflection throughout all or part of a clause chain. In some languages such stripped down
(portions of) chains are exclusively SS strings. However, these chains differ from the
implicit chains in Guanano in that they are more cohesive than the regular switch-reference
chains and embed within them, and in that the stripped down form of the verb may still
distinguish simultaneous/sequential relations even if they lack some of their other inflection
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(as in Amele; see Roberts 1987:107,236(273,314).18
To complete the picture, we should consider languages such as Swahili, in which there is
no indication of SS/DS marking, but special morphemes are used to indicate simultaneity
or sequentiality between the eventualities in related clauses. Example (21) is cited by
Hopper & Thompson (1980:281). In Swahili, the usual narrative past tense is marked by
the prefix -li on the verb; hence a-li-soma means 'he-PAST-read', and so on. However,
when a number of verbs denoting events in sequence occur together, only the first receives
an explicit tense prefix. The others are marked with a connective 'tense' (relative tense)
prefix, -ka.
(21) Tu-li-po-sema vile, wa-ka-jua kama wevi, mara
we-PAST-when-say thus, they-SEQ-know as thieves, at once
ile wa-ka-ondoka wa-ka-kimbia
that they-SEQ-leave they-ka-run away
When we said this, they knew that they had been recognised, and they
at once got off (the train) and ran away.
The ka- prefix is restricted to the narration of single consecutive events, so it functions to
trace the story line - the foregrounded parts of a narrative. This storyline may be
interrupted by other events not central to the narrative, but which modify or comment on
the central events. Such interrupting events may be either contingent (conditional) or
simultaneous, and in either case they are backgrounded and indicated with the prefix ki- on
the verb, as is illustrated in example (22). Hopper & Thompson's (1980:282)
'psychological' explanation for this system is that there is a processing need to signal those
parts of the discourse that are to be stored for immediate sequential processing, vs. those
needed for future reference or concomitant accessing.
(22) Hata wa-li-kuwa wa-ki-rejea kuja zao kambini,
until they-PAST-were they-SIM-return come their to_camp,
wa-ka-shuka kilima-ni magharibi, mara wa-ka-kuta
they-SEQ-descend hill-LOC west, suddenly they-SEQ-come_upon
18 Nichols (1983:249) notes that in the languages she considers, simultaneous forms favour open refer¬
ence readings (usually DS) and sequential forms favour restricted reference readings (usually SS); it is not
clear whether the same tendencies hold for those languages in which SS has open reference and DS has res¬
tricted reference.
-40-
kondoo, bwana wangu ka-m-piga kondoo mkubwa sana
sheep master my ka-him-shoot sheep big very
na pembe zake nzito sana
and horns its heavy very
When they were making their way back to camp, they came down a
hill on the western side, and at once came upon some wild sheep, and
my master shot an enormous sheep, and its horns were very heavy.
Similarly, in Fe?fe? (Haiman 1983:127), clauses which are simply juxtaposed describe
events which took place at the same time or under the same circumstances, while clauses
separated by the coordinate conjunction ni, 'and then', describe events that are separated in
time and space.19
The range of data which has been considered in this subsection shows that switch-reference
marking cannot be considered in isolation from other indications of relative cohesion
between the eventualities described by clauses. In the languages we have considered,
switch-reference marks 'relative reference' (vs. absolute reference), just as it marks
'relative tense' (vs. absolute tense). Furthermore, these two types of function seem to obey
similar structural constraints, for example in the scope of the relation. Thus, where
switch-reference markers do merge .these two distinct referential notions, nominal and
temporal, as one would expect they are both of the same 'reference type' in the sense of
Oswalt (1983), i.e. they are both sequential reference or both focal reference - so in
Kashaya, the temporal relations marked follow the focal ordering of the nominal relations.
Information about the person, number and gender of the pivotal participants may also be
encoded in switch-reference markers. Thus, the switch-reference system in Kobon (Comrie
1983:20) has portmanteau morphs encoding person and number in addition to the SS/DS
distinction. Again, sometimes this kind of information appears to be part of the switch-
reference system in the broadest sense, even though it may be encoded in an isolable
morpheme. In Amele (Roberts 1987), switch-reference is marked partly by invariant SS
and DS morphemes, partly by reduplication, and partly by choice of subject agreement
paradigms from a subset of paradigms which occur only on switch-reference marked verbs.
Whether the person/number/gender information is isolable from the switch-reference
19 It is not clear from what Haiman says whether Fe?fe? has a switch-reference system, or if so, how it
interacts with this distinction.
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marker or not in any particular language, it seems to act as a kind of redundant subject
agreement marking on the marked verbs. Subject agreement distinctions may be marked
on both SS and DS, or on just one of these, with a tendency towards marking on DS for
obvious reasons. Kewa (Franklin 1983:40) provides a typical example: the SS verb has a
constant form, with no inflection for person and number of the subject, and is followed by
an invariable SS suffix. The DS marked verb is inflected for person and number, but takes
different inflections from those which occur on final verbs. In contrast, the Guanano
switch-reference morphemes distinguish person, number and gender for SS markers (with
five suffixes) but have just one undifferentiated DS marker (Longacre 1983:201).
Jacobsen (1983:164-6,169) categorises the 33 North American languages he surveyed as to
the number of distinctive SS and DS markers they have, i.e. how many different additional
meaning contrasts they make. There are no languages which do not have at least one extra
category associated with at least one of SS or DS. Most languages show no more than
three associated categories, with Kashaya (6) and Tonkawa (possibly 7) making the most
distinctions. He also considers the symmetry of the systems with respect to the distinctions
made, and the morphological isolability of the different elements of meaning with respect
to the switch-reference morphemes. A clearly symmetrical pairing of SS and DS markers
occurs in only 14 out of the 33 languages, although for almost all languages, the number
of distinctions made for SS and DS differs by no more than one. The data on isolability
suggests that all those languages where the switch-reference marker encodes additional
temporal/logical meaning are languages in which the switch-reference markers are
portmanteau morphs. In general, isolability of the different elements of meaning is rare,
occurring in only 9 out of 33 languages.
Apart from the meaning distinctions marked by different pairs of switch-reference markers,
note that all the switch-reference markers in a system share the function of indicating that
the marked clause is dependent In a clause chain, the nature of this dependence is reliance
on the final clause for tense and other information encoded in finite inflection. For other
languages, the switch-reference marker shows that the clause is a subordinate one, and may
also indicate dependence for tense etc. on the matrix verb. The signalling of particular
temporal and logical relations between the clauses may be seen as further specifying the
nature of this dependence.
The additional information conveyed by switch-reference markers is almost always
acknowledged in the literature, but is usually ignored in any general account which is
proposed. See Finer (1985a), who doesn't propose an account for it because it falls
- 42 -
outside the scope of the Binding Theory, although as we have seen he does use it as an
argument for putting SS and DS under COMP. Even Jacobsen (1983:152) 'sets aside
many other interesting questions' inluding 'the secondary nuances of meaning that switch-
reference markers have been seen to have developed (or retained) in certain languages'.
Violations of the Functional Condition
We have seen that the Functional Condition is rather simplistic in describing the stipulated
relation between switch-reference pivots as one of coreference or disjoint reference, in
particular given the behaviour of switch-reference marking when either or both pivots are
plural. In addition, we saw that the Functional Condition does not take account of the
additional meanings which may be distinguished by switch-reference systems, in particular
the rather striking conjunction of nominal and temporal meaning which occurs.
Other violations of the Functional Condition occur, involving seemingly 'aberrant' uses of
SS maikers when the subject NPs in the two clauses appear to be in a relation of disjoint
reference, and uses of DS maikers despite the fact that the subjects appear to be
coreferential.
I am here excluding cases where the marking on adjacent clauses seems unexpected due to
the phenomenon of 'clause-skipping', i.e. we start from the premise that the clauses in
question are in the correct relationship of marked and controlling clause. Nor shall we be
concerned with cases where some switch-reference markers appear to be undergoing
diachronic change, usually in very restricted contexts in the language, as Oswalt
(1983:275) describes for Kashaya, where two of the markers seem to be developing into
conjunctions and may be used regardless of the referential relation between the pivots of
the two clauses. I also exclude cases where particular verbs are lexically specified to take
coreferential (and therefore SS marked) or noncoreferential (and therefore DS marked)
subordinate clauses; cf. Austin (1980:17) for Diyari and Munro (1980c:145) for Mojave.
In the range of cases I will be concerned with, unexpected uses of SS marking are all of
the same kind: they occur when the controlling clause is an impersonal construction. This
is a pervasive phenomenon, occurring in geographically diverse switch-reference languages.
I shall consider these cases in detail in chapter 2, where I conclude that they should be
accounted for by introducing a notion of agentivity into the definition of the switch-
reference pivot for the languages in question.
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Unexpected uses of DS marking are at first sight a less cohesive range of cases. These too
will be described in chapter 2. I shall argue that they can be given a uniform description
however. DS marking may be used even if there is coreference between pivot NPs, if
some other characteristic of the eventuality being described has changed: the degree of
control involved, the spatial location, the actuality of the eventuality, or the temporal event
complex of which it is a part. It is notable that a number of these changes involve
temporal, aspectual or modal meaning, that is, meaning of the kind that we have seen is
often associated with switch-reference.
In chapter 2, I will show that these 'functional extensions' of the switch-reference system
are systematic and regular, and should be accounted for by any comprehensive theory of
switch-reference.
1.6. Logophoricity and obviation
In the final section of this chapter, we shall briefly consider some phenomena which are
structurally and functionally similar to switch-reference, and for which the terms
logophoricity and obviation have been used.
Logophoricity
Logophoric systems have been identified in numerous West African languages.20 It is not
surprising that these systems have been likened to switch-reference, since distinct subject
pronouns are used in a dependent clause to indicate same or different reference with the
subject of a controlling clause. On the face of it, the only difference between the two
types of system is in whether marking is on the NP or on the verb. In logophoric systems,
the markers are normally part of the language's pronoun system rather than being affixes
or conjunctions used alongside any pronouns which are usually present, as in switch-
reference.
For example, in Igbo, noncoreference between subjects of a dependent and an independent
clause is indicated by the regular third person singular pronoun o, coreference by the
20 The use of 'cross-clausal reflexivisation' in Icelandic, Japanese and other languages is also claimed to
be logophoric. See Sells (1987) and chapter 6 of this thesis.
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special pronoun yd. See example (23) from Comrie (1983:21). West Afficanists refer to
special pronouns like yd as logophoric pronouns.
6 slii n£ 6 by&ril
hej said that he.J came
6 sirl nil y* by^ri
hej said that he. came
These similarities have led Comrie (1983:20f.) to suggest that a type of switch-reference
system occurs in the Nigerian language Gokana, for which he has adopted the term
logophoric, because it is similar to the logophoric constructions found in other African
languages.21
In Gokana, in certain constructions, especially the reporting of indirect speech, the verb of
the dependent clause takes an -ee suffix if the subject of the dependent clause is


















He^ said hej fell.
From the point of view of other logophoric systems, what makes Gokana look somewhat
different is that logophoric reference is indicated by a verbal suffix rather than by a
pronoun. Otherwise, logophoricity in Gokana functions more or less similarly to the other
languages cited in the literature: it marks coreference (or by default, disjoint reference)
between a NP in a matrix clause and a NP in a embedded clause. In example (24a) there
is no logophoric marker on the verb, and the ordinary personal pronoun in the embedded
21 At the time his paper and the collection it was in appeared, there seemed to be some desire to identify
a switch-reference system in an African language, cf. Comrie (1983:18): 'Africa has generally been considered
[...] devoid of switch-reference'. Hyman & Comrie (1983) describe the Gokana system as logophoric and
don't mention its similarity to switch-reference.
22 The suffix has morphophonemic variants with a short vowel, a nasalised vowel, a close-mid vowel, n
or r before the vowel, and also certain combinations of these.
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clause is therefore interpreted as disjoint with the pronoun in the matrix clause. In (24b)
logophoric marking does occur, and the pronouns are therefore interpreted as having
coreference. Comrie (1983:36) has suggested that this is a young switch-reference system,
presumably developing out of an earlier logophoric system.23
Despite their apparent functional equivalence, and the formal similarity between the
Gokana system and switch-reference systems, there are significant differences between
logophoricity and switch-reference, which cast doubt on the usefulness of trying to
subsume one under the other. These points of difference are listed below.
The most important difference is that logophoric marking is usually not pervasive like
switch-reference, but is restricted to the embedded complement clauses of a set of
logocentric verbs which can be distinguished on a largely semantic basis. The set of
logocentric verbs centrally includes verbs of reporting, and thus the dependent clauses in
which logophoric pronouns are licensed are archetypally contexts of reported speech.
Sometimes verbs of mental or psychological state also trigger logophoric contexts, which
in such cases could be seen as contexts of 'implicit reporting'. The set of contexts in
which logophoric pronouns may be used is also sometimes grammaticised to include
syntactic contexts which do not have an obvious semantic relationship with the other
contexts: logophoricity is often associated with the presence of a complementiser which
tends to be homophonic with the verb 'say' and may originate as a reported speech opener,
but which may spread to be used in other clauses such as complement clauses generally, or
even relative clauses. Switch-reference is not restricted in this way: it may be restricted
syntactically, to particular kinds of subordinate or medial clauses, but it is not restricted to
particular lexically governed semantic contexts.
In Gokana, as in other cases of logophoricity, the marking is not pervasive: according to
Comrie (1983), the system in Gokana seems to have arisen in indirect speech, and marking
is restricted to certain subordinate constructions of reported speech; certainly it has not
23 Comrie (1983:21) reports that Gokana is the only African language he knows of where the verb of a
dependent clause is marked to indicate coreference rather than a special pronoun being used. In this sense it
clearly is closer to the other switch-reference systems we have seen than to the type of logophoricity found in
Igbo. However, Clements (1975) reports that in Ewe, the logophoric pronoun, like other pronouns, is cliticised
to the verb, so Comrie's distinction is not a particularly clear one, introducing the familiar problems presented
by trying to distinguish between free pronouns, verbal cliticisation of pronouns, and verbal inflectional mor¬
phology. It might be argued that a more reliable distinction between Gokana and other logophoric languages is
that in Gokana separate pronouns occur as well as marking on the verb, and there is no morphological varia¬
tion in the form of the marker. Other languages which may straddle logophoricity and switch-reference include
the Chadic language Kera, which is said by Frajzyngier (1985:34), citing Ebert (1979:130), to have a set of lo¬
gophoric pronouns which are 'used in dialogues to indicate switch-reference'.
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spread to subordinate clauses in general and not to coordinate clauses at all. Again, in
Gokana the logophoric context is introduced by ko, which is both a verb, 'say', and a
complementiser.
In addition, there are rather marked differences between the pivotal NPs in a logophoric
relation and switch-reference pivots. Typically, the logophoric pivot in the controlling
clause, called the logocentric NP, is constrained to be either the source of the reported
speech, thought or emotion, or the subject NP, or both. That is, in many languages it need
not be subject as long as it is source, and conversely not all subjects are licensed to be
logocentric NPs. The logophoric NP itself, in the marked clause, normally may have any
grammatical function whatsoever.
Thus in Gokana, the pivot NP in the controlling clause may be either the subject or a non-
subject 'source', and the pivot NP in the marked clause may have any grammatical
function. (25) shows that the argument of the embedded clause which is coreferential with
the subject of the matrix clause is not necessarily the embedded subject.
(25) lebaree ko ae de-e a gia
Lebare said PRO ate-LOG PRO yams
Lebarej said hej ate hiSj yams.
Lebarej said hej ate his- yams.
Lebarej said he- ate hisj yams.
In this example both NPs in the embedded clause may be interpreted as logophoric. This is
common in logophoric languages, and in languages which mark logophoricity
pronominally, they would both have the logophoric form.
Logophoric NPs also tend to be restricted to third person, although second person
logophoric pronouns sometimes occur, and much more rarely, first person ones. Once
again, the marking in Gokana is not pervasive but depends on the person of the relevant
NPs: it is obligatory if the coreferential NPs are 3rd person, it is optional though preferred
if they are 2nd person singular, and optional though dispreferred if they are 1st person.24
As we have seen, this restriction in person is unusual for a switch-reference system.
24 It is impossible for morphological reasons to add the switch-reference suffix to the 2nd person plural.
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Switch-reference can indicate more than just coreference or disjoint reference, i.e. it can
have various extended functions, and the switch-reference marker usually carries additional
meaning anyway, indicating different temporal/logical relations between the clauses. We
shall see in chapter 6 that logophoric marking also can have the extended function of
indicating the speaker's attitude to the reported proposition. However, even if we consider
just the coreferential element of meaning, switch-reference and logophoricity differ in that
logophoric systems mark a NP if it is coreferential, and disjoint reference is indicated by
the unmarked form of the clause, without a logophoric pronoun. In contrast, switch-
reference systems mark a clause for SS or for DS, with a general tendency for coreference
to be the unmarked case.
Comrie (1983:27) considers further evidence of the atypicality of Gokana 'switch-
reference' to be its treatment of inclusive and overlapping reference. There are in fact quite
clear differences between logophoric and switch-reference systems in this respect
Logophoricity is more restricted in the possibilities allowed when one of the two pivot NPs
is plural and 'includes' the other. Recall (13) in section 1.5 where the three possible cases
were listed, (i) where marked clause pivot contains controlling clause pivot; (ii) where
controlling clause pivot contains marked clause pivot, (iii) where the two pivots intersect.
In logophoric systems, only case (i) is treated as coreference; cases (ii) and (iii) are treated
as disjoint reference. In switch-reference systems, crosslinguistically, systems can be
found in which any of these three cases are treated as coreference and the SS marker used.
The most interesting evidence relevant to determining the relationship between switch-
reference and logophoricity comes from languages which appear to have both kinds of
systems. We have seen that more than one switch-reference system may occur in a
language, so prima facie it doesn't mean very much to point out that there are languages in
which both switch-reference systems and logophoric systems exist independently.
However, if it is possible to have logophoric marking and switch-reference marking in the
same clausal environment, it would indicate that the two systems have distinct functions in
that language.
Wiesemann (1982:43,54) claims that switch-reference systems are found in a number of
Bantu languages, particularly of the Grassfields region of Cameroun. Some of these
languages (eg. Ngyemboon) just have switch-reference and no logophoric marking, but in
others (i.e. Noni, Bafut, Aghem) switch-reference seems to be used alongside a logophoric
system. Wiesemann presents no relevant data in this paper, but cites as her sources
Anderson (1979) on Aghem, Hyman (1981) on Noni and Mfonyam (p.c.) on Bafut.
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Nichols (1985) has reported on the presence of a logophoric system in Chechen and
Inguish; as we have seen, Nichols (1983) reports the presence of a switch-reference like
system in these languages also. In the 1983 paper, she mentions in passing the intimate
connection between switch-reference marking and the possibility of use of long-distance
reflexive pronouns (pp.248,250,252,255-6). In these languages, 'cross-clause
reflexivisation' is possible of a kind which has been likened to logophoricity in Icelandic,
Japanese and other languages (see Sells 1987 and chapter 6 below). The relationship
between the two systems in the Northeast Caucasus languages seems to be that SS marked
clauses disallow this use of the reflexive, whereas DS marked clauses allow it; Nichols
claims that the relevant restriction is not due to the SS marking per se, however, but due to
the fact that the SS marked verb is a medial verb. Interestingly, all the examples she gives
of cross-clause reflexivisation involve the verb 'say', which makes it look typically
logophoric. O'Connor (1986) too has apparently reported a logophoric system for Northern
Porno (cited by Sells 1987:450), and Porno languages have switch-reference systems.
Oswalt (1983:286-7) notes that Kashaya has 'reflexive' third person pronouns by which an
argument of a subordinate clause may be represented as coreferential with an argument of
1
a governing verb; disjoint reference is indicated by use of any other third person pronoun;
this is most useful in constructions which do not take part in the switch-reference system,
although it may also be used in switch-reference marked clauses for non-subject arguments.
Gokana is clearly a logophoric system. It has all the important characteristics of
logophoric systems, and the fact that the maiking is on the verb, far from being a reason to
distinguish it from other logophoric systems, actually fits with the range of variation one
might expect given the cliticisation of pronouns onto the verb in many of these languages.
The question of the relation between logophoricity and switch-reference is a separate issue.
Both logophoricity and switch-reference offer ways of indicating anaphoric relations
between two clauses which involve the privileging of some argument in each clause and
specifying of co/disjoint reference between them. The main distinctions between the two
types of system are on the one hand that switch-reference systems are better seen as a kind
of clausal agreement which offers the potential for indicating maintenance or interruption
of other characteristics of the clause, and on the other that the use of logophoric marking is
restricted to logophoric contexts. Switch-reference tends to be widespread in the languages
which exhibit it, whereas logophoricity is not so central to the grammatical system of the
languages which exhibit it. Clearly, given the fact that logophoric contexts may be
extended beyond the set of contexts which were originally motivated semantically to a set
which is motivated syntactically by the presence of a complementiser, there is the potential
for one kind of system to develop into the other.
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In chapter 6, we shall consider logophoric phenomena in much more detail, and shall
include in the discussion long-distance reflexives from Scandinavian languages and
Japanese, which appear to behave in an essentially logophoric way. On the basis of what
we have seen so far, it is hard to see why there is any more reason to class these two types
of system together than to identify either with any other way of marking coreference within
defined interclausal domains.
Obviation
Obviation is a type of phenomenon which is claimed to be functionally comparable to
switch-reference, but which is distinguished from it. Central cases occur in certain
Algonquian languages, including Algonquin, Kutenai, Apachean and Keresan, and it was
with reference to these languages that the phenomena was first defined. See Jacobsen
(1983:151). The terms obviative and proximate are used of these languages to refer to
markers which are, 'referentially, if not structurally' (Jacobsen 1983: 153) part of the series
of pronouns and which are assigned to two different third person referents according to
their relative centrality or importance in the discourse. Hence obviation is often thought of
as an extension to the person system, and the obviative pronoun is called the 'fourth
person'.25
As well as this difference in function, obviative systems again contrast with switch-
reference systems in that the obviative markers are part of the series of pronouns rather
than affixes or conjunctions used alongside any pronouns which are normally present.
Also, once again the obviation system is restricted to the third person.
The Yup'ik Eskimo system (T. Payne 1980, Woodbury 1983) is described as an obviation
system, but it not clear on what basis it is distinguished from logophoric systems, since the
'fourth person' pronoun actually seems to be a reflexive third person pronoun (see
Woodbury 1983:291).
25 Confusion has arisen because the terms 'proximate' and 'obviative' have been used for oppositions in
certain Uto-Aztecan languages (Huichol, Hopi, Papaga) which are more normally agreed to be cases of




A major problem for Finer's account, as for others which assume canonical switch-
reference, is that it lacks generality because there is a significant range of data which it
fails to account for. As indicated in section 1.4, crosslinguistically there are nontrivial
violations of the Locality Condition, the Dependency Condition, and the Subject Condition.
In section 1.5, we saw that the Functional Condition too fails to represent the complexity
of switch-reference systems. Violations of the Functional Condition are considered in
more detail in chapter 2. In the face of counterexamples, Finer (1985a) suggests that only
some types of switch-reference are to be accounted for by the Binding Theory, and other
types by some other set of grammatical principles. Is it possible to find a unified account?
- 51 -
Chapter 2 Functional extensions of switch-reference systems
2.1. Introduction
In chapter 1, I said that the canonical conception of switch-reference assumes that it
satisfies the Functional Condition, which stipulates that the function of switch-reference
markers is to indicate obligatory co/disjoint reference between the two subject NPs of the
related clauses. However, I pointed out that in at least some languages with switch-
reference systems, there is not an absolute correlation between SS marking and
coreferential subjects, DS marking and subjects with disjoint reference. Although a few of
these apparent anomalies of marking are the result of historical changes and other
peculiarities, most are the result of functional extensions of the system. Clearly, this
presents problems for an account in terms of syntactic binding such as is proposed by
Finer (1985a, b). If we take it to be a defining characteristic of a switch-reference system
that it should satisfy the Functional Condition, then a number of otherwise* absolutely
prototypical systems fail to meet this criterion.
In this chapter, we will explore violations of the Functional Condition in four languages in
some detail. They are the North American language Eastern Pomo, the Papuan language
Amele, the Austronesian language Lenakel and the South American language Imbabura
Quechua. I shall also refer to supporting data from other languages. Although the
languages are from different language families and geographical areas, the supposedly
'aberrant' uses of SS marking and DS marking which they exhibit are surprisingly similar
in type. In section 2.2 we will consider unexpected uses of SS marking with
noncoreferential subjects. In sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 we will consider unexpected uses of
DS marking with coreferential subjects.
In chapter 3, I shall argue that these 'violations' of the Functional Condition are actually
rather systematic, and that rather than dismissing them as isolated exceptions, we should
accept that any comprehensive theory of switch-reference should provide a coherent
account for them, even though this may require a different theoretical conception of
switch-reference and a different kind of formal account than have hitherto been subscribed
to. In chapter 5, a formal account for switch-reference in Amele will be proposed which is
capable of handling the full range of phenomena identified in this chapter, and which
therefore can readily be modified to describe the switch-reference systems in the other
three languages discussed.
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Our first hypothesis about what switch-reference does, based on the Functional Condition,
and conforming to the bulk of the literature on switch-reference, is the following:
HYPOTHESIS 1:
SS indicates that the subjects of the two clauses are coreferential.
DS indicates that the subjects of the two clauses have disjoint reference.
Notice that on this hypothesised definition, both SS and DS are taken to stipulate a
reference relation of sameness or difference between the subjects of the two clauses; we
saw in 1.5 that this is an inadequate reflection of their function in a number of languages.
Languages may make a distinction between SS and DS markers such that only one of the
two specifies what Nichols (1983) calls 'Closed Reference', i.e. stipulates a reference
relation, with the other having 'Open Reference'. Taking into account relations of overlap
and inclusion which arise when one of the NPs is plural may also lead to a less restrictive
and symmetrical definition for the two switch-reference markers. In this chapter we will
be concerned with other ways in which the definition needs to be modified, and so shall
ignore these complexities for the present
2.2. Impersonal constructions and switch-reference
In this section we will be concerned with unexpected uses of SS marking when there is
apparently disjoint reference between the subjects of the two clauses. We will focus on
Imbabura Quechua and Amele, although supporting data will be adduced from some other
languages. The conclusion of the argument will be that for these languages, the function
of the switch-reference markers and the definition of switch-reference pivot needs to be
redefined to take into account a notion of agentivity.
Imbabura Quechua (IQ), a South American language spoken in Ecuador, has two sets of
switch-reference markers (see Cole 1982, 1983 and Jake 1985 for a fuller description). On
adverbial clauses (of time, place, purpose etc.) switch-reference is marked by the
morphemes -shpa- (SS) and -jpi- (DS), as in examples (1) and (2).
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(1) Kitu-man chaya-shpa-mi rijsi-ta riku-rka-ni
Quito-to arrive-SS-WIT acquaintance-ACC see-PAST-lS
When I arrived in Quito, I saw a friend.
(2) Nuka ashtaka kulki-ta japi-jpi-ka ftuka
I much money-ACC take-DS-TOP my
tayta ishkay llama-ta kara-wa-nga
father two sheep-ACC give-lS-3FUT
If I make a lot of money, my father will give me two sheep.
(10 and (20 are schematic representations of these sentences, ignoring irrelevant elements,
which show that they fit the formal definition of canonical switch-reference marking given
in chapter 1. Switch-reference marking is by suffixation on the verb of a dependent clause
which immediately precedes its controlling clause. Note that IQ is a 'pro-drop' language,














1 Details of these trees, eg. the use of the abbreviation 'INFL' for 'inflections', should not be taken to
imply any specific syntactic theory.
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Switch-reference is also marked on subjunctive noun clauses (which are also often clauses
of purpose), in which case a separate set of morphemes is used: -ngapaj- (SS) and -
chun- (DS), as in examples (3) and (4).
(3) Utavalu-man shamu-rka-ni ftuka mama-ta visita-ngapaj
Otavalo-to come-PAST-lS my mother-ACC visit-SS
I came to Otavalo to see my mother.
(4) Tayta Kitu-man kacha-wa-rka ftuka chaypi
father Quito-to send-1S-3PAST I there
Father sent me to Quito to study there.
yachuju-chun
leam-DS
Again, these clearly fit the definition of canonical switch-reference given in chapter 1,
except that whereas the adverbial clause construction in examples (1) and (2) manifests the
typical order of marked followed by controlling clause, the subjunctive noun clause










tayta kachu-lS-3PAST ftuka yachuju-DS
father send I learn
Note that according to Cole (1982, 1983) and Jake (1985), both switch-reference
constructions in IQ involve subordinate clauses, although this is not represented in the
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schematic representations above. However, as we saw in chapter 1, this is not a necessary
characteristic of switch-reference systems crosslinguistically. The unexpected SS marking
to be described in this section is not restricted to subordinate marked clauses. Later in
this section we will see examples from Amele where switch-reference is used to set up
'clause-chaining' constructions, in which a number of dependent clauses, with non-finite
'medial' verbs, are followed by a final clause with a finite verb carrying the tense, aspect
and polarity for the entire chain. In such constructions, the relationship between the
clauses is more like coordination than subordination (for evidence of this, see Roberts
1988, and chapters 1 and 5 of this thesis). However, although the marked clauses in IQ
are subordinate rather than medial, they do contain non-finite verbs and are semantically
dependent on the controlling clause for tense. It is also a characteristic of IQ subordinate
clause verbs that they lack the subject and object agreement markers which occur in main
clauses.
Before we go any further, it is necessary to say a few words about how we define 'subject'
in IQ. IQ is a Nominative-Accusative language, and its subject nominals have the
following morpho-syntactic properties:
(i) They take Nominative rather than Accusative case marking (zero-marking
rather than affixation with -ta).
(ii) They control agreement on the verb in main clauses. (Direct objects which
are first person singular also trigger an agreement morpheme, wa, on the verb.)
Subjects are further defined as controlling switch-reference between clauses, but for
obvious reasons this criterion is of little use to us.
Subjectless constructions in Imbabura Quechua
IQ has an interesting set of constructions which have been called 'subjectless'
constructions.2 The IQ 'subjectless constructions' correspond to types of constructions
which in other languages are called 'impersonal constructions': in the remainder of this
chapter I will use the term 'impersonal construction' in a general way which includes the
IQ subjectless construction as well as other types of construction to be more fully
2 Jake (1985) calls them 'inversion constructions', and sometimes 'unaccusative clauses'; both terms are
from Perlmutter (1978), who analyses such constructions as derived unaccusatives (see Perlmutter 1978:179).
More on this analysis below.
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identified below. The IQ subjectless constructions have the following characteristics:
(i) The clause may be transitive or intransitive, but in either case it will contain
an 'experiencer' nominal, which is marked with Accusative case, and which
triggers only object agreement (if any) on the verb.3
(ii) If the clause is transitive, there will also be another Accusatively marked
nominal.
(iii) The verb is invariably marked with third person singular 'subject'
agreement, regardless of the person and number of either of the two NPs.
(iv) This type of construction is obligatory for some verbs and optional for
others.
Example (5) is a case where it is optional. Here we have the desiderative construction
formed by the affixation of the morpheme -naya- to the verb; -naya- can be affixed to any
verb, and to some nouns denoting ingestibles. In (5a) jari-ka is a normal subject NP with
Nominative (zero) case marking. The topic marker ka can cliticise to any constituent in a
main clause, but never occurs in subordinate clauses. (5b) illustrates the 'subjectless'
option, with both NPs marked for Accusative case.4
(5) a. Jari-ka aswa-ta ufya-naya-n
man-TOP beer-ACC drink-DESID-3
The man wants to drink beer.
b. Jari-ta-ka aswa-ta ufya-naya-n
man-ACC-TOP beer-ACC drink-DESID-3
Other constructions which exhibit an optional 'subjectless' variant, are other desiderative
verbs such as muna-, 'want', falta-, 'need', and gushta-, 'like', and a few verbs with
'cognitive' or 'aspectual' meaning, such as (yu)ya(ri)-, 'seem, think', chaya-, 'arrive, have
to begin' and tuku-, 'happen, become. See example (6), with the verb muna, 'want'. In
3 I use the terms 'agent' and 'experiencer' in the sense of the particular semantic or thematic role played
by the participant referred to by the NP in the situation described by the clause; I am aware that these concepts
require a more precise definition but I will not go into this here. I also talk more generally about the 'degree
of agentivity' of a NP or the referent of a NP; this is a separate though related notion and does not necessarily
imply the existence of a set of semantic/thematic roles assigned to participants.
4 In addition to Nominative and Accusative cases, marking subjects and direct objects, there is a Dative
case which marks indirect objects, and other case suffixes marking oblique relations. See Jake (1985: 21ff.) So
it is not simply the case that the experiencer nominal in a subjectless construction is 'non-Nominative'; it is
specifically marked as a direct object
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(6a), the experiencer nominal has Nominative (zero) case marking, and triggers subject
agreement on the verb, thus here it is a normal subject In (6b), it has Accusative case and





I want some beer.
b. Nuka-ta-ka aswa-ta muna-wa-n
I-ACC-TOP beer-ACC want-lS-3
With the exception of the -naya- construction, the desiderative, cognitive and aspectual
predicates which optionally allow the subjectless construction are also predicates which
may take sentential complements, functioning as subject or object depending on the verb.
These sentential complements are either subjunctive noun clauses of the kind we have
already seen, or nominalised subordinate clauses (which do not have switch-reference
marking). The complexities of IQ sentential complementation are not important to the
argument of this section, but since one or two examples with sentential complements will
be given below, see example (7) to illustrate their structure. In (7) the verb muna-, 'want',
appears with a sentential object complement which is a nominalised subordinate clause. It
-to,
appears between the main clause subject, nuka and the main verb. The subordinate verb is
marked with the Accusative case marker -ta. The subject of the subordinate clause is kan,
which has Nominative case.
(7) Nuka-ka [kan shamu-na-ta] muna-ni
I-TOP [you come-FUT-ACC] want-IS
I want you to come.
So far we have seen examples of a number of predicates which optionally take the
subjectless construction. These fell into two main classes: the -naya- desiderative
construction, and a range of desiderative, cognitive and aspectual predicates. We now
come to the second major type of example, where the subjectless construction is obligatory.
The subjectless construction is obligatory with all physical experiencer predicates, as in (8)
with the predicate nana-, 'hurt'; others include yarja- 'hunger', rupa- 'bum', raura- 'itch,
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burn', chiri- 'feel cold'.5
(8) a. Nuka-ta-ka uma-ta nana-wa-n-mi
I-ACC-TOP head-ACC hurt-lS-3-WIT
My head hurts.
b. *Nuka-ka uma-ta nana-ni-mi
I-TOP head-ACC hurt-IS-WIT
The usual account given for all these impersonal constructions (cf. Jake 1985) is that,
superficially at least, they simply 'lack' a subject, or at best have a dummy subject (like
English expletive it in it is raining), except that it has zero phonological realisation. There
is no nominal with Nominative case marking, and the subject agreement on the verb is a
default and invariant third person singular.
More specifically, Jake (1985) proposes a Relational Grammar analysis in which the
experiencer nominal is an initial subject NP which loses its status as subject and
(eventually) becomes a direct object; an 'empty' dummy subject is inserted directly to fill
the subject position at surface structure and prevent any other NP from appearing as
surface subject. In other words, at some intermediate underlying level, these constructions
are 'derived unaccusatives', where an 'unaccusative clause' is defined by Perlmutter (1978)
as a clause which has an underlying direct object but no underlying subject6
The obvious question to ask is, if these clauses have no (real) subject, and if switch-
reference functions to indicate the referential relation between the subjects of two clauses,
what happens to switch-reference marking when one of the two clauses is a 'subjectless'
construction of this kind? The answer is, that SS marking is used.7
This seems to be true of both adverbial and subjunctive noun clause constructions.
However, Cole (1982) and Jake (1985) are in disagreement here. Jake gives examples of
5 All the physical experiencer examples given in the literature, involve inalienably possessed body parts.
6 Jake claims that the IQ constructions provide evidence for Perlmutter's (1978) 'Unaccusative Hy¬
pothesis' and other universal principles which he proposes. I will not explore the details of this analysis or al¬
ternative syntactic analyses here. For more discussion, see chapter 5.
7 I will henceforth assume that clauses of the kind in question simply lack a subject rather than postulat¬
ing an empty dummy subject At this stage this is purely for convenience of exposition of the argument and
does not represent a theoretical choice on my part. Note that if one does adopt the position that these clauses
contain an empty dummy subject one has to explain not why we get SS marking when one of the clauses
lacks a subject but why we get SS marking when one of the clauses has a subject which is a 'dummy', i.e. a
purely syntactic element with no semantic content
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unexpected SS marking involving both kinds of construction, whereas Cole claims that it
occurs only with the subjunctive noun clause kind of switch-reference; he says that in
adverbial clauses the expected DS marking occurs. Dialectal variation may be the origin of
this discrepancy. I follow Jake since she offers a more organised and comprehensive
discussion of this particular topic in IQ grammar.
Logically, either the marked or the controlling clause in a switch-reference relation can be
impersonal, or even both. In almost all the examples to be considered in this section, it is
the controlling clause which is impersonal. Cole (1982) claims that in any case in which a
switch-reference relation holds between an impersonal marked clause and a normal
controlling clause, the expected, DS marking occurs. It does seems likely that this is a
universal tendency, although not enough data has been considered as yet to say this with
any certainty. If it is, it represents an asymmetry which is rather surprising and requires
explanation. Certainly in Amele, a clause chaining language, an impersonal controlling
clause may itself be marked for switch-reference with respect to a following clause, and in
such cases DS marking is always used.8
So, in examples (9)-(ll), with the -naya- desiderative construction, the controlling clause
in each case contains a predicate which as we saw optionally allows the use of the
'subjectless' type of impersonal construction. In the (a) examples in (9) - (10) this option
does not occur, we have a normal Nominatively marked subject, which is coreferential with
the subject of the marked clause, and as we would expect SS marking occurs. In (9b),
(10b) and (11), the impersonal construction is chosen, the controlling clause strictly
speaking lacks a subject, the experiencer nominal which was Nominatively marked in the
alternative version of the examples is now Accusatively marked - and yet we still have SS
marking. Note that while in each case the controlling clause contains a subjectless
construction, the marked clause is adverbial in (9) and (11) and a subjunctive norm clause
in (10).
8 Jake (1985) gives two examples which do not confoim to this generalisation. Both of these are quoted
below, as examples (16)-(18). Both involve weather verb constructions in the marked clause. There is a cer¬
tain amount of indeterminacy in the IQ literature over to what extent unexpected SS marking is required or is
merely one option. Jake suggests that both SS and DS options are available for adverbial clauses in only one
place, in the discussion of one of the examples mentioned (1985:35). Unexpected SS marking seems to be ob¬
ligatory to at least some extent, i.e. at least in the subjunctive noun clauses, and possibly in all cases when it is
the controlling clause which is impersonal; i.e. in the vast majority of cases.
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(9) a. Trabaja-shpa-ka kan-ka miku-naya-n-llu
work-SS-TOP you-TOP eat-DESID-3-Q
When you work, do you like to eat?



















(11) Nuka chagra-pi trabaja-shpa huka-ta puhu-naya-n
I field-in work-SS I-ACC sleep-DESID-3S
When I work in the field, I want to sleep.
(12) is a parallel example, but with one of the obligatorily 'subjectless' physical
experiencer predicates in the controlling clause. The marked clause is of the adverbial
type.
(12) Nuka chagra-pi trabaja-shpa nuka-ta uma-ta nana-wa-n-mi
I field-in work-SS I-ACC head-ACC hurt-1S-3-WIT
When I work in the field, my head hurts.
(13) is an example where the controlling clause contains the desiderative verb faita, 'need',
and the marked clause is a sentential object complement, subjunctive noun clause. The
subject of the subordinate clause has been omitted; recall that IQ is a pro-drop language.
In (13a) the experiencer nominal, huka-ka, appears as subject of the controlling clause, and
the verb of the subordinate clause has SS marking. In (13b), the controlling clause appears
as a subjectless construction, with the experiencer nominal taking Accusative case and
triggering object agreement on the main verb, yet the subordinate verb is still marked for
SS.9
9 I could find no examples in the literature where the controlling clause was a construction such as (6)
above, i.e. with a desiderative, cognitive or aspectual predicate other than a -naya- marked verb, but with non-
sentential complements. Clearly, constructions in which the switch-reference marked clause is a sentential
complement of the controlling clause are interestingly different from the other types of switch-reference rela¬
tion we have examined and demand special consideration to determine whether there is any interaction between
switch-reference marking and other syntactic phenomena such as 'Equi' or control. Given the numerous exam¬
ples which are not of this type, however, the generalisations to be made below still hold.
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(13) a. Nuka-ka [sara-ta tarpu-ngapaj] falta-ni
I-TOP [corn-ACC plant-SS] lack-lS
I need to plant corn.
b. Nuka-ta-ka [sara-ta tarpu-ngapaj] falta-wa-n
I-ACC-TOP [corn-ACC plant-SS] lack-lS-3
The use of SS marking in examples (9b), (10b), (11), (12), and (13b) seems unexpected or
'aberrant' because of two assumptions: (i) that the controlling clauses in these examples do
not contain an overt subject NP and (ii) that switch-reference indicates the reference
relation between subjects, as defined in Hypothesis 1. There are a number of possible
explanations one could propose for this apparently aberrant use of SS, which shall be
considered in turn.
The first two possible explanations both attempt to preserve both of these assumptions, by
treating the examples in question as exceptional, either lexically or structurally.
(a) These constructions are lexically governed exceptions to the general rule of switch-
reference marking. For example, I mentioned in chapter 1 reports from a number of
languages of particular verbs which exceptionally are marked in the lexicon as taking only
clauses with SS marking or only clauses with DS marking (see for example Austin
1980:17 on Diyari). Perhaps we are dealing with verbs which are lexically marked
exceptions here.
There are a number of problems with this kind of explanation. The verbs mentioned by
Austin - wani-, 'to begin', wanyja-, 'to try', yatha-, 'to tell' and nganka, 'to make, cause' -
didn't just require SS or DS marking regardless of coreference facts on any particular
occasion of use. Rather, some verbs constrained the subject of the subordinate clause to be
coreferential with their own subject, in which case SS marking was required, while others
constrained the subject of the subordinate clause to be coreferential with a non-subject
argument of the verb, in which case DS marking was required. Thus no cases of
aberrantly used SS or DS marking could arise. Furthermore, in the IQ case the subjectless
construction is optional for all but the physical experiencer predicates, and to say that the
optional predicates are lexically marked to take SS subordinate clauses ignores the fact that
the SS marking is covered by the general rule normally, and is atypical only when the
subjectless option is taken. Such an account would miss the generalisation that the
unexpected SS marking is due to the subjectless construction, or at best, to other shared
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syntactic/semantic properties of the verbs. Finally, although some such account might
work for the subjunctive noun clause type of switch-reference, it is difficult to see how it
would work for the adverbial clause type, where the marked clause is not lexically
subcategorised for by the controlling verb. Similar phenomena are found in Amele where
the clauses are in the much looser chaining relationship. For these reasons, it seems better
to seek a more principled explanation.
If more evidence is needed on which to rule out this proposal, it is provided by examples
(14)-(16) below, which confirm that the use of a predicate that requires or allows the
subjectless construction is not in itself a guarantee that SS marking will be used. These
examples show that in transitive impersonal clauses of the kind we have been looking at,
the non-experiencer nominal, i.e. the 'original' direct object, can 'ascend' to subject
position. This is what has happened in example (14) below, which is a subjectless
construction with a physical experiencer predicate.10 Examples (15) and (16) show that
when such a clause appears as the controlling clause in a switch-reference construction, DS
marking is required (15a is a repeat of 12), as we would expect. So these examples
represent a third variation: the experiencer nominal has Accusative case marking and
triggers object agreement on the verb, as in the subjectless constructions considered above,
but the clause no longer lacks a subject; the non-experiencer nominal now has all the
characteristics of subjecthood including Nominative case marking and control of subject
agreement on the verb. Thus in (15b), the original direct object, uma-ta in (15a), has been
promoted to subject, uma-kxr, since it is clearly not coreferential with the subject of the
marked clause, nuka-ka, DS must be used.11
(14) Uma-ka nana-wa-n-mi
head-TOP hurt-1S-3-WIT
10 In this particular case the experiencer nominal has been omitted; cf. the exactly parallel: Nuka-ta chaki
nana-wa-n, 'My foot hurts', where both nominals are overtly realised, and the original direct object chaki has
been promoted to subject
11 (16) is a rather complicated example, since it involves sentential complements. Both (16a) and (16b)
are considered by Jake (1985:224) to derive from an original sentence [Nuka-ta uma nana-chun] tuku-shka-mi,
where the verb tuku- has a sentential complement which is a subjunctive noun clause, and the subjunctive noun
clause is a subjectless construction in which the non-experiencer nominal, uma, has lost its original Accusative
marking and been promoted to subject In (16a), this nominal has subsequently ascended out of the subordi¬
nate clause to become the subject of the main clause; hence it can now take the topic marker, which cliticises
to main clause constituents only. In (16a), then, SS marking is used because both clauses are understood to
have the subject uma(-ka). In (16b), it is the experiencer nominal which has ascended out of the subordinate
clause, in which it was direct object, to become main clause subject, but here DS marking must be used be¬
cause uma remains the subject of the subordinate clause.
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My head hurts.
(15) a. Nuka chagra-pi trabaja-shpa ftuka-ta uma-ta
I field-in work-SS I-ACC head-ACC
When I work in the field, my head hurts.
b. Nuka chagra-pi trabaja-jpi uma-ka huka-ta





(16) a. Uma-ka tuku-shka-mi huka-ta
head-TOP happen-PRF-WIT I-ACC











(b) The second possible explanation would be to say that the examples in question involve
the switch-reference system 'skipping' a clause - that is, simply ignoring it and treating the
clause after it as its controlling clause - perhaps just because the clause does lack a subject
and so cannot participate in switch-reference marking.
This explanation has in fact been proposed for such constructions, in particular in work on
the 'clause-chaining' languages of Papua New Guinea, such as Amele, where long chains
of switch-reference marked clauses are involved (see Roberts 1987:299, where he discusses
work by Longacre 1972, Litteral 1972, West 1973, Thurman 1975, Davies 1981, and
Foster 1981). Such an explanation does not work for any of the languages considered here
(although it may do for the languages discussed by the researchers cited), for two reasons.
First, in IQ the switch-reference constructions involve just two clauses, with no clause
chaining, and in Amele as well, the sentence may contain only two clauses, so that it is not
possible for switch-reference to be 'skipping' over the second and referencing a third.
Secondly, in Amele, the so-called 'skipped clause' (the impersonal construction) may itself
be marked for switch-reference with respect to the following clause. (Examples of this
will be given below, eg. (22).)
Given the failure of these two proposed explanations, it seems that it is not going to be
possible to preserve both of the assumptions mentioned above by invoking lexical or
structural exceptionality. The next possible explanation attempts to preserve the definition
of switch-reference given in Hypothesis 1 by arguing that the first assumption, that the
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impersonal constructions lack subjects to be related by switch-reference, is wrong.
(c) The experiencer NP is actually the 'subject' at some less superficial level of syntax
(i.e. it is 'deep' or 'logical' subject), and it is at this level that switch-reference marking is
determined.
This kind of explanation would capture the fact that in the examples in question, there is
an experiencer nominal which is not (surface) subject but which is coreferential with the
subject of the marked clause. However, this explanation too must be rejected. To start
with, switch-reference marking is generally responsive only to 'surfacey' grammatical
relations, eg. it is the surface subject in a passive construction which will control switch-
reference. So subjectless constructions would be unique in this regard. More importantly,
examples (14)-(16) above show that impersonal controlling clauses are not unique in this
way: when a subject nominal is present at surface structure, due to promotion of the
original direct object, switch-reference marking is determined on the basis of the referential
relation between this nominal and the surface syntactic subject of the marked clause. A
final argument against this proposal is that some of the types of impersonal clauses which
we shall go on to consider in this paper, simply lack an experiencer nominal which could
be involved in coreference and which could be seen as an underlying subject.
Examples (15) and (16) are also evidence against various possible proposals, related to (c),
which all assume that the definition of switch-reference given in Hypothesis 1 is correct
(i.e. that the switch-reference markers identify reference relations between subjects), and
take as the problem determining the relevant notion of subject For example, another
version of the argument given under (c) might say that although the experiencer nominals
in question behave in some respects unlike subjects (for example, morphologically - in that
they receive Accusative case marking - and in the kind of verbal agreement which they
trigger), in other respects they do behave like subjects. So we could make a distinction
between different kinds of subjecthood (say, morphological and syntactic) which is
unrelated to postulating different levels of structure. This kind of account is argued for by
Cole (1982) and is given some credibility by discussions of 'quirky subject case marking'
which have appeared in the literature (for example, by Zaenen & Maling 1984, who even
hint at a distinction between tme unaccusative constructions and mere quirkily marked
subjects). Apart from the evidence of examples (15) and (16) above, the problem with this
kind of account is that the only 'other respects' in which the experiencer nominals behave
like subjects rather than objects, is that they seem to trigger switch-reference marking: and
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so we find ourselves caught up in a circular argument12
Given the failure of this argument, the most likely hypothesis remains that the impersonal
clauses lack subjects for the switch-reference morphemes, as defined, to relate. The
rejection of this argument also leaves us with switch-reference reacting to or marking a
relationship between the two clauses as they appear in 'surface syntax' rather than at some
underlying level.
As far as I can see, the remaining possible explanations for the unexpected SS marking all
involve rejecting the second assumption, that is, we have to reject our initial hypothesis
(Hypothesis 1) about what switch-reference marking does. On the basis of the preceding
argument, we can construct two new hypotheses about what switch-reference does, both of
which involve relaxing our original hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2:
SS indicates that there is no subject, nominal in the controlling clause
which has disjoint reference with the subject nominal in the marked
clause.
DS indicates that there is a subject nominal in the controlling clause and
that it has disjoint reference with the subject of the marked clause.
Note that the definition of SS here covers two cases: the case where there is no subject
nominal at all, and the case where there is a subject nominal and it is coreferential with the
subject of the marked clause.
HYPOTHESIS 2':
SR is not a relation between syntactic subjects, but between
agent/experiencers. The switch-reference pivot is the agentive nominal in the
clause, or if there is no agent, the experiencer nominal, and SS marking
indicates that the pivots are coreferential while DS marking indicates that they
have disjoint reference.
These two hypotheses each focus upon one of the two obvious generalisations which one
could make about the data presented so far: one is that all the controlling clauses in
unexpected uses of SS lack a subject, and the other is that all the controlling clauses in
these uses contain an experiencer nominal which is coreferential to the subject of the
12 However, this is probably to dismiss too lightly the difficulties of achieving an adequate definition of
subject vis-a-vis switch-reference marking; see the concluding remarks to this section.
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marked clause.
Hypothesis 2 is roughly as proposed by Jake (1985). It amounts to an acknowledgement
of a fairly obvious point: if there is no subject nominal in the controlling clause, then there
is no disjoint subject in the controlling clause, and we might have taken our previous
definition of SS to include this case anyway. Jake presents this modification as not
representing a radical change from Hypothesis 1, but note that it does involve an
interesting change in markedness. What we are trying to do is to accommodate a case
which does not strictly speaking fit the earlier definition of either SS or DS: the case where
there is no subject nominal in the controlling clause. There is no reason a priori why one
would think this case would be more likely to count as SS rather than DS. What tips the
balance one way or the other will be a decision about which of the two counts as default.
As defined in Hypothesis 1, SS is the more restricted option and DS could be seen as a
default; in Hypothesis 2, DS is the more restricted case - we have evidence that SS is the
default. The modification proposed in Hypothesis 2 is also important because it means that
switch-reference is no longer defined as a relation between subject NPs, but rather is seen
as a relation between clauses. This may seem to be an obvious point given that switch-
reference is marked on the verb rather than on the subject NP, but in fact switch-reference
has consistently been treated in the literature as a semantic relation between subject NPs,
even if it is marked on the verb in what has been called a 'violation of categorial iconicity'
(Haiman (1983): the Principle of Categorial Iconicity says that semantic distinctions should
be marked on the categories to which they pertain). See chapters 1 and 3 for some other
reasons why this analysis is incorrect and switch-reference should be seen as a semantic
relation between clauses which is marked on the head of the clause.
Hypothesis 2' is given here because it has been proposed elsewhere as an alternative
definition of switch-reference (most notably by Foley & Van Valin 1984), and the data we
have discussed so far seems to go some way towards supporting it: it would account for
why all the 'unexpected' uses of SS mentioned so far occur when there is coreference
between an agent in the marked clause (which also happens to be syntactic subject) and an
experiencer in the controlling clause (which incidentally is not syntactic subject). Although
it differs from the family of explanations considered under (c) above (and rejected), in that
it claims that it is our analysis of switch-reference which is wrong rather than our
definition of subject, it is similar to them in its effect, and it is readily disproved using
similar arguments. First, examples like (15b) and (16b) show that coreference between
agent/experiencers, regardless of their grammatical functions, is not sufficient to trigger SS
marking: in both these examples, this condition is satisfied, but DS marking occurs.
- 67 -
Secondly, as was hinted in the discussion of explanation (c) above, unexpected SS marking
occurs when the controlling clause is impersonal (lacks a subject) but does not contain an
agent/experiencer nominal. So coreference between agent/experiencers is not necessary to
trigger SS marking. This is the case with weather verb constructions in IQ, as in example
(17). The weather verbs represent the only other obviously 'subjectless' construction in IQ.
They always appear with third person singular subject agreement marking. In (17b) the




b. Tamya-ju-shpa/jpi-ka wawa-kuna mana shamu-nga-chu
rain-PROG-SS/DS-TOP child-PL NEG come-3FUT-NEG
If it rains, the children won't come.
In (18), again the marked clause is a weather verb construction, but this time with the
subjunctive noun clause type of switch-reference marking rather than the adverbial clause
are
type. Once again both SS and DS marking
^ possible. Note that in this case although the
controlling clause does have an overt subject nominal, it is also an inanimate weather noun.
(18) Tamya-gri-ngapaj/chun waira fuku-shka-mi
rain-INCHO-SS/DS wind blow-PERF-WIT
The wind blew enough for it to rain.
Incidentally, apart from these difficulties for Hypothesis 2', it also predicts other cases
which do not seem to occur. If switch-reference were a relation between
agent/experiencers, regardless of their grammatical function, we would expect to find
examples where the subjects of the two clauses are coreferential non-agent/experiencers,
and DS is used instead of SS. We might also expect examples where the subject of the
marked clause is an agent, and the subject of the controlling clause is an experiencer, and
the two are are noncoreferential, but SS is used because the controlling clause contains an
agentive NP in non-subject position which is coreferential with the agent in the marked
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clause.13
These arguments suggest that Hypothesis 2 is more plausible than Hypothesis 2'. As far as
the evidence from subjectless constructions in IQ goes, Hypothesis 2 does indeed seem to
accurately predict the data. In the remainder of this section we shall consider two
questions. First, is this definition of switch-reference in IQ generalisable to other switch-
reference languages? This will involve seeking out, on the one hand, subjectless
constructions in other switch-reference languages, and on the other hand, aberrant uses of
SS in other switch-reference languages. Second, is there any other evidence from switch-
reference constructions in IQ which has a bearing on whether we should accept or reject
Hypothesis 2?
Before we do so, note in summary of the preceding discussion that so far we have
considered two types of case of unexpected use of SS marking as listed below.
(i) the controlling clause has no subject but has an experiencer nominal, with some other
grammatical relation, which is coreferential with the subject of the marked clause (the
subjectless construction).
(ii) the marked clause has no subject, indeed no overt nominal arguments at all, and hence
there is no possibility of coreference with an argument in the controlling clause, which
may have an agentive or non-agentive subject (weather verbs).
Impersonal constructions in Amele
At this point it is useful to consider some data from Amele, a non-Austronesian language
spoken in Papua New Guinea (see Roberts 1987, 1988). In Amele, unexpected SS marking
(i.e. SS marking where strictly speaking there is disjoint reference between the syntactic
subjects) occurs with four types of controlling clause. The first two types are exactly
parallel to the two types of example found in IQ.14
First, unexpected SS marking occurs with controlling clauses containing what are called
13 Aberrant uses of DS marking do occur, but not under the circumstances described. They will be dis¬
cussed in later sections of this chapter.
14 The phenomena to be presented below along with additional examples of the same kind are discussed
by Roberts 1987: 63, 67, 163, 166, 204, 220f„ 233, 280-1, 299ff., 315ff.
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'impersonal verbs' by Roberts: these verbs are a special type of construction which is
reminiscent of the 'subjectless construction' in IQ, and in particular of the obligatory use
of the subjectless construction with physical experiencer predicates in IQ. (19) is an
example of an impersonal clause in Amele: the clause consists of an experiencer NP which
must come in initial, 'topic' position, and which triggers object agreement; one of a set of
nominals describing physical experiences, some of which only ever occur in these
constructions; and finally, a verbal element which consists simply of the object agreement
marker and obligatory third person singular subject agreement marking, followed by tense:
there is no lexical verb.15
(19) Ija wen te-na-0'
Is hunger ls-3s-Pres
I am hungry.
As (20) shows, when one of the impersonal verbs is used in relation with a switch-
reference marked clause, SS is used, despite the fact that the clauses apparently have
disjoint subjects.16
(20) Ija bi-m-ig wen te-i-a
I come_up-SS-ls hunger ls-3s-TodP
I came up and I became hungry.
Secondly, in Amele as in IQ, unexpected SS marking occurs with weather verbs. See
example (21).
15 The structure of the final inflectional element in these examples is: OBJECT AGREEMENT + SUB¬
JECT AGREEMENT + TENSE. The present tense is zero marked for the third person singular subject. In all
the examples I have seen, the third person singular subject agreement is actually consistent with agreement be¬
ing triggered by the second nominal. There is evidence that this is not the case, as I shall show when these
constructions are discussed in more detail in chapter 5.
16 Some remarks were made earlier about difficulties surrounding the notion of 'subject', and this is dis¬
cussed further below: in particular, work on typological linguistics as well as theories such as Role and Refer¬
ence Grammar assume that subject properties may be assigned to more than one NP in the clause, and divide
into different types accordingly. In the Amele impersonal construction there is more reason to adopt this kind
of approach than there is in the IQ subjectless construction; the usual subject identifying properties in Amele
are just word order and triggering of verbal agreement marking (Amele nominals are not distinguished by case
marking): subjects occur in initial, 'topic' position and trigger subject agreement on the verb. (Again, triggering
of SR marking must be ruled out as a subject criterion for the purposes of this argument.) So the experiencer
nominal in the impersonal construction in Amele has one of these properties (subject position) but not the other
(it triggers object agreement rather than subject agreement on the verb). And it could be seen as triggering
switch-reference marking.
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(21) Ija co-cob-ig wa hedo-i-a
I SIM-walk-ls_SS water finish-3s-TodP
As I walked along the rain stopped.
Note that switch-reference marking in Amele is morphologically rather complicated; if the
temporal relation between the events described by the two clauses is one of sequentiality,
the SS marker is -m(e)- and the DS marker is -c(e)- (and special subject agreement marker
paradigms are used); but if the temporal relationship is one of simultaneity, as in (21), both
SS and DS marking involves reduplication of part of the verb, and they are distinguished
from one another by the special subject agreement marker paradigms which are selected.17
In the weather verb clause in example (21), the word wa, 'water', occurs, and it could be
argued that this is the subject nominal and that it triggers third person singular subject
agreement This is possible, and it is also possible that wa is part of a compound verb
(which are ubiquitous in Amele); on the basis of the data and discussion presented in
Roberts (1987, 1988) it is impossible to tell. In either case, SS marking is unexpected, and
if wa is a normal subject nominal, this case will be subsumed under a type to be discussed
below involving inanimate subjects.
In addition to these two types of unexpected SS marking, at least the first of which is
arguably 'subjectless', we have two other kinds of example involving unexpected SS
marking in Amele, and both of these do involve normal subjects. Our third type of
example in Amele, then, is where the subject of the controlling clause is an inalienably
possessed body part, the possessor is referred to elsewhere in the clause, and the subject of
the marked clause also refers to the possessor. See example (22).
(22) Ija ta-taw-ig ija am-i wal-do-i-a
I SIM-stand-ls_SS I eye-Is spin-3s-3s-TodP
As I stood my eye(s) spun (= I became dizzy).
So again we have a non-subject experiencer which is coreferential with the subject of the
marked clause, as in the subjectless constructions in IQ, but in this case we also have
another NP which seems to be a completely normal subject, although it also indirectly
17 Reduplication is also used to mark iterative aspect, but Roberts (1987: 252) says that the reduplication
involved in switch-reference marking is distinguishable from this, i.e., (21) and (22) below do clearly involve
switch-reference.
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involves reference to this experiencer.
Finally, unexpected SS marking may occur when the controlling clause has an inanimate
subject: in this case choice between SS and DS is possible according to whether or not the
inanimate subject is presented as agentive. (I said above that if we analyse the weather
verb construction as involving a normal subject, wa, then it would assimilate to this type,
but this would not be strictly true if weather verbs necessarily required SS marking; I don't
know whether this is so or not.) In example (23) below SS is used despite clearly disjoint
subject nominals, and similarly in example (24) (from text). In (25) (also from text) DS is
used; that is the sun is presented as being agentive. Note that the clause with the
inanimate subject in (24), which is the second clause in the sentence, is itself marked as
DS with respect to a following clause that has the same subject as the first clause in the
sentence! This is despite the fact that there is still no new agent In chapter 5, an
explanation will be given for this asymmetry.
(23) Age qa q-u-fe-ig cal m-igi-an.
3p dog hit-PRED-SS/CD-3p dead become-3s-Fut
If they hit the dog it will die.
(24) M-i he-du-me-i ceta wal me-ce-b
put-PRED finish-3s-SS-3s yam ripe become-DS-3s
ceta eu hun-i-me-i...
yam that dig_up-PRED-SS-3s ...




na co-cob-on cam gagadic













As he walked to the garden the sun became strong so he went and
lay down in the shade of a galip tree and went to sleep.
mj-en
lie-3s RemP
To summarise, we have seen in Amele the following range of cases of use of aberrant SS
marking. Examples analogous to the first two types of case occurred in IQ as well.
(i) the controlling clause arguably has no subject but has an experiencer
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nominal, with some other grammatical relation, which is coreferential with the
subject of the marked clause (impersonal verbs).
(ii) the controlling clause has no subject and no other agent/experiencer
nominal (weather verbs on the compound verb analysis of them, or as in IQ
where they have no overt nominal argument).
(iii) the controlling clause does have a subject, but also has an experiencer
nominal, with some other grammatical relation, which is coreferential with the
subject of the marked clause (inalienably possessed body part examples).
(iv) the controlling clause does have a subject, which is not coreferential with
the subject of the marked clause, but which is inanimate and presented (by
virtue of the SS marking on the preceding clause) as nonagentive; the clause
therefore contains no agent/experiencer.
If we think in terms of two possible characteristics of clauses; one being whether the
clause has an overt syntactic subject, and the other being whether it has an
agent/experiencer nominal, then we have seen unexpected uses of SS marking in all four
logically possible combinations of these two parameters:
(a) has subject has agent/experiencer (type (iii))
(b) has subject no agent/experiencer (type (iv))
(c) no subject has agent/experiencer (type (i))
(d) no subject no agent/experiencer (type (ii))
We said at the end of the last section that Hypothesis 2 seemed like a reasonable account
of the data we had looked at in Imbabura Quechua. However, it turns out not to work as a
description of the Amele data, and hence would seem to have to be rejected also as a
crosslinguistic generalisation. We saw that in examples of type (iv), where the controlling
clause has an inanimate subject, both SS and DS marking was possible apparently
dependent upon whether the speaker wishes to present the inanimate subject as being
agentive or not. In fact in Amele it is possible to use DS marking in the other three types
of impersonal construction as well (unlike in IQ) - but it has a causative effect, indicating
that some unspecified agent is involved. So as in the inanimate ones, the use of DS
indicates that there is agentivity associated with a protagonist in the following (controlling)
clause: with the inanimate examples, this agentivity is associated with the inanimate subject
referent, but in the other examples, it is attributed to some external and unspecified entity
(type (iii) also has a subject nominal with which agentivity could be associated, but this is
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the body part nominal, although it would not be odd for agentivity to be associated with
some part of an entity's body and the entity as a whole to be treated as an experiencer).
Examples (26) - (28) illustrate the use of DS marking with causative import for types (i)
(impersonal verb), (ii) (body part subject) and (iii) (weather verb) of impersonal
constructions in Amele (type (iv) with the inanimate subjects was discussed above).
(26) Ija be-ce-min wen te-i-a
I come_up-DS-ls hunger ls-3s-TodP
I came up, and something made me hungry.
(27) Ija ta-taw-igin ija am-i wal-do-i-a
I SIM-stand-ls_DS I eye-Is spin-3s-3s-TodP
As I stood something caused my eyes to spin.
(28) Ija co-cob-igin wa he-do-i-a
I SIM-walk-ls_DS water finish-3s-TodP
As I walked along something made the rain stop.
Such examples are counterexamples to Hypothesis 2, because it predicts that any
occurrence of DS will indicate that there is a subject nominal in the controlling clause and
that this subject nominal has disjoint reference with the subject of the marked clause, but
this does not seem to be how DS marking is functioning in these examples: in examples
like (26) (at least), there is no clearcut subject nominal, and more importantly, DS does not
seem here to be identifying a relation between entities referred to in the clauses in
question, but rather it seems to be being used to generate an implication that some entity
not otherwise referred to is agentively involved in the situation. This is clearly something
of a functional extension of the DS marker, but the meaning which we give to it normally
should help explain how such an extension is possible.
Given all of this evidence, the final proposed definition is formulated as Hypothesis 3
below. Crucially, it assumes that as well as a notion of subject, we need a notion of
agentivity. Many SR languages manifest aberrant uses of the SS marker, and a large subset
of these is predicted by Hypothesis 3. How these ideas relate to the differing theories of
subjecthood referred to in passing above, will not be considered here. At present, I
consider it of more fundamental importance to reiterate that whatever is going on in the
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examples we have looked at, it is NOT simply coreference, which assumes first that both
clauses have referential subjects, and secondly that they refer to the same thing.
HYPOTHESIS 3:
SS indicates that there is no new (i.e. disjoint) agentive subject in the
controlling clause.
DS indicates that there is a new (i.e. disjoint) agentive subject in the
controlling clause.
Note that under this modified definition it is still the case that the definition of DS is more
restricted than that of SS, which covers the three cases:
(i) cases where the controlling clause lacks a subject nominal;
(ii) cases where the controlling clause does have a subject but it is not an
agentive subject;
(iii) cases where the both clauses have agentive subjects and these are
coreferential.
Supporting data
This analysis is supported by data from a number of other switch-reference languages. In
section 2.3 of this chapter we shall discuss data from Eastern Porno (based on McLendon
1975, 1978), which differs from Amele and IQ in that it is a 'Split Ergative' language with
what Dixon (1979) describes as 'Split' and 'Fluid' case marking of intransitive arguments
depending on whether they are presented as grammatically agentive or not: in Eastern
Pomo the SS marker indicates coreference and same agentivity value (either agentive or
not) and the DS marker indicates either disjoint reference or difference in agentivity value
or both. Related facts obtain in Northern Pomo (O'Connor & Caisse 1981) and in Barai
(Olson 1978).18
Data which is closer to that in IQ and Amele apparently occurs in Old Japanese (Akiba
18 In addition to the references already given, there has been some discussion of weather verbs and in¬
alienable possession in Langdon & Munro (1979) and D. Payne (1980) which should be followed up. Lang-
don & Munro indicate that languages vary in whether they take two weather verb clauses to have the same or
different switch-reference pivots; Payne (p.98) shows that Chickasaw takes them to be the same. Payne
(p. 104) also discusses possession: in Chickasaw, DS is used when either or both pivot is an expression of in¬
alienable or unmarked possession, and either SS or DS may be used when inalienable possession is involved.
Gordon (1983) provides examples from Maricopa which suggest that when inalienably possessed subjects are
involved switch-reference marking is nevertheless determined strictly on the basis of co/disjoint reference
between surface syntactic subjects. Much comparative work remains to be done.
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1977: esp. 612-3). The SS marker is te and the DS markers (which have the same form as
certain case markers) are ba, wo and ni. Switch-reference marking occurs on non-final
verbs in a coordinated string, or chain, of clauses, the last of which manifests full verbal
inflection. Non-final forms of verbs (including the switch-reference marked forms) have
different shapes according to the conjugation type of the verb: the capital letters I, U,
URU, E and A in the glosses indicate particular conjugation types. As well as occurring
before switch-reference marking, these conjugation type endings also occur before
auxiliaries such as honorifics, and tense/aspect. There is unrestricted deletion of subject
nominals. Akiba looked at the occurrence of switch-reference marking vis-a-vis reference
relations in texts, and with respect to the text from which the examples are taken, Taketori
Monogatari (dating from the beginning of the 9th century), he reports that 94% of uses of
the morpheme te did in fact represent coreference of subjects, but that the remaining 6%
represents cases where the subject of one clause was unclear or non-referential, as in
expressions of time, distance, and weather, and in idiomatic expressions lacking an overt
subject In all these cases the clause is either devoid of a surface subject or the subject
could never be definite (as in 'rain falls'). (29) - (31) give examples of expressions of
time, distance, and weather respectively, and (32) is an example with an idiomatic
expression. Unexpected uses of SS marking also occurred in cases where the subject
nominal was an expression of inalienable possession, as in (33).19
(29) Mi- ka bakari ar-i-te,
three day about be-I-SS
kog-i-kaher-i-tamah-i-n-u
row-I-return-I-HON-I-PERF-U
(He) rowed back home in about three days. (Lit 'there was time about
three days, and ...')
(30) Umi goto ni aruk-i-tamah-u-ni, ito tooku-te, Tukusi no
sea every to go-I-HON-URU-DS very far-SS Tukusi GEN
no kata no umi ni kog-i-id-e-n-u
GEN area GEN sea to row-out-E-PERF-U
(He) went to every sea, and (it) was very far, and (he) rowed out as far
as the area of Tukusi.
19 It is not clear why DS marking appears on the first verb in example (30); one would expect SS mark¬
ing since the following clause is an expression of distance.
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(31) Sukosi hikar-i-te, kaze ha nao hayaku huk-u
a-little flash-I-SS wind TOP/SUB still fast blow-U
(The lightening) flashed a little, and the wind still blew fast.
(32) Oya wo hazim-e-te nan to mo sir-a-zu
parent DO begin-I-SS what COMP even know-A-NEG
Beginning from (= including) (her) parents, nobody knew what (it was).
(33) On-me ha siro-me ni-te, hus-i-tamah-er-i
HON-eye TOP-SUB white-eye be-SS lie-down-I-HON-I-be-U
(Hisp eyes were white eyes, and (hep was lying down.
Inanimate subjects in Imbabura Quechua
We have seen that Hypothesis 2 has to be ruled out for Amele, and hence also as a
crosslinguistic generalisation. So at this point, we should return to the IQ data, as
promised, to see whether there are any examples not already discussed which have a
bearing on the adequacy of Hypothesis 2 for this language, and to see how our new
definition, Hypothesis 3, stands up to the IQ data.
First, note that Hypothesis 2 subsumes Hypothesis 3 as a more specific case. Hypothesis 2
says that SS indicates lack of disjoint subject, and Hypothesis 3 says it indicates lack of
disjoint agentive subject. Choice of Hypothesis 3 over Hypothesis 2 for Imbabura
Quechua will be dependent upon finding examples with SS where there is a disjoint subject
but it is not an agentive subject
We saw in our earlier discussion of IQ, two of the four cases of aberrant SS marking
which were identified in Amele. Type (iv), where SS could be used if the subject of the
controlling clause was an inanimate and non-coreferential nominal, was not investigated:
are there any comparable cases in IQ? It turns out that there are, but the data is
interestingly complex. The problematic cases involve controlling clauses which contain
one of the following:
(i) non-weather verbs with dummy subjects
(ii) inanimate subjects
(iii) subjects of passive clauses
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All examples are from Cole (1983), who claims (p. 8) that the pattern of unexpected SS
marking to be described below is found only with the subjunctive noun clause type of
switch-reference; analogous examples with the adverbial clause type, he says, require DS
marking (note that this is compatible with his claim, mentioned earlier, that unexpected SS
marking in subjectless constructions occurs only in subjunctive noun clauses). Examples
are given in (34)-(37): as is clear from these, sometimes SS is used, sometimes DS,
depending on the person of the subject nominals in a way to be described below. (34) and
(37) are examples with a dummy subject in the controlling clause, (35) is an example with
an inanimate subject, and (36) is an example with a passive construction, which in IQ
involves two nominatively case marked NPs, and, Cole says, no 'real' subject. In all the
examples, the symbol [ ] stands for a choice between the following: a 'zero' or omitted
subject, which means arbitrary reference, or one of the pronouns nuka, 'I', or kan 'you'.
(34) a. Chishi-mi [ ] sacha-man ri-ngapaj
late-WIT forest-to go-SS
[ ] = 0, nuka, kan (ARB, I, you)
It is late for one/me/you to go to the forest.
b. Chishi-mi Juzi sacha-man ri-chun
late-WIT Josd forest-to go-DS
It is late for Josd to go to the forest
(35) a. Chay kipi llashaj-mi ka-rka [ ] apa-ngapaj
that bag heavy-WIT be-3PAST take-SS
[ ] = 0, huka, kan (ARB, I, you)
That bag was too heavy for one/me/you to carry.
b. Chay kipi llashaj-mi ka-rka pay apa-chun
that bag heavy-WIT be-3PAST he take-DS
That bag was too heavy for him to carry.
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(36) a. Wawa-ka mama mikuchiy tukushka-mi
child-TOP mother fed became-WIT
ama [ ] kijari-ngapaj
not complain-SS
[ ] = 0, nuka, kan (ARB, I, you)
The child was fed by the mother in order that one/he/I/you not complain
b. Wawa-ka mama mikuchiy tukushka-mi
child-TOP mother fed became-WIT
ama Juzi kijari-chun
not Josd complain-DS
The child was fed by the mother in order that Josd not complaia
(37) a. Ali-mi [ ] Juzi-wan parla-ngapaj
good-WIT Josd-with speak-SS
[ ] = 0, huka, kan (ARB, I, you)
It is good that one/I/you speak with Josd.
b. Ali-mi pay Juzi-wan parla-chun
good-WIT he Josd-with speak-DS
It is good that he speak with Josd.
SS marking is used for any case except where the marked clause contains a third person
subject which has disjoint reference from the 'dummy' or third person inanimate subject of
the controlling clause. That is, SS is used if the subject of the marked clause refers to the
speaker or hearer or to some arbitrary referent (the latter of course possibly including both
speaker and hearer). DS marking is used if the subject of the marked clause refers to some
individual other than speaker or hearer. The way this is described by Cole is to say that a
person or animacy hierarchy is involved, of the kind which Michael Silverstein postulates
(see Silverstein 1976); the figure in (38) encodes those aspects of such a hierarchy which
would be relevant to describing the IQ data (this is a subset or version of the hierarchy
which Silverstein proposes).
(38) 1st
2nd > (non-agentive) 3rd
ARB
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The reason why the qualification 'non-agentive' third person is used, is that not all first
person, second person or arbitrary referents outrank all third person referents, as is shown
by example (4) at the beginning of this section, repeated below: in this case without the
qualification one would expect the first person subject of the marked clause to outrank the
third person subject of the controlling clause, and SS marking to be used. Agentive third
person subjects are on a par with those to the left hand of the arrow in the hierarchy.
(4) Tayta Kitu-man kacha-wa-rka ftuka chaypi yachuju-chun
father Quito-to send-lS-3PAST I there learn-DS
Father sent me to Quito to study there.
Cole then proposes the following definition of SR for Imbabura Quechua, at least for the
subjunctive noun clause type of SR:
HYPOTHESIS 4:
SS is used if the subject of the marked clause is higher on the hierarchy
than the subject of the controlling clause (this is taken to include the case
where the two subjects are coreferential, since in such a case by definition the
marked clause subject is highest).
DS is used in any other case; i.e. if the two subjects have disjoint
reference AND the subject of the marked clause is not higher on the
hierarchy than that of the controlling clause.
Notice that this hypothesis also covers all four cases that we identified in Amele. This
hypothesis is not incompatible with Hypothesis 3, it is just more specific than it.
Hypothesis 3 states that DS marking is used when the controlling clause has an agentive
subject nominal, and this subject has disjoint reference from the subject of the marked
clause. Hypothesis 4 states that DS marking will be used when the controlling clause has
a subject nominal which refers to speaker or hearer or to some agentive third person, and
where this subject nominal is thereby disjoint in reference from the subject of the marked
clause. It seems very reasonable that subject and hearer should be seen as archetypical
agents. So we could see Hypothesis 3 as a universal condition on the use of switch-
reference markers, and Hypothesis 4 as a language-particular realisation of it, which makes
it more specific by further specifying what is to be seen as more or less agentive. So
Hypothesis 4 represents a language-particular marriage of two universal conditions. What
is envisaged is similar to the typological treatment of relative clauses, where particular
languages choose specific relative clause strategies which must nevertheless conform to
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universal relative clause hierarchies.
Conclusion
In this section, 'unexpected' uses of SS marking in Imbabura Quechua, Amele and Old
Japanese have been discussed, and it has been claimed that similar uses are found in a
number of other switch-reference languages. All the cases considered were found to
involve relations between clauses one of which involved an 'impersonal construction' of
some kind, or had an inanimate subject NP. We saw that while in a few cases of
unexpected SS marking it was the marked clause which was impersonal, in most cases the
impersonal construction was in the controlling clause.
A number of different types of impersonal constructions were involved. In Imbabura
Quechua we looked at three main groups of examples. First, we considered the
'subjectless construction', where no overt subject nominal is present in surface syntax, but
there is an 'experiencer' nominal which is marked with Accusative case and may cause
object agreement on the verb. Two main groups of predicates appeared in this construction:
a set of predicates, which included the -naya- desiderative construction and other
desiderative verbs, could optionally take the subjectless construction; and all physical
experiencer predicates obligatorily took this construction. The second group of examples
in Imbabura Quechua are weather verbs, which not only have no overt subject, but in fact
have no nominal arguments whatsoever. Finally, we looked at a group of examples where
the subject nominal in the controlling clause was either an 'empty' dummy subject, or a
non-agentive inanimate NP, or the surface subject in a passive construction. In Amele, we
looked at four groups of examples. First, examples with the Amele 'impersonal
construction' which include physical experiencer predicates, and where an experiencer
nominal triggers object agreement on the verb, and there is no clearly identifiable subject
nominal. Second, weather verbs again. Third, examples where the subject nominal was an
inalienably possessed body part, and an experiencer object nominal in the clause referred to
the possessor. And finally, clauses with inanimate subject nominals. In Old Japanese,
we looked at examples with weather, time or distance verbs; idiomatic expressions; and
inalienably possessed body parts. Some of these types of example were ones where there
were not two referring subject NPs available for the switch-reference relation to relate, and
some involved cases where the subject nominals both referred, but to different 'degrees' of
entity, in terms of their agentivity, or animacy.
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We saw that there are two generalisations which immediately suggest themselves in
looking at this data. First, in most of the cases in question although SS marking seems
strictly speaking to be aberrant, since the surface syntactic subjects of the clauses are not
coreferential, it is the case that there exists an experiencer nominal in the impersonal
controlling clause with which the subject of the marked clause is coreferential. Secondly,
in many of the cases in question, the impersonal controlling clause cannot really be said to
have a surface syntactic subject at all (so that when we say the subjects of the two clauses
are strictly speaking disjoint, this includes the case where they are disjoint by definition
because one of the clauses has no subject).
Given these two generalisations, we considered a number of ways in which the canonical
account of switch-reference could be modified so as to incorporate the unexpected uses of
SS marking. A basic premise was that the unexpected uses of SS should not just be
dismissed as exceptions, but that they have something interesting to tell us about the nature
of switch-reference: this premise is supported by the fact that similar examples occur in
geographically and genetically diverse switch-reference languages. The final proposal
(Hypothesis 3) was that all the cases in which SS marking could be used were accounted
for if we define SS as indicating only that there is no disjoint agentive subject in the
controlling clause. This incorporates cases where there are coreferential agentive subjects;
where the subject in the controlling clause is not coreferential but not agentive either; and
where there is no subject in the controlling clause. The fact that in the latter case it is
often found that the controlling clause contains a non-subject experiencer nominal which is
coreferential with the subject of the marked clause, is not relevant to the statement of
conditions on switch-reference, and is to be explained in terms of general principles of
discourse coherence.
Note that this final proposal is interestingly different from the canonical definition of
switch-reference because in the canonical definition, SS marking is the more restricted of
the two and DS marking is something of a default case, whereas in the final definition, it is
DS marking which is more restricted and SS marking is something of a default.
It is proposed that this final hypothesised definition is a universal statement of conditions
on switch-reference, with individual languages possibly adding further restrictions. If we
take up this position, the final definition is not incompatible with the fourth group of
Imbabura Quechua examples, taken from Cole (1983) and discussed at the end of this
section: Cole suggests that to account for these examples we must make reference to a
person or agentivity hierarchy of the kind proposed by Silverstein (1976), and redefine the
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switch-reference markers accordingly: SS is used if the subject of the marked clause
outranks that of the controlling clause on the hierarchy (which by definition includes cases
of actual coreference). What this means is that SS is used if the subject of the marked
clause is more agentive than that of the controlling clause: this can be seen as just a more
specific version of the final definition, with the language particular part coming in the
definition of what counts as more or less agentive.
Further support for this hypothesis is provided by Nichols (1983: 247 etc.) who claims that
the relevant definition of switch-reference pivot for the languages of the Northeast
Caucasus which she discusses, is that of 'most subject-like NP\ where this involves a
ranking of NPs along a number of dimensions - topicality, animacy, agency, affectedness -
that she says is equivalent to setting up a hierarchy of semantic roles, agent > experiencer
> patient etc.
A number of questions remain. One important issue is the assumption that it is possible to
identify for all the languages at issue a notion of 'surface syntactic subject', and that it is
just this notion which is relevant to the determination of switch-reference marking. It has
been argued within a number of theoretical paradigms over the past few decades that even
excluding distinctions between 'surface/syntactic' and 'logical' subjects, 'subject' is best
seen as a complex of properties which may be assigned to different NPs in the same
clause, at least in some constructions in some languages (see especially typological studies
of subject such as Keenan 1976, and work in Role and Reference Grammar such as Foley
& Van Valin 1977, Van Valin & Foley 1980). From another perspective, work on the
'Unaccusative Hypothesis' within Relational Grammar, Lexical Functional Grammar, and
Government and Binding Theory, has developed interest in whether we need to distinguish
between 'morphological' and 'syntactic' subjects, based on data from languages which
exhibit various kinds of 'quirky subject case marking'. It has not been possible to fully
address this problem here, but the import which it has for the data which has been
discussed is simple: if indeed we do need to distinguish different kinds of subjects, then it
is possible that in the languages in question, switch-reference operates in terms of one type
of 'subject' (morphological vs. syntactic, or role-oriented vs. reference-oriented, for
example), whereas other grammatical phenomena operate in terms of another kind.
However, this suggestion is open to the same objections as were made to the suggestion
that switch-reference operates in terms of agent/experiencer rather than surface subject:
chiefly, the examples in which there is no nominal argument which could be regarded as a
subject NP of whatever kind. We might try to exclude these cases by saying that SS is
simply the default, and that it occurs if there is no nominal argument in the controlling
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clause. But there are other problems with attributing switch-reference marking to one
particular set of subject properties: we discussed above some problems for the
morphological vs. syntactic subject distinction, and with respect to the role-oriented vs.
reference-oriented distinction, there is evidence to suggest that even in languages where
such a distinction seems motivated, switch-reference does not seem to operate consistently
in terms of one or the other (see, for example, Olson 1978).
2.3. Switch-reference in Eastern Pomo: Shifts in agentivity
Eastern Pomo is a Hokan language (spoken in California) which has been most extensively
studied by McLendon (1975, 1978). Its constituent order is not altogether rigid, but tends
to be SOV, and the marked clause usually, but not invariably, precedes the controlling
clause, to which it is subordinated as an adverbial clause. Switch-reference marking is by
suffixation on the verb. Eastern Pomo thus conforms to most of the formal criteria for
canonical switch-reference.
The following examples (McLendon 1978:7f.) are not problematic on a canonical account
of switch-reference. Note that coreferential arguments are deleted.20
(39) a. Haa kaluhu-y, siimaa merqakiihi
Sa:1SG went_home-SS, SA:0 sleep
I went home and then I went to bed.
b. Haa kaluhu-qan, map merqakiihi
S^:1SG went_home-DS, S^:3SG lay_down
I went home and then he went to bed.
20 The abbreviations A,P,S^,Sp used in morphemic glosses are grammatical functions which will be ful¬
ly explained below. Eastern Pomo is a 'Split Ergative' language with Split/Fluid-S marking; see Dixon (1979).
Dixon defines the 'core grammatical functions' S,A,P as: the sole argument in an intransitive construction (S);
that syntactic argument in a transitive construction which is the more agentive of the two in core clauses (A),
and that syntactic argument in a transitive construction which is the more patient-like in core clauses (P);
languages with Split/Fluid-S marking treat the sole argument of an intransitive construction morphologically
like an A or like a P depending on whether its role is that of agent or patient
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(40) Miipal k i kox-qan muutitki-y muudala
P:3SG A:3SG shot-DS curl_up-SS die
He
j shot him2 (and he^) curled up (and hCj) died.
Like many other Hokan languages, Eastern Pomo has a rather elaborate switch-reference
system. The four pairs of suffixes mark the following distinctions in meaning:
1. First, they all mark the clause suffixed as being a subordinate clause embedded in a
matrix clause. There are 11 dependent-verb forming suffixes in Eastern Pomo, all of
which indicate that the suffixed verb is syntactically subordinate. Of these, 8 are the
switch-reference suffixes described below. These seem to be true subordinate clauses
rather than medial clauses of the kind found in Papua New Guinea languages, however
McLendon does talk about them in terms of the formation of dependent-verbs, and it does
seem that the relationship between dependent and independent 'sentences' in Eastern Pomo
is somewhat different from that between main and subordinate clauses in English.
2. They mark temporal and logical relations between the events described by the clauses.
Specifically, there is a sequential/simultaneous contrast, and a crosscutting causal/unrelated
contrast
3. They mark co/disjoint reference between clause subjects, but this is a case where the
correlation between SS and coreference, DS and disjoint reference, is not absolute (see 4
and below). It is also problematic to what extent it is possible to define 'subjecthood' in
Eastern Pomo, but for the purposes of this paper we shall assume that it is possible.
4. They mark shift in agent/nonagent status of the protagonist, as indicated by the
morphological form of the pronoun subject (described below).
The system is set out in (41) (see McLendon 1975:89). 'el' is the event or state described
in the dependent, switch-reference marked clause, and '62' is the event or state of the
following controlling clause. '<' means 'before', 'O' means 'is simultaneous with', and
'=>' is the relation of logical implication. Certain rather complicated asymmetries between
SS and DS are ignored in the table since they are somewhat peripheral to the argument,
but they will be explained in due course.
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(41) The switch-reference system of Eastern Pomo.
SS DS
I. ei < e2 -iy/-y* -qan
n. e^ O -in/-n* -sa
OR e-j justifies ^
III. e^ < -p^i -p^ila
AND => ei
IV. e^ O ^2 -baya -iday/-day*




For both I and II SS marking, the subject may or may not be expressed.
We can illustrate the different temporal relations involved using a Reichenbachian model
(see Reichenbach 1947). Again, using e^ and
I.
el < e2
That is, the event in the marked clause precedes the event in the controlling clause
(translated by English 'after e^, then > 'when e^, then or lanc^ then e^, and then
For the DS marker only, if the marked clause follows the controlling clause rather
than (more usually) preceding it, the marker has the additional meaning of indicating a
causal relation between e^ and
II.
O &2 ' >
el'e2
That is, the event in the dependent clause is simultaneous with the event in the controlling
clause (translated by English 'was V-ing as 62'). This particular suffix pair is also used to
indicate a purely logical relation such that the event of the dependent clause justifies or
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explains the event of the controlling clause ('e^ that's why e2', 'ej in order to 62'):
whereas the SS marker can have either reading, the DS one can have only the logical
reading.
in.
ej < e2 1 1 >
el e2
That is, the event of the marked clause precedes that of the controlling clause (as in I) -
but m is a more specific version of I, since there is an additional constraint on the logical
relation between the two events, i.e. that the event in the marked clause is a prerequisite
for the realisation of the event in the controlling clause. (Translatable in English by 'when
ej, e2' or 'if e^ e2'.)
IV.
e1 Oe», i.e. e^ and e2 overlap - they are either simultaneous or
e2 begins at the time specified for e^ and continues after it.
>
Note that we have no information about aspect (or types of eventuality): there may be
distinctions between punctual and continuing events which might be important for IV and
for II. The pair in IV are translatable in English as 'while e^, e2', 'since e^, e2', etc.
There appears to be a difference between SS and DS, again.
Suffix pairs I and IV seem to indicate purely temporal relations, of precedence and overlap
respectively, whereas II and in indicate not just temporal relations (of overlap or
precedence), but as well or instead are used to indicate logical relations of justification for
(reason for) or necessary prerequisite. We need to know the answer to such questions as:
is the use of II in the sense of explanation restricted to cases where the subordinate clause
describes a state? Is the difference between the other sense of n, and IV, just a matter of
aspect (types of eventuality)?
The one clear generalisation we can make here is that the event of the marked clause, e^,
never follows the event of the controlling clause, e2> This is as we would expect on the
basis of the discussion in chapter 1.
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For information, Jacobsen (1983:156-7) sets out the system in a rather different way (see
42). He does not mention the SS suffix -baya listed in McLendon (1978), and he
attempts to rationalise the system by taking seriously the fact that the SS and DS members
of pair II above have quite different meanings. He claims that one should not try too hard
to find a symmetrical system in Eastern Porno, and he also has access to unpublished work
by McLendon which may be the basis for the additional meaning he postulates for some of
the suffixes. I have no way of checking the differences between the two systems at the
moment, and they do not seem to materially affect the argument, so I will continue to
follow the published system from the original grammar in McLendon (1975).
(42) SS DS
-iy -qan anterior and motivating
-in simultaneous and motivating
-iday simultaneous
-sa past or habitual condition, motivating
i_ h
-p i -p ila future anterior prerequisite
Eastern Pomo has 'recapitulation clauses' which occur at the beginning of sentences and
carry switch-reference, thereby linking two sentences. These clauses may have actual
verbs (often repeated from the preceding clause) as is more common in Pomo languages
generally, or what are called 'utility verbs', which have the very general meanings 'to be
(thus)' or 'to do (thus)' and exist mainly to carry the switch-reference marking. In Eastern
Pomo the utility verbs which occur are: ?i-, 'do, and miin?i-, 'be'. All suffixes may appear
on these verbs.
Before looking more closely at the violation of the Functional Condition, we need some
further facts about Eastern Pomo. Its pronoun system is set out in (43) (McLendon
1978:2).
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(43) The pronoun system of Eastern Pomo.


























The forms in column I are agentive, and those in column II are nonagentive.
Eastern Pomo has a complicated 'Split/Fluid-S' system of ergativity (see McLendon 1978,
Dixon 1979).21 NPs which are either classed as animate or which refer to protagonists with
a high degree of control, take forms from column I. NPs which are either grammatically
inanimate or refer to protagonists with a low degree of control take forms from column II.
The animacy hierarchy is given in (44).
21 Mclendon (1978) presents the evidence for ergativity in Eastern Pomo, claiming that it is syntactically
ergative as well as morphologically: the lack of a passive; the presence of noun suffixes which mark the sub¬
jects of transitive verbs but not those of intransitive verbs; variation of the verb stem to show plurality in an








In particular, this means that the NP in an intransitive construction (intransitive S), is
treated either as an agent or as a patient, depending on the following factors:
(i) certain intransitive verbs (called 'patient-taking intransitives') always take the II form.
Examples are ?ecki 'sneeze', baakuu, 'fall'. The nature of the action is such that there is
no real possibility of protagonist control.
(ii) certain intransitive verbs take either agent or patient form (I or II) according to the
degree of protagonist control in the situation being described on a particular occasion.
These are called 'Split-S intransitives'. Examples are ceexel, 'slip/slide', i.e. 'slip
accidentally/slip deliberately', diiko, 'hit'. The examples in (45) and (46) are from
McLendon (1978:3).











I got bumped (accidentally).
b. Haa baatecki
Sa:1SG get_bumped
I got bumped (on purpose).
(iii) certain intransitive verbs (also called 'Split-S intransitives') take either agent or patient,
I or II form , depending on where the NP falls on the animacy hierarchy: animates take I
and inanimates take II. These verbs include the verb 'to sit' and other verbs of location and
directed action.
Transitive verbs normally take at least one patient NP (the 'object'). However, transitive
verbs also may take either agent or patient (I or n) forms for the other NP (the 'subject').
Transitive verbs are classified as either agent-taking or patient-taking. Examples of agent-
taking transitives are \aak, 'kill', qaanee, 'bite'. Examples of patient taking transitives are
verbs of emotional state like maaraa, 'love', ma?as, 'hate'. While column I forms are
used unmarked for agentive NPs occurring with intransitive verbs, for agentive transitive
verbs they are additionally marked by the subject marker he?(e)-.
To complete the picture, note that verbs which naturally occur with patients and not agents
can take agents if they have a causative or reflexive suffix.
It would seem that numerous lexemes in Eastern Porno have a feature for
agentivity/animacy/control (verbs require an agentivity feature; nouns are talked about in
terms of animacy, but there seems to be no reason why the verbal and nominal features
should not be the same, especially as they have the same effect grammatically). This
feature tells something about the type of event being described, and contributes to the
meaning of both the nominal and verbal elements in the clause. An approach of the kind
which will be described in chapter 5, using unification, is able to capture very nicely both
the implicit requirement that nominal and verbal elements should be compatible in
agentivity, and the percolation of agentivity features from nominal to verbal element and
vice versa. So Eastern Porno has a kind of agreement between nominal and verbal
elements, in agentivity value rather than is the more usual number, gender etc.
Now consider the examples in (47) (McLendon 1978:8).
(47) a. Hda xaaqaki-qan, wi qaalalmaya
S^:1SG took_a_bath-DS, Sp:lSG got_sick
Just because I took a bath, I got sick.
b. Wi qaalalma-qan, haa k^uyhi qoyuhuu
SpTSG got_sick-DS, S. :1SG didn't come
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Here, the NPs in the marked and contolling intransitive clauses are coreferential, yet the
DS marker is used. The clue to why this is so lies in the forms of the pronouns: in both
examples, one NP is agentive and the other is a patient. The DS marker is used to indicate
that there has been a switch in the agentivity of the 'subject' NP. Example (48) (from
McLendon 1975: 179) is similar.
* h'




After the fish was caught, the fish told the lady....
Analysis of the other examples given by McLendon confirms that SS and DS are used only
under the following conditions. SS is used only when the NPs in the switch-reference
relation are coreferential and share agentivity values (i.e. are both agentive or both
nonagentive). DS is used in all other cases: where there is a switch in agentivity, or where
agentivity is the same but there is disjoint reference, or where there is a switch in both.
The table below lists the patterns of pairs of clauses which actually occur in the data,
excluding cases where DS is used to mark disjoint reference but agentivity is the same.
(49) SS DS
A + SA Sp + A
SA + A SA + SP
SA + SA SP + SA
Sp + Sp
The fact that DS is used whenever there is a difference between the NPs, either in
reference or in agentivity or both, means that one cannot reliably predict from the
occurrence of DS that there is disjoint reference: one can only predict this from the
conjunction of occurrence of DS plus information to the effect that the agentivity is the
same, and this information is not available until the next clause is processed.
Finer's (1985a, b) account works for the SS morpheme, and for the DS morpheme when
there is in fact disjoint reference, but it gives the wrong predictions for DS when the NPs
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are coreferential.
It is important to point out that the Eastern Pomo system does not seem to involve the use
of switch-reference markers to indicate a switch in the identity of the agent per se. That
is, although it is a Split-Ergative system, in Eastern Pomo, as in other Ergative languages
with switch-reference systems, switch-reference operates on the basis of a Nominative-
Accusative definition of subject (as S and A functions). The switch-reference system has
been functionally extended so that it indicates not just identity of subject, but also whether
the agentivity value of the subject is the same or different. It would be easy to assume
that something rather different is going on (as Foley & Van Valin 1984: 119-129, 345
appear to, although it is not entirely clear what they mean here) because in cases where the
DS marker is used but there is coreference, the marking on the subjects involves one
marked like an A (a transitive subject) and one marked like a P (a transitive object).
Oswalt (1983: 288 etc.) indicates that there are also interactions with agentivity in
Kashaya, another Hokan language fairly closely related to Eastern Pomo. It is not clear
from what he says there whether the Kashaya system works in the same way or not. He
notes that in Kashaya, some verbs are 'personal' in that they can take a person or sentient
being as their agent and overt subject, while others are 'impersonal' in that they do not
normally take a person as agent and rarely have an overt subject. Some verbs can be
either, with personal use implying control of the event by the subject and impersonal use
implying lack of control. It sounds from this as if the distinction between the two kinds of
verbs, or usages, corresponds to that between verbs with A or SA subjects and verbs with
P or Sp subjects in Eastern Pomo. Oswalt further notes that although impersonal verbs (P
or Sp verbs?) do not normally have a subject: 'there is an agent in the sense that there is
something which is designated by the agential [switch-reference, L.S.] suffixes as the same
as, or different from, the agent of another impersonal verb' (p.288). In illustration, he




maadal sulam?-ba, mill choyi?-0.
her sicken-SS, that die-Abs.






It was then, when she had fallen sick, that she died.
It was then, when she had died, that they (unexpressed) prepared
her [for burial] ...
Oswalt says that in this example, whatever it was that caused the woman to fall sick (eg.
retribution for breaking a taboo, or guardian spirit of a taboo site) also caused her to die,
and that this is why the SS marker is used. However, the DS suffix in the second sentence
shows that whatever caused her death did not prepare her for burial; indeed it could not,
since do9qo9di9 is a personal verb here, with an animate agent implied.
The examples given by Oswalt are also compatible with a description of the kind proposed
above for Eastern Pomo, and further work needs to be done to determine the degree of
similarity between the two systems. There is clearly an interesting relationship between the
Hokan systems and those described in 2.2, as well, which is highlighted by Oswalt's
distinction between personal and impersonal verbs, and by the use of the notion of
'Unaccusativity' to account for Split/Fluid-S marking phenomena (eg. see Grimshaw
1987).22
2.4. Switch-reference in Lenakel: Shifts in temporal interval
Lenakel is an Austronesian language spoken in Vanuatu (Lynch 1983). As mentioned in
chapter 1, it has SVO constituent order, and switch-reference is marked by prefixation on
the verb of the dependent clause, which follows the controlling clause. Marked and
controlling clauses are in a coordinate, or (modified) clause-chaining relation. The SR
system is asymmetrical in that there is 'zero marking' of the DS option: DS clauses look
just like independent clauses, and two coordinated DS clauses look like two coordinated
independent clauses.
Lenakel violates the Functional Condition in a number of ways due to interactions between
22 Oswalt even notes (p.289) the relationship between verbal prefixes concerning body parts, natural
forces, etc. with the 'personality' of the verb.
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referential mariting and other factors.
The most relevant of these interactions here is with tense. Tense is normally overtly
marked on all verbs, although it may be deleted under certain circumstances. If two
clauses are conjoined by simple parataxis but one is future tense and one not, then only DS
is possible, regardless of whether the subjects are coreferential or have disjoint reference.















(and) FUT-3SG-eat (zero DS)
Magau has come and will eat (later).
In example (53) both clauses are future tense, with the future tense suffix t- obligatorily
deleted from the second, marked verb. The clauses also share the same subject referent.
In this case SS may be used. However, in (54a), although the clauses have coreferential
subjects, SS maiking may not be used because the controlling clause is past tense and the
marked clause is future tense. Instead, DS marking must be used, as in (54b).
DS thus functions to indicate that there has been a change either in chief protagonist or in
the temporal interval within which the events described occured. The future tense has a
special status in the language anyway, and given its common connection,
crosslinguistically, with irrealis mood, it would not be too surprising to find that DS
effectively marks a change of mood through maiking the temporal shift. This is for further
research to determine.
So in Lenakel as in Eastern Porno, strictly speaking, DS is ambiguous, and fails to signal
unequivocally whether the subjects of the two clauses are coreferential or not - although in
practice disjoint reference will normally be indicated by presence of an overt subject NP in
the marked, dependent clause, as in example (55).
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(55) Magau r-n-va kani lomhan t-r-augin
Magau 3SG-PERF-come and Lomhan FUT-3SG-eat (zero DS)
Magau has come and Lohman will eat.
There are other languages in which functional extensions of the switch-reference system
are intrinsically connected to temporal and/or modal meaning. One of these is again Amele,
which will be described in the next section. In chapter 1 we also saw that this kind of
aberration occurred in Tunebo and Guanano, languages in which the indication of whether
two eventualities occurred sequentially or simultaneously is more basic than an associated
SS/DS distinction, to the extent that the sequential marker, normally used for SS, may be
used even though there is disjoint reference as long as the events are sequential, and the
simultaneous marker, normally used for DS, may also be used when there is coreference as
long as the events are simultaneous - again provided also that there is explicit marking by
a norm or pronoun.
Just to round off the discussion of Lenakel, I will briefly indicate the other areas in which
the SR system violates the Functional Condition.
First, there is an interaction with the syntactic relation between the clauses which is
indicated by the presence of switch-reference marking. DS may mean that there is
coreference but a different relation between the clauses - that they are coordinate rather
than subordinate (here again in practice disjoint reference is shown by presence of an overt
subject). The reason this kind of thing happens is that in Lenakel, while SS clauses are
dependent ones, DS clauses are automatically given the status of independent clauses. SS
marking may only occur on a verb which is coordinate with the preceding verb; it may
also occur on the second of two clauses, both of which are subordinate to some other
clause. When the verb is not coordinate with the previous verb (either when it is
subordinate to it or superordinate to it), then DS marking must be used. Examples are
given in (56)-(58). In (56), the marked verb is subordinate to the controlling verb, so SS
may not be used despite the fact that the clauses have coreferential subjects. In (57), the
controlling verb is subordinate to the marked verb, and again SSmarking is disallowed.
Once again, these sentences would normally receive a coreferential interpretation, because















Magau ate when he came.




If he had come, he would have eatea
(58) Magau r-im-augin le nian tion r-va
Magau 3SG-PAST-eat LOC time John 3SG-come
Magau ate when John came.
Second, SS marking can sometimes be used when the subject of the verb is coreferential
with some other argument of the controlling clause. This happens if the two are
coreferential and the NP in question is different in number from the subject NP (so there is
no possibility of ambiguity). Examples are given in (59)-(60). SS may alo be used to
indicate coreference between the subject of the mariced clause and a non-subject argument
of the controlling clause, if it is impossible on semantic grounds for the subject of the
controlling clause to be the subject of the mariced clause. See examples (61)-(62). These
examples may be amenable to reinterpretation in terms of the discussion of impersonals
and inanimate subjects given in 2.2. It is not clear whether this is an obligatory or an
optional use of SS marking.
(59) Magau r-im-ho torn mine siak kani m-u-akimw
Magau 3SG-PAST-hit Tom and Siak and SS-DU-run:away
Magau hit Tom and Siak and they ran away.
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(60) Peravin miin k-im-ar-ofin nauginaan kam
woman PL 3NSG-PAST-PL-give food DAT
in kani m-ep-apul
him and SS-SEQ-sleep
The women gave him food and then he slept.
(61) I-im-alak-hiaav-in kesi m-pwalhepwalhe
lEXC-PAST-throw-down-TRANS pawpaw SS-splatter
I dropped a pawpaw and it splattered.
(62) I-im-os nelki kuri m-im-arpiko
lEXC-PAST-hold leg dog SS-PAST-thrash:about
I held the dog by the leg and it thrashed about.
2.5. Switch-reference in Amele: Shifts in time, place and world
In Amele, a DS marker may be used even where there is coreference, if there is a change
in time or place from one clause to the next, or a modal switch between an intended or
proposed action and a real action. Native speakers apparently explain such cases by saying
that the DS suffix marks the beginning of 'a new situation' ('something has changed')
(Roberts 1987:303ff.). These cases will be dicussed in detail in chapter 5. Representative
examples of a change in location, temporal interval, and modality are given in (63), (64),
and (65) respectively. Aberrantly marked verbs are in bold.
(63) Age ceta gul-do-co-bil 1-i bahim na tac-ein.
3p yam carry-3s-DS-3p go-PRED floor on fill-3p-RemP
They carried the yams on their shoulders and went and filled up
the yam store.
(64) Eu 1977 jagel November na
that 1977 month November in
odo-co-b cul-ig-en.
do-DS-3s leave-lp-3s-RemP
That was in November 1977 that he did that and then he left it for us.
- 98 -
(65) 'Hina gaim heew-ig-a eu mani-te-te-ra
2s crab hold-ls-TodP that roast-SIM-ls-2s-DS
ija sab met-ig-en,' do-n. Odo-co-b
Is food peel-ls-Fut 3s-3s-RemP do-DS-3s
sab met-en ijom.
food peel-3s-RemP EM
'You roast the crab that I caught for me while I peel the food,' she
told him. Then, alright, she really peeled the food.
These abberant uses of DS maricing are normally backed up by the presence of temporal or
locative adverbial expressions, verbs of motion, or aspectual verbs of termination and
inception, and in the case where a modal shift is indicated, it is usually quite clear that the
contrast is between an intended action and the real actioa Further discussion of linguistic
elements of the sentences which license aberrant DS maricing is given in chapter 5.
Roberts (1987, and more especially 1988) considers that this use of the switch-reference
system in Amele should be accounted for not in the syntax (as Finer attempts to do) but in
the pragmatics. As I said in chapter 1, I think the systematic nature of switch-reference
maricing, even in Amele, requires at least an initial attempt to handle it in the morpho-
syntax/semantics, although I also believe both that a Discourse Representation Theory
account has more potential than an account such as Finer's, and that there will be influence
from context in determining which of the range of potential meanings switch-reference in
Amele has is intended on a particular occasion. See the account in chapter 5.
The final example of violation of the Functional Condition also comes from Amele, where
it is common in narrative to begin a sentence with a 'recapitulation clause'; either a full
repeat of the final clause of the previous sentence, or a dummy verb ('to do', 'to finish').
The dummy verb can occur in a stereotyped form with third person singular subject and
object agreement marking ('He did it'), and when this happens, it functions to indicate that
a particular series of related events (or 'episode') is completed, and a new one is about to
begin. In such cases the dummy verb is marked with DS, even if the following clause has
the same subject as the previous one to which the recapitulation clause is supposed to
correspond. An example is given in (66); see Roberts (1987: 250ff.).
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(66) Eu nu qila i ege meen qaig eu
that for now this lp stone shoot that
mede qo-qo-na. He-do-co-b eu fal-doc
nose-3s-POSS hit-lp-Pres finish-3s-DS-3s that fence-INF
nu cabi sanan me-q-an.
for work start put-lp-Fut
So now we are gathering that money. When we have finished that we
will start to do the fencing work. [305, (629)]
According to Woodbury (1983), there is a related phenomenon in Central Yup'ik Eskimo
and other languages he studied, where there is some pressure towards ensuring continued
SS marking throughout a clause sequence which he refers to as a 'rhetorical unit' (defined
in terms of prosodic factors, external sandhi, sentence adverbial choice and placement, etc.)
- although a switch of rhetorical unit is not necessarily marked by DS. Munro (1983:228-
9) also notes that speakers of Mojave will use function changing (subject creating) thematic
processes to effect continued SS marking with a unified topic throughout a sequence
of clauses.
2.6. Conclusion
In addition to the unexpected uses of switch-reference markers which have been discussed
or mentioned in this chapter, Jacobsen (1983:152) notes reports of unexpected uses of SS
marking for Yavapai by Kendall (1975) and for Kiowa by Watkins (1976), and of
unexpected uses of DS marking for Yuma by Slater (1977), and for Choctaw by Davies
(1981). Jacobsen (1983:163) himself points to a possible aberrant use of DS marking in
Tonkawa.
It is notable that in all the cases discussed, what happens is that, an SS marked chain
having been established, it is possible for DS markers to develop additional functions,
indicating whether or not some other aspect of the eventuality has changed.
Unsurprisingly, the reverse does not happen, that is, the switch-reference system continues
to signal disjoint (agentive) subjects using the DS marker, even in circumstances when it is
redundant to do so, such as when person differences or the presence of overt NPs make it
absolutely clear that the pivot NPs are different. Although unexpected SS marking does
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occur, this is accounted for once we revise our definition of the switch-reference pivot and
of the nature of the reference relation between pivots, to take account of agentivity.
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Chapter 3 Theoretical conceptions of switch-reference
3.1. Introduction
Chapters 1 and 2 have given a comprehensive picture of switch-reference phenomena and
some discussion of the relationship between switch-reference and comparable phenomena
such as logophoricity. It should be clear from what has been said so far that the question
'how can one be sure when one is dealing with a switch-reference system?' (Munro
1980b:2) has been an important one for workers in this area. Researchers have had a fairly
concrete notion of what a 'canonical', 'classical' or 'true' switch-reference system looks
like, and have been concerned to produce a ruling on languages which fail to conform to
this profile in certain respects, such as Yup'ik Eskimo, the languages of the Northeast
Caucasus, Warlpiri, or Gokana. Thus, Munro (1980b:2) notes that 'most of the
participants [at the conference, L.S.] felt that the Eskimo "fourth person" system was not a
canonical switch-reference system'. Such decisions are not unrelated to the other
classificatory task which researchers have undertaken; that of trying to situate (canonical)
switch-reference with respect to other linguistic phenomena, such as for example
logophoricity or syntactic binding phenomena.
Why have these been such persistent preoccupations? After all, it would seem very
reasonable to take the position that the way some function is realised formally in a
language will be due to numerous factors which may themselves be amenable to systematic
description, such as the morpho-syntactic typology of the language, its historical
development, and functional or semantic universals (for example, the animacy hierarchy, or
links between nominal and temporal cohesive devices). For any particular language, some
system may be identifiable which has as one of its main functions the tracking of same or
different reference of major protagonists across clauses: any such system should
presumably have a fairly precisely definable place in the field of universally possible
formal/functional relations in this domain.1
It seems to me that the persistence of classificatory and terminological questions in the
literature has been due to two factors. The first is the idea that switch-reference is,
1 More graphically, one could define a space of features and then locate various systems by coordinates
in this space. 'Canonical' switch-reference and 'canonical' logophoricity presumably cluster around particular
(perhaps extreme) points in this space, and languages such as Gokana and Yup'ik Eskimo may fall somewhere
outside these clusters.
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somehow, rare, exotic or even aberrant (i.e. in 'violating' categorial iconicity). That is, it
is felt to be different from other means of tracking the reference of major protagonists
across clauses. There is some feeling that individuation of switch-reference on the basis of
structural criteria may capture this intuition, whereas if the functional similarities between
switch-reference and other devices are taken too seriously, we may lose the 'typological
value of the category'; thus Heath (1983:144) notes: 'In a broad definition we might even
say that Nunggubuyu does have switch-reference, though we would then perhaps be forced
to say that it occurs in all languages so that the typological value of the category would be
gone.' The formal characteristics which have been emphasised have been not only
marking on the verb, but also the pervasive nature of switch-reference marking, as not just
restricted to a few constructions, and not operating just when required for disambiguation.
See the consensus view of 'true' switch-reference reported by Munro (1980b:2) on the
basis of discussion of participants at the conference whose proceedings she is introducing.
This more or less rules out a characterisation of switch-reference as a purely pragmatic
device and as we shall see removes the possibility of seeing phenomena in other languages
such as English or Spanish as types of switch-reference.
The second factor is the theoretical desideratum of identifying a universal grammar which
will in the most economical and accurate way reflect the range of variation of human
languages. If there is a definable phenomenon called 'switch-reference', it should be
amenable to the same kind of account wherever it appears; if it is a type of reference
tracking, this should be expressible in terms of parameters of variation; and any variation
within switch-reference systems themselves should also be explainable in terms of
parameter setting.
I indicated in chapter 1 that I do not think switch-reference is 'weird' or aberrant because
it is marked on the verb; on the contrary, this seems to be a natural consequence of other
typological characteristics of the languages which exhibit it Nor does it make much sense
to call it 'exotic' except from the point of view of one's own native tongue, if this happens
to be a dependent-marking language such as English rather than a head-marking language
such as Amele. However, I do think that the fact that switch-reference is marked on the
verb is important just in that it allows the development of a multi-functional system which
combines reference-tracking with other elements.
We saw in chapters 1 and 2 that switch-reference systems exhibit considerable functional
complexity, both in the association of nominal reference tracking with the marking of
temporal and logical relations between eventualities, and in the kinds of functional
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extensions of DS marking which occur, which involve temporal, modal and aspectual
meaning, as well as notions of agentivity or control of the action.
The account which I propose assumes that the detailed description of switch-reference
phenomena given in the previous two chapters is accurate and crosslinguistically
representative, and also makes a number of other basic assumptions. The first is that the
two types of phenomena described in chapter 2 - the implication of agentivity in the
definition of the switch-reference pivot, and the functional extensions of DS marking - are
systematic enough and pervasive enough that any comprehensive and coherent theory of
switch-reference should at least provide the basis of an account for them. We must take
seriously the full range of functions switch-reference systems have, and the way they can
be seen as fitting into other paradigms besides that of reference tracking. The second
assumption is that it is not sufficient to assume that the 'canonical' function of switch-
reference systems will be handled in the morpho-syntax/semantics while the extended
functions will be handled pragmatically: given that there are a range of possible specific
interpretations of DS marking in the languages in question, discourse or pragmatic factors
may well be involved in the resolution of interpretation on any particular occasion, but as
we shall see in chapter 5, the functional extensions are grammaticised enough and form a
coherent enough set semantically, that it is possible to give a more interesting and unified
account of the semantics of switch-reference systems. The final assumption is that it is
desirable to aim for a syntax/semantics which is compositional and conforms to a 'rule-to-
rule hypothesis' whereby every syntactic rule is associated with a semantic rule.
In this chapter I shall briefly describe two previous informal theoretical conceptions of
switch-reference, that developed by Givdn (1983) and that developed by Haiman (1983).
These place different degrees of emphasis on the structural and functional similarities
between switch-reference and other phenomena and also reflect ideas about its origins. I
shall then propose a third way of thinking about switch-reference theoretically which is not
incompatible with these two approaches, but which provides a better basis for accounting
for the full range of functions of switch-reference systems, and therefore will underlie the
formal accounts presented in chapters 5 and 6.
Basically, I propose that we see switch-reference marking as a kind of clause-level
agreement, which normally marks the clause it occurs in as syntactically and semantically
dependent, and indicates whether there is continuity or discontinuity between the
eventuality described by the marked clause and that described by the controlling clause.
Eventualities may agree or disagree along various parameters, including not only their
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major protagonists, but also their temporal and spatial location, their actuality and their
place in a larger complex of eventualities which may be presented within a discourse. The
fact that pivot NP co/disjoint reference is in some sense primary then becomes something
of interest and remains to be explained.
3.2. Switch-reference as topic maintenance
As Haiman (1983:105) points out, 'since the discovery of switch-reference systems,
attention has been focussed primarily on their structural properties.' Although he assumes
that this is reasonable, others believe that this bias has been detrimental and that more
attention should be paid to functional properties. Givdn (1983), who puts the case most
strongly, argues that researchers have tended to ignore the fact that switch-reference can be
situated in a wider functional context.
It is worth expanding on Givdn's (1983) position in some detail, first because he makes the
fullest statement of the argument that switch-reference should be described as just a variant
of reference disambiguation, and second because he mentions in passing certain ideas
which support the proposal I shall put forward in 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
Givdn believes that there are certain functions which languages can fulfil, and that the
formal phenomenon characterised as 'switch-reference' (with the formal characteristics
described in chapter 1) is just one way of fulfilling a particular function: namely, what he
calls 'topic continuity'. 'Topic continuity' is more complex than and subsumes referential
tracking.
Givdn sees the clause as the basic information-processing unit in conversation, and sees
clauses as combining to form 'thematic paragraphs', which may themselves combine into
larger coherence units, such as 'chapters' or 'stories' (i.e. types of units at the level of
discourse). That is, he works with a concept of clause sequence which is independent of
sentence boundaries, and which (it seems) is defined in an intentional and functional rather
than a structural way; though he does make some reference to structural criteria such as
intonation and syntactic clause boundaries.




III. Topic (or participant) continuity
The first pertains to the structure of the discourse above the level of the thematic
paragraph, and seems to involve considerations of genre, style, or even content. In the
paper at issue he says nothing further about it
The other two levels of continuity are involved in defining the structure of the thematic
paragraph and the syntax of clauses. Clauses are made up of one or more participants (or
topics), plus the verb (or predication).
Action continuity is the domain of chaining verbs or predications one after another within
the thematic paragraph in 'a way that coheres or makes temporal or causal sense' (p.54).
The grammatical subsystem principally concerned with this is the tense-aspect-modality
system, most commonly found as verbal bound morphology. It is this subsystem which
marks clauses as 'foreground' or 'background', i.e. as inside or outside the sequence of
action continuity; as clauses which maintain the sequence of action continuity and move
the action along, or which do not. Givdn says that 'while action continuity is often
inseparable in live discourse from participant/topic continuity, I will have little to say about
it here' (p.54). He adds in a footnote that occasionally, the same syntactic device is used to
code either action break or topic change - this is one manifestation of more general links
between nominal based and predicate based 'meaning',and we shall return to it below.
According to Givdn, thematic paragraphs in discourse are generally organised so that one
'nominal' tends to be the recurring 'topic' of the paragraph: that is, it tends to appear in
each successive foreground clause in the paragraph. This is what is meant by topic
continuity: the maintenance of one topic via its occurrence as a nominal in each of the
clauses which maintain action continuity.2
Givdn also recognises a continuum of 'continuity values'. At different points in a thematic
paragraph a topic will have different continuity values. For example, at the beginning,
supposing it is a new topic, it breaks the continuity of the preceding paragraph's topic
chain, whereas later manifestations maintain the continuity of the current chain. Topic
continuity is the unmarked case and, Givdn says, easier to process (this fits the fact that SS
appears to be the unmarked case in switch-reference systems, but leaves us with something
2 'Topic' is a nonatomic discourse-functional entity, whereas 'subject' is defined as an again nonatomic
'grammaticalised/systemised topic'. Languages differ in the extent to which the function of topic is grammati-
calised (see Li & Thompson 1976).
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to be explained in that in logophoric systems it is noncoreference which is unmarked).
There are degrees of discontinuity depending on distance, number of potential topics, and
other factors pertaining to the potential difficulty of topic identification.
Differences in the syntactic coding of the topic NPs are dependent on such considerations
as the continuity value of the topic. Givdn sees intonational and word order constraints as
just as important and highly pertinent to this functional domain as morphological contrasts.
He identifies a number of pairs of contrasting formal features which act as devices to
indicate topic continuity vs. discontinuity, at various continuity levels - such as an
opposition between stressed and unstressed pronouns. As well as different devices being
used at different levels of continuity, different languages also make different choices from
the devices available. It is these devices which he compares to switch-reference.
For example, one such device used in English is an opposition between the use of
contrastive stress on a pronoun and the unmarked case of the use of non-contrastive stress.
Compare the following pair of sentences, where contrastive stress is indicated by bold type
(see also Givdn 1983:58).
(1) He went North and he went South.
(2) He went North and he went South.
Here, contrastive stress is used to indicate topic discontinuity, or disjoint reference between
subjects (a switch in the subject of the clause), while the unmarked case is topic continuity,
or same subject of the clause. Givdn claims that universally, lower intonation or stress
signals predictability and continuity, while higher prosodic value signals discontinuity,
surprise or new information. See also Brown & Yule (1983), Prince (1981) etc. on these
matters.
A further contrast, again from English, is exhibited in the following pair of sentences (from
Givdn 1983:66):
(3) Before he left, John talked to Bill.
(4) Before leaving, John talked to Bill.
In (4), where there is deletion of the subject, continuity of reference of the subject NPs is
assumed. In (3), the first clause has an overtly coded subject, and this may be read as
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coreferential with either NP in the following clause.
Two other devices which Givdn identifies include:
(i) The opposition of grammatical agreement (or 'bound pronouns') and
independent pronouns in pro-drop languages such as Spanish.
(ii) Word order differences eg. in Biblical Hebrew, where the SV word order is
used to encode disjoint subject reference, and VS order to encode same subject
reference.
In fact, Givdn sees bound pronouns as comparable with unstressed ones, and independent
pronouns as comparable with stressed ones. A further possibility is simple zero anaphora,
and languages differ in which pairs of devices are opposed: English opposes stressed and
unstressed pronouns; Spanish opposes agreement and free pronouns; Japanese opposes zero
anaphora and free pronouns.
The use of word order as a continuity device is interesting from the point of view of the
argument to be developed in this chapter. In Early Biblical Hebrew the word order
distinction described above correlated very closely with the use of aspect. Perfect aspect
was used with SV word order to code out of sequence or anterior clauses, and imperfective
aspect was used with VS word order to code sequential clauses. Thus, as Givdn notes,
there was almost complete agreement between the two major indices of continuity in
discourse: of action, coded by the aspects, and of the topic NPs, coded by the word order.
Notice how his interpretation of the data is constrained by his requirement that the
language conform to the principle of categorial iconicity. In Ute, too, SV/VS order are
distinguished, with SV coding reintroduced definite NPs after a long absence and newly
introduced indefinite subjects (the most discontinuous topic NPs); while VS order codes
other NPs. This applies not just to subject but also to object NPs. It is interesting to
speculate as to why SV or OV codes discontinuous topics, while VS or VO codes
continuous ones.
In summary, the choice of devices available is taken to include the following major
options.3
(a) AGREEMENT vs. FREE PRONOUNS
3 This does not exhaust the full range of devices discussed by Givon (1983).
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(b) UNSTRESSED vs. STRESSED PRONOUNS
(C) FINITE CLAUSES vs. NONFTNITE GERUNDIVE NOMINALISATIONS
(d) WORD ORDER DIFFERENCES
Those of the strategies for reference which refer to the form of NPs are arranged in a
hierarchy tied to the degrees of continuity to be expressed.4
ZERO ANAPHORA > UNSTRESSED PRONOUNS/AGREEMENT MARKERS >
STRESSED PRONOUNS/FREE PRONOUNS > FULLY LEXICAL DEFINITE NPs.
The strategy is that one starts as low as possible in the hierarchy (i.e. as far to the left as
possible) and that sticking to the same level indicates continuity whereas moving up a level
indicates a discontinuity; the general principle being that the more predictable the
information, the less coding it receives. For example, zero anaphora in English indicates
coreference; a shift in the subject/topic will normally precipitate a move to the next level
up, i.e., use of a personal pronoun (although the reverse does not always hold, i.e. use of a
pronoun may not always indicate disjoint reference).
In this context, Giv6n makes two claims about switch-reference. First, that it is functionally
just- like these devices, even though, unlike them, it violates categorial iconicity (a point
which he does not really discuss). Second, that historically, we are led to hypothesise that
switch-reference systems developed from one or other of these processes.5
In fact, Giv6n discusses a number of hypotheses about the development of canonical
switch-reference from a range of such coding devices, in some cases giving examples from
languages where such a development seems to have taken place or currently to be taking
place. He then tries to judge which process is the most likely precursor of switch-
reference devices - although he does acknowledge that the origins of switch-reference
might be heterogeneous, this is apparently not a preferred option. The hyptheses
considered are:
(i) Switch-reference developed from a contrast between zero anaphora, agreement
or unstressed pronouns (SS) and free or stressed pronouns (DS). (This seems to
4 It is not clear where the other devices such as word order contrasts fit on this hierarchy.
5 Note that the assumption here is that switch-reference is inherently a less 'natural' way to mark topic
continuity than these other processes, in which case one wonders what caused it to develop from them.
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have happened in Lango, an East African language.)
(ii) Switch-reference developed from a contrast between participial or nominalised
clauses (SS) and finite clauses or other subject marked clauses (DS). (He gives
examples from Latin, Classical Greek and Amharic.)
(iii) Switch-reference developed from word order contrasts as in Hebrew.
(iv) Switch-reference developed from deictic-related morphemes (contrasting
'proximate' SS and 'remote' DS) (Persian provides a possible example.)
(v) Switch-reference developed from a pronoun-deictic contrast between first
person (SS) and non-first person (DS) agreement (as in Sherpa).
There is no space to discuss these fully here. Givdn rules out (iii) and thinks (iv) unlikely,
(v) represents the possibility that switch-reference systems may develop from logophoric
ones, since the Sherpa data appears to indicate a logophoric system in that it is restricted to
the reporting of direct or indirect speech, and is restricted in person. Givdn believes a
pronominal or deictic origin (i or v) is most likely for non-anticipatory switch-reference,
and claims that one could build up a reasonable argument to support the same origin for
anticipatory switch-reference (cf. p77) as a contrast of subject pronouns on following
clauses which got cliticised to the preceding clauses.6
I think we must see Finer's claim that switch-reference should be handled as a binding
phenomenon as falling into the category of switch-reference as defined by its function, as
an instance of the referential tracking approach. Focussing on the Function Condition led
Finer to see switch-reference as a type of syntactic binding on a par with other sentence-
bound anaphoric phenomena which are accounted for by the binding theory, such as
reflexives (his example). Finer's is clearly a very different approach to Givdn's, however,
because it requires that we take a sentence grammar perspective of switch-reference,
whereas Givdn's is a discourse approach.
Somewhat similar ideas to those discussed in this section inform Woodbury's (1983)
description of switch-reference in Yup'ik Eskimo. His conception of switch-reference is
similar to that of Givdn in that he too sees switch-reference as a referential tracking device,
and also considers the way it fits into a theory of discourse cohesion more generally.
6 Givon (1983:77) defines 'canonical switch-reference' as being of two kinds, anticipatory or non-
anticipatory, depending on whether or not the marked clause precedes or is superordinate to the controlling
clause.
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Woodbury considers switch-reference in Central Yup'ik Eskimo from the perspective of a
concept of rhetorical structure, and generalises this to other languages. The rules which
have normally been given for switch-reference devices in Eskimo have always been known
to be inadequate in that there is a group of counterexamples, arising in actual texts but not
elicited material, which they do not account for. Woodbury claims that these
counterexamples lead to a set of conclusions about discourse organisation.
For Woodbury, the rhetorical structure of a discourse is signalled by rhetorical units
signalled by grammatical devices including intonation and adverbials.
Eskimo languages have two devices which indicate switch-reference, both formally part of
the inflectional system. The first is the appositional mood, used to mark a clause in
apposition to another clause with which it (usually) shares a (transitive or intransitive)
subject - a bit like English 'while V-ing, NP V-ed'. Chains of appositionally marked
clauses represent a loose stringing along of propositions and an implication of simultaneous
or sequential time relation between them. The appositional mood (which is in a class of its
own), generally marks clauses that either are appositive or subordinate to other clauses, and
whose subjects are usually coreferential with the subjects of those clauses. Note that in
addition to marking mood, every verb ending cross-references the person and number of
the verb's core arguments. Unlike the other switch-reference device in these languages, to
be discussed below, this is a restrictive switch-reference mechanism, and can only be used
if the subject of the marked clause and the subject of the controlling clause are
coreferential. If the subjects are not coreferential, an entirely different construction must
be used, because there is no construction with all the syntactic and semantic effects of
apposition but which indicates disjoint subject reference.
The second device which he describes as a switch-reference system is the reflexive vs.
plain third person distinction (sometimes called fourth vs. third person) - which indicates
that a NP is coreferential or noncoreferential with the (transitive or intransitive) subject of
a controlling clause in a specific structural relationship to it. As we have seen, this
contrast is restricted to the third person, and may involve non-subject NPs. I suggested that
it could be regarded as an obviative or perhaps a logophoric system instead of a switch-
reference system, depending on how these phenomena are considered to relate to one
another. When a third person nominal NP of a dependent clause is coreferential with the
subject of a controlling clause, it is treated as fourth person, and marked as such by means
of a fourth person cross-referencing in the ending of the verb of its own clause.
Otherwise, a third person subject NP is treated as plain third person.
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The counterexamples to be explained are ones in which the appositional mood is used even
though the subjects of the related clauses are not coreferential. Woodbury claims that this
results firom an understandable pressure to use the appositional construction even when its
coreference conditions are not met - a functional pressure brought about by the uniqueness
of the appositional construction and lack of a comparable option for indicating disjoint
reference.
His analysis for these examples assumes that there are two formal-functional systems,
partially overlapping, which organise switch-reference in Central Yup'ik Eskimo. The first
system is the system of inflectional categories, and the surface syntactic analysis it presents
based on the inflectional notions of subject, transitivity, clause, sentence. It is in terms of
such notions that the 'ideal' version of switch-reference is formulated. The second system
is the system of rhetorical structure. An idiosyncratic definition is given of this (p.292): 'by
which I mean the structural analysis of the surface utterance in Central Yup'ik that is
evident from intonation, external sandhi, and sentence adverbial choice and placement'.
Basically, the system of rhetorical structure is centred around discourse level prosodic
systems, but with some non-prosodic additions. On the basis of such markings, he defines
a hierarchy of units of rhetorical structure. The general argument is that narrative
performance is better rendered in a kind of fine, verse and stanza poetic or dramatic
format, than in terms of inflectionally defined units such as clause and sentence.
Woodbury says that, particularly in narrative, units of rhetorical structure often set the
boundaries within which switch-reference operates, even when they are at variance with
inflectionally defined units like clause and sentence, which are canonically seen as setting
the bounds of switch-reference marking.
The units of rhetorical structure in Central Yup'ik, from smallest to greatest, are: WORD;
MINIMAL INTONATION UNIT; LINE; SUBGROUP; GROUP; SECTION. Sandhi joins
words to form minimal intonation units which have one of four basic intonation contours.
The line is bounded by a pause or breath or emphatic closure of an intonation contour.
Only certain sequences of minimal intonation units are allowed to co-occur as lines. The
pauses between groups are longer than those between lines. The first word of a group is
often a sentence adverbial particle or enclitic. Sections are bounded by long pauses and
tend to end with a short group with a particular intonation contour. They are felt to have
unity of content by speakers. One of the main arguments for the claim that such a system
of rhetorical structure actually exists in the language is the degree to which intonationally
identifiable units of rhetorical structure coincide with the placement of enclitics and
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sentence adverbial particles.
The functions of rhetorical structure in Central Yup'ik are explicated by Woodbury
(1983:302). Its semantic functions are not very interesting. But, he says: 'Syntactically,
rhetorical structure cannot be said merely to be read off, that is, deteimined by,
inflectionally signalled surface syntactic structure, for it often carries original, non-
recoverable syntactic information'. The effects on switch-reference provide one of the
arguments for this conclusion.
In the terms of the system of inflection, a (major) sentence is defined around a main clause
which is independent or has participial mood. However chains of 'SS-marked' appositional
mood clauses may also occur. In narrative, main clauses can be scarce, while appositional
chains are common. However as I noted above, the appositional clauses do not maintain
the same referent as subject throughout; there are cases where contiguous appositional
mood clauses have different rather than same subjects. These are cases of 'unexpected SS
marking'.
Woodbury claims that if one takes rhetorical structure into account, these switches in
subject from one appositional mood clause to another are predictable. The rule he gives
(p.303) is: 'The subject of an appositional clause must be coreferent with the subject of a
controlling clause or of the other appositional clauses in its own simple group or
subgroup.' That is, there is no requirement for the subject of an appositional clause to be
coreferent with the subject of any clause outside its own simple group, or subgroup. The
reflexive vs. third person opposition follows the same rule when it occurs in appositional
clauses - though in other situations, for example in oblique mood clauses, the reflexive vs.
third person opposition can operate from one simple group or subgroup into the next, if its
controlling clause is in a different simple group or subgroup from it
It does not seem to be the case that when a switch in reference occurs, it functions to
indicate a switch from one group to the next (a group boundary). Woodbury (1983:308)
says:
It would not be possible to turn this around, and say that chains of coreferent
appositional mood clauses define new discourse units each time they switch
subjects, and that intonation, sentence adverbial particle and enclitic placement then
follow suit. This is because not all rhetorical structure boundaries occur at switches
of subject [...]. Moreover, the mere fact of a switch gives no clue as to just which
intonation contour sequence will occur.
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What seems to be happening here is that there is pressure for rhetorical subgroups or
simple groups to be consistently SS marked, and in consequence some anomalous
coreference marking occurs and one might expect that in at least some cases shifts to a
new (sub)group might occur triggered by disjoint reference. From another perspective,
switch-reference marking in appositional clauses is bounded to the (sub)group rather than
operating just over two clauses.
Woodbury's final point is to do with differences between elicited speech and ordinary
narrative. Nichols (1983:246) makes a very similar point about the languages of the
Northeast Caucasus. Switch-reference that is entirely determined by the system of
inflection is what Woodbury calls 'ideal' - he says it occurs all the time in elicited Yup'ik
sentences, Yup'ik translations of English sentences, and even in naturally occurring Yup'ik
conversational exchanges. It is contextualised pragmatically rather than embedded in long
stretches of narrative text. Such sentences are readily judged for grammaticality by
speakers, whereas successions of appositional clauses taken out of context are greeted with
uncertainty or objected to. 'Rhetorical structure, at least in the form it takes in narrative, is
so much a property of whole discourses, that its contribution to syntax is obscure out of
the whole discourse context' (p.309).
3.3. Switch-reference as gapping
There are certain obvious similarities between switch-reference marking and verbal
agreement, which will be highlighted in this sectioa On a fairly simple definition, verbal
agreement is the marking on the verb of nominal features of the subject, and perhaps also
of other NPs, such as number, gender and person. It functions to associate nominal
arguments with their grammatical function vis-il-vis the verb, for example it helps identify
the subject.
As we have seen, formally, switch-reference is almost always a verbal category, and of all
verbal categories, it is prima facie most similar to that of verbal agreement, since in both
cases an affix on the verb indicates something about a noun phrase in the clause (more
specifically, something about its referent). The switch-reference marker indicates whether
or not the two clauses 'agree' in the identity of their subjects. So it could be regarded as
agreement at a different level; i.e. at an interclausal level.
Furthermore, it is significant that in some languages, verbal agreement and the switch-
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reference marking system overlap completely, so that switch-reference markers also
incorporate agreement with the subject. This is particularly common in many languages of
Papua New Guinea, in contrast to North American languages, in most of which switch-
reference is distinct from concord. In Papuan languages like Kate and Fore, the DS
markers are typically subject-verb agreement affixes, while the SS markers are typically
either zero or an invariable suffix - clearly from a functional point of view it is enough to
say that the subjects are coreferential and not necessary to give any explicit indication of
person, number or gender.
Haiman (1983) presents an argument for the diachronic origin of switch-reference on the
basis of facts about the structural similarity between switch-reference and agreement
phenomena. I outline this argument here as a counterpoint to the position taken by Givdn,
and because the analogies observed between switch-reference and agreement phenomena
will be echoed in sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. As we shall see in chapter 5, Haiman's
arguments have also had some impact on the way in which switch-reference in clause
chaining languages is handled formally, i.e. as coordination rather than subordination or
something between the two.
The languages considered are a subset of Papuan languages with switch-reference systems,
although it is claimed that there are analogs elsewhere. Haiman divides Papuan languages
into two types. The first type are languages such as those mentioned above, in which SS is
either zero marked or marked by an invariant morpheme, while DS is marked by a
morpheme which indicates person agreement with the subject NP. In languages of the
second type, SS marking verbs consist of the verb plus the normal personal affixes, while
DS marking verbs have in addition another morpheme which functions to indicate a change
in referent This morpheme is often either a conjunction or a nominalising particle. I shall
return to his argument concerning the second type of language in section 3.4.
Haiman makes the following general observations about the first group of languages:
(i) The DS marker is to the SS marker as an agreement marker is to zero encoding.
That is, SS as unmarked case is not given overt coding, and DS turns up as an
agreement marker (personal affix).
(ii) Switch-reference applies to clauses in clause chaining constructions but often
not to subordinate clauses.
(iii) Where the personal affix is a suffix, the marked clause precedes the
controlling clause; where the personal affix is a prefix, it follows it.
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Haiman argues that the clauses in chaining constructions are in a relation of coordination.
Restriction to coordinate structures is a property of gapping, but not of other rules of
deletion under identity. The generalisation in (iii) reflects the generalisation described in
chapter 1 about the relation between the linear order of coordinate clauses and the type of
affixation the language exhibits. Again, the relation is claimed to be a structural property
characteristic of gapping and 'of no other rule which deletes under identity' (p. 106).
Lenakel is a test case here: it is verb medial and prefixing, and given Ross (1970) and
Tai's (1969) constraints on the directionality of gapping, we can predict what in fact does
happen - that in such a language the marked clause will follow the controlling clause.
On the basis of these observations, Haiman argues that switch-reference in this first type of
language reduces to the familiar mechanisms of verbal concord and conjunction reduction
or gapping, with the null SS marking in coordinate (chained) clauses considered to be an
instance of this process.7
To put all this in context, we can see that what Haiman is saying is the following. The
similarity between switch-reference marking and verb agreement, and the fact that switch-
reference systems and agreement marking overlap, is completely unsurprising if switch-
reference just is verb agreement, with deletion of the agreement (gapping) on identity in
the case of SS marking.
Presumably, the assumption of conjunction reduction of bound morphemes may be
explained if we see the verb agreement affixes as originally being independent pronouns, as
Givdn (1983) suggests. Alternatively, we can do without this step, given analogs in
languages such as Turkish (Haiman 1983:112ff.) where clauses with a high degree of
cohesion or continuity with the following clause (including not only identical subject, but
also identical tense, mood and polarity) will appear with verbs in which the suffixes
marking these categories are replaced by an invariable suffix: -(y)A for simultaneous
activity and -(y)Ip for sequential activity. In chapter 2 I also noted that in most clause
chaining languages, the medial verb lacks inflection for tense, mood and polarity and is
understood to have the same values for these features as the final verb in the clause chain.
Similarly in chapter 2, we saw that in Lenakel the person marker is not the only bound
7 Haiman (1983:106,108) issues two caveats. First, he notes that gapping is not usually thought of as an
operation which can affect bound morphemes (but gives some other examples in a footnote). Second, no sin¬
gle Papuan language examined perfectly fit the pattern he proposed of DS being marked by verb + personal
affix, and SS by verb + zero marking - though some, like Ono (p,108f.) came very close, and numerous other
closely approximated the pattern, including some which have been mentioned in chapter 1: Kate, Kewa,
Wojokeso, and Usan.
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morpheme which can be gapped under identity; the tense prefix which normally follows the
personal subject agreement prefix also may be.
3.4. Categorial iconicity revisited
We have seen that in general, switch-reference is regarded as a kind of nominal reference
tracking, and that the idea that it involves a violation of categorial iconicity is based on
this. The Principle of Categorial Iconicity, as defined by Haiman, states that a distinction
is normally marked on the category to which it applies semantically - in the case of
switch-reference, this is taken to be the subject NP. Although this principle seems to have
some validity in general (see Haiman 1985), there are a number of problems with the way
it is used in arguments concerning switch-reference. Some of these were sketched in
chapter 1, and I shall here go over them in more detail.
In chapter 1 I said that there were reasons why we might question the assumption that the
category to which switch-reference applies semantically is the subject NP. Switch-
reference systems encode meta-level information about the relative reference and other
characteristics of clauses. Although it must be acknowledged that referential meaning is
classically associated just with NPs in semantic theory, I would argue that switch-reference
is a clause level function which does not deal with the reference of NPs as such but with
degrees and types of cohesion between eventualities. This position is supported by the
other functions which switch-reference markers have.
Further support for this position is provided by the fact that there are numerous cases
where a particular type of meaning may be encoded either nominally or verbally. For
example, the fact that an eventuality is iterated may be indicated crosslinguistically either
on the verb or adverbial elements or by using a distributively quantified NP, or even in
English by a 'floating quantifier'. Stirling (1985a) gives more discussion of this point.
Compare the following English sentences, which all describe iterated events of pizza
eating.
(5) a. Each student ate a pizza for lunch.
b. Every day the student eats a pizza.
c. The students ate a pizza each.
Similarly, certain aspectual distinctions, for example between completed and uncompleted
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events, may be indicated by the definiteness of a nominal argument as well as by the form
of the verb (Mourelatos 1978). In cases such as these, it has been argued that the type of
meaning involved is really a type of clause meaning which may be manifested on or
pertain to both nominal and verbal aspects of the clause - although even when it is marked
just nominally or just verbally, there will often be implications for the other elements of
the clause (again, see Stirling 1985a). It is of course logically possible to argue for
meaning marked both nominally and verbally that one of these is more basic, either on the
grounds that the type of meaning involved is more 'nominal' or 'verbal' inherently, or
because of characteristics of the encoding such as frequency, conformity to other
nominally/verbally encoded meaning, centrality or peripherality, simplicity, etc.
Granted that maintenance or discontinuity of reference may be encoded both nominally and
verbally, there are a number of hypotheses we could propose to situate it within this
general schema.
Most conservatively, we might argue that reference tracking is centrally nominal and that
this is why switch-reference is weird, or at least why some explanation needs to be found
for the fact that it is marked on the verb. It is this position which is assumed by both
Haiman (1983) and Giv6n (1983), regardless of other differences in their theoretical stance.
A more radical position to adopt would be to argue that the kind of reference tracking
indicated by switch-reference systems represents not just nominal meaning, but clausal
meaning, and that this is why it is possible to mark it on both nominal and verbal elements
of the clause. In fact, we have seen that the type of meaning expressed by switch-reference
includes but is not exhausted by maintenance of pivot reference - switch-reference systems
may mark other types of clausal meaning which are normally expressed verbally, such as
maintenance or discontinuity of temporal interval. Thus we have grounds for this more
radical position. Thus I would argue that to talk of switch-reference in terms of violation
of categorial iconicity is too simple: really what we have here is clause-level meaning, and
this is able to switch marking between nominal and verbal elements.
Certain work: on language typology is of relevance here, and as we shall see the violation
of categorial iconicity hypothesis seems to conflict with what is known about the operation
of relatively well-established typological parameters.
First, Capell (1965, 1969), largely inspired by his work on Papua New Guinea languages,
has proposed a general typological distinction between languages in terms of what kind of
'concept domination' they exhibit: between what he calls 'event-dominated' and 'object-
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dominated' languages. 'Object-dominated' languages exhibit elaborate systems of noun
classification but have a simple verbal system; often the tense and mood of a clause are
indicated by free forms placed before the verb. 'Event-dominated' languages have
complicated verbs with verbal affixation for tense, mood, agreement and so on, but have
little morphological elaboration of the noun; highly event-dominated languages have clause
chaining with a contrast between sentence-medial and final verb forms. Various kinds of
intermediate systems are possible. The 'event-dominated' label is a response to languages
such as Amele, and indeed all switch-reference languages would appear to be of this type
by definition.
A similar typological distinction proposed by Nichols (1986) distinguishes 'head-marking'
from 'dependent-marking' languages, according to whether morphological grammatical
distinctions are marked on the head or the dependent member of the relevant syntactic unit.
Again, mixed and double-marked types are possible. According to Nichols, most North
American and Papua New Guinea languages are head-marking. Since switch-reference is
marked morphologically, provided we accept that it is a grammatical relation it should fall
into the class of distinctions for which this typological classification is relevant.
Nichols gives criteria for identifying which type of marking a language exhibits at phrase,
clause and sentence level. At phrase level, a head-marking language will mark possessive
and adpositional phrases on the possessed noun head and the adposition head respectively.
It will also lack adjective agreement with nouns in norm phrases and may even have
marking on the norm head to indicate that there is adjectival modification. Dependent-
marking languages, which are more familiar to English speakers, will have adjective
agreement, and inflection on the possessor noun and the noun complement of an
adpositional phrase. At clause level, head-marking languages mark the core syntactic
relations on the verb, not on the NPs, whereas dependent-marking languages tend to have
elaborate, noun-inflected case systems to perform the same function. Universally, languages
are most likely to be head-marking at clause-leveL At sentence level, however,
dependent-marking is most common, with the subordinate clause being the one which
marks the relation between it and a matrix clause. Dependent-marking at sentence level is
also indicated by relativisation using a relative pronoun or zero anaphor in the relative
clause, whereas the head-marking relativisation strategy is to use a headless relative
construction. Many otherwise strictly head-marking languages have dependent-marking at
sentence level.
There are certain obvious correlations between Nichols' typological distinction and that
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proposed by Capell, especially at the level of clause structure, which is Capell's major
concern. Languages classified as 'event-dominated' will also be classified as 'head-
marking'. Once again, all switch-reference languages will a priori be head-marking at
clause-level, and in fact those languages considered more closely in this thesis are head-
marking more generally. For example, Amele has the following characteristics:
(a) What evidence there is suggests head-marking at phrase-level. There is no
marking on either head or dependent in NPs and PPs, and inalienable possession is
marked by inflection on the possessed noun for the number and person of the
possessor.
(b) Core grammatical relations are, as we have seen, marked on the verb. There is
no case-marking on nouns.
(c) The relativisation strategy is head-marking, with the possibility of headless
relatives occurring.
(d) Subordinate clauses are dependent-marked, but as noted above, dependent-
marking is the norm at sentence level even in the most stringently head-marked
languages.
Thus, the fact that switch-reference is a way of marking reference tracking which occurs
on the verb is probably a result of a more general property of the languages in which it
occurs, namely that they are head-marking languages (and, more radically, 'event-
dominated'). This does not mean, however, that switch-reference is 'just' the same as
other types of referential-tracking. I hypothesise that switch-reference is marked on verbs
in these languages because they are head-marking, but that because it is marked on verbs,
this makes it possible for the switch-reference system to become a multifunctional system,
through the addition of temporal meaning and perhaps other kinds of meaning which also
gravitate to the verb in head-marking languages.
On the basis of the discussion in this section, I make the following claims about switch-
reference. First, the type of meaning it marks is clausal in its domain, that is, it pertains to
the eventuality or situation corresponding to the clause. Second, the function of switch-
reference systems is best seen in terms of continuity or agreement between clauses, along
particular parameters. Finally, although these parameters will usually include agreement in
pivot identity (topic or participant continuity) other types of continuity or agreement may
be involved, either pertaining to the pivot, or to what Givdn calls 'action continuity'.
Furthermore, there is an interaction between these two.
The general position which has just been described is reliant upon a notion of
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'dependency' which needs to be examined in more detail. One thing that has become clear
from the preceding discussion is that it makes sense to talk about the degree of
dependence between clauses. This appears to be a function of both their closeness in the
text linearly and structurally and the number of features they share. By 'features' here, I
mean both syntactic features and the semantic information they encode. These include:




This notion of dependence is a relatively general concept. One could also describe it in
terms of the degree of coherence between clauses or the degree of agreement between
clauses along certain parameters. We can also talk about the degree of continuity across
clauses, subsuming Givdn's participant and action continuity.
Clearly, languages have ways of formally encoding differing degrees of dependency. At
least some and possibly all these mechanisms also indicate or focus on some particular
feature and its contribution to the dependency or independency of the clause. It is also
clear that many languages have a way of chaining clauses in a sequence which indicates
that these clauses exhibit a high degree of dependency. For example, in English there is a
stylistic option of producing chains of clauses with coreferential subjects using the device
of nonfmite clauses (see example (4) above). As we saw in chapter 1, Amele and other
Papuan languages allow chains of medial verbs, followed by a final verb, where the
'medialness' of the medial verbs and the 'finality' of the final verbs is morphologically
obvious, with medial verbs receiving no absolute marking for subject agreement or tense or
other features (such as modality and polarity) but are simply dependent on the final verb
for these values. Haiman gave the example of Turkish mentioned earlier in this chapter,
and we also saw in chapter 1 that in Swahili there is the possibility of producing clause
chains very like those in switch-reference languages, but where only temporal continuity is
marked, rather than nominal continuity.
We can think of switch-reference as a mechanism for indicating the relative dependency of
one clause on another, which can focus on particular features of the clause. In general, the
focus in switch-reference systems is on identity of the pivot participant However, as we
saw in chapter 2, other foci are possible.
8 As we shall see, these features overlap with the 'transitivity features' to be discussed in the section 3.5.
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In fact, there are two ways in which we could see switch-reference as fitting into a
continuum of dependency marking devices. The presence of switch-reference marking per
se is an index of semantic dependence between clauses, but it is also important to take
account of the fact that SS marking indicates a greater degree of dependence than DS
marking. There is evidence for both these claims.
For example, Haiman (1983:120f.) discusses Hua, a language in which there are two kinds
of medial verb types, which differ in the nature of the medial verb desinence. In the first
kind, the desinence indicates that the clauses are conjoined and signals switch-reference. In
such cases, the marked dependent clause must agree with the following controlling clause
in tense, mood and polarity, and in addition 'tense iconicity' must be observed; that is, the
order of clauses must mirror the order of events. There are a number of exceptions to this
general characterisation, all of which pertain to DS clauses: agreement in polarity is not
obligatory for DS clauses, DS marked verbs can be independently inflected for tense,
whereas SS marked verbs cannot, and future tense DS clauses need not agree with the final
clause in mood. So although all switch-reference marked medial clauses are to some degree
semantically dependent on the following clause, clearly DS clauses are less dependent than
SS ones. Haiman defines this dependency or cohesion as coordination. That is, he sees
the dependency as an index of coordination.
The other type of medial verb in Hua has a desinence identical with the personal desinence
found on a variety of subordinate clauses of time, place and condition and on all relative
clauses. There is no possibility of switch-reference, and this, Haiman says, is explained by
the fact that this desinence never gaps. None of the other dependency constraints apply to
these medial verbs. Haiman suggests that these independent, subordinate clauses
semantically express presuppositions.
The same pattern occurs in other languages. For example in Chuave, the mood and
epistemic validity of switch-reference clauses are dependent on the final clause. In other
words, in Hua and other languages, clauses which are semantically independent of the
following clause simply fail to mark switch-reference. They can be but need not be
identical to it, not just in subject reference, but also in tense and other grammatical
categories. So switch-reference marking seems to indicate semantic dependency between
clauses. We could also see a continuum of dependency: SS marked clauses are most
dependent, then DS marked clauses, then subordinate, non-switch-reference marked
clauses. Haiman (1983:121-2) notes the ambivalent status of DS marking (i.e. as
dependent and independent) and suggests this may explain the possibility of the DS
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morpheme developing into or from a marker of subordinatioa
This ambivalent status of DS marking also means that some languages are better described
by saying that DS marking serves to indicate or is associated with independent clauses,
whereas SS marking serves to indicate or is associated with dependent clauses. This is
true of Hua to a certain extent, and is also true of Lenakel, which was discussed in chapter
2. In Lenakel, DS marked clauses simply have the form of independent sentences, and in
particular have independent tense marking, whereas SS marked clauses must agree with the
controlling clause as to their tense.
Giv6n (1983:65) also talks about the degree of dependence between clauses with respect to
the opposition in English between finite clauses with overt NP subjects, and nonfinite,
participial or nominalised clauses. He sees finiteness as corresponding to or indicating the
'degree of independence, or conversely, [...] degree of dependence or binding' between
clauses (p.65). This dependency has two main elements to it, he says. On the one hand
there is the degree of temporal and causal independence of the event from other events,
and on the other there is the degree of independent control exercised by the subject/agent
of the clause.
Givdn claims that each of these functional/semantic dimensions is coded in an iconic
fashion: temporal/causal independence is coded by independent or 'free' tense and aspect
marking on the verb, and independent control of the subject/agent is coded by its overt
expression, via case-marking, grammatical agreement or pronoun status, as an agent
Finite clauses have both; other clauses receive less coding: the verb is dependent for
reading of its tense/aspect on the immediate verbal context; and the subject/agent tends to
be expressed as zero and is thus dependent for its referential interpretation on the overtly
expressed subjects of other verbs.
In summary, in a clause-chaining language, or in any language in which switch-reference
clauses lack independent finite inflection and agree with the controlling or final verb for it,
switch-reference itself indicates dependence of the marked clause on the clause with the
relevant inflection. This is often a matter of temporal dependence. In other languages in
which switch-reference marked clauses may be subordinate, the marking may indicate the
syntactic dependence of the clause and perhaps in addition, other information about the
temporal or logical relation between the two clauses. Notice, though, that in either case
there is a sense in which one could see the controlling clause as being dependent upon the
switch-reference clause, in that the switch-reference marking restricts its pivot NP
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reference, usually in advance. The following diagram indicates this reciprocal dependency.
'INFL' stands for all the independent morphology which a final verb may have, possibly
including tense, modality, aspect and polarity.
dependent on
CLAUSE 1-SR CLAUSE 2-SR .... CLAUSE N-SR CLAUSE N+l-INFL
has as dependent has as dependent
In concluding this section, I will review the ways in which the theoretical positions of
Givdn and Haiman are relevant to the ideas which have been presented.
Givdn introduces the concepts of topic continuity and action continuity and several times
notes that the two are not independent Sometimes a particular grammatical sign may
indicate continuity or discontinuity in either, depending on other aspects of the
interpretation. For example, use of a personal pronoun in English often indicates
coreference, and a new subject/topic will precipitate a move to the next level of continuity
device, i.e. to use of a fully lexical NP. However, such a shift to use of a lexical NP may
also signal a break in action continuity rather than in topic continuity. See examples (6)
and (7) from Givdn (1983:60).
(6) He came into the room, looked around and sat down. He was tired and confused; he
slumped in his chair and waited....
(7) He came into the room, looked around and sat down. The man in the blue suit was tall
and well dressed, middle aged but still in full vigor...
In (7), the escalation in strategy from pronouns to fully lexical definite NPs has been
precipitated not by referent dicontinuity, which is no greater than in (6), but by action
discontinuity; there is a larger thematic break imposed by the writer and this is signalled by
choosing the more discontinuous strategy.
Givdn also points to the possibility of grammatical devices being multifunctional. For
example he describes passive voice as 'a complex functional domain' (p.55).
If one adopted Givdn's position, and accepted that although the verbal morphology system
is concerned with action continuity, there is often an interaction between topic and action
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continuity, it would seem reasonable to make a case of the following kind in order to
account for the functional extensions of switch-reference described in chapter2. Although
switch-reference may have pronominal origins, and functions to mark topic (dis)continuity,
it also functions in some languages to mark action (dis)continuity as well (in contrast to the
examples of strategy escalation Givdn gives which may mark either topic or action
discontinuity). That is, either switch-reference is a complex functional domain like
passive, or at least it is one of those continuity devices which is regularly used to indicate
both topic continuity and action continuity. The fact that switch-reference does end up on
the verb and perhaps forms a portmanteau morph with other verbal inflection only means it
would be more likely for it to have mixed functions.
Turning now to Haiman (1983), we saw earlier that he describes one type of switch-
reference system which occurs in Papuan languages in terms of coordination. He also
equates coordination with dependency or cohesion between clauses, and notes that SS
indicates a correspondingly greater degree of dependency or coherence than DS. With
respect to the other type of switch-reference system he identifies in languages from this
geographical area, Haiman goes even further in developing the suggestion that switch-
reference marks the degree of coherence of clauses in discourse.
This second type of switch-reference occurs in languages in which SS marking verbs
consist of the verb stem plus normal personal affixes, while DS marking verbs in addition
have another morpheme which functions to indicate disjoint reference. This morpheme is
often either a conjunction or a nominaliser, i.e. DS marking is signalled by an extra
nominalising particle or a conjunction added to the SS form. So it seems that historically,
a morpheme whose original function was to mark a relation between the dependent and
controlling clauses has come to be used to mark DS. Examples of such languages include
Maring, where SS verbs just have a personal affix, but DS marking verbs have in addition
a suffix -k, a morpheme which is glossed as a subordinator or conjunction. Similarly, in
Daga, DS marking verbs may have either the suffix -wa, a 'substantive clitic' which occurs
on NPs and nominalised clauses, or the sentence connective augmental coordinator amba,
'and then'. Haiman (1983:116) says: 'The reason both morphemes may perform this
function, I believe, is that both may mark a relative lack of cohesion between their own
clause and the one following'.
Haiman attempts to explain this hypothesised historical development as follows: 'I suggest
that a common function of both nominalisation and overt conjunction (as opposed to
simple parataxis) is to signal a lack of cohesion between the clause on which they occur
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and the clause with which it is joined' (p. 107). He says, 'The characteristic index of
cohesion is not "same x" but rather "necessarily same x" as in the other clause' - where x
may be subject, mood, tense, object, polarity and so on. Conversely, the characteristic
index of lack of cohesion is not "different x" but rather "independent x". Thus, he argues
that the original and motivated meaning of conjunction and nominalisation is to signal
indifference to the identity of the subjects of dependent and controlling clauses. He then
says, 'By a familiar semantic specialisation, the portion of the meaning of a category which
is unique to it ([...]its par excellence meaning) is easily reinterpreted as its basic meaning:
thus indifference as to coreference or "open reference" may be reinterpreted as a signal of
different reference'.
In any case, and regardless of any possible historical origins, the following point which he
makes seems very reasonable (p. 127):
Formally, the contrast between SS and DS clauses in languages like Maring, Daga
and Latin may be diagrammed as this:
SS: S, S2
DS: Sj X S2
The interposition of any formal element X between coordinate clauses is sufficient
to suggest a semantic disassociation between them. In Daga, Maring, and possibly
Chuave, this disassociation 'suggests that the two conjoined clauses have different
subjects. In other languages, it may be that they occur at different times. [....]
Conversely, the reduction of either Sj or S2 may be taken as an iconic index of
the fusion of the events described therein, so that they are perceived as one
event....
That is, Haiman identifies two conditions, of semantic separation and of semantic fusion.
He claims that the extra marking 'X' which usually characterises DS morphology is
literally a graphic indicator of separation or lack of cohesion between the two clauses; SS
morphology lacks this additional marking and so literally does not separate the two clauses
to the same extent.
3.5. Transitivity
Hopper & Thompson (1980) define 'transitivity' as a cluster of morphosyntactic and
semantic properties all basically concerned with the effectiveness with which an action is
'carried-over' or 'transferred' from an agent to a patient (though this does not mean that
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transitivity properties are only relevant where agent and patient are grammaticised
categories). These properties each have a particular value for 'high' or 'low' transitivity,
and taken together enable a transitivity value to be assigned to the clause as a whole.
Clearly, then, transitivity as a global property of the clause is something of a continuum.
Hopper & Thompson do formulate a universal principle, which states that whenever an
obligatory pairing of two transitivity features occurs in the morphosyntax or semantics of a
clause, the paired features are always on the same side of the high/low transitivity scale
(p.254). The relevant properties and their values are summarised in following table.9
Hopper & Thompson further argue for a correlation between transitivity and the discourse
functional notion of grounding, whereby a distinction is made between foregrounded and
backgrounded clauses: high transitivity is correlated with foregrounding, and low
transitivity with backgrounding. They summarise the distinction, which is more fully
described by Grimes (1975), Hopper (1979), and others, as follows (p.280):
That part of a discourse which does not immediately and crucially contribute to the
speaker's goal, but which merely assists, amplifies, or comments on it, is referred
to as BACKGROUND. By contrast the material which supplies the main points of
the discourse is known as FOREGROUND. Linguistic features associated with the
distinction between foreground and background are referred to as GROUNDING.
The distinction is most applicable to narrative texts, and another way to look at it (cf.
9 As in chapter 2, I use Dixon's (1979) symbols A P and S to stand for the three types of syntactic ar¬
gument of transitive and intransitive verbs.
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Hopper & Thompson 1980:280 citing Polanyi-Bowditch) is to see narrative as consisting of
two kinds of structures; a temporal structure of sequentially occurring events, and a
durative/descriptive structure which provides a spatial, characterological and durative
context for these events. Numerous languages have morphological and syntactic devices
which reflect grounding, and these range from discourse particles to the elaboration of
verbal paradigms of tense-aspect.
There are several potential points of contact between switch-reference, transitivity and
grounding. First, SS and DS marking correlate in certain respects with foregrounding and
backgrounding respectively. Hopper & Thompson point out that chains of foregrounded
clauses (within one episode) typically continue to talk about the same participants rather
than introducing new ones, thereby maintaining same subject. Furthermore, chains of
foregrounded clauses tend to present sequential events, while simultaneous events (along
»
with states and on-going or repeated events) appear in background clauses.10 We have seen
that marking of sequential versus simultaneous events is a common additional element of
meaning of switch-reference markers, and that while the SS/DS and
sequential/simultaneous distinction is usually completely cross-cutting, sometimes a
naturalness assumption is made on which SS is correlated with sequentiality, and DS with
simultaneity.
Second, DS marking could be seen as indicating a switch in grounding (from foreground to
background or vice versa). In Amele, DS marking is used not just if there is disjoint
subject reference, but if there is an interruption in the spatio-temporal setting, or a change
in modality: both these could also be seen as a switch from one type of grounding to
another. As we have seen, Lenakel, too, makes use of DS marking to indicate a switch
between non-future and future tense - which could plausibly be seen as a realis/irrealis
switch.
However, it is also true that switch-reference marking itself occurs on clauses which meet
at least some of the morphosyntactic and semantic characteristics of backgrounded clauses.
Switch-reference markers usually occur on subordinate clauses or the medial clauses in
clause chains. Subordinate clauses tend to be backgrounded (and low in transitivity), and
10 More strictly, it is said that foregrounded clauses are ordered in a temporal sequence and a change of
order means a change in the order of the real-world events, in comparison with background clauses which are
not ordered temporally with respect to one another, and may even be movable with respect to foreground
clauses.
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medial clauses are non-finite, again an indicator of backgrounding (and low transitivity).11
Finally, Hopper & Thompson note that low transitivity clauses may be ones in which one
argument is deleted, and the verb takes a form which would not be possible in a full
version of the clause. We may see switch-reference clauses as having this property too,
especially in languages with a medial/finite clause distinction. The relevant missing
element, though, is not an argument, but tense. Although the NP arguments may be
omitted, the verb is certainly in a form with which they could occur, whereas the presence
of a tense morpheme in these languages is dependent on the absence of a switch-reference
morpheme.
Interestingly, Hopper & Thompson (1980:265) mention Eastern Pomo as a language in
which morphosyntactic correlates of higher versus lower agency of the subject are
displayed in clauses with only one NP argument (in fact, this also occurs in Eastern Pomo
to some degree in clauses with two arguments). As we saw in chapter 2, this is called
'Split-S marking': the single argument of the intransitive verb takes case marking
appropriate for agents or for patients depending on the degree of control it exercises over
the activity. Hopper & Thompson correlate high agentivity with high transitivity (that is, it
is one component of high transitivity), while low agentivity is correlated with low
transitivity. In chapter 2, the following examples were given in illustration of this property
of Eastern Pomo.
(8) a. wf ceexelka 'I'm slipping'
b. hat ceexelka 'I'm sliding'
(9) a. wi baatecki 'I got bumped accidentally'
b. haa. baatecki 'I got bumped on purpose'
We also saw that there is an interesting interaction between split ergativity in Eastern
Pomo and its switch-reference system. In summary, the SS/DS markers signal not simply
continuity of reference, but more complexly, continuity of reference and of agentivity
value: SS always implies both same referent and same agentivity or control value (whether
high or low), while DS marks a discontinuity in either reference or agentivity value (high
to low or low to high).
More generally, we can see switch-reference as being generally a backgrounding
mechanism within which SS marks continuance of the same level of transitivity across
'I However, there may be a distinction between subordinate clauses and medial clauses in terms of transi¬
tivity: medial clauses may be higher in transitivity.
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clauses, or of the same (degree of) grounding across clauses, whereas DS marks a shift in
level of transitivity or grounding.
It seems, then, that the 'extended functions' of switch-reference systems are quite naturally
explained as indicating shifts in level of transitivity or grounding. But is there any obvious
way to reconcile this with the 'core function' of switch-reference systems to marie topic
continuity? As mentioned above, there does seem to be a correlation between coreference
and foregrounding and disjoint reference and backgrounding, but there is no clear direct
correlation between co/disjoint reference and transitivity.
3.6. Switch-reference as agreement between eventualities
We have seen examples of switch-reference markers used to signal continuity or
discontinuity, across syntactically related clauses, of the following elements of clausal
meaning:
(i) the reference of one or more nuclear NPs, usually subjects, but sometimes
objects, and sometimes more appropriately characterised as agents.
(ii) the agentivity value assigned to an important protagonist.
(iii) the tense, or time of the event
(iv) the location of the event.
(v) the mood of the clause (realisArrealis).
(vi) continuance of or shift out of a cohesive sequence of events.
In all the languages looked at, the switch-reference system marked at least the first of these
meaning contrasts, so there is reason to believe that the identity of a major protagonist,
whether regarded as subject or agent, is in some sense basic. Yet the fact that such a
range of meaning contrasts is covered crosslinguistically, and the fact that they cohere to
cover the familiar range of elements of clause meaning, suggests that it may be more
plausible to see switch-reference markers as indeed pertaining to the whole clause, and as
types of clause linkage rather than as mere devices of referential tracking. Further support
for this position has been given in this chapter.
If a clause is taken as describing a situation or eventuality, with its component elements
being the type of situation (from the lexical meaning of the verb plus aspect and mood),
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participants in participant roles, and spatio-temporal location, then it seems that switch-
reference marking can be used to indicate continuity or change in any of these except in
the actual nature of the activity or state as encoded in the lexical meaning of the verb. If
we further postulate larger units made up of clusters of eventualities, to form episodes or a
rhetorical context (not necessarily identical to Woodbury's rhetorical units), this accounts
for use (vi). It would seem that at the level of universal grammar, SS markers (the
unmarked case) have the capacity to signal maintenance of the clausal status quo, and the
extension of the current event sequence, while DS markers have the potential to signal
change in at least one of the clausal elements, or a shift out of the current event sequence.
There must then be certain parameters set by individual languages, as to what will count as
an important enough shift in the clausal elements to warrant marking with DS. It seems
likely that, even at the universal level, reference of participants may be the most salient
characteristic of such event sequences.
Although the signalling of (dis)continuity in the reference of major participants is always
one of the functions of switch-reference systems, in languages such as the ones described
in chapter 2 there are circumstances in which it is given lower priority than the signalling
of (dis)continuity in some other parameter of the eventuality. The following relatively
simplistic rules summarise the findings of chapter 2 in the light of the discussion in this
chapter, and capture the functional hierarchies and defaults which seem to govern the
functioning of switch-reference marking in these languages.
(a) For Eastern Pomo:
if agentivity changes, use DS;
otherwise, if reference changes, use DS;
otherwise (i.e. if agentivity and reference stay the same), use SS.
Or from the point of view of interpretation;
if SS, then you know reference and agentivity, are the same;
if DS, the default is that just reference has changed;
if DS and reference has not changed, agentivity has changed.
(b) For Lenakel:
if tense/mood changes, use DS;
otherwise, if reference changes, use DS;
otherwise, if tense and reference stay the same, use SS.
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From the point of view of interpretation:
if SS is used, assume tense and reference are the same;
if DS is used, check whether reference is the same or not
(by seeing if there is a full NP for the new subject);
if there is not, assume reference is the same and just tense changed.
(c) For Amele:
if time, place, event sequence, mood changes, use DS;
otherwise, if reference changes, use DS;
otherwise, use SS.
From the point of view of interpretation:
if SS is used, assume same reference, and general continuity of event
(unless otherwise indicated);
if DS is used, assume disjoint reference;
if this doesn't work, assume some other change.
Exactly how one is to account for switch-reference in particular languages is a different
question, and one which we will go some way towards answering in chapter 5. Although
a syntactic binding account can probably be made to work for canonical cases, and perhaps
even for some languages exhibiting noncanonical switch-reference, explanatory adequacy
might be better served by a theory which encodes the notions of eventuality and event
sequence mentioned above.
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Chapter 4 Discourse Representation Theory and Unification Categorial Grammar
4.1. Introduction
In chapters 5 and 6 formal accounts are proposed for switch-reference and for
logophoricity. The proposals are made within the framework of a semantics based on
Discourse Representation Theory, which is described in 4.2. The semantics is part of a
grammar formalism called Unification Categorial Grammar, outlined in 4.3. In 4.4, the
choice of this theoretical framework is justified.
4.2. Discourse Representation Theory
Discourse Representation Theory (DR Theory) was developed by Hans Kamp (1981a),
though closely related ideas are presented in Karttunen (1976), Heim (1982) and Kamp
(1983). It is a formal semantic theory which has its origins in a desire to formulate a
model-theoretic semantics for natural language which would be applicable to discourse
phenomena, specifically anaphoric and tense phenomena. It departs from Fregean semantics
in taking discourse rather than the sentence to be the unit over which truth conditions are
defined. Apart from this it does not represent a radical departure from a standard formal
semantics, based on first order predicate calculus and model-theoretic interpretation.
The extensions proposed by Kamp (1981a) in order to treat natural language discourse
phenomena reflect his particular goals, namely of accounting for the anaphoric behaviour
of personal pronouns, and formulating a plausible account of the truth conditions of so-
called 'donkey sentences' such as those in (la,b) (see Geach 1962, Evans 1977, 1980). He
took the latter task to involve giving general accounts of the conditional, and of the
meaning of indefinite descriptions, as well as of pronominal anaphora.
(1) a. If Pedro owns a donkey he beats it.
b. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
Donkey sentences are conditional and universal sentences containing scope-dependent
indefinite NPs and pronominal anaphors which are neither bound syntactically by the
indefinite antecedent, nor even in its scope, at least on a normal logical translation of the
sentence. The particular problem they present is thus that of providing a univocal
treatment of the indefinite NP, eg. a donkey, which accounts for the fact that it is perceived
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to have universal force in this syntactic context, without violating the tradition that
indefinites in general have existential force. Thus, it is generally agreed (though cf. Cooper
1983) that the truth conditions for (la) should be as in (2), where the indefinite description
reemerges as a universal quantifier.
(2) Vx (Donkey(x) & Owns(Pedro,x) -> Beats(Pedro,x))
Such examples are a manifestation of the equivalence between V with wide and 3 with
narrow scope, but are complicated by the particular anaphoric binding relationships which
must be allowed for, i.e. between the indefinite in the subordinate clause and the pronoun
in the matrix clause. We shall see how they are handled below.
In addition to the question of how to handle donkey sentences, and partly as a result of the
account given for them, two other general issues are addressed by DR Theory.
The first is whether a univocal account of pronominal anaphora is possible at some level of
representation. Various distinctions have been made in the literature between different
kinds of interpretation of anaphoric pronouns. In particular, 'coreference' and 'variable
binding' interpretations have been distinguished (eg. see Reinhart 1983). The pronouns in
the donkey sentences are problematic for this distinction, because they appear to fit neither
category; this led Evans (1977) to propose a third category of 'E-type' pronouns. Even if
it were necessary or desirable to postulate this kind of ambiguity for pronouns, the question
would remain of what the nature of the suppposed 'variable binding' relation actually is,
since as has frequently been noted, we would like to be able to invoke it to relate pairs of
NPs which don't seem to be in the required syntactic or logical configuration.
■to
Kamp claims^ provide a unified account of the different uses of personal pronouns.
Variable binding and coreference anaphors are represented in the same way, but receive
different model-theoretic interpretations because of the larger contexts in which they
appear. In DR Theory, the semantic representation is in the form of 'Discourse
Representation Structures' (DRSs) built up algorithmically on the basis of the syntactic
analysis (see below). These representations are then interpreted by embedding into a
model. At the level of representation construction there is a single rule which applies to all
personal pronouns equally, introducing into the universe of the DRS a 'discourse marker'
(DM) representing the pronoun, and adding to the body of the DRS an anaphoric condition
linking this discourse marker to some other discourse marker in the universe.
Quantificational meaning is shifted into the embedding procedure, and it is at this level that
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the perceived differences in the interpretation of pronouns are handled, rather than by any
difference in their representation. This move also allows Kamp to give a satisfactory
analysis of the donkey sentences, as we shall see. One major factor in making a univocal
account possible is that the same construction rule operates both at the level of the
principle DRS and at the level of subordinate DRSs, where due to the embedding
conditions, subordinate levels in effect represent contexts in which the DM representations
for pronouns are bound, and it is only at the top level that DMs are fully available for
reference. These changes enable Kamp to give a uniform account of anaphoric relations
between NPs, which does not make use of their differing referential characteristics.
Because he distinguishes these two levels of interpretation, he is able to reject a variable
binding/coreference distinction entirely.
The second issue is the nature of the anaphoric relation between introductory, indefinite
NPs (traditionally taken to be nonreferring) and following definite referential pronouns.
This is related to the first issue since it too concerns the definition of a level of semantic
representation at which NPs are treated uniformly regardless of their referential
characteristics. Kamp's account allows indefinite descriptions to be represented in the
same way as referential terms such as proper names, rather than being given a distinct
representation as existential quantifiers. When an indefinite has existential force it has it in
virtue of the particular role played by the clause containing it within the sentence or
discourse of which it is a part, i.e. clausal roles may impose existential or universal
readings on indefinites. Thus Kamp's explanation for the donkey sentence phenomenon
hinges on the fact that the indefinite NP both has the same referential characteristics as
normal indefinite NPs, and receives universal force because of the clausal context in which
it occurs.
DR Theory of course handles anaphoric relations which cross sentence boundaries, and
does so in the same way as it handles anaphoric relations within sentences. Notice that
binding-like intersentential relations occur as well as coreference ones, as in example (3),
where such relations link each boy and his as well as a book and it. Although the version
of DR Theory defined in Kamp (1983a) doesn't handle these cases, it seems possible to
extend the theory to do so (see Roberts 1986, Stirling 1988a).
(3) Mary gave each boy a book. Then she marked his name off the list as having
received it
Discourse Representation Theory thus claims to describe a level of processing of natural
- 135 -
language intermediate between syntax and semantic interpretation, at which discourse
connections that may extend beyond the bounds of the sentence (centrally, anaphora) are
taken account of. Having such a level apparently allows a uniform account of NP
representation and anaphoric relations at least at this stage in the processing.
As we have seen, there are two components to the theory. The first involves the
construction of the basic units of representation, the Discourse Representation Structures,
on the basis of the syntactic analysis. These can be regarded as partial models, typically
with small, finite domains, describing how the world ought to be if the sentence is true.
The second component is the determination of the semantic content of these
representations. This involves their embedding in the model, and assignment of a
truthconditional interpretation to them. Key tools of DR Theory are thus the construction
algorithm, and the definition of proper embedding and concomitant definition of truth.
The Discourse Representation Structures consist of discourse markers and a set of
conditions. For any DRS K, I shall use the notation U.K to indicate its universe, and
Con.K to indicate the set of conditions it contains.
As part of the construction process, NPs license the introduction of discourse markers into
the universe of the DRS, and also license certain conditions which constrain their
instantiation in the model. Discourse markers are represented by indexed lower case letters,
{Xp x~> ... , xn). They are formal entities of a uniform kind in the sense that no
notational distinction is made between constants, variables, or arbitrary objects. However,
as we shall see, the conditions introduced by different kinds of NPs do have the effect of
licencing introduction of their DMs into different places in the DRS, eg. into the principal
universe of discourse or that of some subordinate DRS, and licencing different additional
conditions according to the logical operators their determiners are associated with. 1
Thus, processing of sentence (4) would result in the introduction of two discourse markers
Xj and *2> licensed by the NPs Fred and Mary. The DRS for this sentence at this stage
would look like (5). DRSs are normally represented notationally as box diagrams, where a
box encloses a DRS, the universe of DMs is listed horizontally along the top and the
1 Also, different interpretations are placed on DMs in Kamp's explication. For example Kamp (1983: 4)
says that if the NP is definite the DM whose introduction it prompts acts as a 'placeholder' for the object to
which the phrase refers, whereas if it is not definite the marker functions more or less as a variable bound by
the quantification the NP expresses - although he does follow this remark with a caveat! Similarly, Kamp
(1981a) talks about a universally quantified antecedent in terms of 'some arbitrary item x'.
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conditions are listed vertically below them.
(4) Fred likes Mary.
(5)
There are several kinds of conditions. Most straightforwardly, full NPs license the
introduction of an atomic condition which either states that the DM for that NP has the
property expressed by the common noun, or for proper names, identifies the DM with the
referent of the proper name, eg. cat(x.) for a cat or Mary(x-) for Mary.
We can thus extend the DRS in (5) by introducing two NP-based conditions of this kind.
(6)
Other conditions result from the substitution of the appropriate DM for the corresponding
NP in the sentence, and are thus based on the predicate, eg. run(Xj), like(x.pcj). A
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condition of this kind completes the DRS for sentence (4). It is assumed that the





Supposing the discourse of which (4) is the beginning were to continue with the sentences
in (8).
(8) He gave her a cat. It is large and cunning.
The assumption of DR Theory is that the full discourse, including intersentential anaphoric
relations, can be represented by appending the new DMs and conditions required for the
interpretation of these subsequent sentences, to the DRS opened for the initial sentence.
Thus (9) would be the representation for the whole discourse consisting of (4) and (8).












As (9) illustrates, processing of second and subsequent sentences in a discourse proceeds
relative to the DRS already constructed; that is, this DRS provides a context for the
interpretation of subsequent sentences.
What this amounts to is just that discourse markers introduced when pronouns - and indeed
anaphoric full NPs - are processed are, as part of the construction process, linked with
discourse markers introduced earlier, via a condition which may be represented as x. = x.
In making the required links, it is not actually important whether one introduces a new DM
for a pronoun and then sets it equal with some earlier DM (as has been done above), or
simply uses the earlier DM in the new condition introduced by the predicate associated
with the pronoun. The reason for Kamp taking the first course was to make the analogy
between anaphoric and deictic pronouns more explicit (Kamp 1983: 8, n.4).
I noted above that existential and universal import are handled in the embedding definition
and the way it applies to the representation of the clause as a whole, rather than in the
representation of NPs. The existential import of a cat in the example discussed above is
thus not apparent from the DM or condition introduced by this NP, but the result of the
embedding definition.
informally, the truth condition for a DRS K states that it is true relative to a model M if
and only if K is compatible with M, where compatibility of K and M can be defined as the
existence of a proper embedding of K into M, and a proper embedding is given by an
embedding function which instantiates all the DMs in the universe of K into the universe
of Af; these instantiations must satisfy all the conditions stated in K. Thus the existential
force which most indefinites have comes from the implicit existential quantifier in the
embedding condition: 'there is a proper embedding/an embedding functioa...'
Now let us turn to a fourth type of condition, which has the form K. => Kj. Both
universal sentences and conditionals license the introduction of two 'subDRSs', the first
representing the antecedent and the second the consequent, linked by an operator
represented as '=>' or 'ifthen*. That is, sentences with universal quantification introduced
by every are treated as expressing generalised conditionals. For example, the sentence in
(10) (cf. (3)) would have the representation in (11).








give (xi, x2, x3)
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Just as in example (9), this DRS will be extended in various ways to incorporate DMs and
conditions from subsequent sentences in the discourse. If a following sentence maintains
the binding, as in the original example (3), the DMs and conditions will be added to the
consequent subDRS; if it does not the subDRS will be closed and they will be added to the
principle DRS. Thus, (13) will be the DRS for the extended discourse (12).
(12) Then she dismissed him. She is very systematic.
Xl
Mary (xi)







If a DRS AT has as its principle condition a statement of the form K. => Kj, a proper
embedding of K will then have to conform to the embedding condition for '=>', which
states that every proper embedding of the antecedent subDRS Kj must be extendable to a
proper embedding of The notion of extension desired is one in which the extended
embedding function must assign the same values to all the DMs in K. and also assign
values to the DMs in Kj, such that the values assigned satisfy the conditions in K. and Kj.
By virtue of this analysis, every DM in the universe of the antecedent DRS K. is
universally quantified, which is of course how 'donkey sentences' can be handled, and
indeed all DMs in the consequent are universally quantified too - unless they are proper
names, which always give rise to a DM in the principle DRS rather than in a subDRS.
The anaphoric linking relation indicates that the two DMs have the same instantiation in
the model, a definition which is general over both existential and universal embeddings.
More explicitly, 'having the same embedding' means that, for DMs x. and Xj, when x- =
x, then for any embedding function f. which instantiates x. in the model as a, there must
J 11
be an embedding function fj which instantiates Xj in the model as a. Disjoint reference
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may be indicated by an anaphoric linking condition of the form x- * Xj, interpreted as
meaning that there is no such embedding function.2
Notice the assumption that anaphoric pronouns select their referents from certain sets of
antecedently available entities. The selection set for an anaphoric pronoun is made up of
DMs from the universe of the representation which has been constructed in response to the
antecedent discourse. Kamp has nothing to say about the strategies used in choosing a
referent for a particular anaphoric pronoun; he is interested just in the construction of the
selection set. However, this process is not unconstrained: structural restrictions are imposed
on anaphoric linkage in DRT, by appealing to a subordination relation between DRSs, and
defining a notion of 'accessible DM' in terms of it. The DM x. is accessible to the
pronoun a if * belongs to the universe of the DRS immediately enclosing a or to some
superordinate DRS. Since the DMs introduced by proper names are inserted into the
principal DRS, they are always accessible to any other DM. However, Chierchia & Rooth
(1984) argue that the notion of accessible DM can be dispensed with because the
restrictions it is designed to capture fall out anyway from the recursive definition of truth
in terms of embedding functions.
This is the basis of DR Theory. Before moving on, I shall give a more formal statement
of the definitions of truth and satisfaction with respect to a model.
The algorithm from syntactic structures to Discourse Representation Structures has not
been given in any detail here, because the grammar formalism to be used in chapters 5 and
6 will be described in 4.3. Input to the level of discourse representation is assumed to be
syntactic phrase markers (or parts thereof) of a familiar kind. In the original account, DRS
construction proceeded top down and assumed the prior availability of a full syntactic parse
tree for the sentence, however more recent work postulates a bottom-up version of DRS
construction similar to the compositional construction of logical formulae in Montague
Semantics. See eg. Klein (1986), and the theory described in 4.3.
A model M is a pair <AF>, where A is the universe of discourse, and F is a valuation. An
embedding is a partial function / from the set of entities V to A, where V is the set from
which the elements are drawn to make up the universes of the DRSs.
2 An alternative formulation would be to describe the linking relation in terms of cosatisfaction, so that
the condition x- = x- holds just in case there is some extension of the embedding function f. of x-, which also
satisfies the conditions predicated of x-.
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Truth is defined:
(i) A DRS K is true in a model M iff there is an embedding function / such that U.K is
included in the domain off and M/|= K.
(ii) M/|= K iff M/|= <j) for every <j> e Con.K.
If the following kinds of conditions occur in DRSs (including two not discussed above):
(i) Atomic: R(xp...,x^) or
x = x;
(ii) Universal: K. => K^;
(iii) Negative: -iK;
(iv) Disjunctive: V I^.
Then satisfaction is defined:
(i) M/|= R(x1,...,x ) iff <^xA.../xJ> g F(R).
(ii) M/|= x. = x . lffj^xp =Axy).
(iii) M/1= Kj => K~ iff for every extension g of f such that M,g |= K^, there is an
extension h of g such that |= K2.
(iv) M/|= -iK iff there is no extension g of/ such that M,g |= K.
(v) M/|= Kj v K2 iff there is an extension g off such that M,g |= Kj or M,g |= K^.
The original account has been extended in a number of ways which will be important in
the proposals made in chapters 5 and 6: to handle plural as well as singular NPs, and to
handle temporal reference phenomena. Other extensions which will not be considered here
include work on belief sentences (Asher 1986, Zeevat 1986), and VP ellipsis (Klein 1986).
For work on plurals in DR Theory, see Kamp (1982), Chao (1986), Stirling (1985b,
1988a) among others. To introduce notational conventions for handling plural NPs is a
straightforward matter. Just as singular NPs license the introduction of discourse markers
represented by the lower case letters Xj, x2 xn, similarly we can say that plural NPs
license the introduction of plural discourse markers, represented by upper case letters Xj,
x2,... ,
To start with, we can see such DMs as simply markers of grammatical number features on
the NP, and as acting as an instruction imposing a minimal constraint on instantiation: eg.
as a requirement that the DM should be mapped onto some plural object in the model.
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However, what the semantic status of these DMs is, and whether we should use them for
all plural NPs, are more problematic questions. For one thing, the relationship of plurality
to quantification - which as we have seen is handled in DR Theory at the level of clause
embedding rather than in NP representation - is not entirely straightforward (see Stirling
1985b). For another, there is evidence to suggest that it is unwise (even if possible) to
think of natural language plurality in terms of the set-theoretic entities familiar from logic
and mathematics; rather we need a concept like Links' (1983) 'pluralities' or Bealer's
(1982) 'aggregates/collections'. However, these differ from 'sets' in ways which are not
important for us here.
Having introduced plural DMs, we are free to use the anaphoric linking relation to connect
two pluralities, with the definition of coembedding already given requiring that their
instantiations must be equivalent sets. However, we also need to account for anaphoric
relations between plural and singular NPs, as in example (14).
(14) The girls came in. One girl was carrying a stack of books.
To account for this and other relations involving pluralities, we use normal set-theoretic
relations such as 'element oF and 'subset of relations, and introduce new anaphoric
linkage conditions accordingly, eg. we can say: x- e Xj, or X. c Xj.
It is also straightforward to extend the original account to incorporate an event theory
which enables us to handle temporal and aspectual phenomena, in particular the kinds of
temporal relations which occur in narrative discourse. See Partee (1984), Hinrichs (1986),
Kamp (1979, 1981b), Kamp & Rohrer (1983) etc. The extensions which have been
proposed in the literature have generally represented a combination of an interval semantics
for tense which takes tense to refer to temporal entities, a Davidsonian event semantics
(Davidson 1967), in which events as well as temporal intervals are added to the ontology
of the theory and may be referred to and quantified over, and an aspectual classification of
'eventualities' (or situations) which derives from original work by Mourelatos (1978) and
others. Although it is often necessary to refer to temporal entities such as reference times,
eventualities are taken as primitive.
The basic assumption is that tense is anaphoric: the tense of each clause refers to a
'reference time', a temporal interval situated in time relative to the speech time and relative
to a reference time provided by the previous discourse. The temporal extensions to DR
Theory which have been proposed have been designed to account especially for (past
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tense) narrative discourse, which has as one of its most obvious characteristics that each
event clause progressively moves on the temporal reference, by moving the action forward
in time. That is, events are sequentially ordered, with the time of each successive event
following that of the previous one. State clauses do not involve a forward movement in
reference time, but rather describe how things were at the time of the last-mentioned event
So we start with the speech time, an event clause will introduce an event situated in time
in the past relative to the speech time, a subsequent event will be situated in the past
relative to the speech time but following the reference time introduced by the first event,
and so on. As an example, see the text in (15).
(15) Ronnie got up, went to the window, and raised the blind.
el e2 e3
It was light outside. He pulled the blind down and went back to bed.
S1 e4 e5
He wasn't ready to face the day. He was too hungover.
s~ s~
To construct an event-theoretic DRS for this text, we need to introduce new types of
discourse markers standing for different sorts of eventualities: at least e. for 'event' and s.
for 'state', perhaps a. for 'eventuality' subsuming both of these, and maybe others. We
also need the discourse markers r (or now) for the speech time; and r for various
>3 n
reference times.
These DMs may be related using the anaphoric linkage condition '=', but we also need
new types of conditions to relate them:
(i) Each clause will license the introduction of an e or s DM, and a condition such as:
get_up(ejjCj).
(ii) Conditions specifying ordering relations between event DMs are also necessary: '<' for
the relation of complete precedence between events, and '2' for the relation of partial or
complete overlap.
In the discourse representation for example (13), we would need to specify that ^ <
< Cj < rg, and that ej c Sj, e^ ^ and e^ c s^.
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It is possible to capture this information either directly, by specifying the relevant
conditions as holding between the eventualities, as above, or indirectly, by causing each
new event clause not only to introduce an event DM but also to shift the reference time
forward; each new event DM is then ordered with respect to such reference times. On this
approach we would start with TqJ e^ occurs within the reference time r^; the clause
introducing e^ also introduces a new reference time r^ which e^ is ordered as preceding
and which itself precedes the speech time; then is specified as occuring within the
reference time r^; etc. The more simple direct approach will be taken in this thesis;
reference times if required can be defined in terms of the eventualities. However, in the
DRS in (16), representing the simplified version of (15) given in (15'), the full details are
given.
(150 Ronnie got up and looked out. It was light. He went back to bed.





ex < rx < now (rp := ri)
e2 C rx
look_out(e2, Xx)
e2 < r2 < now (rP := r2)




e3 < r3 < now (rP ~ rs)
Each new past tense event sentence is specified to occur within the then-current reference
time r , and it subsequently causes the reference time to be shifted to a new reference time
which follows the just introduced event.3 State sentences are required to include the current
reference time (but need not overlap the event that led to the introduction of that reference
time). Unlike events, states don't have the effect of updating or moving forward the
reference time r .
P
3 The notation indicates that r is set to a new reference time.
P
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The whole DRS is true just in case proper embeddings can be found in the model for the
event entities and state entities and for the reference times such that these are in the correct
temporal relations to each other.
We saw above that the subDRSs introduced by universal quantification or conditionals can
be seen as 'semantic subordination' contexts. These may represent anaphoric relations
across sentence boundaries, which seem to involve maintenance of the binding context
introduced in the first sentence. More recent work on other kinds of subordinate contexts
has focussed on the anaphoric relations possible within and between subDRSs. See Roberts
(1986, Stirling 1985b, 1988a) for discussion of 'modal subordination' contexts triggered by
modal elements, and distributive/iterative contexts triggered by quantification and aspect
Such accounts involve the imposition of even more structure within the DRS than we have
already seen, with the possibility of various kinds of subordinate DRS being defined, along
with various kinds of relations between subordinate DRSs. Once again, the contexts may
be used to represent chunks of several sentences.
In summary, DR Theory offers a promising formal account for certain systematic effects in
discourse. In addition to intersentential relations and relations between eventualities, it has
shown itself to be particularly successful at handling cases which apparently involve
binding but which neither syntactic nor logical definitions of binding relations have been
helpful in explaining: donkey sentences, where DR Theory succeeds due to its treatment
of quantificational meaning, and reference within quantified and modal contexts, where it
succeeds due to the notion of a DRS, which allows one to define semantic contexts
intermediate between the representation of a sentence and the representation for an entire
discourse.
4.3. Unification Categorial Grammar
The grammar formalism used in chapters 5 and 6 is a version of Unification Categorial
Grammar (UCG), which incorporates a semantics based on DR Theory. UCG is described
in Zeevat, Klein & Calder (1987) and Klein (1988). It is one of a family of grammar
formalisms which have as their basic operation unification: informally, two grammatical
objects may unify if they encode no incompatible information, where the unification of two
representations is a third representation which combines all the complete specifications in
the first two, and thus results in a sharing of the information in each. Other grammar
formalisms of this kind, notably HPSG (Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar) and
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PATR-II, to which UCG owes many insights, are described in Shieber (1986) and Pollard
& Sag (1987); see also Calder, Klein & Moens (eds.) (1987) and Haddock, Klein &
Morrill (eds.) (1987). The operation of unification is also important in GPSG (Generalised
Phrase Structure Grammar), LFG (Lexical Functional Grammar) and Prolog, among other
formal systems.
The basic grammatical object in UCG is the sign (a term borrowed from Saussure via
HPSG). The sign is a list of phonological, syntactic and semantic information:
phonology-.syntactic categorysemantics. These three levels of representation are treated as
equal partners in constructing analyses of linguistic expressions. In some versions of the
theory, contextual, or dicourse resolution information, is also specified (eg. see Zeevat
1987).
I shall use the sign for the English third person singular present tense intransitive verb
form walks as an illustration. The sign for this verb form would be as in (17). For
typographical convenience, the three levels of representation are listed vertically, on
separate lines. The various parts of the representation will be explained in turn.4
(17)
w walks
S[FIN]/ w: NP[3,SG,SBJ]: Xj
[Sj] [walkXSpXj) & Sj 2 now]
Phonological representations are expressed in ordinary orthography here, and nothing
further will be said about this level of representation. Note that w is a variable standing
for some phonological/orthographic string.
The syntactic representation is a categorial grammar representation of the kind found in
Montague Grammar. Categorial grammar began with Ajdukiewicz (1935) and has since
been developed further by Bar-Hillel, Lambek, and Montague and more recently by a range
of investigators such as Steedman and Pollard. The basic principle of categorial grammars
is that the full range of syntactic categories necessary in the syntax of a language can be
defined using a very small number of basic categories, if one specifies more complex
categories in terms of information about what kind of basic categories they need to
4 The exposition which follows departs in certain minor respects, mainly notational, from the version of
the theory presented in Zeevat, Klein & Calder (1987) and Klein (1988). Where relevant, the changes are not¬
ed.
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combine with in order to result in other basic categories. Thus, the basic categories in
UCG as in standard categorial grammar are S, NP and N. Complex categories are built up
from these using slash notation, for example the category for an intransitive verb is S/NP,
i.e. it is the kind of thing which needs to combine with a NP in order to make a sentence.
Often a notational distinction is made in categorial grammars between forwards and
backwards combination, using the forwards slash / and the backwards slash \: this simply
indicates the direction in the linear string in which the category is looking to be satisfied.
However, information about linear ordering is normally handled at the phonological level
in UCG.
Let us adopt the terminological convention of referring to the element on the righthand side
of the major slash (the element which the category is looking to combine with) as the
argument or active sign, and the element on the left of the slash as the functor or result
sign.
It is normal in categorial grammars, including UCG, for basic categories to be further
constrained by morpho-syntactic information in the form of features, for example in the
grammar of English the category NP may be specified for the features [PERSON],
[NUMBER] and [CASE], which take values [1,2,3], [SG,PL], and [SBJ.OBJ]. Similarly
the category S may be specified for a feature [VFORM] with a set of values including
[FIN]. Thus in example (17), the NP category of the active sign is constrained to be third
person, singular subjective case. The S category of the result is specified to be a finite
verb, which indicates that it agrees with and assigns case to its subject and situates the
eventuality in time relative to the time of speech. As we shall see, signs may be prevented
from applying (as arguments) to other (functor) signs by these syntactic feature
specifications, and also by restrictions imposed at the level of semantics. If their syntactic
categories conflict, or it is not possible to construct a new semantics by unification, the
denotation is dropped.
The syntactic categories used in UCG are defined in (18).
(18)
1. S, N, NP are basic categories.
2. Every basic category is a category.
3. If X is a category and S is a sign, then X/S is a category.
This definition encapsulates the distinction between the categorial grammar used in UCG
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and standard categorial grammars. In normal categorial grammars, the argument, or active
edge, of a complex category, is just another basic category. In UCG, it is a sign, which
means that it may include phonological and semantic information as well as morpho-
syntactic information: thus, phonological and semantic constraints may be specified on the
argument. So in our example, (17), the syntactic category of the verb form has as its result
the category S with the feature value [FIN], indicating that it is a verb form which takes
tense and subject agreement. The active sign is the sign w: NP[3,SG,SBJ]: Xp a partial
description which must be satisfied by any potential argument, where the phonology and
the semantics are relatively unspecified but the argument is constrained to have the
category NP and furthermore to be a third person singular NP in subjective case.
The semantic representation is expressed in the semantic representation language InL (for
Indexed Language), which is based on DR Theory.
The major similarity between InL and DR Theory is in its algebraic structure. Just like
DR Theory, InL has only two connectives for building complex formulae: an implication
'=>' that introduces universal quantification, and a conjunction '&' (which as we saw is
understood in DR Theory representation to link the conditions in a DRS). These allow the
construction of complex formulae of the following general forms:
M> => V]
[<t> & y]
As in DR Theory, the semantic formula as a whole carries existential import.
InL is similar to the event-theoretic versions of DR Theory described in section 4.2 in that
it incorporates a Davidsonian event theory (Davidson 1976), which involves the use of
sorted DMs for eventualities of various kinds: e for events, s for states, etc. Every verb is
assumed to introduce an eventuality DM. Thus in the example given, the present tense verb
form walks introduces a state DM Sj. The condition walk'(SjpCj) is to be read 'there is a
state Sj of walking and x^ is the agent of s^'. As in 4.2, also, tense is handled as a
temporal relation of precedence or overlap with respect to the time of utterance, which I
shall henceforth represent as the special DM now.
There are a number of minor differences between InL and DR Theory, for example that the
formulas of InL are linear rather than represented in the box diagram notation of DR
Theory. The main difference between the two theories is in the status of the DMs. InL
does not make the same kind of distinction as DR Theory between the universe of a DRS
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and the conditions in it. Instead, it is assumed that every formula <}> introduces a
designated variable v called its index. This is written in square brackets in prenex
position, thus: [v] <J>. Hence the formula in example (17) has s^ as its index. An index is
taken to act as a binding operator, with its formula as its scope; thus designation as an
index is equivalent to introduction into the universe of a DRS as a discourse marker.
It is assumed that the first argument of any atomic formula will be the index for that
formula. To reduce typographical complexity, prenex indices appearing within
subformulae are often omitted in the notation.
Despite this difference, the semantic representations expressed in InL are in all essential
respects equivalent to event-theoretical DR Theory representations of a familiar kind: the
universe of discourse markers may be scattered throughout the list of semantic conditions,
but the cumulative set of DMs associated with a complex conditon can be constructed by a
simple recursive definition. Thus, the example (17) has the equivalent DRS representation
(19).
(19) si xi now
walk (si, xi)
now C si
These changes have several advantages (see Zeevat, Klein & Calder 1987, Klein 1988):
InL allows a rule by rule construction of semantic representations; offers more options in
assigning constituency, and associating different sorts of DMs with different sorts of
constituents; and allows a better treatment of modifiers.






Here, the underscore in the NP's feature list is used to indicate that the NP is defined for
the feature [CASE], but as yet unspecified as to its value. This sign meets all the
constraints specified on the argument of (17): it is a NP, and it is third person singular. It
contains no information about case, which is compatible with specification for subjective
case. It contains no information which is in conflict with the information in the argument
sign of (17), i.e. there are no features for which both signs are specified but have different
values, nor are there any features for which one sign is defined but the other is not. The
sign in (17) and the sign in (20) can thus unify with one another.
In order to understand the process of unification, it is useful to think of grammatical
objects as partial information specifications. Two objects may be ranked according to how
informative they are: if one grammatical object contains at least as much information as
the other, we say that the first is subsumed by the second, the two are compatible, and they
may unify, with the more informative of the two substituting for the other. Thus the
process of unification involves the uniform substitution of a values for all occurrences of
any variable and the filling in of unspecified feature values and other unspecified




[Sj] [walk^Sp^) & Sj 2 now & kim'^)]
The sign (20) has substituted for the argument sign of (17). This has had the effect of
further specifying the phonology and semantics of the result sign. The phonological
representation for (20) has substituted for the phonological variable w, the DM Xj has
unified with the DM the semantic condition kzmY^) has been added to the
semantics.
This illustrates a further difference from standard categorial grammars: representations for
complex expressions are built up in the way familiar from categorial grammars, except that
unification makes possible information flow between an argument and the sign resulting
from its application.
The final step in the process is for the now satisfied and redundant active sign to be





[Sj] [walk'CSj^) & Sj 2 now & kim'^)]
Thus the different levels of representation are built up simultaneously using the same basic
operation of unification: the compositional construction of all three levels takes place in the
same manner, i.e. by the accretion of constraints on the possible representations.
More formally, the only rule of grammar in UCG (the application rule) is defined as
follows:
a. Phon.Cat/Signj.Sem Sigri2 -> [Phon.Cat/Sigrij:Sem\a,
b. Phon.CafiSigrij :Sem Sigri2 -> a[Phon:Cat/Sigrij:Sem],
where a is the most general unifier of Sigrij and
This covers both forwards and backwards functional application. To check whether some
potential argument sign actually does match the active edge of the functor sign, it is
necessary to check whether there is some substitution of values for variables such that the
two signs are equal under substitution. Such a substitution is a unifier.
A few further points need to be made. We have seen that sorted eventuality indices are
introduced by verbs and I mentioned that different aspectual sorts were distinguished, eg.
for events and states. In fact, all kinds of ontological types are formalised in UCG by
dividing the semantic variables into sorts. A sort is a bundle of features associated with a
particular variable. This conception of sorts allows operations of unification to be
performed on them, which provides a way of expressing selectional restrictions, and allows
thes ort of a variable to be incrementally specified by different references to it by different
subexpressions. To avoid typographical complexity, these sort feature bundles are often
represented notationally by special variable letters: thus, e for event, s for state. Other
standard distinctions are between singular and plural individual sorts, count and mass sorts,
etc. The ontology of sort assumed for English, for example, is represented in the
hierarchical structure in (23) from Klein (1988: 13): for any pair of sorts connected by a
branch, the higher of the two is less informative than and subsumes the lower, and thus
may be replaced by it via an operation of unification. Thus, the sort a, being completely
unspecified, may unify with and be replaced by a variable of any other sort.5 However,
5 In following chapters, I shall in fact restrict my use of the sort a to eventualities unspecified for aspect.
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sorts which are merely sisters in the hierarchy, and not connected by a subsumption
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The second point to note concerns features and feature structures. I have had little to say
about feature structures here, but in fact all grammatical information in this type of
grammar formalism can be seen as consisting of feature structures, from lexical
information upwards. See Shieber (1986), Pollard & Sag (1987) and Smolka (1988) for
more detailed discussion and formal definitions of feature structures and their logic.
Due to the way complex expressions are built up using the operation of unification, any
features specified on the category for a verb will be inherited by the category of the
sentence. Thus in our example, both verb and sentence are specified as [FIN], as the result
of specifying this feature value for the category S in the result portion of the verb's
category.
Another way to indicate feature sharing is by using multiple occurrences of a subscripted
tag 0, which indicates that the subscripted categories must agree in all feature values (see
Pollard & Sag 1987: 32f. etc.). As an illustration of how feature sharing works, consider
an example adapted from Pollard & Sag. Suppose we use feature structures to keep track








NI NW 19 50 92 B
SECRETARY NAME JONES
NAME DEVITO
NI AB 54 64 87 A
ASST-MANAGER SECRETARY NAME JONES
(24) encodes the information that both Abrams and Devito have a secretary called Jones.
Subsequent information may reveal that these are two different individuals, eg. we may
find out that they have different National Insurance numbers. In comparison, the feature
structure in (25) indicates that Abrams and Devito share a secretary named Jones. (24)
subsumes (25), since (25) contains all the information that (24) does plus information that















AB 54 64 87 A
4.4. Conclusion
Since DR Theory claims to present a level of description intermediate to syntax and
semantic interpretation, which is specifically designed to account for anaphoric phenomena
and other systematic discourse effects, it seems likely that it might be useful in accounting
for switch-reference. In fact, apart from the potential interest and particular suitability of an
account in DR Theory, one might well argue that given its expressed aims, the theory is
obliged to say something about switch-reference data. I shall briefly explore the main
reasons for proposing a DR Theory based account.
We saw in chapter 1 that switch-reference pivot NPs are not in the syntactic configuration
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which is required for the Binding Principles to apply, so that according to the Binding
Theory these NPs should be completely free in reference with respect to one another.
Since they are not, Finer (1985a, b) proposes a generalised binding account. However,
even this does not allow switch-reference relations to be handled by a syntactic binding
account, since switch-reference may also relate coordinated or chained clauses, or clauses
which are not linearly adjacent. It is also necessary to account for the use of switch-
reference marked recapitulation clauses to relate sentences. Yet, switch-reference is also a
highly systematic phenomenon, and there are good reasons for taking it to be relatively
'syntactic' rather than pragmatic or functional (cf. Finer 1985a, b for such arguments).
Switch-reference may appear to be a device for eliminating possible ambiguity in
discourse, but it redundantly occurs even in environments that have no potential ambiguity,
and it doesn't occur in certain constructions where it would be expected, were it governed
exclusively by functional/pragmatic considerations. Rather than make a distinction for
switch-reference analogous to that made for anaphora between 'bound'and 'discourse'
anaphora (Reinhart 1983), it seems sensible to see whether DR Theory cannot say
something about switch-reference, given that it has been so successful in accounting for
other kinds of 'binding' outside syntactic or logical binding contexts, and in unifying
sentence internal and sentence external anaphora.
From what we have seen in chapters 1 to 3, it is also clear that relations between events,
of the kind discussed by Partee (1984) etc. are also implicated in switch-reference. An
event-theoretical version of DR Theory of the kind described above should be able to
account for this aspect of the meaning of switch-reference markers.
In addition, in DR Theory, it is clear that a DRS may represent more than one simple
clause. In fact not only can DRSs represent sequences of sentences, but we have seen
that various types of relations between subDRSs have been proposed which can account
for some of the structure of discourses above the level of the sentence. Further, there is
some underlying and implicit assumption that DRS's correspond to cohesive event
sequences, especially if one considers an event version of DR Theory - so that there is
some coherence of the sentences represented in a DRS in terms of genre and in terms of
the overall temporal interval involved. For example, if one is representing a narrative
structure one assumes temporal continuity within the larger DRS which encompasses the
events, and if some interpolated future event occurs, it will certainly appear in a DRS on
its own and off the main timeline/event sequence. Thus, DR Theory offers various
mechanisms by which one would be able to define discourse semantic relations between
complexes of eventualities, of the kind that we have seen in chapter 2 are sometimes
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implicated in switch-reference relations. At the moment DR Theory looks at quite a
narrow range of discourse continuity and needs enrichment. In giving an account for
switch-reference, I will be generally interested in defining (meta)conditions which specify
types of DRS and the way they are related to other DRSs.
The reason for using a variant of DR Theory embedded within UCG is so as to allow an
account of the syntax of switch-reference as well as its semantics, in fact an account of
syntax and semantics which proceeds simultaneously. Because a categorial syntax is used,
the syntactic category of the switch-reference marker may encode the (partially specified)
sign for the controlling clause, with which the marked clause is to combine, offering the
potential for specifying a variety of constraints, both syntactic and semantic, on this
following clause.
Finally, since versions of DR Theory such as InL take processing considerations seriously,
and have been implemented computationally, it is interesting to consider within this
framework what is involved in accounting for the kind of restricted information the
switch-reference markers provide, before the controlling clause comes along.
- 156 -
CHAPTER 5 A Discourse Representation Theory account of switch-reference
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I illustrate the kind of treatment I propose for switch-reference systems by
presenting a formal account of switch-reference in Amele. At the end of the chapter, some
suggestions are made about how such an account could be used to handle switch-reference
in Eastern Porno, Lenakel and other languages.
Two factors have dictated the choice of Amele as an illustrative language. First, it is a
clause chaining language, and switch-reference languages of this kind have received little
formal attention (cf. Finer 1985 a,b, Tsujimura 1987). Second, it exhibits the Ml range of
nonreferential functional extensions of switch-reference marking described in chapter 2,
including unexpected uses of SS marking with impersonal controlling clauses, and
unexpected uses of DS marking triggered by changes other than in reference of the subject
NPs.
Unification Categorial Grammar (UCG) will be used to formalise the account. Since UCG
incorporates a semantics based on Discourse Representation Theory (DR Theory), the
proposed account illustrates the way DR Theory can be used to handle switch-reference
phenomena, both in Amele and more generally. It was shown in chapter 4 that the
semantic representations of UCG can readily be translated into more familiar DR Theory
representations.
The basis for the account is the idea developed in chapter 3 that switch-reference should be
regarded as a kind of interclausal agreement. We saw in chapter 4 that in event versions
of DR Theory, and in particular in UCG, it is assumed that the universe of discourse
contains discourse markers or indices representing the eventualities introduced by clauses.
In UCG these indices are sorted according to the aspectual type of the eventuality. In the
account proposed here, it is claimed that in order to handle switch-reference, even more
structure should be introduced into these eventuality indices, so that they encode all or
most clause-level information i.e. transitivity information in the sense of Hopper &
Thompson (1980). Switch-reference markers then are seen as indicating the degree of
agreement or dis-agreement between these structured eventuality indices.
In section 5.2, some preliminary remarks are made about Amele and its typological
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characteristics. Section 5.3 is concerned with the syntax of switch-reference in Amele, and
in particular considers the question of how the syntactic/semantic relation between marked
and controlling clauses is to be handled, and the question of what set of lexical features is
necessary to characterise Amele verbs and account for the inflectional dependency of the
marked verb on the controlling verb. Then, in 5.4, we consider the semantics of switch-
reference in Amele. This has two main elements: how to isolate the switch-reference
pivot, and how to handle functional extensions to the switch-reference system. In this
section we also consider how to handle cases where one of the switch-reference pivots is
plural, and how the account fits into a more general account of textual structure, which
enables us to provide a treatment of recapitulation clauses. In section 5.5 it is shown that
the account can be extended to include the impersonal constructions described in chapter 2.
Finally, in section 5.6, I show how the account can be modified to apply to other
languages with switch-reference, including those which exhibit non-referential functional
extensions and those which do not.
5.2. Amele
Amele is a Papuan language with about 6000 speakers, who live in an area of
approximately 120 square kilometers between the Gum and Gogol Rivers, just south of the
town of Madang in Papua New Guinea. Although they have lived on the coast for some
centuries, the people were originally highlanders, and the language resembles other
Highland languages. It is the largest of the Gum family of languages, and has four distinct
dialects. The data here is from Hua, the prestige and literary dialect. Although the
language has been mentioned in various works on Papua New Guinea languages (eg.
Capell 1969), substantial woric on it has been done only by Roberts (1987, 1988),
following on from a relatively scanty beginning made by Wullenkord (ca. 1930). All the
data in this thesis are taken from Roberts' work, which is based on recorded text material
comprising some 32 different texts totalling 15,500 words, from a wide range of
informants.
Basic word order in Amele is relatively strict for core constituents: S IO DO V. The verb
may be followed by a subordinator, but otherwise it is always last. The order of other core
constituents may vary due to a small number of thematic movement rules (Roberts 1987:
70f,161,142,147-8). These movement rules constitute evidence for a VP constituent, and
Amele has other characteristics of configurational languages such as the relatively fixed
word order and lack of case marking on NPs, although it also has some characteristics of
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nonconfigurational languages (see Roberts 1988: 48).
Amele is a head-marking language. There is provision for marking subject and both
objects on the verb, and in some cases this is obligatory. This allows extensive 'null
anpahora', i.e. Amele is a 'pro-drop' language but also freely allows omission of elements
besides the subject, provided they are retrieveable from the context. In some
circumstances even the verbal agreement marking may be omitted, so that the minimal
clause is a verb stem stripped of all its inflections. At the other extreme, it is very
common for 'intraclausal pronominal copies' to accompany full NPs. These agree with the
verbal markers in person and number, and function to further specify the full NPs (which
are not marked for number), and to emphasise or disambiguate.
Since there is no case marking on NPs, linear position in the clause and agreement
marking on the verb between them indicate the grammatical function of NPs. Amele is a
Nominative-Accusative language (Roberts 1987:164).
Amele has extensive clause chaining, and also a range of subordinate constructions. A
limited number of coordinated constructions also occur. Subordinate clauses normally
precede the verb of the matrix clause and any arguments of that verb which are not
expressed in the subordinate clause. With respect to the switch-reference system, the
marked clause almost always precedes the controlling clause. Adverbial elements have
relatively free word order within the clause.
It is a postpositional language, and in possessive NPs the possessor element precedes the
possessed element. The structure of postpositional phrases and possessive NPs is given in
(1) and (2) below; note that compound postpositions are common. The PossP is used for
alienably possessed things; inalienable possession is indicated by an inflection on the noun
for person and number of the possessor. Most but not all modifiers follow the noun in a
NP, including determiners.
(1) PP -> N N-modifiers Postpositions
(2) PossNP -> Possessor_N Postposition_na('of') Possessed_N
Prototypical switch-reference in Amele is exemplified in (3)-(5). In addition to their other
functions, the switch-reference markers indicate whether the two events are simultaneous or
sequential. The structure of the verb and the morphology of the switch-reference markers
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will be described in more detail in 5.3.2.1
(3) uqa q-it-i-me-i na 0-i-te-i-a
3s hit-ls-PRED-SS-3s stick give-PRED-ls-3s-TodP
He hit me and then gave me the stick. [298, (593)]2
(4) hina ho-co-m sab je-i-a
2s come-DS-2s food eat-3s-TodP
You came and he ate the food. [294, (559)]
(5) ija Malolo uqa na













While I waited for Malolo's car there at the main road, he came down,
I climbed in, we two went off. [101, (Text 7); 238, (396); 297, (583)]
The long text in (6) gives a better idea of how the switch-reference system works in
1 Unless indicated examples are from Roberts (1987). The page number and example number are given
in that order in square brackets after the free gloss for the example. Sometimes an example appears more than
once in Roberts' grammar and in this case all occurences are cited. The following list of abbreviations is used
in morphemic glosses:
1,2,3 - First, second, third person
s,d,p = Singular, dual, plural number
TodP, YestP, RemP, HabP = Today Past, Yesterday Past, Remote Past and Habitual Past tenses.
Pres = Present Tense
Fut, NegF = Future and Negative Future tenses
PRED = Predicate marker
INF = Infinitival form of the verb
SIM = Simultaneous (the reduplicated part of simultaneous SR marking)
DUR = Durative aspect
CONTR = Contrafactual mood
IMP = Imperative mood
Q = Question particle
NEG = Negative particle
POSS = Possessive form (inalienable possessive inflection, or possessive postposition)
INDEF = Indefinite pronoun
2 According to Roberts (1987:313), the verb 'give' is not lexically realized in Amele, but the predicate
marker -i- is required in such cases.
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discourse in the language. Other long examples are given in Roberts (1987: 108, (515),
(516); 101, (Text 7)). The example shows how subject NPs, other NPs and indeed verbal
inflection including SS marking is omitted under identity. These 'stripped down' forms of
SS-marked verbs appear to have a rather predictable distribution in text, occurring after the
first use of an SS-marked verb; a fact which will have to be accounted for by the theory of
textual structure.3 This example also illustrates the usefulness of switch-reference in
keeping track of referents. To aid the reader in following the text, each clause is started on
























































The chicken did that. Then while the wallaby sat there confused the
turtle came out of the sea. He lifted the wallaby on his shoulder and
carried him and put him on the shore. Then he (wallaby) got up and
went down into the bush. [107-8, (514)]
3 Stripped down forms of sequential SS marked verbs consist of either the stem plus the predicate mark¬
er, or the stem plus subject agreement; in both cases optional object markers may also occur. Stripped down
forms of simultaneous SS marked verbs, consisting of the reduplicated verb stem, may occur if the verb is fol¬
lowed by a verb marked for durative aspect See Roberts (1987: 107, 236, 273, 314).
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5.3. The syntax of switch-reference in Amele
A full description of the formal notation to be used in this chapter was given in chapter 4.
As we saw there, in UCG, linguistic expressions are represented by signs, where a sign
consists of phonological, syntactic and semantic information. The phonological level is
represented here using ordinary orthography, and I have nothing further to say about it.
The syntactic representation is in the form of a. category of the kind familiar from
categorial grammars. Basic categories are S and NP, which may be further constrained
through the feature structures associated with them. Complex categories are built up from
S and NP using slash notation, with / indicating forwards combination and \ indicating
backwards combination.4 UCG differs from standard categorial grammars in that the
element to the right of the slash in a complex category is itself a sign, i.e. it is specified for
phonological and semantic information as well as syntactic information. Semantic
information is represented in InL, the Indexed Language developed on the basis of DR
Theory. InL is a predicate logic representation enriched with a Davidsonian event theory.
In InL each linguistic expression introduces an index corresponding to the discourse
marker introduced into the universe of a Discourse Representation Structure in DR Theory.
Linguistic expressions also introduce one or more conditions of the same kind as are
found in Discourse Representation Structures.
The syntactic representation and the semantic interpretation are built up in tandem as the
signs representing linguistic expressions are combined by the operation of unification.
In this section we develop an account of the syntactic information encoded in switch-
reference markers; we also sketch an account of that part of their semantic representation
which pertains to the temporal relation between the clauses. In section 5.4 we give an
account of the other semantic information provided by the switch-reference marker.
5.3.1. The relation between marked and controlling clauses
Finer's (1985 a,b) formal grammar of switch-reference crucially assumes that the syntactic
relation between clauses linked by switch-reference marking is one of local hierarchical
adjunction. This is necessary to achieve the correct structural configuration for a Binding
4 Normally in UCG the linear order of constituents is indicated at the phonological level.
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Theory account of switch-reference. In many languages, especially from North America,
switch-reference does indeed marie subordinate adverbial clauses, and in a few languages it
may mark other kinds of subordinate clauses such as relative clauses or complement
clauses. However, as we saw in chapter 1, in some languages switch-reference operates
across coordinated or paratactic clause sequences, and in many other languages, especially
from Papua New Guinea, it marks the clauses in chaining constructions.
Amele is typical of Papua New Guinea clause chaining languages. That is, one of the
major interclausal syntactic relations is that holding between a dependent clause headed by
an inflectionally impoverished 'medial' verb, and a final independent clause headed by a
finite verb. These clauses are concatenated without subordinating or coordinating
conjunctions. Very long chains of medial clauses are possible: Roberts (1987:103) notes
that the maximum number of clauses per sentences in any text he looked at was 13, and
frequently sentences had 10-12 clauses, with an overall average of 3 clauses per sentence.5
Dependency relations in clause chains
As we saw in chapter 3, in general, two types of dependency relate the clauses in a
chaining construction. Medial clauses are marked for switch-reference and thereby provide
information about the subject reference and other characteristics of the controlling clause.
The controlling clause is usually the following clause, whether medial and itself switch-
reference marked or final and hence unmarked for switch-reference. However, because
medial verbs are non-finite, they are themselves dependent on the final clause for
information about temporal reference, and possibly other information morphologically
marked on finite verbs. This is the case whether or not the final verb is also their
controlling clause for the purposes of switch-reference.6
Amele conforms to this general pattern. Verbs are medial by virtue of being marked for
switch-reference instead of receiving the morphological marking for tense etc. characteristic
of finite verbs. They are thus dependent on the final, finite verb for temporal reference.
As usual, the switch-reference marking itself indicates relative temporal ordering between
5 Elsewhere Roberts notes that it is not uncommon to get as many as 15-20 verbs per sentence in certain
kinds of narrative (Roberts 1987:293; 1988:48).
6 We also noted that some languages manifest 'focal' rather than 'sequential' switch-reference; in such
languages all medial clauses have the final finite clause as their controlling clause for switch-reference as well
as being dependent on it for tense, regardless of whether they are immediately adjacent to it.
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the marked clause and the controlling clause, i.e. whether the eventualities they describe
occur simultaneously or sequentially. The schematic representation in (7) of the verbs
from example (5) illustrates the Amele clause-chaining construction, showing the two types
of dependency relation. The arrows along the top of the diagram represent the fact that
medial verbs are dependent upon the final verb for temporal reference, and the arrows
along the bottom of the diagram represent the fact that the switch-reference marker on each
medial clause constrains the reference of the subject of the immediately following clause,
Here, with the exception of the first verb, each verb (medial or final) is dependent on the
previous one for information about the anaphoric relation between their subjects and the
temporal relation between their eventualities. So, the second medial verb MV2 has a
different subject from MVj, MVg has a different subject from MV2, and FV has a
different subject from MV^. Similarly, MVj is marked as simultaneous with MV2, and
MV2 and MV^ are each marked for sequential action, indicating that second, third and
fourth events occurred consecutively. In addition, each medial verb is dependent on the
final verb of the sentence for its tense. The tense of the whole chain is Yesterday Past,
because this is the marking on the final verb. Thus the medial verbs are indirectly
anchored to the time of speech through their dependence on the final verb, which is a
result of being marked for switch-reference at all, and are temporally ordered with respect
to each other through the particular type of switch-reference marking they receive.
Examples (8a,b) illustrate the dependence of medial verbs on final verbs for tense.
(8) a. Ho busale-ce-b dana age qo-ig-a.
pig run_out-DS-3s man 3p hit-3p-TodP
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The pig ran out and the men killed it.
b. Ho busale-ce-b dana age qo-qag-an.
pig run_out-DS-3s man 3p hit-3p-Fut
The pig will run out and the men will kill it. [1988: 52, (10)]
The medial clauses in these sentences are identical, yet they receive different
interpretations. In (8a), the final verb is in the Today Past tense, and so the event described
by the medial verb busaleceb is also interpreted as Today Past; in (8b) the final verb is in
the Future tense and the event described by the medial verb is interpreted as being in the
Future.
We handle the semantic representation of these temporal relations using the mechanisms
introduced in the event theoretical versions of DR Theory described in chapter 4, which
include UCG. Basically, each medial verb introduces an eventuality index for the clause it
heads and one for the following clause, and specifies a linear ordering relation of temporal
precedence or overlap between the two. The final verb introduces an eventuality for the
clause it heads and specifies a linear ordering relation between it and the time of utterance.
Although only the final verb is marked for tense, since each eventuality in the chain is
related to the subsequent one, the temporal reference of the chain is eventually 'cashed out'
at the time of utterance. The semantic conditions which would describe the chain of
eventualities introduced in (5) (repeated below) would be as in (5').
(5) ija Malolo uqa na ka
Is Malolo 3s of_POSS car
jic ana-g na ono nu





While I waited for Malolo's car there at the main road, he came down,
I climbed in, we two went off. [101, (Text 7); 238, (396); 297, (583)]
(50 e^ O e2 & e2 K e3 e3 < e4 & e4 < now
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Since medial verbs are dependent upon the final verb for all information encoded in finite
verb inflections, which medial verbs lack, they are also dependent upon the final clause for
polarity marking and for the marking of the imperative mood and for habitual aspect
Medial clauses are also dependent on final clauses for other moods which are marked not
on the verb but by sentential particles, but which are constrained to occur with finite verbs,
eg. the (yes/no) interrogative; see Roberts (1987:112,237). This will be discussed in more
detail in 5.3.2. For example, (9) shows that it is not possible to specify the mood of a
medial clause independently from that of its final clause.
(9) a. Ho busale-ce-b dana age qo-ig-a fo?
pig run_out-DS-3s man 3p hit-3p-TodP Q
Did the pig run out and did the men kill it?
b. *Ho busale-ce-b fo dana age qo-ig-a.
pig run_out-DS-3s Q men 3p hit-3p-TodP [1988:52, (13)]
Switch-reference and subordinate clauses?
Although switch-reference in Amele is in general restricted in its domain to the clause
chaining construction, Roberts notes that it is also marked on two types of subordinate
adverbial clause construction: the conditional construction and the certain-apprehensive
construction. Examples of the conditional construction are given in (10) and examples of
the apprehensive construction are given in (11).
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(10) a. Ija wa na no-co-min fi waga q-it-igi-an.
Is water in go_down-DS-ls if crocdile hit-ls-3s-Fut
If I go down into the water the crocodile will get me.
b. Waga q-it-igi-an ija wa na no-co-min fi.
crocodile hit-ls-3s-Fut Is water in go_down-DS-ls if
The crocodile will get me if I go down into the water. [1988: 58-9,
(44)]
(11) a. Ija wa na no-co-min
Is water in go_down-DS-ls
waga q-it-ec/q-it-i-aun
crocodile hit-ls-INF/hit-3s-NegF
If I go down into the river the crocodile might get me.




The crocodile might get me if I go down into the water. [1988: 59,
(45)]
In conditional constructions, it is the conditional clause which may be marked for
(sequential) switch-reference. The conditional mood particle fi occupies clause-final
position unless the verb is SS sequential, in which case the conditional particle replaces the
SS marker. Conditional constructions are normally left-branching, but the marked
conditional clause may be extraposed to the end of the sentence as in (10b). The
controlling consequent clause has a normal independent, finite verb. This construction
may occur without switch-reference, and in this case the verb of the conditional clause is
not a medial verb, but an independent, finite verb.
In the certain-apprehensive construction, it is the consequent clause which is marked for
switch-reference. The certain-apprehensive clause is marked with the apprehensive mood
particle dain which occupies clause-final position, and its verb may be either in the
infinitival form, with the suffix -ec, and no subject agreement or tense, or a finite verb
form with either future or negative future tense, in which case the particle is optional. The
certain-apprehensive construction is normally right-branching, but the controlling,
apprehensive clause may be extraposed to the front of the sentence as in (lib). Note that
the extraposed versions of both constructions result in the marked order of controlling
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followed by switch-reference marked clause. Once again, another version of the
construction occurs, without switch-reference marking; in this case the verb of the
consequent clause is not medial but is a finite verb with negative future tense.
Since the presence of a clause-final subordinating particle and the ability to be extraposed
are criterial for subordinate clauses in Amele, Roberts (1988: 46) proposes an analysis on
which it is the antecedent conditional clause, marked for switch-reference, which is
subordinate in the conditional construction, but the consequent apprehensive clause, the
controlling clause, which is subordinate in the apprehensive construction. This is further
supported by the fact that the apprehensive clause may have an infinitival verb, normally
restricted to subordinate clauses. If this is the correct analysis, it represents a counter¬
example to the proposed universal constraint mentioned in chapter 1, that the switch-
reference relation never holds between a superordinate marked clause and a subordinate
controlling clause. It is also, as Roberts (1988: 59) points out, a further problem for a
configurationally based syntactic binding account of switch-reference such as Finer's.
It is possible that subordinate clauses with the purpose/cause subordinator nu also take
switch-reference. Roberts does not mention these explicitly as being a possible domain for
switch-reference - on the contrary, in both Roberts (1987:121) and Roberts (1988:58) he
explicitly says that only two types of subordinate clause can take switch-reference - but
examples occur in the texts he gives, such as the following. This case is like the
conditional construction in that switch-reference is marked on what is apparently the
subordinate clause.7
(12) ija ja hudo-co-min nu
Is fire open-DS-ls cause
uqa sab mane-i-a
3s food cook-3s-TodP
Because I lit the fire she cooked the food. [98, (481)]
So in total, switch-reference is marked on the following range of clause types in Amele:
(i) medial clauses in clause-chaining constructions
(ii) subordinate adverbial clauses
7 There is also a tenuous historical connection between switch-reference marking and the contrafactual
and prescriptive mood constructions, which take special subject agreement markers that seem to be related to
the subject agreement which helps mark simultaneous-irrealis and sequential DS; Roberts (1987:270-1).
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- conditional clauses
- antecedent clauses in a certain-apprehension construction
- ? purpose/cause clauses
In all cases, the switch-reference marked verb is a non-finite medial verb. These are the
only constructions in which such verbs appear. All the subordinate adverbial clauses in
which such verbs may occur also appear in other varieties in which some other verb form
is used.
The semantic relation between the switch-reference marked and controlling clauses in the
three subordinate constructions is the same as that which holds between marked and
controlling clauses in clause chains, with the additional specification of a causal or logical
relation between the two eventualities due to the meaning of the subordinating particle. It
should therefore be possible to give a coherent account of the semantics of the switch-
reference markers which will generalise across all these cases. I shall present such an
account below.
Generalising the syntactic account of switch-reference marking across all three types of
clause is a more difficult task. My general assumption is that use of the medial verb form
assimilates these constructions to the clause chain construction, and so the treatment of
medial verbs in conditional and certain-apprehensive clauses is to be assimilated to the
treatment of medial verbs in clause chaining constructions. That is, I hypothesise that the
medial verb makes the construction no longer subordinate (this seems to be implied by
Roberts 1987: 269 too). The fact that the conditional and apprehensive particles remain
has the effect of placing additional restrictions upon both the semantics and the syntax of
what is basically a clause chain construction. This idea is easy enough to put into practice
for the conditional (and possibly for purpose/cause) clauses, but the analysis of the
certain-apprehensive construction remains rather mysterious and I shall leave it for future
work.8
8 It is perhaps significant that most adverbial clauses apart from those which have the potential for
switch-reference marking are really relative clauses on head nouns of place, time etc.
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'Clause-skipping' in Amele
Switch-reference marking may relate clauses which are chained or in a conditional or
certain-apprehensive construction, but which are also both subordinate to some other
clause. However, with the two possible exceptions noted in the preceding discussion,
switch-reference marking never holds between a subordinate clause and its matrix clause.
Switch-reference marking operates only over clauses at the same level of syntactic
structure, so that if a subordinate clause occurs within a chain, the switch-reference
marking will appear to skip over it and reference the next clause on the same grammatical
level instead.
The following diagram illustrates the possibilities. Sp S2, S3, and S4 constitute a clause
chain. S^ and S^ are subordinate clauses embedded within S2. Sj may be switch-
reference marked vis-a-vis S2. S2 vis-a-vis S3, and S3 vis-a-vis the final clause S^.
Likewise, S^ may bear switch-reference marking vis-a-vis S^, as both are part of a
subordinate structure. But there is no possibility of Sj marking switch-reference with
respect to S^, or Sg with respect to S2.
Sj , s2 , s3 , s4
S2[[S5 ' S6^"^
For example, see (13).
(13) Aluh gemo na b-i-me-b [cudun
mountain middle to come_up-PRED-SS-lp [place
oso jain mud-i-me-ig meci-egi-na eu
INDEF rest make-PRED-SS-3p 10ok-3p-Pres that
na] ono ege jain mi-mi bil-eb
at] there lp rest SIM-put be-lp_SS
ege ege na cahineg sab j-om
lp lp of day food eat-lp_RemP
We came up to the middle of the mountain and at the place where they
stop to rest and enjoy the view there we rested while we ate our lunch.
[44, (160); 57, (215)]
In this sentence, the section from cudun to na inclusive is a subordinate adverbial clause of
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place, which strictly speaking is a relative clause modifying the NP cudun oso, 'a place'.
The eu na marks the clause as a place adverbial. This subordinate clause itself contains
two clauses in a clause chain, which are linked by switch-reference marking; but the
switch-reference marking at the subordinate level and at the top level of the sentence are
completely separate, as is indicated by the otherwise anomalous SS marking on the first
verb bimeb 'we come up'.9
This property of the scope of switch-reference marking seems to reflect a feeling that there
is more cohesion between clauses in a clause chain than there is between a matrix and
subordinate clause. One way to express this difference in degree of cohesion would be to
say that all the clauses in a chain are at the same level of 'grounding' in terms of Hopper
& Thompson (1980:280; see also Grimes 1975), whereas matrix and subordinated clauses
differ in their grounding, the former being foregrounded and the latter backgrounded.
The syntactic analysis of medial clauses
In addition to the clause chaining construction and a range of subordinate clause
constructions, Amele has clauses which are overtly coordinated in a familiar way, by
means of conjunctions such as qa, 'but'. See example (14).10 Independent clauses with
finite verbs may also be conjoined in a coordinate relationship by simple juxtaposition, as
in example (15).11
(14) ija ja hud-ig-a qa
Is fire open-ls-TodP but
uqa sab mane-i-a
3s food cook-3s-TodP
I lit the fire but she cooked the food. [99, (483)]
(15) ho eu tuqe-si-n cile-si-n
pig that butcher-3d-RemP boil-3d-RemP
They (2) butchered that pig and cooked it [103, (491)]
The question has arisen in the literature as to whether clause chaining is a type of
coordination or a type of subordination. I shall argue that, in so far as one can make such
claims independent of the syntactic analysis of particular languages, it is something distinct
from either.
This question has some importance for deciding on what syntactic analysis to give for the
relation between switch-reference marked and controlling clauses. However, it has been
considered a non-trivial decision in the literature chiefly because syntactic binding accounts
such as Finer's crucially require switch-reference to hold between subordinate constructions
and not between coordinate ones. Hence, the line of argument which has been pursued bv.
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researchers such as Roberts (1988) has been to attempt to show that switch-reference holds
between coordinated clauses so that Finer* s analysis is inadequate. I have already noted in
chapter 1 that switch-reference is said by Jacobsen (1983), Austin (1980), Gordon (1983)
and others to hold between uncontroversially coordinated and paratactic constructions, as
well as in clause chains, and I have given several other reasons for looking for a more
comprehensive account than Finer's. Before giving an analysis for medial clauses,
however, I shall briefly review the main arguments for seeing clause chaining as
subordination or coordination.
Clause chaining constructions in Papua New Guinea languages have most usually been
likened to or collapsed under coordination (see Haiman 1980, 1983, Olson 1981, Comrie
1983, Franklin 1983, Reesink 1983, MacDonald 1983). Most such claims have been based
on two types of evidence. The first is the way such clauses are translated into a language
like English, which makes an overt distinction between coordinate and subordinate clauses,
so that clause chains are claimed to be functional equivalents of coordinate structures in
English (Comrie 1983: 19). The second is the fact that medial clauses are dependent on a
final clause for tense, etc. in a way said to resemble coordinate reduction (Haiman 1980,
MacDonald 1983). As Roberts (1988: 51) shows, these are not particularly effective
arguments. Nevertheless, he too claims that clause chains are an instance of coordination.
The syntactic evidence he gives for this claim is summarised below (see Roberts 1988:
50-58; also 1987: 43ff., 100f., 292). This evidence is based on rather specific facts about
the grammar of Amele and should probably be generalised to other languages only with
care.
(i) Medial clauses lack subordinate clause functions. Subordinate clauses in Amele
are basically nominal, relative or adverbial; if anything, one could at a pinch see
the medial clauses as being adverbial, although Roberts (1988: 54-5) claims that
this works much better for sequential medial clauses than for simultaneous ones.
(ii) Since Amele has relatively free word order with respect to adverbial elements,
it is possible for subordinate adverbial clauses to occur 'embedded' in their matrix
clause in patterns like the following:
AdvP S V
S AdvP V (the preferred version)
Neither medial clauses nor overtly coordinate clauses can be embedded within
another clause in this way.
(iii) Subordinate clauses can be extraposed, normally to the end of the sentence,
but medial clauses are like coordinate clauses in that their order is sequentially
fixed and must normally correspond to the order in which the events being narrated
occurred. Switch-reference marked conditional and certain-apprehensive clauses
can however be extraposed.
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(iv) Cataphoric relations are possible between a pronoun in an initial subordinate
clause and an NP in the following matrix clause, but are not possible between
medial clauses, or between medial and final clauses. Nor are such relations
possible between overtly coordinated clauses.
(v) Combinations of coordinate conjunctions are highly restricted in Amele.
Particularly restricted are combinations involving qa, 'but'. However, coordinating
and subordinating conjunctions may combine. Switch-reference marking may
combine with subordinating conjunctions such as fi, 'if and dain, 'lest', which we
saw above, but not with coordinating conjunctions such as qa or ca, 'add' (i.e.
'and'). The sole exception is the disjunction fo, 'or'. Roberts says this is a
plausible exception if we assume that switch-reference clauses are covertly marked
for 'and' as this combination then comes out as the inclusive disjunction 'and/or'.
While this evidence is suggestive, there are significant differences between medial clauses
and overtly coordinate clauses, both in Amele and in other clause chaining languages I
have looked at. In fact, there is one important respect in which subordinate and coordinate
clauses pattern alike, and medial clauses are different. This is the matter of independent
tense, aspect, mood and polarity marking: both subordinate and coordinate clauses have
independent finite verbs, while medial verbs are nonfinite and dependent (comparative
examples for Amele may be found in Roberts 1988: 52, (12), (15)). Thus, unlike
coordinate clauses, medial clauses cannot occur independently, because they lack
appropriate verb morphology.12
The difference between subordinate/coordinate and medial verbs is particularly noticeable
in Amele with respect to negation. Negation can be marked by verbal inflection or by the
negative particle qee, 'not'. In clause-chaining constructions only the final verb is marked
for negation, with the scope of negation being determined by the position of the negative
particle. See examples (16a) and (b): in each, everything between qee and the final verb is
within the scope of negation. However, subordinate clauses can be negated independently
from their matrix clauses, and vice versa, with the scope of negation limited to the
syntactic level at which it occurs, and similarly for coordinate clauses.
9 Note that the sequence jain mimi bileb is a compound verb meaning to 'make rest'.
10 There are three other coordinating conjunctions; ca, 'add', and fo, o 'or'. All four have very restricted
distribution: eg. qa can connect only two clauses at a time, and ca can link only nominalised/adjectivalised
clauses. See Roberts (1987: 98ff.,324).
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(16) a. Uqa jo 1-i-me-i sigin qee o-l
3s house go-PRED-SS-3s knife NEG get-3s_NegP
He went to the house and didn't get the knife.
b. Uqa jo qee 1-i-me-i sigin o-l
He didn't go to the house and get the knife. [112, (530), (531)]
Because of this, I would wish to keep a clear distinction between the medial verbs of
clause chaining constructions and independent coordinated verbs. The medial verbs seem
to fall between subordinate and coordinate verbs in the degree of dependence which they
exhibit, and while it is obviously important to recognise that clause-chaining constructions
are often dissimilar to subordination in the language in question in various ways, it does
not seem important to find some foolproof way to assimilate them to coordinate
constructions: since they share properties of both kinds of construction, we could assimilate
them to one or the other perhaps depending upon the particular language.13 Equally, we
could recognise that they are just a separate category of interclausal relation. As Longacre
(1985) has argued, it may be that in clause-chaining languages we have to assume that the
notions of subordination and coordination are suspended in a clause chaining structure.
How, then, is the syntactic relationship between switch-reference marked clauses best
represented in a categorial grammar such as that incorporated in UCG?
We will treat a switch-reference marked (i.e., medial) clause as having the category S/S.
On this account, the syntactic analysis for sentence (17) is as in (18).14
11 Amele also has serial verb constructions of various kinds (see Roberts 1987:309ff.) Serial verb con¬
structions (Foley & Van Valin 1984: 189-93 & s5.2, Foley & Olson 1985, Comrie 1985) have been defined as
constructions in which a small number of verbs with some coreferential core arguments (usually subjects) are
juxtaposed, share a single verbal inflection, and receive an interpretation which is in some sense a function of
the meanings they have individually. I shall have nothing further to say about them here, but note the follow¬
ing problem which arises in giving an account of serial verbs in switch-reference marking languages. In
Amele, as we have seen, verbs with SS marking may occur in a stripped down form in which the switch-
reference marker is delted. When series of stripped down verbs occur, it is therefore hard to tell whether we
are dealing with a verb in a serial verb construction or a stripped down SS verb in a switch-reference relation.
Compare Roberts (1987: 236, 273, 314).
12 Roberts himself states that this makes medial clauses look more like subordinate clauses than coordi¬
nate clauses, in his evaluation of Haiman's coordinate reduction argument.
13 For example, apparently in Japanese, medial verbs in clause chaining constructions have the same form
as the verbs in complementation structures (p.c. Pete Whitelock).
14 This example is exactly like (4) above except that third person subjects occur in both clauses; this
highlights the way the account distinguishes the referents of two formally identical NPs.
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(17) uqa ho-co-b sab je-i-a
3s come-DS-3s food eat-3s-TodP
Hej came and hej ate the food.
















The move from the category S\NP to the category S for the clause sab jeia is allowed in
Amele because of its head marking and null anaphora properties. We allow for this in the
grammar by an optional unary rule which maps S\NP into S; although this may not be
regarded as a particularly satisfying solution in a theory of null anaphora, it serves our
rather different purpose here.
Because long chains of medial clauses are possible, we have to allow the active S edge of
the medial clause category S/S to be satisfied by both a final clause with category S and
another medial clause, also with category S/S: this is possible if we allow function
composition of the following kind:
X/Y + Y/Z => X/Z
It is also necessary to prevent the category S/S from unifying with a following subordinate
clause, since apart from giving the wrong results in terms of constituent structure, this
would make the wrong predictions about the use of SS and DS markers, which as we saw
only operate across the same syntactic level. To do this we introduce the feature VFORM
with values {subordinate,root}. This feature is defined for all verb forms and is inherited
by the clause of which the verb is head; see 5.3.2. Assignment of values for this feature is
determined by the verb form, and possibly also by the presence of particular subordinating
particles in clause-final position. We then constrain the category of the switch-reference
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marked clause to be:
S
^ [VFORM rootl/S Q
As we saw in chapter 4, the subscripted □ on each feature structure indicates that the two
categories must agree in all feature values, so that the S of the active edge must also be
[VFORM root].15
The fact that the active and result S signs agree in their feature structures allows us to
account for the way the medial clauses inherit the tense, polarity, mood and aspect marked
on the finite clause. This will be discussed further in section 5.3.2.16
The category S/S is the kind of category which would normally be given to sentential
modifiers, including sentential adverbs and adverbial clauses in a language such as English.
I have said that in Amele, most other 'adverbial' clauses are actually relative clauses.
There is in any case scope for distinguishing between medial clauses and other adverbial
expressions, both in the feature structures associated with the categories and in the
semantics given to the switch-reference markers. That is, the analysis does not mean that
medial verbs are taken to have other properties of adverbial clauses in Amele, such as
freedom of position in the clause. The motivation for this kind of analysis for medial
clauses is that it accounts for their dependency on a final finite clause. The additional
hierarchical structure introduced into the analysis does not seem to present any particular
problems. Furthermore, we do not, by adopting this proposal, fall into the same trap that
Finer does, because we will not use a configurational account of binding to handle the
referential dependency relation.
5.3.2. Lexical classification of Amele verbs
In this section I will present those elements of an account for Amele verbs in the lexical
component of Unification Categorial Grammar which are relevant to capturing the switch-
15 This account works for conditional clauses with medial verbs, as we assume that they are [VFORM
root] due to the presence of the medial verb. It will be necessary to impose an additional locality constraint on
them, due to the conditional particle, such that they must combine with a finite clause and may not combine
with a following medial verb. The account would not work for apprehension clauses, however, on the
analysis, if correct, where the controlling clause is subordinate. I have no solution to this problem at present.
16 There is no space here to give a full account for the scope of negation.
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reference relation.
Amele verb foims fall into three classes distinguished according to their morphological
inflection: finite verbs, medial (non-finite) verbs and infinitival (non-finite) verbs.17 We
have seen examples of all three kinds. Here we shall be concerned just with the medial
and finite verb forms. The structure of medial verbs (MV's) is diagrammed in (19) and
the structure of finite verbs (FV's) is diagrammed in (20). Bracketted elements indicate
those whose occurence is dependent upon the subcategorisation characteristics of the verb.
All verbal inflection is optional in context, as noted above.
(19) MV: stem + (obj. agr.) + (obj. agr.) + predicate marker + SR + subj. agr.
(20) FV: stem + (obj. agr.) + (obj. agr.) + predicate marker + subj. agr. +
tense/aspect/mood/polarity.
There are two differences between these verb forms. The medial verb but not the finite
verb takes switch-reference marking, and conversely the finite verb but not the medial verb
is inflected for tense, and optionally for habitual aspect, imperative mood and negation.18
In each case, optional object markers may occur agreeing in person and number with a
direct or indirect animate object or both. The pronominal clitics which are the object
markers are almost identical for direct object and indirect object, as the table in (21)
shows. The main function of the predicate marker -i- appears to be to distinguish the direct
from the indirect object marker the direct object clitic, if present, attaches directly to the
verb stem, and the predicate marker either follows it or is omitted; the indirect object
marker always follows the predicate marker, so it either attaches to the verb stem plus
predicate marker, or to the verb stem plus direct object plus predicate marker. However,
the predicate marker may also occur when object agreement is not present.
17 Roberts (1987: 272, 324) distinguishes the 'infinitive' form, which is the citation form and occurs in
various mood constructions, from the 'nominalised/adjectivalised' form; but both have the ending -ec/-(d)oc.
18 In addition, there are certain moods which are restricted to finite clauses but not morphologically
marked on the verb; medial verbs inherit these too. Sequential medial verbs may themselves be marked for
iterative aspect; both the simultaneous switch-reference markers and iterative aspect are indicated by reduplica¬
tion, but apparently there are differences between them (Roberts 1987: 252).
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Subject agreement is obligatory in finite verbs, and in DS-marked medial verbs, and
optional in SS-marked medial verbs if they are sequential or if they are simultaneous and
the following verb has durative aspect. In finite verbs, the order of subject agreement and
the tense/aspect/mood/polarity desinence depends on the tense/aspect/mood/polarity in
question, and will not be detailed here (see Roberts 1987:278). Nor will the morphology
of finite inflection for tense/aspect/mood/polarity be given (Roberts 1987: 223ff.)
The morphology of the switch-reference system is quite complex, and is summarised in the
diagram in (22). Switch-reference marking interacts with the class of subject agreement
marker which is chosen; there are eight such classes of which the three below co-occur
with switch-reference marking and are not used in any other contexts.19
19 The numbering of the classes as I, II and III is for convenience, and does not correspond to the



























Sequential switch-reference marking is straightforward: the SS marker is -me and the DS
marker is -cV, where V is an epenthetic harmonic vowel. The SS-marker is optionally
followed by a subject agreement marker taken from class I, and the DS marker is
obligatorily followed by a subject agreement marker taken from class n. In a sense the
sequential aspect is the unmarked case.
Simultaneous switch-reference marking is somewhat more complicated. SS marking is by
reduplication of the verb stem (or occasionally the subject marker or object marker) and by
choice of subject marker from class I. Simultaneous DS marking distinguishes between
realis and irrealis mood - completely dependent upon the tense and mood of the final verb,
as we shall see below. Both are marked by reduplication of the verb stem (or occasionally
the subject marker or object marker), but they choose subject markers from different
classes: II and m respectively. So in the simultaneous case, there is no isolable SR
morpheme. Whether it is the verb stem which is reduplicated, or the subject marker, or the
object marker, depends on the class of the verb (Roberts 1987: 242ff.). See examples
(23a,b), where (a) is realis and (b) is irrealis.20
(23) a. Ho bu-busal-en dana age qo-in.
pig SIM-run_out-3s-DS man 3p hit-3p-RemP
20 Roberts (1987:237) shows that it is not possible to further analyse the switch-reference morphology,
eg. he rejects an analysis of the morphology of medial verbs on which switch-reference is indicated by the sub¬
ject agreement paradigm used, and the markers and reduplication indicate the temporal relation between events.
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As the pig ran out the men killed it.
b. Ho bu-busal-eb dana age qo-u-b.
pig SIM-run_out-3s-DS man 3p hit-CONTR-3p
The men would have killed the pig as it ran out
The following set of features, with the feature values listed, is required. One of these is
the feature VFORM which was introduced in 5.2.1. Abbreviations are indicated.21
VFORM {subordinate, root}
TENSE {tod_p, yest_p, rem_p, pres, fut, rel_f}




SWITCH-REFERENCE TEMPORAL RELATION {seq, sim}
PARAMETER AGREEMENT {SS, DS}
Finite verbs are defined for all features except SWITCH-REFERENCE,
defined for the features SWITCH-REFERENCE and STATUS. The
REFERENCE takes complex values; i.e. the features TEMPORAL
PARAMETER AGREEMENT, which have the values listed.
I make a distinction between MOOD and STATUS, although the two are related.22 I take
MOOD to encode the range of specific grammatical distinctions in modality which are
realised morphologically on finite verbs (or by sentential particles in finite clauses). I take
STATUS to encode the distinction between realis and irrealis verbs and clauses which
partially corresponds semantically to a distinction between actual and non-actual
eventualities. This distinction is motivated by the fact that as shown in table (22) above,
simultaneous DS markers have distinct realis and irrealis forms, with the choice between
the two dependent upon the tense and mood of the final verb in the clause chain.
21 To avoid undue complexity, just those feature values marked by verbal inflection are given here. We
will also need to account for types of mood, aspect etc. encoded in independent constituents; these feature
values will be inherited by the medial clause in exactly the same way as those listed. Note that some portman¬
teau morphs occur; I will leave their realisation as a problem for the realisation rules. They are: Remote Past
(tense and subject agreement). Negative Past and Negative Future (tense, subject agreement and polarity). Ha¬
bitual Past (tense and aspect). As we saw above, there are also interactions between switch-reference marking
and subject agreement There are also feature cooccurrence restrictions which will not be specified here, for
example that contrafactual and prescriptive moods only occur with the Negative Future tense.





The feature STATUS is defined for both medial and finite verbs. For medial verbs,
assignment of a particular value may be due to the form of the DS marker for which the
verb is inflected, or due to unification with a final finite verb, upon which the value for the
STATUS feature will be shared. For finite verbs, the value for STATUS will be
determined via the feature cooccurence restriction specified as the following biconditional.
[STATUS: realis] <=> -i [TENSE: future] & [MOOD: prescriptive]23
This rule should be read as meaning that the feature STATUS, if defined, is realis if and
only if the feature TENSE, if defined, is not future, and the feature MOOD, if defined, is
prescriptive. The rule encodes the information that irrealis status cooccurs with future tense
and indicative, imperative, conditional and contrafactual moods; while realis status
cooccurs with non-future tenses and prescriptive mood.24
Due to the operation of unification, clauses automatically inherit the features of their verbs,
with no need for any additional mechanism of feature percolation. The syntactic type of
the clause (i.e. its potential for interclausal relation) is determined by morphological
characteristics of the verb. This has two important effects. First, as we saw in 5.3.1, if a
verb is specified as [VFORM root], then so is the clause of which it is head. Second, this
is the way in which the TENSE, ASPECT, MOOD, POLARITY and STATUS features of
the finite verb may end up as features of the whole clause chain.




For example, the sign for a NP caja, 'the woman', would be:
23 For any feature F with values (vj,...,vn}, —i [F: v.] is to be interpreted as stating that the value of the
feature is some member of the complement of v- or that the feature is undefined. [F: —i v.] is to be interpreted
as stating that the feature is defined but has some value other than v.. Recall from chapter 4 that we make an
important distinction between a feature being defined but not specified as compared with a feature simply not
being defined for some expression. Smolka (1988) defines a feature logic which supports the partial descrip¬
tion of linguistic objects using sorts and features as primitives, which is a crucial part of unification-based
grammar formalisms. His feature logic grounds many of the operations and relations on feature structures as¬
sumed in such grammars. See also Pollard & Sag (1987:chs.2,3) and Shieber (1986: §3.2).
24 This formulation of the rule is based on the statement in Roberts (1988:50); in Roberts (1987: 239,






The function of the feature AGENTIVITY will be explained below. Since NPs are not
case marked, there is no need for a case or grammatical function feature. Following the
general approach taken to grammatical relations in categorial grammar by Klein (ms.) (see
also Dowty 1982a, b; Pollard & Sag 1987), we define grammatical relations by referring
to the categorial make-up of the verb, and regard the order of NPs subcategorised for via
the category of the verb as significant just to the extent that it indicates their obliqueness;
thus we define the subject NP as that NP closest to the S, the direct object NP as the next
closest, and the indirect object NP as the outermost Thus:
SU DO 10
i 1 1
S \ NP \ NP \ NP
A way of schematizing the identification of grammatical relations across verbs of varying
polyadicity is proposed by Klein (ms.:2), using a notation (due to Ades & Steedman 1982)
which allows variables over the initial segments of lists. He uses Yj/Y^—fY^C to
represent a valency list whose tail is the list of categories YjfY^J-JY , and whose initial
segment (possibly empty) is the list C. Using such a notational device, grammatical
relations in Amele can be defined in terms of the following verb categories:
a. subject; SNNP$C
b. direct object: S\Y\NP$C
c. indirect object: S\Yj\Y2\NP$C
If necessary, morphosyntactic information can be associated with NPs of a particular
grammatical category by features.
Agreement between these NPs and the verb falls out through unification: agreement
25 I adopt the following notational conventions in representing signs. The features for which a particular
category is defined are listed after it in square brackets. Only the values are given, not the feature labels.
Where it is useful as a mnemonic, features which are defined but unspecified will be represented with the un¬
derscore _. Some information will be omitted from the representation of the sign: in particular, the unspecified
phonological representations of categories on the active edge, and certain verbal features. Features are listed
for NPs in the order [PERSON, NUMBER, AGENTTVE], The only feature I shall consistently list for S will
be VFORM, although other features such as TENSE and STATUS will be listed from time to time where
relevant to the discussion; where all three are listed it will be in that order.
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markers on the verb place restrictions on the feature structures of the subcategorised for
NPs, and only NPs with compatible feature structures can unify with the verb. Note that
the flow of information between the verbal category and the NPs which it unifies with is
not simply one way, since nonpronominal NPs in Amele are not moiphologically marked
for number, so that their number may be indicated just by the agreement marker on the
verb.
The signs for verb stems, as might be found in the lexicon, are illustrated by the following




This states that the verb stem has the phonology/orthography met-, the syntactic category in
line two which is basically S\NF\NP, i.e. the category for a transitive verb, and the
semantics in line three expressed in InL. Notice that the verb met- constrains its subject
NP to be [AGENT!VE +ag]. At this stage this is the only feature which is specified.
The sign for a finite form of the verb, with tense inflection and subject agreement, would
be:
meten
S [root,rem_p,realis]\NP[3,s,+ag] :x ,\NP[_,_,J :x2
[ej] [peel' (e^.x-.x^) & e^ < now]
The subject marker on the verb has the effect of further constraining the feature structure
of the subject NP, and the tense has the effect of further specifying the aspectual sort of
the eventuality, and adding a condition situating the time of the event vis-a-vis the time of
utterance. Thus, we now know that the eventuality is an event rather than a state, and that
its temporal reference is past relative to the time of utterance.26
I said in section 5.3.1 that switch-reference marked clauses have the category S/S. The
question of the syntactic relation between marked and controlling clauses ultimately
26 Given the theory we are working with, in general one might expect temporal reference conditions in¬
troduced by tenses to be of the form e R now, where R is a relation of linear precedence or overlap. Since
Amele has such a complex tense system, and the details of how it should be accounted for are not relevant
here, I shall not distinguish between the different degrees of remoteness of past tenses in the semantic condi¬
tions which are introduced.
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reduces to the question of what category the switch-reference morpheme has, i.e. what
effect does it have on the category of the verb to which it applies? The switch-reference
markers are treated as inflections which turn a verb, as head of its clause, into a dependent
verb heading a dependent clause: i.e. into something which requires another S in order to
yield a complete sentence. Their syntactic category is thus:
(S Q[root]/S 0\NP)/(S[J\NP)27
Finite verbs and medial verbs thus have distinct syntactic categories: S[root]\NP and
Sj^-j [root]/S qjNNP (for intransitive verbs) respectively.
The categories for the simultaneous DS markers will be further specified with a feature
value for STATUS, thus:
(S [root,realis]/S 0\NP)/(SL,J\NP)
(S Q[root,irrealis]/S Q\NP)/(S[_,_]\NP)
We saw in 5.3.1 that one semantic condition introduced by switch-reference markers is a
temporal relation between eventualities, analogous to the temporal relation introduced by
tense on the finite verb. We have seen in this section how these temporal conditions are
licensed by the feature values specified on categories. We have also seen how feature
structures and unification together provide us with a mechanism for handling the
dependency of medial verbs on finite verbs. The semantics of the switch-reference markers
are dealt with more fully in section 5.4.
5.4, The semantics of switch-reference in Amele
In section 5.3 a syntactic analysis was given for medial verbs and the clauses they head.
This analysis allowed us to account for the dependence of medial verbs on a finite verb for
tense and other inflectional information. In addition, we indicated the form of that part of
27 This covers intransitive verbs; some provision needs to be made for transitive and ditransitive verbs.
The most straightforward way to do this in the grammar formalism being used here is to write separate rules
for each of the three kinds; alternatively the '$' notation introduced above for handling grammatical relations
could be used. Other alternatives are offered by HPSG type grammar formalisms such as that described in
Pollard & Sag (1987), where instead of the slash category notation, a subcategorisation list is used.
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the semantic analysis of medial clauses which will deal with the temporal relation of
sequentiality or simultaneity specified by the switch-reference marker.
It remains in this section to show how we account for the other element of meaning
contributed by switch-reference maiking: the specification of a relation between the two
clauses which as we saw in chapter 2 is normally a matter of whether the switch-reference
pivots are coreferential or not, but may also involve nonreferential meaning.
In section 5.3.1, we gave a syntactic representation for the example sentence (17) (repeated
below). In (24) below, we give a standard DR Theory representation of the kind we
would want for the semantics of this sentence.
(17) uqa ho-co-b sab je-i-a
3s come-DS-3s food eat-3s-TodP
Hej came and hej ate the food.






eat (e2, x3, x2)
e2 < now
The discourse marker y is assumed to have been introduced in some prior Discourse
Representation Structure. The effect of the DS marker is encoded in the anaphoric
condition Xj * x^, which constrains the reference of the two switch-reference pivots to be
disjoint. Notice how the temporal relations between the events are encoded in the way
foreshadowed in 5.3.1: the eventuality introduced by the dependent clause, ej, is not
temporally located relative to the speech point now, but is located relative to the 'reference
point' provided by the event time of the independent clause, ^ since ^ is then located
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relative to now, then indirectly so is ej.
Although it is relatively straightforward to specify the kind of semantics we want for this
sentence in DR Theory, a number of interesting problems remain, chief among them the
question of whether it is possible to express the effect of switch-reference marked clauses
in a largely compositional manner.
Within the grammatical framework; of UCG, we assume that at the level of semantic
representation, verbs introduce an eventuality marker which usually percolates up to the
semantics of the sentence which the verb heads. Thus, the switch-reference marked clause
will combine with a sentence whose interpretation is of the form:
(i) [a^A
(where the DM sort a is used because the eventuality is as yet unspecified aspectually, and
could be an event or a state).
This combination will yield a new interpretation, for the whole sentence, of the form:
(ii) [e^] [come'(el,xl)] & e^ < a2 & Xj * subjectfl^A) & I^A]
Apart from any information contributed by the switch-reference marker, the marked clause
itself is responsible for the introduction of the discourse markers and Xj, and the
condition come'(ejPCj). In addition, this representation encodes the conditions introduced
by the switch-reference marker, ej < ^ and Xj * subject([a2]A), and the interpretation of
the controlling clause as given in (i).
If we assume that (i) will turn out to be something like:
(iii) [e^] [food'^) & eat^e^Xo^) & e < now]
then we end up with a representation equivalent to the DRS in (24) above. That is, as well
as the discourse markers and conditions introduced by the marked clause, the discourse
markers ^ x2> xj an(* now are in the universe of the DRS, and the conditions food'(X2)
('x2 is food') and eaf (e2^c^pc2) *s 311 event in which x^ eats X2') and ^ < now ('e2
happened in the past') are introduced into the body of the DRS.
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The main problem is to ensure that we pick out Xj as the subject of the eat proposition.
At the stage at which the conditions in (ii) are introduced, i.e. upon interpretation of the
switch-reference marked clause, information about the number of arguments in the
following clause is not available, making the relation between switch-reference pivots
difficult to state formally: above we used the undefined function 'subject' to indicate the
desired effect, but a principled account of how the switch-reference pivots of the two
clauses can be distinguished remains to be given. This is one of the two main issues to be
addressed in this section.
The second problem is giving an account for the functional extensions of the switch-
reference system in Amele, as described in chapter 2. We saw there that Amele exhibits
both types of functional extension we discussed: use of SS marking where there was
apparent disjoint reference, and use of DS marking where there was apparent coreference
between switch-reference pivots. Accounting for the functional extensions of switch-
reference markers will also involve representing information which cannot be fully
specified in advance of the interpretation of the following controlling clause.
Both these difficulties will be handled using the notion of the structured eventuality
index mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. The structured eventuality index, and
thus the core of the account, is presented in 5.4.3; first, we briefly review what is involved
in distinguishing the switch-reference pivot and in accounting for functional extensions.
5.4.1. Distinguishing the switch-reference pivot
Restricting the switch-reference relation to the switch-reference pivot, usually the subject
NP, is going to be a problem for any formal theory. In this section I shall consider how
the switch-reference pivot in Amele can be characterised, preparatory to presenting an
account of how it will be distinguished formally in 5.4.3.
Roberts says that the switch-reference pivot in Amele is the surface syntactic subject. The
definition of 'subject' is itself a notoriously difficult one crosslinguistically (see especially
Keenan (1976) and work in Role and Reference Grammar such as Van Valin & Foley
(1980), Foley & Van Valin (1977)). Surface syntactic subjects in Amele are identified as
having (at least) the morphosyntactic properties listed in (i)-(iv) (Roberts 1987:67f,145ff).
Property (iv), here as elsewhere in this thesis, is one which must be discounted in trying to
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establish whether it is subjects which are switch-reference pivots.28
(i) the subject nominal obligatorily triggers subject agreement marking in number
and person on the verb, unless the verb is infinitival.
(ii) subjects 'normally' occur in initial position in the clause, identified as 'subject
position'.
(iii) the subject is that nominal which is 'suppressed' by the pseudo-passive
construction (to be described below).
(iv) subjects trigger switch-reference marking.
Roberts (1987:297ff) shows that the switch-reference system operates in terms of syntactic
subject rather than marking changes in semantic role, from agent to patient etc. However,
we saw in chapter 2 that as in a number of other switch-reference languages, there are
some interactions with agentivity. In brief, SS marking may be used even when there is
actual change of reference of the syntactic subject, when the subject of the controlling
clause is nonagentive: either the subject of an impersonal verb, an inalienably possessed
body part, or an inanimate NP. In other words, changes of subject which are not also
changes of agent are ignored by the switch-reference system. A DS marking in such cases
produces the reading that some other causal agent is involved which is not the subject (or
any other argument) of the controlling clause. Hence, the definition of switch-reference
pivot in Amele seems to be rather 'agentive subject'. The reformulated definition of of the
switch-reference markers which was proposed in chapter 2 was:
SS indicates that there is no new (i.e. disjoint) agentive subject in the controlling
clause.
DS indicates that there is a new (i.e. disjoint) agentive subject in the controlling
clause.29
We should consider the possibility that the switch-reference pivot in Amele may be defined
as the 'topic' rather than the (agentive) syntactic subject of the clause. Roberts
28 As we have seen, there is no case marking on NPs to help identify their grammatical function. Since
nay NP can be omitted provided it is semantically retrievable, ellipsis provides no good tests for subjecthood.
There is no 'true' passive construction involving movement of an initial subject NP.
29 Although Roberts (1987: 292) leaves it as a 'matter for interpretation' whether the switch-reference
system should be seen as a syntactic system influenced by semantic factors, or as a semantic system marking
just same or different agent, I presented evidence in chapter 2 for choosing the first option: in brief, in a struc¬
ture MVj-SS + MVj-DS + FV, MV2 may be an impersonal clause which does not have an agentive subject,
and MV j and FV may both have the same agentive subject, but although there has been no change in agent
throughout the entire chain, MV2 will still receive DS marking.
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(1987:145ff.) defines the Amele topic as the first element in the clause, and states that
syntactic subject and pragmatic topic coincide in all cases except in the case of impersonal
constructions and pseudo-passive constructions. The first of these constructions was
discussed in chapter 2 and both will be treated in more depth in 5.5. Briefly, in impersonal
constructions, the original subject nominal is in initial position in the clause but triggers
object agreement rather than subject agreement on the verb, i.e. it remains topic but is no
longer subject In such constructions it is ungrammatical for the other nominal in the
clause to appear in first position. In the pseudo-passive construction, the original subject
nominal is omitted, and the original object nominal, which remains syntactic object as it
triggers object agreement, is in topic position.
However, it is not clear what theoretical status this notion of 'topic' is supposed to have.30
Apart from this, there is no advantage in redefining the switch-reference relation as a
relation between topics. Although it would account for some of the cases of otherwise
'unexpected' SS marking with impersonal controlling clauses, there are other examples of
the same kind which it cannot account for, such as those involving weather expressions or
other inanimate subjects. For example, in Ija cocobig wa hedoia, 'As I walked along the
rain stopped', there is SS marking but two different topics.
To identify the switch-reference pivot as the agentive subject of the clause, we introduced
the NP feature AGENTIVE with values {+ag,-ag}. We also saw in 5.3.2 that the
grammatical function of NPs could be defined over their linear position in the syntactic
category of the verb, i.e. in terms of their obliqueness as arguments. Further, as Klein
(ms.) shows for case in German, NPs of a particular grammatical category can be
constrained to have certain morphosyntactic characteristics by features. Thus we can
define the switch-reference pivot in Amele as follows:
An expression a is the switch-reference pivot of a verb p iff it unifies with the
NP[AGENTTVE +ag] slot of P with category S\NP[AGENTIVE +ag]$C.
Specification of the anaphoric relation between the switch-reference pivots is a matter for
anaphoric conditions of the kind familiar in discourse representation structures, which are
introduced by the switch-reference markers: for example, the condition Xj * x^ in DRS
30 That is, it does not appear to be implicated in any grammatical processes, and as Roberts (1987: 146)
points out, it doesn't meet Li & Thompson's (1975) criteria for distinguishing topic from subject: the Amele
topic need not be definite, need not be first constituent in the clause provided it is first core constituent, and
does agree with the verb.
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(24). These conditions relate discourse markers which are given a special status in the
semantics due to their identification as the referents of the switch-reference pivots. We
shall see how they are assigned this special status in 5.4.3.
Finally, the anaphoric relation defined as holding between switch-reference pivots must be
able to cope with cases in which at least one of these NPs is dual or plural, and a relation
of inclusion or overlap holds between referents of the two NPs, which I shall call their
•pivot sets'.
We saw in chapter 4 that the version of DR Theory we are using handles plurals by
introducing plural discourse markers represented by upper case letters {Xj, X^, X^
Xn). Anaphoric relations which occur between two plural NPs are handled with the
normal anaphoric linkage condition, eg. Xj = This is taken to mean that the set or
group of entities referred to by Xj is coextensive with that referred to by X^. Anaphoric
relations between a singular and a plural NP may be handled by an 'element of anaphoric
linkage condition, Xj e X^ This is taken to mean that the entity referred to by is a
member of the set or group of entities referred to by X^ Other set-theoretic relations may
also be used in anaphoric conditions, for example, a 'superset of condition, Xj a
would be taken to mean that the set or group referred to by X^ is a subset of (included in
or equal to) the set or group referred to by X^.31
In chapter 1 I discussed the crosslinguistic possibilities of use of SS and DS marking in
circumstances where at least one of the switch-reference pivots was plural, and where there
was a subset or intersection relation between the two pivot sets. (25) lists the possible
anaphoric relations which may hold between pivots, at least one of which is plural; NPj is
the pivot of the marked clause and is the pivot of the controlling clause. In many
languages at least some such cases require or allow SS marking.32
31 Accounting for the reference of plural NPs is a much more difficult problem than this suggests. For
example, there is evidence that it is unwise, even if possible, to think of natural language plurality in terms of
set-theoretic entities; rather we need a concept like Links' (1983) 'pluralities' or Bealers's (1982)
'aggregates/collections'. These differ from 'sets' in ways which are not important for the present endeavour.
Note, though, that it is a significant step we have taken in conceiving of discourse markers as denoting sets
rather than individuals, and the use of set-theoretic relations such as 'element of and 'subset of in anaphoric
linkage conditions between discourse markers, gives rise to non-trivial choices about when the appropriate DM
for an expression is to be an individual and when a (possibly singleton) set.
32 This of course makes a definition of the function of the switch-reference markers in terms of corefer-
ence seem less plausible. As Finer (1984) and Chomsky (1981:283-7, 1986:207n) note, subset and intersection
relations also seriously complicate a coindexing formalism for anaphoric relations such as is adopted by the
Binding Theory: in his account of switch-reference. Finer has to propose a system of dual indexing to express
set inclusion and intersection.
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(a) NPj properly includes NP2
(b) NP2 properly includes NPj
(c) NPj and NP2 intersect
(d) NPj and NP2 are disjoint
(e) NPj and NP2 are equal
In Amele, as in all switch-reference languages, case (d) always requires DS marking and
case (e), SS marking. The Amele examples (26)-(29) illustrate cases (a) and (b).33
(26) Ege h-u-me-b sab j-ig-a
lp come-PRED-SS-lp food eat-ls-TodP
We{ijk} came and I^j ate the food, (a) [294, (564)]
(27) Ija ho-co-min sab jo-qa-a
Is come-PRED-DS-ls food eat-lp-TodP
came and we^ j kj ate the food, (b) [295, (570)]
(28) Ele jo na h-u-me-u uqa q-ite-i-a
Id house to come-PRED-SS-ld 3s hit-ls-3s-TodP
We-twojj jj came to the house and he^j hit me^j. (a) [298, (591)]
(29) Odo-co-b sab cil-i-me-i ah-u 0-ale-ce-b
do-DS-3s food boil-PRED-SS-3s bring-PRED give-3d-DS-3s
ale sab eu j-i-me-si dana uqa na
3d food that eat-PRED-SS-3d man 3s of_POSS
danah eu uqa caj-i nuo-lo-i
friend that 3s arise-PRED go-HabP-3s
Then she would cook some food and bring it and give it to them two.
They two,. would eat that food and then the man's friend,-, would
get up and g6. (a) [106-7, (513); 297, (588)] 1 '
In Amele, in case (a), where the pivot set of the controlling clause is properly included as
a subset in the pivot set of the marked clause, SS marking is used. This is shown by
examples (26), (28) and (29). In case (b), where the pivot set of the marked clause is
properly included in the subject referent of the controlling clause, DS is normally used.
This is shown by example (27).
33 For the purposes of this exposition I do not distinguish between dual and plural semantically.
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However, consider the following examples. Here, we have case (c), where the two











We{ij k) came 311(1 tw0{kJ} ate food- (576),(577)]
Informally, we need to modify the definition of switch-reference given above as follows:
SS indicates that at least one element of the pivot set of the controlling clause is
also an element of the pivot set of the marked clause.
DS indicates that at least one element of the pivot set of the controlling clause is
not an element of the pivot set of the marked clause
where the pivot set is the discourse marker introduced by the agentive subject of the
With the exception of the person restriction, this covers the full range of cases, as the
following schematic illustration shows.




DS: {i} * {j}
{i} <= {ij}
{i,j} n {i,k} (unless i is first person)
In general terms, a new group counts as a new agent, even if it includes the previous agent
as a member, but a member of a previous group need not count as a new agent.35
34 Unless the subject of the controlling clause is first person, when SS must be used. This special status
of the first person would need to be accounted for by a person hierarchy. See the discussion of Imbabura
Quechua in chapter 2. I shall have nothing further to say about this restriction in what follows.
35 There are interesting interactions with reciprocals; see Roberts (1987: 296, 306ff.) Basically, where
the pivot set of the marked clause includes the pivot set of the controlling clause, as we have seen, normally
SS is used, but if the marked clause has a reciprocal simultaneous verb there is a choice of SS or DS unless
clause.
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In order to capture the full range of cases formally, we should require SS and DS markers
to introduce anaphoric conditions of the following kind.
SS: Xj n *2 * 0
DS: *2~ X1
That is, SS means the intersection of Xj and x2 is not empty, and DS means that there is
some element in x2 which is not in Xj. In the remainder of the paper, however, I shall use
a more elegant definition which covers all the central cases, excluding only those involving
intersection; as we have seen these would require some additional mechanism such as a
person hierarchy in any case. The definitions of SS and DS which will be used are given
below.
SS: xj 2 *2
DS: Xj it x2
That is, SS indicates that x- is properly included in Xj as a subset or is equal to it, and DS
indicates that x2 is not included in Xj, where Xj is the discourse marker introduced by the
pivot (agentive subject) of the marked clause and x2 is discourse marker introduced by the
pivot (agentive subject) of the controlling clause.36
5.42. Functional extensions
Unexpected uses of SS marking in Amele have already been discussed extensively in
chapter 2 and 5.4.1, and will be returned to in section 5.5.
We saw in chapter 2 that in addition, cases of DS marking occur, which remain
unexplained by a definition of switch-reference in terms of anaphoric relations between
pivots, since the clauses actually have the same agentive subject referent. The explanation
given for these examples by native speakers is that 'something has changed* or 'a new
situation' is involved (Roberts 1987: 303). Roberts attributes the DS marking in these
the subject of the controlling clause is first person, when SS must be used.
36 Note that although we need upper case plural DMs to represent plural NPs, in the statement of these
anaphoric conditions lower case individual DMs are used: these are taken to be unspecified for number and
hence neutral over singular, dual and plural. This is necessary if we wish to give a general formulation of the
meaning of the switch-reference markers. It is also necessary because as we saw, lexical NPs in Amele are
unspecified for number, so the DMs they introduce need to be able to unify with verbs with singular, dual or
plural agreement marking.
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cases to 'deictic changes ... in the area of time, place or world reference points'. He says
that such uses of DS marking typically occur in clause chains in which a major participant
has been established via a series of SS-marked verbs (though this does not seem to be
generally true of the examples given below). He describes (1988: 60) how we know what
has changed (time, place or world) rather vaguely:
often it is obvious that the change being indicated is deictic rather than syntactic
and that these deictic changes are in the area of world, time, or place reference
points. For example, a change of time marked by the SR system is often backed
up by a temporal expression; a change of place marked by the SR system occurs
most frequently with verbs of motion, and a change of location can also be
indicated by a locative expression; a change of world marked by the SR system is
normally a switch from an intended or proposed action to the real action itself or
vice versa ....
We noted in chapter 2 that similar nonreferential functional extensions of DS marking
occur in other languages with switch-reference. For example, Lenakel exhibits use of DS
marking with coreferential subjects when there is a shift between future and non-future
tense.
In this section I shall try to make more precise the conditions under which unexpected DS
marking occurs. A selection of the relevant examples from Amele is reproduced in (31)-
(42). The verbs with unexplained DS marking are in bold. Other examples of unexpected
DS marking are given in Roberts (1987: 304, exx. (621) and (625); 305, ex. (628); 57, ex.
(216); 62, ex. (245); 85, ex.(380)).
Examples (31)-(33) illustrate changes of place. Notice that they all involve verbs of
motion, possibly as part of a serial verb construction in which the motion verb indicates
direction of an action (Roberts 1987: 308), and in some cases they also involve adverbial
expressions of location.37
(31) Mike uqa car tuli-do-co-b jic
Mike 3s car start-3s-DS-3s road
37 Note that in (33), DS is used on the verb ehitecebe and the DS marking relates to the following verb
belom, where the pivot set of the first, marked verb is included in the pivot set of the second, controlling verb.
As the discussion in 5.4.1 shows, DS is the expected marking here.
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to-d-u b-i Sioba na jo cemenug
follow-3s-PRED Sioba of house near
ono uqa car heewe-ce-b taw-en.
there 3s car hold-DS-3s stand-3s-RemP
Mike started the car and then followed the road up to Sioba's house
and held the car there near the house. [304, (623)]
(32) Age ceta gul-do-co-bil 1-i bahim na tac-eia
3p yam carry-3s-DS-3p go-PRED floor on fill-3p-RemP
They carried the yams on their shoulders and went and filled up









ca ale na jo na bel-om
and 3p of house to go-lp-RemP
He met me. He did that, then he took me to their house, his mother
and father's. [304,(626)]
Many examples which involve a change of place could also be seen as involving a change
of time. This is particularly true of example (32) above and examples (34) and (35)
below.
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(34) Ono bi-bil-igin cuha ijed







jic sacia-du-m-ig man wag
road prepare-3s-SS-ls bird canoe
u-m-ig Ethiopia ono 1-i ton-oom
get-SS-ls Ethiopia there go-PRED descend-ls-RemP
ton-oo
I stayed there for three weeks and then I prepared my journey,
took a plane and landed at Ethiopia. [303, (618)]
(35) Je eu culo-co-hul ni-nij-en oso







We two left that text lying there and moved on to another one. [303, (617)]
(35) must be seen as involving a metaphorical rather than a literal shift in place. Note that
Roberts (1987: 250, (427)) gives an alternative translation for what appears to be the same
example: 'Then we stopped talking about that and went on to something else.' This looks
more like temporal shift is involved.38
Roberts (1987:249) indicates that the verb cul-ec 'to leave', which occurs in (35),
expresses discontinuative aspect; i.e. the notion that a situation has been discontinued or
abandoned. Example (36) below similarly is said to involve completive aspect as
expressed by the verb he-doc 'to finish/complete'; i.e. the notion that a situation is finished
or completed. I shall return to this below. Examples (36) and (37) are clearer examples
of a shift in time. (38) is also said to involve a shift in time, but might well be seen as
involving a shift in modality.
38 In example (35), the sequence culocohul ninijen is a serial verb construction. It is assumed by Roberts
(cf. 1987: 239) that the DS marking is a marking on the whole construction and hence relates it to the next
verb in the clause. It might be suggested that the DS marking on the first verb relates it to the second verb in
the series and that DS rather than SS is used because the two verbs have different subjects. However, such an
assignment is not supported by current analyses of serial verbs (see Foley & Van Valin 1984, and the refer¬
ences given earlier in this chapter).
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(36) Deel ijed he-do-co-b uqa cesel-i
day three finish-3s-DS-3s 3s retum-PRED
After three days he came back. [249, (421)]
(37) Eu 1977 jagel November na
that 1977 month November in
odo-co-b cul-ig-en.
do-DS-3s leave-lp-3s-RemP
That was in November 1977 that he did that and then he left it for us.
[304, (620)]
(38) Od-i-me-ig eu na cuha fe-ce-bil
do-PRED-SS-2p that of Sunday see-DS-2p
hib na age meen qaig gaban-du-me-ig
later 2p stone shoot gather-3s-SS-2p
ihoc f-i-me-ig
enough see-PRED-SS-2p
Do that and then later take a look and you will see that the money you
have collected will be enough ... [304, (619)]
The examples in (39)-(41) involve changes between actual eventualities and non-actual
ones, usually a switch between intended and completed actions.
(39) Aria meme-g eu mado-n, "Cois
all right father-3s that say-3s-RemP OK
eu mado-co-min 1-ig eh-i 1-i
that say-DS-ls go-(SS)ls take-(SS) go-(SS)
m-ih-ig-en," d-on. Odo-co-b li-me-i dana
put-2s-ls-Fut say-3s-RemP do-DS-3s go-SS-3s man
co cafa q-oc eu mado-n,
mouth-3s close hit-INF that say-3s-RemP
"Cois caja eh-i 1-i






All right the father told her, "OK I say I will take you and give you to
him." Then he went to the man with the closed mouth and told him,

















'You roast the crab that I caught for me while I peel the food,'
she told him. Then, alright, she really peeled the food. [305, (630)]
(41) Eu nu qila i ege
























So now we are gathering that money. When we have finished that we
will start to do the fencing work. [305, (629)]
Note that shifts in both directions can be indicated with DS marking: shifts from realis to
irrealis are involved in (41) and in the first bold verb in (39); shifts from inealis to realis
are involved in (40) and in the second bold verb in (39).
I said earlier that all the verbs in a clause chain must share the tense, mood, polarity, status
and some aspectual values of the final verb. The examples given here mostly involve
continuation of switch-reference marking across sentence boundaries by use of a
recapitulation clause, as in the second case in (39), (40), and (41), or shifts between the
current speaker and a reported speaker, as in (39) and (40). This explains the fact that
some of the verbs have different status and tense. However, this use of DS marking in
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itself appears to be a way of allowing verbs to have different status values, and also in
some cases different tense: thus in example (39) one of the verbs with aberrant DS
marking, madocomin, is given a present tense translation whereas the remaining verbs in
that chain are future tense, as is indicated by the inflection on the final verb mihigen. In
example (38) above, also, nonreferential use of DS marking appears to licence a shift in
status and possibly mood; this example could be analysed as involving a shift in status
rather than in time.
A change in actuality appears to be indicated by a switch between current speaker and
reported speaker, by a switch between realis and irrealis status (as indicated by future vs.
non-future tenses), or by the use of an emphatic marker such as ijom, which indicates that
the speaker has a high degree of certainty about the assertion (Roberts 1987: 266).
Finally, note example (42) below, which is presented by Roberts as involving a shift in


















m-i-me-i bagac qahe-ce-b ma
become-PRED-SS-3s leaf sprout-DS-3s taro
eu jagel
that month
Me na age ma
May in 3p taro
huno-lo-ig.
pull_up-HabP-3p
But for taro they used to plant it and then it grows big and becomes a
fully grown corm. When the taro has ripened it sprouts leaves and
they used to harvest it in May. [238, (397); 304, (622)]
Many of the examples which are said to involve temporal shifts contain temporal
expressions. However all the examples which seem to involve a change in time rather
than, or as well as, one of the other changes mentioned share a common property of
another kind. Roberts (1987:235ff.) discusses the marking of aspectual meaning ('different
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ways of viewing the duration of a situation', cf. 5.4.3) by lexical means, i.e. by the use of
aspectual verbs either on their own or more commonly, in serial verb constructions of one
kind or another. Three main types of aspectual meaning are indicated in this way: durative,
inceptive and terminative (the latter encompassing distinctions between conclusive,
completive, discontinuative and resultative; see Roberts 1987: 248-50). Completive,
resultative, conclusive and discontinuative aspects are indicated respectively by the verbs
he-doc 'to finish/complete'; cuha-doc 'to excel'; cit q-oc 'to bring to a conclusion' and
cul-ec, 'to leave'. The inceptive (regressive) indicates the beginning of a situation and is
marked by the compound verb sanan m-ec 'to begin', or just by m-ec, 'to put, become'.
All the cases analysed as shifts in time involve one of these aspectual expressions. In
example (35) the unexplained DS verb is the discontinuative aspect verb cul-ec; in example
(36) it is the completive aspect verb he-doc. In example (37), the verb with unexplained
maricing is d-oc, 'to do' (see below), but the following verb is cul-ec 'to leave', although it
may not be being used aspectually here. Example (41) could also be seen as a shift in
time or situation as well as a shift in actuality, and in support of this analysis note that it
contains unexplained DS marking on the completive aspect verb he-doc, while the
following verb is the inceptive compound sanan m-ec. Finally, example (42) contains a
number of uses of m-ec, including one following the unexplained DS marked verb.
What I am suggesting, therefore, is that rather than saying these examples involve a change
in time, we should see the use of DS maricing as reflecting a shift from one situation or
event complex to another, which is marked by use of one of these aspectual forms.39
The previous discussion relates to the final kind of example to be considered in this
section: examples of recapitulation clauses with unexplained DS marking. A number of
the examples we have looked at in this chapter have also included recapitulation clauses,
and Roberts (1987: 251) gives more examples. Before we consider an anomalous example,
see (43), where the recapitulation clause is in bold.40
39 Although it would not be surprising to find that this is an optional use of DS marking, in fact all the
examples I have noticed with these aspectual markers do involve DS marking, with the exception of the resul¬
tative where I have seen only an example with SS marking (Roberts 1987:250); this particular aspect may
behave differently.
40 Note that in example (43) the second sentence functions as an expansion of the previous eventuality
rather than a following event, so here the recapitulation clause is just tracking reference and its normal transla¬
tion, 'having done that', is inappropriate.
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ben ca cehe-gi-na. Od-i-me-ig cuamu ijed









Sometimes the men make one of those houses bigger. They divide
it into three or four rooms. [89, (418)]
Switch-reference across sentence, boundaries is ruled out, but in narrative discourse,
recapitulation clauses enable the switch-reference system to connect separate sentences.41 A
recapitulation clause is the first clause of a new sentence. It may be a repeat of the final
verb of the previous sentence, or it may be one of the two 'dummy verbs' od-oc 'to do'
and he-doc, 'to finish'. The dummy verb has the same subject agreement marking as the
final verb of the previous sentence. It enables the switch-reference system to connect this
sentence with the previous sentence, by virtue of the fact that it is both anaphorically
linked to the final clause of the previous sentence, and also linked by switch-reference
marking to the second clause in its own sentence. It thus indirectly indicates whether the
final subject of the previous sentence is the same or different from the subject of the first
clause in the next sentence.42
The dummy verb may occur in a 'stereotyped' form, odo-co-b 'he did it-DS' or he-do-co-b
'he finished it-DS' (Roberts 1987: 250ff.) In this case, it takes third person subject (and
indeed object) agreement regardless of the agreement on the preceding clause43 These
forms of the verbs have a special function to mark the completion of a particular series of
related events and indicate that some new episode is about to begin. The DS form is used
whether or not the subject of the preceding clause is the same as that of the following
clause. An example is given in (44).
41 I am making a distinction here between clause and sentence, and define an Amele sentence as a se¬
quence of syntactically linked clauses at least one of which contains a finite verb.
42 Roberts (1987: 117f.) notes that in some cases the clause to which the recapitulation clause is linked
may be further back than the final clause of the preceding sentence; in all but one of the examples he gives it
is impersonal clauses that it skips back over (examples (555)-(557)), in the other example some notion of
discourse topic may be involved.
43 Clearly, in a case where the agreement would have been third person singular anyway, it will not be
clear whether the clause is a stereotyped form or a regular form.
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(44) Man age man cunug age cul-i
bird 3p bird all 3p leave-PRED
he-do-in. Odo-co-b mala sul-do-ia
finish-3s-3p-RemP do-DS-3s chicken send-3s-3p-RemP
All the birds were completely exhausted so then they sent the chickea
[251, 432]
Example (41) above, the fencing example, is also cited by Roberts in this connection, and
can be seen as involving episodic completioa A number of the other examples we looked
at above could be analysed in this way too: in examples (33), (37), (39) and (40)
unexplained DS marking is on a recapitulation clause of this kind. If we see forms of the
verb od-oc as having terminative aspectual import, we can make a general statement to the
effect that DS can be triggered by aspectual changes indicating a shift in the event
complex, as well as by other changes.
This reanalysis of some of the examples may explain what at first sight seems to be a
slight problem with a few of them: in some cases the unexplained DS marking does not
seem to coincide exactly with postulated shift in time, place or actuality which is supposed
to account for it. For instance, in the second example in (39) Roberts says that the DS
marked verb odocob marks a shift from irrealis, to realis on the following verb limei, but
this shift seems rather to coincide with the preceding inflectional complex marking the end
of the direct quote d-on; if we attribute the DS marking to the aspectual trigger provided
by the recapitulation clause this is not a problem. Similar difficulties may occur with (38);
it is hard to tell given the translation, but the temporal adverb hib na 'later', seems to refer
to the temporal relation between the doing and the looking, rather than that between the
looking and the seeing. Of course, it is not necessarily required that the observed change
in place, time, actuality etc. occur on the DS marked verb. See also the Appendix to this
thesis for a possible alternative account for unexpected DS marking in Amele, which takes
into consideration what Roberts (1987: 281-291) describes as a distinction between verbs
according to whether they are 'agent-oriented' or 'goal-oriented'. On such a revised
account, virtually all the examples of unexplained DS marking are accounted for, including
those which I have just questioned. However, not enough information is available at this
point about orientation in Amele for a conclusive proposal to be put forward.
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In summary, we have observed the following types of triggers for unexplained DS
marking:
(i) A shift in eventuality episode indicated by an aspectual verb; this may be
accompanied by (ii) and/or (iii) as well;
(ii) A shift in location indicated by a verb of motion, and/or locative adverbial
expressions;
(iii) A shift in actuality indicated by a shift between current and reported speaker
and/or a shift in tense between future and non-future, and/or use of emphatic
markers.
Notice that we have moved some way from Roberts' classification of cases of unexplained
DS marking as caused by shifts in world, time or place. The main difference is in seeing
both his 'time shifts' and the cases involving recapitulation clauses as shifts in eventuality
episode and in identifying aspectual verbs as the triggers of such shifts.
5.4.3. Switch-reference as parameter agreement
The account to be proposed is based on the idea in chapter 3 that the full range of
functions of switch-reference systems can be accounted for if we see the switch-reference
markers as indicating agreement or dis-agreement between clause-level information about
parameters of the eventuality the clause introduces: its major protagonist, its temporal and
spatial location, and the actuality of the eventuality.
Before we see how this idea can be formally encoded in the semantic component of UCG,
it is important to motivate the notion of an eventuality. So far, we have seen that versions
of DR Theory which are designed to handle such phenomena as temporal reference,
aspectual distinctions, and quantification over times all involve the introduction of a special
type of discourse marker for eventualities: these eventualities hold over intervals and are
related to one another by linear ordering relations such as relations of precedence and
overlap. In InL, such eventuality indices are introduced by the verb, and normally
percolate up to act as the index for the completed clause. We also saw that the eventuality
indices are 'sorted': an index e. indicates an event, an index s. indicates a state, and an
index a. indicates an eventuality unspecified as to its aspectual type.
In the first half of section 5.4.3 I discuss in more detail the aspectual classification of
eventualities, and in the last half of this section the notion of a structured eventuality index
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is presented.44
The aspectual classification of eventualities in Amele
I use the term 'eventuality' as a general technical term covering all kinds of descriptions of
'things going on the world'45 I assume that clauses are used to present eventualities.
Figure (45) gives a general classification of types of eventualities, with some examples of
verbs which centrally describe these types. The classification presented here is part of a
long tradition stretching back to Aristotle but is based most closely on work done by
Vendler (1976) and Mourelatos (1978), although I have changed the terminology to make
it more self-explanatory. Other recent work in this area can be found in Verkuyl (1972),
lessen (1974), Taylor (1977), Dowty (1979), Moens & Steedman (1986), and Moens
(1987).
The major distinction is between states and events. Sentences describing states refer to one
or more participants and express properties of and relations between them, which are taken
to hold constant over some (usually relatively long) period of time. No changes are
involved and hence no successive phases. In contrast, sentences describing events refer to a
changing state of affairs in which the participants are actively doing something, or
44 By 'aspect' I mean Aktionsarten, i.e. broad classifications of types of eventualities, rather than gram-
maticised aspect such as morphological marking of the traditional progressive, past perfect etc. in English.
43 Following Bach (1981); equivalently one could use a term such as 'situation'.
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undergoing a change. An event is something that happens over a particular, usually limited
period of time. The various distinctions within the set of events are ways of classifying
them according to the way this period of time is perceived.
In brief, culminating events are perceived as having some consequence or result Once the
final point is reached a change in state takes place. These types of events have internal
structure or successive phases: possibly a pre-culminating phase, the culmination, and the
consequences. Extended culminating events are ones where there is a rather long pre-
culminating phase; in such events, a process goes on in time until it reaches a particular
and well-defined point. Punctual culminating events are ones where there is really no pre-
culminating phase: the event is presented as occuring instantaneously. In contrast, non-
culminating events are ones which are homogeneous and have no internal successive
phases, no expected final point, and no expected consequences. These may also be
punctual or extended in time; in the latter case they are called processes. The distinction
between culminating and non-culminating events is also called the telic/atelic distinction.
It is an aspectual classification of this kind which underlies the definition of the sorted
eventuality discourse markers a, e, s as eventualities, events and states.
Vendler (1976) treated his classification as a taxonomy of verbs. However, this is not
satisfactory, because the presence of various auxiliaries and adverbials, and the nature of
the subject and object NPs, are all important in determining the classification on any
particular occasion of use of the verb. It is now considered more accurate to regard the
classification as one of clause meaning. Verbs will fall into one category or another
basically, but the presence of other elements may change this category in particular cases.
In fact, almost any verb may occur in context in almost any category.
In addition to grounding the notion of aspectual classification of eventualities which is
assumed in this thesis, I wish to propose in this section that in giving an aspectual
classification of predication in Amele, and indeed more generally, we should extend the
framework which has been developed in the literature to include a dimension of control: a
parameter of whether or not a volitional agent participant is involved in the eventuality.46
46 By 'control' here I do not mean syntactic control in the sense of control of unexpressed subjects in
infinitival subordinate clauses. Clearly there are some connections between this type of control and switch-
reference (see Simpson & Bresnan 1983), but an exploration of these does not fall within the scope of this
thesis.
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I have argued that the relevant definition of the switch-reference pivot in Amele is that of
'agentive subject'. The basis for the argument was the behaviour of switch-reference
marking when the controlling clause was an impersonal construction. We saw in chapter 2
that impersonal constructions in Amele involve a class of predicates which have been
identified in other languages as 'unaccusatives' (see, inter alia, Perlmutter (1978) for the
origin of this term, McCloskey (1984) for explicit identification and cross-linguistic
generalisation of the class of predicates).
The basic insight is that intransitive, i.e. single argument, verbs which are superficially
alike, actually divide into two classes: 'unaccusative verbs' and 'unergative verbs'.47
Unergative verbs include all agentive intransitive verbs, such as shout, hide, etc. In
contrast, the class of unaccusative verbs includes no verbs with agentive arguments, but
many verbs with a single theme or patient argument, such as arrive, remain, etc. See
Marantz (1984), Grimshaw (1987) for further discussion of this distinction.
Unaccusative verbs behave in many ways like passive verbs, and this resemblance is
usually attributed to an underlying representation of unaccusatives in which they are
assigned an underlying object, but no subject. It is then assumed that syntactic constraints
of some kind force movement of this underlying object into subject position. This is called
the 'Unaccusative Hypothesis'. Such an analysis is required by theories which assume a
rather strict initial corelation between grammatical functions and semantic roles.
Alternatively, on an LFG account, the surface subject of the unaccusative verb is not said
to be an underlying object; rather, both objects of transitive verbs and subjects of
unaccusative verbs are simply assigned the 'theme' semantic role.
1
In addition to explaining the marked assignment of theme/patient role to apparent subjects,
the concept of unaccusative verbs has been used to account for a range of syntactic
behaviour, which interestingly includes agreement phenomena in 'Split-S' languages like
Eastern Pomo, which was discussed in chapter2. Grimshaw (1987:246-7) gives a
comprehensive survey of the literature.
There has been considerable discussion of whether there is a clearly definable semantic
basis for the distinction, which can be generalised crosslinguistically. It does seem to be a
universal that agentive predicates never appear as unaccusatives. The classification below is
47 Terms due to Geoffrey Pullum, as cited in Perlmutter 1978:186ji.4.
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based on Perlmutter (1978:162-3), who also notes that verbs of motion are ambiguous
between the two categories.
UNERGATIVE: - willed or volitional acts (including manner of speaking
verbs and predicates describing sounds made by animals),
and certain involuntary bodily processes.
UNACCUSATIVE: - predicates expressed by adjectives in English,
predicates whose argument is a Patient, inchoatives, verbs
of existence, duratives, predicates describing the
non-volitional emission of stimuli that impinge on the
senses, aspectual predicates.
While this classification has been challenged, as has the whole idea of providing a
semantic basis for the distinction, it does seem likely that at least the core cases of the
unaccusative and unergative categories are predictable on the basis of semantic properties,
although syntactic factors may need to be invoked in defining the classes for particular
languages. There is some suggestion that the classification may be due to eventuality type
rather than being lexically specified for individual verbs (see Grimshaw 1987:248-9,
quoting Rosen 1984).
The motivation for introducing a dimension of control into the aspectual classification of
eventualities is that the eventualities introduced by unaccusative predicates are
distinguished by lacking an agentive controller. Switch-reference in Amele, then, can be
taken to hold only between controlled eventualities, since only these provide agentive
switch-reference pivots to be anaphorically related by the switch-reference markers;
uncontrolled eventualities are by default treated as 'same subject' since no new controller
is introduced.
To my knowledge, such a parameter has not previously been incorporated into
Aktionsarten frameworks. There is at least one obvious reason for not so including it:
unlike the other distinctions between eventuality types, it is not definable in terms of the
temporal reference and temporal structure of the eventuality, using a time-line constmcted
out of temporal intervals. That is, there are obvious ways of giving formal definitions for
the aspectual distinctions normally made, but not for control.
However, there are also reasons prima facie why some such extension seems plausible.
There is some evidence that the aspectual distinctions we have already described in fact
cannot be properly defined just in terms of temporal intervals.
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First, very recent work on temporal reference and eventuality type (eg. Moens & Steedman
1986, Webber 1987, Zeevat 1987) has suggested that it is more useful and appropriate to
distinguish eventuality types, and to individuate eventualities, on the basis of their logical
and causal structure and relationship with other eventualities. For example, Moens &
Steedman (1986) suggest that we can give an elegant account for the aspectual distinctions
in figure (45) if we define eventualities as having structure in the form of preconditions
and consequences. In such an approach to aspectual classification, there is no reason to
reject a dimension of control.
Second, the relation between temporal, logical and causal structure is itself unclear and
awaits further research. For example, many 'temporal' connectives such as English when
can also identify causal or logical relationships between the eventualities they connect.
Such shared temporal, causal and logical meaning characterises many systems of switch-
reference markers.
Third, both the type of account given in Moens & Steedman (1986) and my own proposal
are in accord with less formal philosophical work, which has considered the notions of
causality and intentionality (implying agency) to be of pre-eminant importance in the
individuation of events. For example, Davidson (1980) assumes that part of our
individuation and typology of actions and events is indeed whether a volitional agent has
'caused' them.
Besides this kind of support from the literature, there is a further argument for the
proposal, which goes like this. We saw that the literature on aspectual classification was at
one time concerned with the question of whether the proposed classification should apply
to verbs (predicates) or to clauses (propositions) or both. Crucial evidence was that even if
one seemed certain of the classification of a particular verb, on a particular occasion of
utterance some other reading could be forced, depending upon the morphological properties
of the verb form and the type of arguments it took. We saw that the current assumption is
that it is most useful to classify eventualities on the basis of complete clauses, although a
relatively systematic description can be given of the basic classification of verbs and the
ways in which non-basic readings can be derived (see Moens (1987), Moens & Steedman
1986).
Now, an exactly parallel difficulty arises with control. Although it seems that some
predicates describe actions and events which are inherently controlled, while others
describe actions and events which are inherently uncontrolled, it is usually possible to
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'force' one or the other reading in context. As an example, consider the systematic use in
Amele of DS (rather than SS) with a following impersonal construction, to give a
'causative' reading implying a different and unidentified causer. Good examples come
from Eastern Pomo, as well, where as we saw in chapter 2, for some verbs, it is only
through the agentive properties of other constituents in the sentence that an agentive
reading is possible.48
So, in both the case of the aspectual distinctions described in figure (45), and the case of
control, the characteristics of the NPs in the sentence are important in 'forcing' non-typical
readings on the verbs. This brings us to the second half of the argument. Aspectual
distinctions in meaning, such as distinctions between culminating and non-culminating
events, have frequently been compared with distinctions in nominal meaning such as
distinctions between definite and indefinite NPs or between count and mass NPs
(Mourelatos 1978). In the languages with which we have been concerned, the degree of
'control' or agentivity of a NP (which possibly may be modelled using an 'animacy'
hierarchy of the kind proposed by Silverstein 1976) is matched by verbal distinctions in
whether or not the eventuality is a 'controlled' one. This is particularly true of Eastern
Pomo, where as we have seen, the degree of control in the eventuality as a whole is a
function of the inherent degree of control of the verb and the inherent degree of control of
its NP arguments.
Hence the nature of the meaning expressed by Aktionsarten distinctions and by control
distinctions appears to be similar in that both involve clause-level meaning which may be
manifested on either nominal or verbal elements of the clause or both.49
Finally, we could argue for the proposal on empirical grounds. First, if part of our aim in
establishing an aspectual classification is to account for the distribution of adverbs, then we
have to account for the distribution of those adverbs which refer to intentionality as well:
intentionally, unintentionally, deliberately, accidentally, etc. Such adverbs can themselves
force particular readings. Second, in Eastern Pomo and certain other American Indian
48 As we saw in chapter 2, Eastern Pomo exhibits 'Split-S' and 'Fluid-S' marking, having three types of
verbs: inherently uncontrolled verbs which require a Sp (patient) subject, verbs which may take a S . (agent)
subject or a Sp (patient) subject depending on the degree of control exhibited in the situation being described,
and verbs which may take either kind of subject depending upon the inherent agentivity of the subject NP.
49 A question which remains unanswered here is whether or not other types of meaning which percolate
between NPs and verbs should also be parameterised in aspectual types of distinctions, for example other types
of 'transitivity' (Hopper & Thompson 1980) such as iterativity, or exhaustiveness of the application of the ac¬
tion.
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languages such as other Pomo languages and Lakhota, such a distinction must be a
necessary part of the eventuality classification, since it determines the distribution of
'Split-S' and 'Fluid-S' marking, and of other morphological inflection on nouns and verbs.
If we adopt the proposal that an aspectual distinction should be made in terms of control,
we then have to consider the question of how this additional distinction is to be encoded in
the grammar. A prior question is how the aspectual distinctions described in (45) and the
control distinction are related.
Prima facie the basic traditional aspectual distinction between events and states correlates
quite closely with a distinction between predicates which have volitional agent participants
and predicates which have only experiencer participants. All the impersonal constructions
we considered would seem to be states. Hence, presumably, Davidson's attempt to base his
classification of events largely upon intentionality, distinguishing events as actions or non¬
actions. However, we cannot completely collapse the two distinctions. First, we might
argue that some states do involve volitional agents, eg. progressive forms if they are
analysed as states, or examples like I live in Edinburgh. This example could be dismissed
by saying that it only makes sense to talk about volitional agency when some sort of causal
act is involved; that perhaps I act volitionally in the first instance by causing that I live in
Edinburgh (or even at regular intervals by actively maintaining the state of living in
Edinburgh), but that it is not appropriate to identify me as causal agent of the state itself.
Even if one accepts this rebuttal and allows the claim that all states lack volitional agents,
there remains the difficulty that within the class of what we would normally call events, we
still have to distinguish those with volitional agents from those without, including those
with inanimate subjects.
In sum, it seems that there is some connection between having a volitional agent, and the
other, independently motivated, eventuality classifications, but it is a complex one, so that
on the whole it may be better to see the two classifications as largely crosscutting rather
than part of a single set of distinctions. Hence, the kind of eventuality hierarchy we might
propose for Amele and other languages would be in the form of a lattice rather than a
simple tree to capture the complex interrelations between Aktionsarten and control. This is






We could encode the additional information about control in the sorted eventuality
discourse markers which UCG distinguishes, i.e. making a distinction between controlled
and uncontrolled sorts of events.50 In fact, in the account which follows, we encode this
information indirectly, deriving it from the agentivity value of the switch-reference pivot.
We encode whether the eventuality is controlled by whether there exists what we call a
'protagonist*. This is a more efficient way of handling the impersonal data in Amele, since
it is the notion of agentive subject which is important, not just the notion of agent
However, we shall return to this question in the account suggested later for Eastern Porno .
The structured eventuality index
We saw in the introduction to section 5.4 that, given a standard UCG account, from the
interpretation of the medial switch-reference marked clause, all we can reasonably expect
to know about the semantics of the following controlling clause is encoded in the
representation [a]A, i.e. the clause has some eventuality index [a] whose aspectual sort is
unspecified, and some set of semantic conditions A. We handle the full range of switch-
reference phenomena in Amele by introducing a structured eventuality index in place of
the unstructured index [a]. This structured eventuality index incorporates eventuality
parameters which represent that clause-level information about the eventuality that seems
to be involved in switch-reference relations. That is, the motivation for the eventuality
parameters which are defined is that these encode that information which needs to be
50 In an unpublished paper on Eastern Pomo, Adger (1988) moves towards this kind of approach.
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'pulled out' of the semantics A of the following clause in advance of full interpretation of
this clause.
Let an eventuality index be a triple <Id, Aspect, Parcuneters>, where:
(i) Id is a uniquely identifying integer l,2,3,...,n;
(ii) Aspect is a sorted eventuality variable, chosen from e for an event, s for a state, a for
an aspectually unspecified eventuality, and perhaps others; and
(iii) Parameters is a parameter list <Protagonist, Location, Actuality>.
The parameter list is made up as follows:
(a) Protagonist is an individual discourse marker chosen from the set ^^.x^,...^};
(b) Actuality is a value in the set {actual,non-actual}; and
(c) Location is a sorted locational discourse marker chosen ffom the set {ljJ^Jg,....Jn}.
The values of the eventuality parameters are assigned as follows.
For any regular verb, the protagonist of the eventuality is defined as its agentive subject
argument in the way specified at the end of 5.4.1; that is, the value of Protagonist is
lexically specified. We can see the Protagonist as inherently agentive. (What happens
when there is no agent we shall see in section 5.5.)
The actuality of the eventuality is a function of the STATUS of the fully inflected verb
plus possibly other factors such as whether there is a shift in the source of the speech
(between current and reported speaker) or use of emphatic markers such as ijom. The
default value for actuality is {actual}.
The value for location will be assigned on the basis of adverbial expressions which may
have occurred previously in the text. In addition, the location parameter may be altered by
verbs of motion. Part of the meaning of a verb of motion such as the verbs glossed as
'left', 'went', 'crossed', 'took' etc. in the examples in 5.4.2 will be that the Location value
for the eventuality index it introduces is required to be distinct from the Location value of
the eventuality index for the previous clause. This is analogous to the movement of the
temporal reference time which has been observed in narrative text (see Hinrichs 1986,
Partee 1984).
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On this revised account, the eventuality indices for the two clauses in example (17) would
be respectively (46) and (47).
(17) uqa ho-co-b sab je-i-a
3s come-DS-3s food eat-3s-TodP
Hej came and hej ate the food.
(46) [1, e, <Xp lj, actual>]
(47) [2, e, <Xy lp actual>]
We can refer to a structured eventuality index in shorthand by mentioning its aspectual sort
subscripted with its Id integer, for example as e^, e2. Hence we can also write (46) as
(48).
(48) [ep <Xp lp actual>]
In addition, if P. is the i parameter label, then we write P-(a) for the value of the i
parameter in a. Thus, the value of the parameter label Protagonist in a is written
Protagonist(a).
In comparison with the sorted discourse markers of the standard UCG account, the new
information encoded in the eventuality index resides in these three eventuality parameters.
To see this, compare the sign for the verb meten 'he peeled', as given in 5.3.2 and in the
new notation:
meten
Sfroot.rem p,realis]NP[3.s.+ag]:x,NPL, , ]:x2
[ej] [peel'(epXpX2) & e^ < now]
meten
S [root,rem_p,realis]NP[3 ,s,+ag] :x jNP[_>_>J :*2
[ep <Xp_,actual>] [peelXepXpX^ & e^ < now]
Notice that the eventuality protagonist is identified with the subject argument Xj.
We can now try to generalise the relation involved in switch-reference marking. The
analogue of our earlier definition of the markers as indicating whether or not a disjoint
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agentive subject was present in the controlling clause would treat SS as showing that,
given two eventualities and ^ then Protagonist (ej) 2 However, in order to
capture the anomalous DS marking, we need a somewhat richer relation between
eventualities.
Thus, we define an agreement relation between eventuality parameters such that:
If a., a.j are structured eventuality indices (SEI's), then
Protagonist( a.) ~ Protagonist( ay <=> Protagonist( a.) 2 Protagonist( aj);
& Actuality( ap ~ Actuality( Uj) <=> Actuality( = Actuality( ay;
& Location( a.) = Location( aj) <=> Location( a.) = Location( ay.57
If a., dj are SEI's, and Parameters( aJ ~ Parameters( ay, then dj ~ a.
I use this formal apparatus to capture the interpretation of switch-reference markers. The
semantics of the switch-reference markers specifies an agreement or dis-agreement relation
between the two eventualities (in addition to specifying a temporal relation between the
eventualities introduced by the two clauses). The SS marker introduces a condition in the
semantics that e- = e., and the DS marker introduces the condition that e- =/ Hence, the
signs for the verb 'come' marked for third person singular subject agreement and
sequential SS and sequential DS would be:
humei
S/S:[aj]ANP[3,s,+ag]:xj
[ep <Xp_,actual>] [come'(epxy] &
e





[ep <Xp_,actual>] [come'(epXy &
&■
e, < a, &
C^] AT
51 It may turn out to be necessary to specify a looser relation between Locations, which will allow 'over-
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The signs for simultaneous SS and DS markers will specify the temporal relation of
simultaneity, '0\ instead of that of sequentiality, between the two eventualities, and the
signs for simultaneous DS markers will in addition specify that both eventuality indices
will have a particular value for ACTUAL.
This means that while SS marking indicates that the eventualities agree in all three
eventuality parameters, DS marking indicates that they disagree in at least one parameter,
and possibly in others. It is this definition of DS marking which enables us to account for
the full range of functional extensions of DS as illustrated by the examples in section 5.4.2.
The full definition of the 'dis-agreement' relation, 4< says that if a., dj are SEI's, then a. 4
dj iff Parameters( a.) 4 Parameters( dj), i.e. iff:
Protagonist( a.) i Protagonist( dj),
V Actuality( a.) * Actuality( aj),
V Location( a^) * Location( ay.52
Hence, a DS marker on a verb indicates a shift in the parameters of the next eventuality.
The default is a change in Protagonist, but changes in Actuality or Location are also
possible.
We need to account for the fact that the default and preferred meaning of DS marking
remains a shift in reference of the switch-reference pivot, the Protagonist. The order in
which the three parameters are listed is significant in this respect. When a switch-reference
marked clause is interpreted, the switch-reference maiker is taken to indicate only an
agreement or dis-agreement relation between the two eventualities, although language users
will 'know' that the parameters are preferentially ordered in terms of significance for
agreement. When the controlling clause is interpreted, information will be given about the
agreement relations between individual parameters. This will enable full interpretation.
Pragmatic or discourse factors such as whether a major participant has been established in
context will come into play here as well.
Figure (49) gives the full derivational tree for the example sentence (17) on the revised
account.
52 That is, a relation of dis-agreement holds if of those pairs of Parameter values for which the eventual¬
ities are defined, at least one pair is in the relation specified.
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(49) U(/U nucuu SUV JC1U
S[root,tod_p,realis]
[ei>{xi,li,actual)] [come(ei,xi) & ei < e? ] k









S[root,_,realis] / S:[a2]A \ NP[3,s,+]:xi
[ei,(xi,li,actual)] [Gome(ei,Xi) k













S[root,tod_p,realis] \ NP[3,s,+]:x2 \ NP].,.,.]^
[e2i(x2i-iactual)] ]eat(e2,X2,x3) & e2 < now]
So far, I have not said anything about those unexpected uses of DS marking which are
triggered by terminative and/or inceptive aspect or by 'stereotyped' forms of recapitulation
clauses, both of which marie a shift from one eventuality complex to another. To account
for these related phenomena, we need two things. First, we need a way of grouping
eventualities into eventuality complexes or episodes and a way of indicating closure,
opening and shifts between such episodes. Second, we need a way of accounting for the
anaphoric relation which holds between the eventuality index of a final clause in one
sentence and the eventuality index of the recapitulation clause which begins the next
sentence.
The latter is in fact the only additional mechanism we need in order to account for
recapitulation clauses, since once we have an account for this anaphoric relation everything
else will follow from the account given for switch-reference marking in general. Indeed,
the anaphoric relation itself will be handled using some adaptation of independently
motivated principles of discourse anaphora which specify the possible anaphoric relations
between DMs. That is, as well as the relations we have already specified as holding
-216-
between eventuality indices, we have the ordinary anaphoric linkage relations of etc.
So that if ej = e2 then this simply means that these two DMs refer to the same
eventuality.53
Although the four types of trigger of DS marking - shift in protagonist, in location, in
actuality or in event complex - are superficially alike, in fact they differ in that the first
three concern the internal characteristics (parameters) of some particular eventuality and the
last concerns the place such an eventuality might have in some sequence or complex of
related eventualities.
So far, we have defined two kinds of information about relations between distinct
eventualities:
(i) temporal ordering relations of precedence or overlap:
(ii) relations of agreement or dis-agreement in their eventuality parameters
(protagonist, location, actuality)
The most promising approach to defining a more sophisticated notion of the 'eventuality
structure' of a text, which will incorporate the notion of eventuality episode which we
need, is that taken by investigators such as Moens & Steedman (1986), Webber (1987) and
Zeevat (1987), who were mentioned in the earlier discussion of aspectual classification.
The basic idea is that in situating any single upcoming eventuality in the textual structure,
decisions need to be made concerning where it is to be attached in the hierarchy of
eventualities, and how it is to be attached, i.e. by what kind of relations. See especially
Zeevat (1987) for worked out examples of hierarchically ordered eventuality trees; he
assumes a basic classification of the textual function of each sentence from which temporal
relations are worked out. There is no space to develop a detailed proposal along these
lines here, so I will leave this for future research. Such an account would proceed by
defining a notion of eventuality episode, and allowing terminative or inceptive aspect to
trigger a shift in episode representing the closure of one eventuality complex and the
opening of another. We would then modify our definition of the agreement relation
which holds between eventuality indices, so that SS marking constrains the eventualities to
belong to the same episode, whereas DS marking may be licenced by a shift in episode.
The difference in temporal interval between the eventualities, which Roberts responded to
53 As with individual DMs, which of the set of possible anaphoric relations actually holds is a matter for
additional resolution heuristics, cf. Calder, Klein, Moens & Zeevat (1986).
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in giving his description of the examples in question, would just follow from the difference
in episode.
The selection of information to be included in the structured eventuality index was made
on the basis of which parameters of coherence between eventualities are grammaticised in
the language, both in the switch-reference system and less directly in those elements which
appear to trigger DS marking, such as aspectual markers.54 The resulting parameters
encode very much the kind of information that Hopper & Thompson (1980) identified as
transitivity features: the agency and volitionality of participants, aspectual distinctions
between completed and uncompleted events, realis or irrealis mode, although their list did
not include location (see chapter 3). In addition, work in the philosophy of language and
formal semantics, especially work on indexicality, has tended to select a very similar range
of elements as defining the 'context' or 'circumstances' with respect to which an utterance
is to be evaluated, and with respect to which the meaning of indexical elements is defined.
For example, Kaplan (1977:22-3) lists speaker, time, position and world as important in
this respect
Although I reached my conclusions about the range of functional extensions available
crosslinguistically for DS independently of Roberts and on the basis of consideration of a
number of languages, the above account can be regarded as a first step towards formalising
his idea that it is time, place and world which are important in accounting for the Amele
functional extensions of DS marking.55
However, there are certain noteworthy differences between my account and the kind of
account which Roberts seems to envisage from his remarks in (1987:292,303) and
(1988:46,60). From what Roberts says he seems to regard the possibility of functional
extension of the SR markers as a matter for pragmatics rather than semantics, although he
cites Lewis's (1972) ideas about semantic theory: he speaks of it as involving 'discourse
deixis' and having a 'pragmatic (and) deictic role/function' or being a 'pragmatic discourse
device'. I have proposed an account which encodes all the possible functions of switch-
reference markers in a grammar with a developed semantics and a discourse component,
and have restricted the role of pragmatics to choice of one of these possibilities on some
54 Clearly, factors other than these may contribute to discourse coherence more generally, see inter aha
Halliday & Hasan (1976), Grosz & Sidner (1985).
55 Cf. Roberts (1988:61 jt.20): 'It is not clear how one would account for the operation of the Amele SR
system on a formal basis. At one level the rules for marking SS/DS are fairly rigid (...), however ....'
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particular occasion - much as Kamp (1981), (1983) etc. claims only to account for possible
anaphoric relations, not to provide heuristics for actual anaphor resolution.
In addition, Roberts anticipates a possible world account of modality as a basis for
explaining those examples where a shift in actuality triggers use of DS marking: i.e.,
presumably a switch from one possible world to another, or a switch between that possible
world which is identified as the 'actual' world and some other possible world, would be
seen as the trigger in such cases, much as a switch in locations is in other cases. In
contrast, my account does not presuppose a possible world semantics, although such a
semantics may turn out to be the best way to define a distinction between actual and non-
actual (cf. Kaplan 1977:19).
5.5. Switch-reference with impersonal constructions
I have said that the switch-reference pivot in Amele is constrained to be an agentive
subject NP. The evidence for this is the behaviour of switch-reference marking when the
controlling clause is an impersonal construction or has an inanimate subject. In such cases,
unexpected SS marking normally occurs although strictly speaking there is no coreference
between the subject NPs. This argument was presented in chapter 2. In order to
complete our account of switch-reference in Amele, it is necessary to show how it works
for switch-reference involving these constructions.56
There are two kinds of impersonal construction in Amele. These were discussed in chapter
2, but will be briefly reviewed here. I shall identify them as types I and II. A schematic
representation of type I is given in (50a) and a schematic representation of type II is given
in (50b); representative examples of each type are given in (51) and (52) respectively.57
(50) a. TYPE I:
NP(Experiencer) + NP(Cause) + Inflection
36 For further discussion of these constructions, see Roberts (1987: 63, 67, 163, 166, 204, 220, 233, 280-
1, 299ff„ 315ff.)
57 Roberts (1987:264) briefly mentions a subtype which expresses a continuing desire; the second element
is the noun gale, 'desire', and the first element, which desribes the habitual desire, is a PP functioning as ob¬
ject complement with the verb within the PP in the infinitival form. Eg. Ija ceb j-ec nu gale tena, 'I like to eat
betelnut'.
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(50) b. TYPE II:
NP(Experiencer) + V(complement) + Inflection
(51) Ija wen te-na-0
Is hunger ls-3s-pres
I am hungry. [315, (679)]
(52) Ija nu-ug-a te-na-0
Is go-2s-IMP ls-3s-pres
I want to go. [264, (489)]58.
The two types of construction have exactly the same form, except in whether the second
element of the clause is a NP with the thematic role of Cause, or a verbal complement In
each case the first element of the clause is a NP with the thematic role of Experiencer, and
the final element is an inflectional complex without a lexical verb, consisting of object
agreement with the Experiencer NP, third person singular subject agreement, and the
normal finite verb inflection for tense/aspect/mood/polarity. Note that although the normal
Amele word order, S O V, would suggest that the Experiencer NP is subject, this cannot
be the case since it triggers object agreement marking on the verb. However, any other
order of constituents results in an ungrammatical sentence, eg. in Type I the order
NP(Cause) followed by NP(Experiencer) is ruled out: *wen ija tena. Roberts suggests that
this is due to the fact that initial position, as well as being subject position, is topic
position, and there is a constraint such that the topic position must be occupied by that NP
which is highest on an animacy hierarchy such as that proposed by Silverstein (1976).
In Type I, the NP in the cause role must be one of a closed class of nouns, some of which,
including wen, only occur in this construction. All refer to physical or psychological states
which are understood to hold of the Experiencer NP. Type II is a desiderative construction
with the verbal complement identifying the action which is desired. Unlike the Cause NP
of Type I, the verbal complement position is fully productive - any verb can occur. It
takes either imperative mood, as in (52), in which case present or future desire is indicated,
or the remote past tense, in which case contrafactual desire is indicated and the inflectional
complex at the end is marked for contrafactual mood.
58 Present tense is zero-marked for a third person singular subject.
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In both types of impersonal construction, subject agreement marking must always be third
person singular. In Type I, there are two possible explanations for this. One is that
agreement is with the Cause NP, which is always third person singular, making this the
subject NP, and the other is that the agreement is third person singular default agreement
which always occurs in Amele in the absence of a trigger in the appropriate grammatical
function. In Type II, it seems clear that the third person singular subject agreement on the
final inflectional element is default agreement and that there is no overt subject; the
alternative would be to make the less likely supposition that the verbal complement
constituent is dominated by a NP node and acts as subject.
In chapter 2 we saw a number of examples of switch-reference relations in which the
controlling clause was an impersonal construction of Type I or Type II. See example (53).
(53) Ija bi-m-ig wen te-i-a
I come_up-SS-lS hunger ls-3s-TodP
I came up and I became hungry. [300, (598)]
In such cases, SS maiking is used despite the fact that, even if the controlling clause could
be said to have a subject NP, the latter is certainly not coreferential with the subject of the
marked clause. DS maiking is used in this context only to effect a kind of causative
construction. Thus in example (54) it indicates that some unidentified other party caused
the eventuality described in the impersonal clause.
(54) Ija be-ce-min wen te-i-a
I come_up-DS-ls hunger ls-3s-TodP
I came up, and something made me hungry. [300, (601)]
In Amele, controlling clauses with subjects which are inalienably possessed body parts or
weather expressions are found to behave in the same way as impersonal controlling clauses
with respect to switch-reference maiking. That is, SS marking is used regardless of the
fact that strictly speaking the subjects of the two clauses have disjoint reference. In such
cases, DS may also be used with the causative interpretation mentioned above. Controlling
clauses with other inanimate subjects offer a choice of SS or DS maiking, depending upon
whether the subject is being regarded agentively or not. See examples (55)-(59).
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(55) Ija co-cob-ig wa hedo-i-a
I SIM-walk-ls_SS water finish-3s-TodP
As I walked along the rain stopped. [300, (600)]
(56) ? Ija co-cob-igin wa he-do-i-a
I SIM-walk-ls_DS water finish-3s-TodP
? As I walked along something made the rain stop.
(57) Ija ta-taw-ig ija am-i wal-do-i-a
I SIM-stand-ls_SS I eye-Is spin-3s-3s-TodP
As I stood my eye(s) spun '(= I became dizzy). [300, (599)]
(58) Ija ta-taw-igin ija am-i wal-do-i-a
I SIM-stand-ls_DS I eye-ls_POSS spin-3s-3s-TodP
As I stood something caused my eyes to spin. [300, (602)]
(59) M-i he-du-me-i ceta wal
put-PRED finish-3s-SS-3s yam ripe
me-ce-b ceta eu hun-i-me-i...
become-DS-3s yam that dig_up-PRED-SS-3s ...
He finished doing that and then since those yams were ripe he dug them up... [302, (612)]
In chapter 2, we considered and dismissed a possible explanation for the switch-reference
facts involving impersonal constructions which was that the switch-reference relation is
sensitive to whether or not there is coreference with the Experiencer NP, even though it is
not the subject according to the facts of verb agreement, either because it is highest on
some hierarchy of semantic roles, or because it is topic.
Before giving the details of my UCG analysis for impersonal constructions in Amele, let
me situate the data in question in a broader context by briefly discussing the range of
phenomena called 'unaccusative verbs', which were mentioned in 5.4.3.
Jake (1985:ch.6,esp.l93,255-7) used the notion of unaccusativity to explain characteristics
of the 'subjectless' impersonal construction in Imbabura Quechua. This construction was
discussed in chapter 2. It is very similar to the Amele impersonal constructions in that,
although the clause may be transitive or intransitive, in either case it will contain an
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Experiencer nominal which is marked with Accusative case and which triggers object
agreement on the verb, the verb is marked with default third person singular subject
agreement, and there seems to be no overt subject The construction is optional for
desiderative predicates and obligatory for physical experiencer predicates, exactly the same
range of cases as is covered by the Amele constructions.
Jake's Relational Grammar analysis of subjectless constructions in Imbabura Quechua is
that the experiencer nominal is an initial subject NP which loses its status as subject and
(eventually) becomes a direct object Hence her description of them as 'unaccusative' on
the basis of the relation between grammatical relations and semantic roles which they
manifest at surface structure, as well as other behaviour, involves a use of this term which
is less frequently seen, although Perlmutter (1978:179) does discuss such derived
unaccusatives, or 'inversion structures'. If we disregard the claim that the experiencer
begins life as a subject NP, the main difference from unaccusative constructions familiar
from the literature is that the 'theme' object NP does not appear as surface subject, rather
the sentence lacks a surface subject. Jake accounts for this by saying that a 'dummy'
element is indeed promoted to subject, but that the language is one of those which does not
allow dummy elements to be realised by expletives on the surface; the same kind of
explanation is given for the subjectless impersonal passives which occur in various
languages. See Perlmutter (1978), McCloskey (1984). It is possible to propose just such
an analysis for impersonal constructions in Amele.
The failure of an underlying object to move into subject position at surface structure
reflects a general lack of subject promotion processes in this language (which also lacks
expletive elements). For example, Amele does not have a passive construction which
involves promotion of an object argument to subject. However, there is a construction
which involves suppression of the subject, which Roberts (1987:220f.) calls the 'pseudo-
passive'. In this construction, the subject NP is simply omitted, and the object NP hence
occurs in initial 'topic' position. This construction is apparently restricted to 'agentive
verbs'. In other words only the agent subjects of such verbs can be omitted. That is, it
seems to be restricted to unergative predicates. Default third person subject agreement
marking occurs on the verb; i.e. subject agreement is not triggered by the sole remaining
NP, instead this NP continues to trigger object agreement marking. See the examples in
(60M61).
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(60) a. Ija na qet-ig-a
Is tree cut-ls-TodP
I have cut down the tree. [220, (328)]
b. na qete-i-a
tree cut-3s-TodP
The tree has been cut down; someone has cut down the tree. [220,
(329)]
(61) a. Ija na qet-ad-ig-a
Is tree cut-3p-ls-TodP
I have cut down the trees. [220, (332)]
b. Na qet-ade-i-a
tree cut-3p-3s-TodP
The trees have been cut down; someone has cut down the trees. [220,
(333)]
The Amele 'pseudo-passive' is similar to the kinds of constructions in Dutch, in Romance
languages and in other languages which have been called 'impersonal passives' (see
Perlmutter 1978: 157-8). These lack overt surface subjects in many languages, and in
others have expletive subjects. For example, the Italian impersonal passive (or middle)
voice is exemplified in (65).
(62) a. Gli edili costruiscono le case.
The builders build(PL) the houses. (ACTIVE)
The builders build the houses.
b. Si costruisce le case.
Si build(SG) the houses. (IMPERSONAL)
The houses are built.
c. Si costruiscono le case.
Si build(PL) the houses. (IMPERSONAL)
d. Le case si costruiscono.
The houses si build(PL) (IMPERSONAL)
In the middle construction the verb may agree with the sole remaining NP (the object of
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the active) as in (c) and (d), or it may take default third person singular agreement as in
(b). The middle marker si is a dummy subject with arbitrary reference and is also used in
reflexives as in si rade, 'self shaves'.59
Our account makes the correct predictions about switch-reference marking, because none of
the NPs in impersonal constructions, weather expressions or inalienably possessed body
part subjects can be designated as Protagonist of the eventuality which the clause
introduces, since even if we were to analyse any one of them as subject, none have the
appropriate value for the AGENTTVE feature, i.e. {+ag}.
In such constructions, I say that the value for the Protagonist parameter of the eventuality
is a completely unspecified pronominal which is anaphorically linked to none of the DMs
introduced by the nominals in the impersonal clause. For clarity of exposition, I will
represent this notationally as the discourse marker ARB.60 If the previous clause is SS
marked, this causes the value of the protagonist of the impersonal controlling clause to
share the value of the protagonist of the switch-reference marked clause. If the previous
clause is DS marked, the value for the protagonist of the controlling clause remains the
unspecified agentive discourse marker ARB, which automatically gives the causal reading.
If the impersonal clause is itself switch-reference marked with respect to a following
controlling clause in a clause chain, it is not possible for SS marking to occur when the
following clause has a distinct subject This case is handled automatically, as a result of
the asymmetry in the switch-reference relation which prevents the use of SS when the
subject referent of a marked clause is contained in the subject reference set of a controlling
clause.
This account generalises to handle the examples with inanimate subjects, where as we saw
speakers can choose to use SS or DS according to whether they wish to present the subject
as agentive or not
The same kind of account will be given for the pseudo-passive construction, although I
could find no examples where such a construction was used in a switch-reference relation.
59 The data are from Antonio Sanfilippo, pc.
60 This is a slightly different use of ARB from that the GB literature, for example in Chomsky (1981:24).
However there is an analogy between the arbitrary interpretation available for the subject of the infinitival
clause in John is annoyed, that it is so difficult to get the tyre back on the car, and the interpretation of the
impersonal clause as involving some unspecified agent when DS marking is used.
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I would predict that if one were, the same kind of behaviour would be observed, with SS
marking being used.
Example (63) gives a derivation for the impersonal sentence in (51). Examples (64) and
(65) give derivations for (53) and (54) above, where the controlling clause is an impersonal
construction, and example (66) gives a step by step derivation for (the full version of)
example (57), (57'), where the controlling clause has an inalienably possessed body part
subject.
(51) Ija wen te-na-0
Is hunger ls-3s-pres




[si,(ARB,^actual)] [hunger(si,i') & sj O now]
wen tena
NP[l,s,_] S[root,pres,realis] \ NP[l,s,-]:i'




S[root,pres,realis] \ NP[l,s,-]:i' \ NP[_,_,-]:P
[si,(ARB,_,actual)] [P(si,i') & si O now]
(53) Ija bi-m-ig wen te-i-a
come_up-SS-lS hunger ls-3s-TodPI e.






[ei,(i',li,actual)] [come_up(ei,i') k ei < a2 k ei « a2 k [a.2]A]
bimig
S[root,_,_] / S:[a2]A \ NP[l,s,+]:i'
[ei,(i',li,actual)] [come_up(ei,i') k ei < a2 k ej w a2 k [a.]A]
STEP 2: ija. bimig wen teia
S[root,tod_p,realis]
actual)] [come_up(ei,i') k < S3] k
[s3,(i',_,actual)] [hunger(s3,i') k S3 < now]
(54) Ija be-ce-min wen te-i-a
I come_up-DS-ls hunger ls-3s-TodP
I came up, and something made me hungry. [300, (601)]
(65) ija becemin wen teia
S[root,tod_p,realis]
[ei, ( i',li,actual)] [come_up(ei,i') k ei < S3] k
[33, ( ARB,_,actual)] [hunger(33,i') k S3 < now]
wen teia
S[root,tod_p,realis]
[s3, ( ARB,^actual )] [hunger(s3,i') k S3 < now]
ija becemin
S[root,_,realis] / S:[a2]A
[ei> ( i'dijactual)] ]come_up(ei,i') k ei < a2 k ei 96 a2 k [a2]A]
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(57') Ija ta-taw-ig na met-i-m-ig
I SIM-stand-ls_SS wood split-PRED-SS-ls
am-i wal-do-n
eye-ls_POSS spin-3s-3s-RemP









S[root,_,_] / S:[a2]A \ NP[l,s,_]:i'
[si)(i')li>-)] [stand(si,i') & si O a2 sj « a2 &
STEP 2:
na metimig
S[root,__] / S:[a3]A \ NP[l,s,+]:i'





S[root,_,_] / S:[a3]A \ NP[l,s,+]:i' \ NP[.,.,.]:x2




[e2,(i',_,_)] [split(e2,i',x2) & wood(x2) & e2 < a3 & e2 « a3 & [a3]A]
STEP 4: ija. tatawig na metimig
S[root,_,_] / S:[a3]A
[ex,(i',_,_)] [stand(ei,i') & e2 O e2] &:





[s4,(ARB,^actual)] [spin(s4,x1) k eye(xi) & poss(i',x1) k s4 < now]
ami waldon
NP[3,s,_] S[root,tod_p,realis] \ NP[3,s,-]:xi
[xi] [eye(xi) k poss(i',xi)] [s4,(ARB,_,actual)] [spin(s4,xi) & s4 < now]
STEP 6:
ija tatawig na metimig ami waldon
S[root,tod_p,realis]
[ei,{i',-,actual)] [stand(ei,i') & ei O e2] k
[e2i(i'>-iactual)] [split(e2,i',X2) k wood(x2) & e2 < s4] &;
[s4,(i',_,actual)] [spin(s4,xi) k eye(xi) k poss(i',xi) & s4 < now]
ami waldon
S[root,tod_p,realis]
[s4,(ARB,actual)] [spin(s4,xi) k eye(xi) k poss(i',xi) k s4 < now]
ija tatawig na metimig
S[root,tod_p,realis] / S:[a3]A
_)] [stand(ei.i') k ei O e2] k
[e2)(i'i->-)l [split(e2,i',X2) k wood(x2) k e2 < a3 k e2 » a3 k [a3]A]
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5.6. Generality of the account
The basic account can readily be adapted to handle switch-reference in other languages,
whether or not they exhibit functional extensions of the switch-reference system of the kind
discussed above and in chapter 2.
For example, to handle switch-reference marking in Imbabura Quechua (see chapter 2), we
need the same definition of Protagonist, as agentive subject, but since Imbabura Quechua
does not to my knowledge exhibit any functional extensions of DS marking, we can simply
define SS and DS marking as putting conditions on the value for the Protagonist parameter
of the eventuality indices.
We saw in chapter 2 that in Eastern Porno, SS marking is used when the subject NPs of
the two clauses are coreferential, and share the same agentivity value, as indicated by the
morphological form of the pronoun and/or possibly the type of verb in the clause: thus SS
marking may be used when the two subjects are both agentive or both non-agentive. DS
marking is used either if the two subjects have disjoint reference, or if they have different
agentivity values, whether or not they have the same or different reference. Another way
to put this is to say that in Eastern Pomo, two eventualities related by SS marking must be
of the same aspectual sort with respect to the aspectual distinction for control proposed in
5.4.3. To account for switch-reference in Eastern Pomo, we therefore need to include a
parameter of control or agentivity in the Parameter list.61
Again in chapter 2, we saw that in Lenakel, DS marking may be used, even if the two
switch-reference pivots are coreferential, if the two clauses differ in that one is future tense
and the other is non-future. I propose that the most elegant way to account for this is to
see future and non-future tenses as introducing different values for the Actuality parameter,
and SS and DS marking responding to both the value for the Protagonist parameter, where
this is the DM introduced by the subject NP, and the value for the Actuality parameter:
SS indicates that Protagonist(ap = Protagonist(aj) & Actuality(ap = Actuality(aj), and DS
indicates that Protagonist(a-) * Protagonist(aj) A Actuality(ap * Actuality(aj). Further work
must determine whether this analysis of the difference between future and non-future tenses
i
is supported by any other areas of the grammar, and the same qualifications apply as for
61 It will not do to use the kind of account we have proposed for agentivity in Amele (and Imbabura
Quechua), since in these languages agentivity is a constraint on the switch-reference pivot, whereas in Eastern
Pomo agentivity value is irrelevant to the selection of the pivot.
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Eastern Pomo concerning other potential parameters, in this case of Location and Control.
Finally, we now have a way of modelling the observations made by Woodbury (1983)
about switch-reference in Yup'ik Eskimo. He indicated that in this language, there is some
pressure towards ensuring continued SS marking throughout any clause sequence which is
constituted as a 'rhetorical unit' by prosodic factors, external sandhi, sentence adverbial
choice and placement etc. Although more information would be required about the
definition of rhetorical units in Eskimo before a proper account could be given, it seems
quite likely that the notion of episode defined for Amele could be used in such an account.
5.7. Conclusion
Previous chapters have identified three criteria of adequacy for a comprehensive theory of
switch-reference. The account presented in this chapter meets all three.
The first, and most important, criterion was that the theory of switch-reference give a
principled account for the full range of functions of switch-reference markers, including
both referential and non-referential functions. I showed in section 5.4.3 that it was
possible to give a unified account of both types of function of the switch-reference markers
in Amele by introducing a structured eventuality index which encodes eventuality
parameters, and defining an agreement relation between eventuality indices. The
information included in the structured eventuality index was selected on the basis of what
was required to account for switch-reference in Amele, but in section 5.6 I sketched
accounts for the switch-reference systems of other languages exhibiting functional
extensions using the same mechanism, and introducing no new parameters (since the
parameter of Control used in the account for Eastern Pomo was implicit in the account for
Amele, although it had a rather different role there). We also saw that there is some
additional support for the choice of parameters from work on transitivity features and on
indexicality. I hypothesise first that the structured eventuality index will be found
necessary to account for other phenomena besides switch-reference, and secondly that it
will prove capable of handling other switch-reference systems which have not been
discussed here.
The second criterion was that the theory provide an alternative account for anaphoric
relations between switch-reference pivots, to binding accounts based on configurational
notions which we saw were unsatisfactory. In this chapter we saw an account which
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makes the correct predictions about anaphoric relations between switch-reference pivots
without relying on notions of syntactic binding. The switch-reference pivot is selected
locally, and in the selection process we are able to take account of not just information
about grammatical function but information about agentivity as well. In these two respects
the account differs from Finer's (1985a, b) Binding Theory account, where the relevant
NPs are identified by their position in a complete syntactic configuration.
The final criterion was, that the account could handle the temporal and aspectual meaning
encoded in switch-reference morphemes. We saw that this was of two types. In clause-
chaining languages, switch-reference morphemes indicate the dependency of marked
clauses on final, unmarked clauses for temporal reference and other elements of meaning
encoded by verbal inflection. In addition, in many switch-reference languages, the switch-
reference system specifies temporal and logical relations between the eventualities which
are introduced by the marked and controlling clauses. The account proposed here captures
the temporal dependency of the marked clause on the final clause, and the temporal
relations between marked and controlling clauses, in a natural and unified way.
Whether or not one takes a strictly Chomskyan approach to Universal Grammar, it would
seem plausible to propose that universally, switch-reference is an agreement relation
between clauses in terms of their eventuality parameters.62 Evidently, languages incorporate
different definitions of what it means for eventualities to agree, highlighting different
eventuality parameters, however the parameters are ordered hierarchically such that (at
least) any language which has switch-reference at all, will define it as a relation of
agreement between Protagonist parameters.





Logophoricity was introduced in chapter 1, where we tried to establish criteria for deciding
whether or not some given set of linguistic phenomena constitutes a switch-reference
system. There, we presented data from the African languages Igbo and Gokana, taken
from Hyman & Comrie (1981) and Comrie (1983). Hyman & Comrie (1981) identify the
Gokana data as a logophoric system, but Comrie (1983:32,36) calls it a 'young switch-
reference system'. He thereby draws attention to the similarities between switch-reference
and logophoricity, and also raises the possibility of logophoric systems developing into
switch-reference systems. In chapter 1, we argued that despite these similarities, and
potential diachronic analyses of the data, we should maintain a clear distinction between
switch-reference and logophoricity, and analyse the Gokana system as an instance of the
latter rather than the former.
Recently, logophoricity has been the focus of renewed interest by linguists, due to
analogies which have been drawn between the logophoric systems described for African
languages, and the 'non-clause-bounded', or 'long-distance' reflexives, which are found in
some Scandinavian languages (Thrainsson 1976, Maling (1984), Barnes 1985, Hellan
1987), and Japanese (Kuno 1972, 1988), and which have also been reported for a wide
range of other languages, including Italian (Giorgi 1984), Northern Pomo (O'Connor
1986), Malayalam (Monahan 1982), and the Caucasian languages Chechen and Inguish
(Nichols 1985). The basis for these comparisons is that the use of reflexive pronouns with
clause-external antecedents seems to be restricted to just those semantically defined
contexts in which logophoric pronouns may occur. Work has been done within the
frameworks of GB (eg. Anderson 1986) and LFG (eg. Kameyama 1984, Bresnan
Halvorsen & Maling (to appear)), and Sells (1987) has proposed a treatment within
Discourse Representation Theory.
It therefore seems appropriate at this point to return to the question of how switch-
reference and logophoricity are related, and to consider whether it is possible and
appropriate to extend the account given in chapter 5 so as to handle logophoric
phenomena.
I first give a fuller description of logophoric and long-distance reflexive (LDR) phenomena.
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Then I present Sells' (1987) account, and critically evaluate it. In its place I propose an
alternative account within Discourse Representation Theory, more particularly within
Unification Categorial Grammar. Note that although Sells gives prominence to the African
language data in his presentation of logophoric phenomena, he applies his account only to
the use of LDRs in Icelandic and Japanese. I discuss some African language data, and in
Stirling (1988b) show how the account can be modified to handle the system in Gokana.
Finally, I return to the question of the relationship between switch-reference and
logophoricity, and show that the account proposed in this chapter is compatible with that
proposed in chapter 5.
6.2. Logophoric phenomena
The term 'logophoric' ('returning to the discourse') was created by Claude Hag6ge (1974)
in a paper in which he discussed data from the African languages Mundang, Tuburi, Ewe,
and Ubangi languages (such as Ngbaka, Gbandili and Banda). He wrote (287; my
translation):
The term 'logophoric' is here proposed to designate a particular
category of anaphoric pronouns, personal and possessive, which
refer to the author of a discourse or to a participant whose
thoughts are reported.
Hag£ge was also the first to compare the logophoric pronouns in African languages to
LDRs, looking at data from Latin and Japanese - a fact which has usually been passed over
in more recent work on LDRs.
In the description of logophoric phenomena given in this section, we shall concentrate on
the African language data. Most of the examples will be taken from Ewe, a language of the
Kwa group which also includes Igbo and Yoruba. The data is from Clements (1975),
Duthie (1984), and Westermann (1930). However, much of what is said will also apply to
LDR data, and some examples from Icelandic and Japanese will be given, the former taken
from Thrainsson (1976), Anderson (1986), Maling (1984), Rognvoldsson (1986), and
Sigurdsson (1986), and the latter from Sells (1987).1
1 The African languages which have been identified as possessing such systems belong to the Niger-
Congo, Bantu, Chadic and Ubangi families, and include: Idoma, Yoruba, Igbo, Avatime, Mundang, Tuburi,
Ewe, Mapun, Angas, Sura, Pero, Kera, Akoose, Tikar. In addition to references given in the text, see Frajzyn-
gier 1985, Hedinger 1984, Wiesemann 1982, Stanley 1982.
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A clear example of a system which would be labelled uncontroversially as logophoric
|l
occurs in Igbo (Hyman & Comrie 1981). See example (1).
6 slri nd 6 bydrd
hei said that hej came
6 slri n& yd bydrd
hei said that hej came
In addition to the normal set of personal pronouns, which includes the third person singular
form 6, there is a logophoric pronoun yd. This logophoric pronoun is used to indicate
necessary coreference between the subjects of two clauses, where one clause contains a
verb of communication such as say, and the other is an embedded clause in which the
content of the speech is reported. In such a context, use of the normal third person
pronoun is normally taken to indicate disjoint reference.2
The term logophoric context will be used to refer to the embedded complement clause,
and more generally to the syntactic domain in which it is possible to use a logophoric
pronoun. The term logocentric NP will be used to refer to the matrix clause NP with
which the logophoric pronoun is coreferential.
Logophoric pronouns
Logophoric marking takes various forms. Logophoric pronouns may be free forms, as in
Igbo, or cliticized to the verb, as in Ewe. See example (2).
2 As we shall see below, in some languages the use of a logophoric pronoun is optional, and tied to other
meaning distinctions. In such languages the logophoric pronoun always indicates coreference, but a normal
third person pronoun does not strictly require disjoint reference.
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(2) a. kofi be yfe-dzo
Kofi say LOG-leave
Kofi- said that he- left.
b. kofi be e-dzo
Kofi say PRO-leave
Kofi- said that s/hej left.
We also saw in chapter 1 that in Gokana, there is no special logophoric pronoun form, but
ordinary personal pronouns are used logophorically by virtue of the appearance of a
morphologically invariant logophoric marker suffixed to the verb. See example (3). The
basis on which clitics such as occur in Ewe are classified as pronominal rather than as
verbal affixes as in Gokana is not clear from the literature.
(3) a. ae ko ae do
PRO said PRO fell
He- said hej fell.
b. ae ko ae do-e
PRO said PRO fell-LOG
He- said he^ fell.
Hag£ge (p.309) notes that Korean seems to exhibit logophoric gapping: omission of a
pronoun in a logophoric context such as the complement of a verb of saying indicates
coreference, and use of a normal personal pronoun indicates disjoint reference.
In Ewe, there are just two logophoric pronouns, singular yfe and plural yfcwo. These are
used coreferentially with both third person and second person logocentric NPs. Besides
cases where both logophoric pronoun and logocentric NP are plural, cases arise where just
one of the two NPs is plural and refers to a set which contains the referent of the other
singular NP. Crosslinguistically, where logophoric pronouns enter into anaphoric
relationships in which one of the two NPs is plural, the possibilities are extremely
constrained. A logophoric pronoun may be used to indicate coreference, if it is plural and
refers to a set of entities which contains the singular antecedent - as in example (4) from
Ewe.
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(4) kofi kpo be yfewo-do go
Kofi see COMP LOG_PL-come out
Kofi saw that they (including Kofi) had come out.
The opposite situation does not in general appear to be possible; i.e. a singular logophoric
pronoun may not have a plural antecedent, regardless of whether or not the set referred to
by the plural NP includes the referent of the singular pronoun. However, such a situation
is said by Frazyngier (1985) to occur in Mapun, a Chadic language.
Normally logophoric pronouns may be used in any grammatical function in the embedded
clause, including subject, object and possessive pronoun. In addition to number
distinctions, languages may have separate forms of the logophoric pronoun for different
grammatical functions - especially personal versus possessive. For example, Mundang
distinguishes between a possessive form and a nonpossessive, with the latter able to have
any other grammatical function within the embedded clause. Some Ubangi languages
apparently have separate forms for subject, direct object, indirect object, alienable and
inalienable possession, parallelling non-logophoric pronouns (F. Cloarec-Heiss 1969,
referred to by Hag£ge 1974:304f.).
Some person distinctions are also made. It is reported that at least one of the Ubangi
languages studied by Cloarec-Heiss distinguishes first person as well as second and third
person forms in the possessive form of the logophoric pronoun (Hagfcge 1974: 304).
However, this is the only report I have seen of a logophoric pronoun with a first person
form, and Hagfcge gives no examples: mostly, logophoric pronouns are identified as third
person, with, more rarely, second person forms also occurring.
In languages with long-distance reflexives, these have the same form as clause-bound
reflexive pronouns. Thus, in Icelandic, this is the special reflexive form which exists for
the third person and which is invariant for number and gender, but has different case
forms: accusative sig, dative ser and genitive sin. There is no nominative form and so
Icelandic LDRs only appear as subjects when the subject takes 'quirky case' assigned by
the verb (see Levin & Simpson 1981, Zaenen & Maling 1984).
In Japanese, the invariant form zibun occurs as LDR. Examples from these two languages
will be seen later.
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In African languages with logophoric pronouns, clause-bound reflexive pronouns also exist
which are completely morphologically distinct. As we shall see, it is clear that the
distribution of logophoric pronouns and of LDRs must be accounted for using similar
means. However, we cannot collapse the two phenomena completely. Besides the obvious
distinction in that LDRs are closely related to clause-bound reflexives whereas logophoric
pronouns are not, note also that whereas logophoric pronouns may be used to refer to some
set of which the logocentric NP referent is a member, reflexives always , have the stronger
requirement of identical extensions.
Direct and indirect reporting
Logophoric pronouns are identified as (usually) third person, on the basis that logocentric
NPs are (usually) third person; that is, because logophoric pronouns are coreferential with
these NPs, they are taken to agree with them in person and other grammatical features.
Thus, logophoric systems are said to be motivated by the ambiguity which otherwise arises
in sentences such as English John said, that he went home, where the he can refer to John
or to some other third person.
The appropriate feature specification for logophoric pronouns is not a trivial question,
however. It is somewhat misleading to analyse logophoric pronouns as third person. The
reason this position has been taken in much of the literature is on comparison with English
translations which usually use indirect reporting. However, logophoric contexts in many
languages behave exactly like direct reported speech, except in that a logophoric pronoun
occurs instead of a first person and/or second person pronoun. That is, all other pronouns
which occur are those which would have been used in the original utterance, temporal
deixis is unchanged, etc. In such languages logophoric pronouns therefore seem to have
'dual status': they are both anaphorically linked with an antecedent in current speech, and
acting 'deictically' in the reported speech, with respect to the original speech context. The
logophoric context is thus something between direct and indirect speech as we usually
understand them. In such languages, it is more plausible to regard logophoric pronouns as
complementary with first person pronouns. The choice between a logophoric and an
ordinary first person pronoun allows the distinction between the actual speaker and the
reported speaker to be maintained. Thus it is better to see logophoric systems as motivated
by the need to disambiguate sentences such as English John said I went home, where I is
ambiguous between reference to the current speaker and reference to John. Logophoric
pronouns are the form the first person takes in reporting the speech of anyone but oneself.
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This explains why it is almost unknown for a first person logophoric pronoun to occur.3
This is the case in Mundang, and in Ewe there is no apparent distinction between direct
and indirect speech. In Mundang, logophoric pronouns are singular, and cannot have
plural antecedents: if reference is to a set, even to a set all of whom are the reported
speakers of the reported speech, the regular plural form of the first person pronoun is used.
Hagfcge reports that there is no ambiguity of the kind found in spoken English The boys
said we went home, because any first person plural form appearing after a verb of saying
belongs to the reported speech and can't include the current speaker.
Analysing logophoric pronouns as "in some sense first person has the further advantage that
it better conforms to Silverstein's (1976) person hierarchy, which ranks the persons as 1st
> 2nd > 3rd: we can make the generalisation that the further towards the left an element
occurs, the more likely it is to have a special logophoric pronoun within the logophoric
context. Silverstein also presents evidence that number is relevant to ranking on the
hierarchy, which may explain the Mundang system.
Logophoric context
The logophoric context is defined as that domain in which it is possible to use a logophoric
pronoun. The central use of logophoric pronouns crosslinguistically is within clausal
complements of verbs of saying. However, many languages do not restrict the use of
logophoric pronouns to this context. If a language further generalises its range of
logophoric contexts, it will do so according to the following implicational universal
hierarchy. Verbs which introduce logophoric contexts in the form of their clausal
complements are called Iogocentric verbs.
3 Hagege (1974: 294, etc.) and Westermann (1930:60-1) adopt the position that logophoric pronouns are
the form the first person takes in reported speech, but in general the importance for logophoricity of an account
of direct and indirect speech has been ignored in most of the literature. For example, Sells (1987) takes many
of the examples he quotes from Hagege, but he actually gives the wrong glosses in many cases, interpreting
what is clearly direct reporting in Hagege (1974) as indirect speech (for example. Sells' (la,p.446) vis-a-vis
Hagege's (4,p.292)). An account of direct and indirect speech may allow a unified interpretation of first person
pronouns and logophoric pronouns. However, logophoric pronouns are used in indirect speech contexts in
some languages. There is no scope to explore these issues here, and in the account proposed below I find it
most efficient to analyse logophoric pronouns as having the person feature —>[1].
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Logocentric Verb Hierarchy:
communication > thought > psychological state > perception
That is, it is claimed that in any logophoric language, if verbs of one kind trigger a
logophoric context, then so will verbs of the kinds to the left of it on the hierarchy.4 Some
languages, such as Igbo, restrict logophoric contexts just to verbs of communication, and
some, such as the Chadic language Mapun, just to the verb 'say'. Others allow all four
types of verb, such as Ewe. Mundang allows only verbs of assertion, verbs of ordering,
and more rarely, verbs of thinking. Tuburi excludes only verbs of perception. Note that
the hierarchy includes verbs of propositional attitude, but is not restricted to them; nor do
they have a privileged position in any way.
The logophoric context is often introduced by a 'report opening' complementiser. For
example, in Tuburi, the complementiser ga always introduces the logophoric context, and
in Icelandic the complementiser ad is required. In Mundang, the complementiser se
optionally occurs. Such complementisers are often historically derived from a verb 'say',
in a process which has been well documented for African languages by Lord (1976). This
seems to be the case in Tuburi.
Logophoric contexts, as well as allowing the use of logophoric pronouns, and possibly
requiring a special complementiser, may have other characteristics. For example, it is
common for verbs in a logophoric context to require subjunctive mood. Coulmas
(1985:14,21 etc.) points out that use of subjunctive mood is a common way to indicate
indirect speech. This requirement is best documented for Icelandic (see Thrainsson 1976,
Anderson 1986 etc.), but also apparently is true of Italian (Giorgi 1984) and Ewe (Duthie
1984). In Ewe, the set of logophoric contexts includes purpose clauses introduced by a
complementiser be and containing a verb in the subjunctive form marked by -a- (glossed
by Qements 1975 as the 'atelic' marker); the clause implies future possibility. There may
also be constraints on tense. Anderson (1986) bases his account on the observation that in
Icelandic, indicative, non-logophoric subordinate clauses may have different tense from the
matrix clause, but subjunctive, logophoric subordinate clauses almost always have the same
tense as the main clause.
4 There may be lexically determined exceptions within some type of verbs which are generally allowed,
for example Icelandic allows nonfactive verbs of communication, thought and psychological state but native
speakers vary in their acceptance of semifactive verbs belonging to these groups, such as 'know'.
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Languages may further extend the range of logophoric contexts if these become
grammaticised in some way. Usually what happens is that the 'report opening'
complementiser, which introduces the embedded clause constituting the logophoric context,
has its distribution extended beyond complements of verbs of communication, thought,
psychological state or perception. Thus, in Tuburi, ga forms part of the relative clause
marker ma:ga, where ma: is a complementiser used in nominal determination as well as
the relative. Logophoric pronouns are thus licensed in relative clauses, which is not
possible in other logophoric languages. Also in Tuburi, the complementiser may occur by
itself, with the matrix logocentric verb omitted, in which case it seems that ga itself carries
the force of a verb of saying.
Grammaticisation of this kind has also occurred in Ewe. In Ewe, the form be is
homophonous between the verb 'say', and the complementiser 'that'; these may not co-
occur, and the complementiser is clearly derived from the verb historically. Either use of
i
be may introduce a logophoric context. Logophoric contexts in Ewe thus comprise:
(i) clausal complements of the verb 'say';
(ii) clausal complements of other logocentric verbs, of communication, thought,
psychological state and perception; these are obligatorily introduced by the
complementiser be;
(iii) other clausal complements introduced by be, all of which express future
possibility.
In Japanese, too, it is possible to introduce a logophoric context not just by a logocentric
verb but also via complementiser node 'because'. We can see this complementiser as
involving implicit logophoricity (the subject of the preceding clause does something for a
reason), in contrast with the purely temporal complementiser toki 'when' which cannot





[Yosiko ga mizu o
[Yosiko SUBJ water OBJ
ue ni kobosita node]
on LOC spilled because
nurete-simatta
wet-got
Takasij got wet because Yosiko spilled water on hiim
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We have seen two ways of introducing logophoric contexts, and can generalise over these
by using the term Iogocentric trigger to refer to that element which introduces such a
context: either a logocentric verb or a report opening complementiser, sometimes both may
occur. So the logophoric context is that domain which falls within the scope of the
logocentric trigger.
Apart from the way they are introduced, the main parameter of variation for logophoric
contexts is whether they are constrained to be local to the logocentric trigger, or whether it
is possible for them to extend over an arbitrarily long stretch of discourse following the
use of a logocentric trigger. Mundang is a language of the first type; it requires the
logocentric trigger to be local, usually in the preceding clause (i.e., the matrix clause).
However, most logophoric languages are of the second type.
Note that in particular, in languages other than Mundang, any clausal modifiers which form
part of the clausal complement of the logocentric verb, for example relative clauses, may
contain logophoric pronouns - even though when not embedded under a logocentric verb,
they cannot do so. Compare the ungrammatical examples from Ewe in (6), which would
be grammatical with the personal pronoun e, meaning 'him', replacing the logophoric
pronoun, with the examples in (7) in which the same clauses are embedded under a
logocentric verb.
(6) a. *ama do nku nyonuvi hi
Ama set eye girl REL
dze yfc gbo dyi
stay LOG side on
Ama remembered who was the girl who stayed with her.
b. *kofi se koku wd 1
Kofi hear Koku PRO/he
le yb dzu-m
be LOG insult-PROG
Kofi heard Koku insulting him.
(7) a. ama gblo be y£-do nku nyonuvi










Ama- said that she^ remembered the girl who stayed with her.
b. kofi gblo be y£-se koku w6





Kofij said that he- heard Koku insulting him-.
The logophoric context may even extend across sentence boundaries. Usually in such
cases it is maintained through continuing use of a report opening complementiser, as in
Ewe, or subjunctive mood, as in Ewe and Icelandic, or by special syntactic constructions
such as the inversion structures of Icelandic exemplified in (8).
Thus, in Tuburi, it is possible within a reported-narrative context for logophoric pronouns
to occur throughout the long text, to indicate coreference with an original antecedent which
may be many sentences back. Unlike in Ewe, just one occurence of the complementiser ga
is necessary to introduce a logophoric context. Hag&ge (1974:298) gives a nice example:
It is also noteworthy that the introductory (i.e. logocentric) verb, contrary to the
usage in Mundang, may only be used once at the beginnning, so that logophoric
pronouns appear in utterances very far from this verb in the temporal progression
of the discourse. Thus, an old informant, relating to us the origin of his clan, told
us, thirty minutes after the initial passage, which contained an introductory verb




Example (8) is from Icelandic, quoted by Sigurdsson (1986:12); here too the antecedent for
the long-distance relfexive may be in a previous sentence.
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(8) formaSurinn- var5 dskaplega reiSur.























In fact, he did not care ....
Another example is given by Maling (1984:239n.27), and for examples from Japanese and
Ewe see Sells (p.455) and Duthie (1984) respectively. The inversion structure (in bold)
shows that the speaker is 'taking the part' of the internal protagonist (it is translated as
something like 'It was aimed at him personally, he expressed'). Note that the subjunctive
mood on the intervening verbs is important in preserving the character of the indirect
discourse.5
The logocentric NP
The logocentric NP is a subcategorised for argument of the logocentric verb or of the verb
immediately preceding the report opening complementiser. It is almost always the subject
of its clause, however it may be some other argument, provided this argument is the
'source' of the reported proposition - the speech, thought, or psychological or perceptual
experience. Example (9) is from Ewe and example (10) from Japanese; examples from
5 In the restricted case described in literary theory analysis of direct and indirect discourse as 'style in¬
direct libre' or 'represented speech', (Coulmas 1985:7), the referent of the logophoric pronoun may not be ex¬
plicitly referred to at all, but just understood from the context, as the source of the mental, emotional or ex¬
periential content being reported. Most of these examples are unusual more for not specifically predicating the
role of source of this understood referent; usually the referent has been introduced into the discourse previous¬
ly. Sigurdsson (1986:13-4) quotes such an example:
Maria var alltaf svo andstyggileg.
Maria was always so nasty.
pegar Olafur kaemi segdi hun ser areidanlega ad fara.
when Olafj came(S) told(S) she self, certainly to leave
'When Olaf would come she would^certainly tell him to leave.
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dyi na e be yb






She- is happy that she^ will bear a child.
(10) [Yokiso ga zibun- o
[Yosiko SUBJ self. OBJ
nikundeiru koto]
be-hating COMP]
ga MitikOj o zetuboo e
SUBJ Mitiko. OBJ desperation to
oiyatta.
drove
That Yosiko hated her drove Mitiko- to desperation.
It is most usual for the relevant constraint on the logocentric NP to be just that it bears the
semantic role of 'source'. However, in Japanese the constraint is more liberal. The
antecedent for the reflexive zibun, in its 'long-distance' use, must be either a grammatical
subject (even if not source) or the source argument of a logocentric verb (even if not
subject). In contrast, in Icelandic, a more restrictive constraint is in operation. The
antecedent for the LDR must be both subject and source, and non-subject sources may not
be antecedents. These differing constraints mean that languages differ as to whether passive
versions of logocentric predicates may introduce logophoric contexts: in Japanese they
may, but in Icelandic they may not, because the subject is no longer source, and the
available source is no longer subject. Hence example (12) is ruled out; cf. the Japanese
example (14).
(11) Harnij sagdi [ad sig- vantadi hafileika].
hej said [that self- lacked ability].
He^ said that he^ lacked ability.
6 In some logophoric systems, the relevant argument in the matrix clause is not the subject/source, but
the addressee of the reported speech (etc.). Two types of case occur. In one, there is a special form of the
logophoric pronoun for this type of coreference, in addition to the ordinary logophoric pronoun already
described. This is what happens in Mapun, a Chadic language (Frazyngier 1985). In some languages, howev¬
er, it is just the addressee argument which is important: there is no logophoric coreference to the
subject/source. This is the case in another Chadic language (Frazyngier 1985).
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(12) *Honunij var sagt [ad si
he- was told [that sel&
vantadi hafileika].
lacked ability].

















o nikundeiru koto] o hanasita.
OBJ be-hating COMP] OBJ told











Tarooj was told that Yosiko wanted to visit him..
We shall return to the notion of source below. For now, note that although from what has
been said it is clear that the concept of 'source' of reported speech or mental experience is
important, we must nevertheless deal with examples such as (15), from Ewe, which are
common in logophoric languages: here the matrix verb is negated, so that strictly speaking
one could not speak of Kofi as being a 'source' (it is asserted that he is not), yet use of the
logophoric pronoun is still possible.
(15) a. kofi nya be me-kpo yfc
Kofi know COMP PRO-see LOG
Kofij knew that I had seen him^.
b. kofi me-nya be me-kpo yfc o
Kofi not-know COMP PRO-see LOG
Kofi- didn't know that I had seen him-.
Further, it is not sufficient that the logocentric NP refer to the origin of the information;
some intention to communicate is usually required. This is shown for Icelandic by the
contrasting examples (16) and (17). These examples are also negated.
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(16) *barni5- bar bess ekki merki [a5 ba8
child-the bore it not signs [that there
hefSi veriS hugsaS vel um sigJ-
had(S) been thought well about self]
The child didn't look as if it had been taken good care of.
(17) bamiSj I6t ekki I ljds [a5 baS
child-the put not in light [that there
hefSi veri8 hugsaS vel um sig:].
had(S) been thought well about self-]
The child- didn't reveal that it- had been taken good care of.
Optionality of logophoric pronouns
In many languages, given a logophoric context in which there is coreference with the
logocentric NP, speakers may choose to use a logophoric pronoun or to use an ordinary
personal pronoun. Such a choice is not possible in Mundang, but is possible in all the
other languages we shall have occasion to consider. In such cases the appropriate choice
between subjunctive and indicative mood, if relevant, must also be made.
In all the languages in which such a choice is possible, it is associated with a meaning
distinction of a remarkably consistent kind: if the ordinary pronoun is used, it indicates that
the speaker has assimilated the proposition being reported into her own scheme of things,
and accepts its truth and/or approves of its content.- If the logophoric pronoun is chosen, it
indicates that the speaker has not assimilated the proposition into her knowledge base, and
does not necessarily accept its truth or approve of its content: in some sense, responsibility
for its truth or content is distanced, and left to the referent of the logophoric pronoun.
That is, the optionality of logophoric reference allows the speaker to express her attitude to
the truth of what she reports - and logophoricity must thus be seen as part of the evidential
system of the language. As we shall see below, choice between logophoric and
nonlogophoric pronouns, and choice of mood, are both to be seen as the result of a prior
choice at the semantic/functional level, in how the proposition is to be presented.
I shall give an example just from Ewe, but exactly parallel examples are given for Tuburi
by Hag&ge (1974), and for Japanese by Hag£ge (1974) and Sells (1987), based on original
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examples from Kuno (1972) and Kuroda (1973). In Icelandic, use of an LDR plus
subjunctive mood is also optional and seems to be associated with a similar meaning
distinction, but examples are harder to find due to the fact that mood is rather rigidly
lexically determined. See the example in Maling (1984:212).
Example (18), from Ewe, is equally grammatical with the logophoric pronoun (as it
stands), or with the pronoun wb replacing it, according to whether the current speaker
herself assumes the reality of the event reported in his own discourse, or simply presents it
as assumed in the discourse of the reported speaker. Westermann (1930, 61) says that at
that time the 'rules' (i.e. for using logophoric pronouns) were sometimes not observed 'in
modern speech' - instead he found the pronoun of the main clause would be repeated in
the subordinate clause; this suggests that the optionality of the logophoric pronoun with
this meaning difference is a historical development of an earlier more rigid system.
(18) e nyo na ama be ye a dyi vi
that is good Ama COMP LOG SBJV bear child
It pleases Ama that she is with child.
Note that the embedded clause in (18) represents future possibility: literally, 'she will bear
a child'.
6.3 Accounting for logophoricity within DR Theory
There has been considerable discussion in the literature about whether the distribution of
logophoric anaphors should be handled syntactically or semantically; for example
Thrainsson (1976) argues for the latter, Anderson (1986) seeks a purely syntactic
explanation, and Maling (1984) argues for a partly syntactic and partly semantic account.
As we shall see, syntactic binding accounts seem doomed to failure, and Maling (1984),
Sigurdsson (1986) and Rognvaldsson (1986) show that a syntactic account along the lines
of Anderson's (1982) also fails. Given that both structural and semantic constraints are
involved to some extent, the question remains how far and in what way the semantic
constraints can be brought into the formal account.
The relationship between a logophoric pronoun or LDR and its antecedent logocentric NP
is clearly an anaphoric relation, with the possible exclusion of the 'style indirect libre'
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cases. However, it is difficult to find a place for logophoric pronouns within the range of
possibilities provided by the Binding Theory of GB. Logophoric pronouns are not
'anaphors' in the technical sense of the Binding Theory, since they occur optionally, and
they contradict the principle that an anaphor must be bound in its governing category, at
least if we define 'governing category' in configurational terms. The structural relation of
c-command need not hold between the NPs so related (see Maling 1984), and even if we
depart from c-command and redefine governing category in terms of lexical government,
we still face the problem that logophoric anaphora can cross sentence boundaries. Not
only is syntactic binding not a necessary condition, however, it is also not sufficient. As
we have seen, the logocentric NP is commonly semantically constrained to have a 'source'
role, and we shall see later that -it must also be a definite NP. According to Maling
(1984), logophoric pronouns may not have split antecedents, and the relation between
anaphor and antecedent cannot cross speakers. Given this and the possibility of
grammaticisation of logophoric contexts, we must recognise that in some languages there
are some structural constraints on the distribution of such pronouns. This means that they
lack the freedom of reference which characterises 'pronominals' as defined by the Binding
Theory. Logophoric systems also contradict the principle that a non-anaphor cannot be
bound in the same domain as an anaphor. Finally, as in Dogrib (Saxon 1984), we once
again need a way of stating a requirement of disjoint reference on nonlogophoric personal
pronouns in logophoric contexts.
Approaches within DR Theory have proved very successful in handling cases which
apparently involve binding but where neither syntactic nor logical definitions of binding
relations have been helpful: the 'donkey sentences' (Kamp 1981a, Heim 1982); reference
within quantified contexts (Stirling 1985b); and reference within modal contexts (Roberts
1986, Stirling 1988a). In the first instance, the DR Theory account succeeded due to its
treatment of the existential and universal quantifiers, in particular by treating existential
quantification as resulting from the definition of embedding rather than present in the
semantic representation. In the other two cases, DR Theory succeeds by virtue of the
notion of a Discourse Representation Structure, which allows one to define semantic
contexts intermediate between the representation for a sentence and the representation for
an entire discourse, and thus offers an alternative level of representation at which to
account for binding-like relations.
Therefore, a DR Theory account for logophoricity would appear to offer a potential
solution to the problems identified above. Such an account has been proposed by Sells
(1987), who claims that it is 'the beginnings of a formal construction of the fundamental
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aspects of logophoricity' (p.445). I shall give a brief outline of his account, raise a number
of problems with it, and then propose an alternative DR Theory account.
Although the first part of his paper is concerned with work on logophoricity in African
languages, Sells goes on to base his account almost entirely on long-distance reflexives
data from Icelandic and Japanese. His account is presented as an amalgam of ideas from
other work drawn together within the 'wider theory of anaphora' (p.446) afforded by DR
Theory; the work he draws on, from Banfield (1982), Kuno and Sigurdsson, also
concentrates on LDRs, and the key element of these analyses is that they propose a feature
[+log] which is specified on particular NPs (LDRs, or logophoric pronouns) by logocentric
verbs.
Sells incorporates this basic idea into the version of DR Theory described in Kamp (1981a)
(see also chapter 4). He extends this version of DR Theory in three ways. First, he needs
to introduce two new kinds of Discourse Marker (DM): prepositional DMs (p, q, ...) to
stand for clauses embedded under verbs of saying, and an ad hoc DM (S) representing the
speaker of the discourse and added to the top level of the DRS. The latter is analogous to
including a DM for the time of speech ('now'), as is done in extensions of DR Theory to
handle tense and events.
The final and most important extension to the theory that Sells proposes is a new kind of
condition which encodes information about semantic or discourse roles. As we saw in 6.2,
the idea that the 'source' of the communication is relevant for determining logophoricity is
not a particularly new one. Sells defines a set of three primitive predicates, see (19).
These result in a new type of condition, which is introduced into a distinguished part of the
DRS. The DM of which the primitive is predicated is then available to be anaphorically
related to other entities in the discourse, with the result that any one of the roles can be
indirectly predicated of either the DM introduced for the speaker, or of some discourse-
internal referent Sells claims that logophoric phenomena are the result of the interaction
of these three more primitive notions.
(19)
SOURCE = 'the one who makes the report'; 'the intentional agent of the
communication'.
SELF = 'the one whose 'mind' is reported'; 'the person with respect to whose
consciousness or 'self' the report is made'; 'the one whose mental state or attitude
the content of the proposition describes'.
-250-
PIVOT = 'the one from whose (physical) point of view the report is made'; 'the
centre of deixis'; 'the one whose shoes are literally being stood in'; 'the one with
respect to whose space-time location the content of the proposition is evaluated'.7
The SELF and PIVOT thus represent two aspects of 'point of view': the mental and the
physical.
As is assumed by most work on logophoricity, verbs in a language may be lexically
specified for determining that their subjects may be antecedents for a logophoric
pronoun. The way this is formulated in Sells' account is that logocentric verbs have the
effect of adding certain conditions to the DRSs representing their complement clauses.
These conditions predicate each of the three roles, source, self, and pivot, of a discourse
marker; often the DM associated with the subject of the main verb. A logophoric pronoun
then receives its interpretation via these predicates: the discourse marker introduced for the
logophoric pronoun is linked anaphorically to the discourse markers predicated of the three
roles. In other words, a logophoric pronoun is linked to some NP in virtue of the fact that
the NP is associated with a particular role. (In fact, it is the DM of which the 'pivot' role
is predicated which is actually chosen as the antecedent, for reasons of uniformity (459)
though arguably the complex of predicates, or the highest on the hierarchy, would be a
better option.)
The following DRS, then, would be the representation given for the Japanese example in
(20).8
(20) TaroOj wa Yosiko ga zibum o aisiteru to itta.
TaroOj TOP Yosiko SUBJ self OBJ loved COMP said
TaroOj said that Yosiko loved self.
7 Quotes are from Sells.
8 Sells uses the symbols a, if) andO for the SOURCE, SELF and PIVOT respectively; for notational con¬












In this case, all three roles are assigned to the subject of the embedding predicate. That is,
Taroo is the source of the report, the person whose mental state is described, and the locus
of deixis. This is the representation given to verbs of communication and prepositional
attitude, which Sells calls 'logophoric predicates'.9
Not all possible combinations of reference assignment to the three predicates are
recognised; the full range is listed in the table below, where 'external' means the role is
assigned to the current speaker, and 'internal' means that the role is assigned to some
internal protagonist in the discourse.
I II ni IV
SOURCE external external external internal
SELF external external internal internal
PIVOT external internal internal internal
9 It is not clear that the condition z = PIVOT is well-formed, since anaphoric conditions of this kind usu¬
ally link terms and here a term is linked to a predicate.
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Hence, four discourse contexts are defined. Context I is direct speech; this is the default
setting. Sells' account implies that all DRS's will have specification for each of the three
roles, and for most of them, this will be the setting. Context IV is the context for what
Sells calls 'logophoric verbs'; these are however just verbs of communication and
propositional attitude. The claim is that logophoric pronouns may only be used when the
speaker is identifying completely with an internal protagonist. Context III is the context of
'psychological verbs', where the claim is that these are distinguished from the verbs of
communication in that the current speaker is the SOURCE rather than the internal
protagonist, who does however have SELF and PIVOT roles. Finally, context II, where
only the PIVOT role is predicated of some entity other than the current speaker, is said to
be the context of '3rd person point of view'.
Sells claims two main advantages for his account. The first is that (in contrast with the
accounts he draws on) it gives some content to the feature [+log]. Presumably this content
consists of the requirement that any NP marked with this feature will result in the insertion
of a condition in the DRS which will associate its discourse marker with the PIVOT role
and therefore with the discourse marker of which 'PIVOT' is predicated. This in turn will
be linked to the subject of the higher DRS by virtue of the conditions imposed by the
logocentric verb.
The second claimed advantage is that his account makes a number of predictions and
accounts for other phenomena as well. There are two main types of example given in
support of this claim.
First, his account is claimed to make predictions about the facts of anaphora, in virtue of it
being embedded within a formal semantic framework. That is, it is supposed to capture
certain other, 'anaphoric', aspects of interpretation relevant to logophoricity, eg. the
Japanese pronoun zibun is sometimes ambiguous between a bound-variable and a
referential interpretation, and this is predictable from the discourse structure.
Second, and more importantly, the primitives he introduces, are claimed to explain the
distribution of evaluative expressions such as that idiot Mary, beloved Mary, and
mysteriously.
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Evaluation of Sells' account
There are a number of problems with Sells' account
First, it lacks generality. We have already noted that, although he gives the impression
that he is making general proposals about logophoric phenomena, he actually restricts his
attention to the long-distance reflexives, and neglects to show how it can be generalised to
the more central cases of logophoricity represented in the African languages. In particular,
it is unclear from his paper whether or not he takes the whole gamut of machinery he
introduces - semantic primitives of SOURCE, SELF and PIVOT, etc., - to be necessary to
account for the African phenomena.10
Furthermore, his account fails to capture the generalisation that in African languages, and
also in LDR languages, his 'psychological' and Togophoric' predicates behave the same
way. Sells does not give any account for why or how subjunctive mood is associated with
logophoricity in those languages in which it is, or for the optionality of logophoric
pronouns, nor does he address the question of the relationship between LDRs and clause-
bound reflexives in any serious way.
Second, the account lacks technical specificity. Sells presents a DR Structure analysis, but
completely fails to specify the algorithm from syntactic structures to DRSs, and the
semantic interpretation of the machinery he introduces. This leaves us speculating about
what his treatment for the syntactically different types of clauses would be, what semantic
interpretation is to be given for the roles introduced, in what sense they differ from other
predication conditions (as they clearly do, since they are put in a special part of the DRS),
and what kind of definition of logophoric pronouns he gives in order to capture the
'content' for the [+log] feature which he claims to provide. Finally, he does not
incorporate a treatment of tense and events into his account.
It is perhaps due to the latter that a problem with the status of the prepositional discourse
10 He justifies this (p.475):
It would be inappropriate to say too much about the African languages discussed in section 1, in the
absence of certain crucial information; but (...) it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the cri-
terial feature of true logophoric pronouns is SOURCE-orientation. These really are, then, pronouns
that occur in contexts of indirect discourse.
It is a fair point to be cautious in dealing with data from languages of which one has no access to native
speaker informants; however, I think we can at least start to examine some of the African data.
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markers arises. These seem to be a reasonable way of representing the content of clauses
embedded under verbs of propsitional attitude, but Sells generalises their usage to other
kinds of embedded clauses where there is much less motivation for them. In particular, he
uses them to represent clausal complements of psychological predicates such as distress, as
in the example That Yosiko was following her distressed Mary. We might imagine the
embedding condition for the prepositional DM here to be something like: 'there is some
proposition such that it distressed Mary'. But is it really a proposition which is distressing
Mary, or is it rather an event?
Sells does indicate that the introduction of the additional machinery he proposes will
proceed along the following lines. -
1. Any 'top' DRS for a discourse will have a DM S representing the speaker of the
discourse. This will of course be accessible to any embedded DRS within it.
2. Any DRS will incorporate three conditions, predicating the three roles of
SOURCE, SELF, and PIVOT of a DM representing either the speaker, or some
'internal' protagonist The default will be for all three to be assigned to the external
speaker: i.e., the default discourse context is 'direct speech'.
3. Apart from this, certain verbs will be specified in the lexicon as setting up the
three role conditions differently from the default
PSYCHOLOGICAL VERBS will have the effect of predicating SELF and PIVOT
roles of an internal protagonist (which will be specified subsequently) and the
SOURCE role of the external speaker as usual.
LOGOPHORIC VERBS will have the effect of predicating all three roles of some
internal protagonist.
These are the only lexical constraints associated with predicates which Sells
mentions. The 'third person point of view' environment is not lexically determined
by a particular embedding predicate, but instead arises constructionally, eg. because
a particular interpretation is required compatible with the meaning of a
subordinating conjunction which is usually of an adverbial kind.
The final and most important problem with Sells' account is that it provides inadequate
motivation for the proliferation of semantic primitives and discourse contexts which he
proposes. There seems to be no real evidence for needing more than one additional role to
handle logophoricity, nor does it seem to be true that this proliferation of roles actually
does handle the non-logophoric data which it is claimed to.
As far as I can determine, three kinds of reasons lie behind Sells' support for three
semantic roles: problems with the generality of the role SOURCE, attribution of the
- 255 -
evaluative content of expressions, and grammaticality judgements about sentences
containing 'deictically' oriented directional verbs such as come and go.
First, the role of SELF as defined by Sells seems more appropriate as a description of the
role of the relevant participant in the psychological examples than a SOURCE role would
be. Recall that SELF is defined as the person whose mental state the proposition
describes, whereas SOURCE is defined as the one who makes the report. Some examples
with psychological predicates will be discussed below, for instance in (22), which
translates as 'That that fool Yosiko was following her drove Mitiko to desperation'.
Trying to generalise the role SOURCE to these cases would involve postulating 'implicit
acts of communication', as Hagfcge (1974) is led to do. Separating out at least two roles
also in principle offers an explanation for the difficult negated examples, if one assumes
that although the role of SOURCE is negated, the entity is still SELF/PIVOT: however,
Sells does not make use of this possibility. So defining more than one predicate seems to
be an attempt to handle certain problems in making the role 'source', as commonly
assumed in the literature, actually wotk for all the examples.
Second, Sells argues that we need to split SOURCE from SELF/PIVOT in order to explain
a difference in the behaviour of 'psychological predicates' and 'logophoric predicates' with
respect to the interpretation of evaluative phrases. He claims that the evaluative content of
phrases such as that fool Yosiko is always attributed by native speakers to the SOURCE
participant; for logophoric predicates this will be an internal participant but for
psychological predicates and third person point of view predicates it will be the external
speaker. The relevant contrasting examples are (21)-(23) (Sells 1987:462-3).
(21) Takasi. wa Taroo ni [baka no Yosiko ga
Takasij TOP Taroo DAT [fool GEN Yosiko SUBJ
zibun. o oikake-mawasiteiru koto] o hanasita
self OBJ chase-around-be COMP] OBJ told
Takasi.. told Taroo that that fool Yosiko was following hiim.
(22) [Baka no Yosiko ga zibun. o
[fool GEN Yosiko SUBJ self OBJ
oikake-mawasiteiru koto] ga Mitiko- o




That that fool Yosiko was following her- drove Mitiko. to desperation.
(23) Tarooj wa [baka no Yosiko ga mizu
Tarooj TOP [fool GEN Yosiko SUBJ water
o zibua no ue ni kobosita node]
OBJ self GEN on LOC spilled because
nurete-simatta
wet-got
TaroOj got wet because that fool Yosiko spilled water on him^.
(21) has a logophoric predicate and the SOURCE is the internal participant Takasi. The
judgement that Yosiko is a fool is supposed to be attributable only to Takasi, and not to
the external speaker. In contrast, (22) and (23) have a psychological and a third person
point of view predicate respectively. On Sells' account, in both cases the SOURCE is the
external speaker, and this is claimed to explain why these sentences are interpreted as
meaning that the external speaker judges Yosiko to be a fool, rather than some internal
participant such as Mitiko or Taroo.
Finally, Sells gives several arguments for further distinguishing a PIVOT role. First, he
says that logophoric predicates and psychological predicates behave differently from third
person point of view predicates with respect to the interpretation of a second group of
evaluative phrases, adverbs such as mysteriously, and phrases such as beloved. The
evaluative content of these phrases is claimed to be attributable to the referent with the
SELF role; for logophoric and psychological predicates this will be an internal protagonist,
whereas for the third person point of view predicates it will be the external speaker. The
relevant contrasting examples are (24)-(26) and (27)-(29) (Sells 1987: 464-6).
(24) Takasi wa [Yosiko ga hukakainimo ato
Takas TOP [Yosiko SUBJ mysteriously be-following
o tuke-mawasiteiru to] itta
COMP] said
Takasij said that Yosiko was mysteriously following hirm.
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(25) [Yosiko ga hukakainimo ato o tuke-mawasiteiru
[Yosiko SUBJ mysteriously be-following
koto ga] Takasi o iradataseteiru
COMP SUBJ] Takasi OBJ bothers
That Yosiko is mysteriously following him- bothers Takasi-.
(26) [Yosiko ga hukakainimo ato o tuke-mawasiteiru
[Yosiko SUBJ mysteriously be-following
noni] Takasi wa ki ni sitei-nai
though] Takasi TOP care to give-not
Takasi- doesn't mind though Yosiko is mysteriously following hiim.
(27) Takasi j wa Taroo ni [itosii Yosiko
Takasi- TOP Taroo DAT [beloved Yosiko
ga zibua o nikundeiru koto]
SUBJ self OBJ be-hating COMP]
o hanasita
OBJ told
Takasij told Taroo that his beloved Yosiko hated hira.
(28) [Itosii Yosiko ga zibua o nikundeiru
[beloved Yosiko SUBJ self OBJ be-hating
koto] ga Mitiko- o zetuboo e
COMP] SUBJ MitikOj OBJ desperation to
That her beloved Yosiko hated her drove MitikOj to desperatioa
(29) Takasi j wa [itosii Yosiko ga mizu o
Takasi j TOP [beloved Yosiko SUBJ water OBJ
zibua no ue ni kobosita
self GEN on LOC spilled
node] nurete-simatta
because] wet-got
Takasi got wet because his beloved Yosiko spilled water on him.
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(24) and (27) are examples with logophoric predicates, and in each case, in conformance
with Sells' definition of the logophoric context, an internal protagonist - Takasi - has the
SELF role. That is, he is the one whose mental state is reported. (25) and (28) are
examples with psychological predicates, and again it is an internal protagonist who has the
SELF role, Takasi in (25) and Mitiko in (28). Sells claims that native speaker judgements
confirm that for all four examples, it is the protagonist with the SELF role who believes
the following to be mysterious, or who is attributed the judgement that Yosiko is beloved
by him. In contrast, (26) and (29) have third person point of view predicates, where by
definition the SELF role is assigned to the external speaker, and here native speakers are
reported to attribute the evaluative judgements to the external speaker.11
Further evidence for the PIVOT role comes from constraints on the occurence of
deictically oriented directional verbs with third person point of view examples. The



































Takasij was happy because Yosiko went to visit him..
(31) a. He. was happy when his- own mother came to visit him. in the hospital,
b. ??Hej was happy when hiSj own mother went to visit him. in the hospital.
Here, the claim is that Japanese verbs such as tazunetekita and tazuneteitta, and English
11 (26) counts as a third person point of view example because the subordinate clause is adverbial, even
though the matrix predicate is one of the psychological predicates.
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verbs such as come and go, are inherently oriented towards the deictic centre provided by
the PIVOT. If the eventuality involves direction towards the PIVOT, tazunetekita or come
must be used; if direction is away from the PIVOT tazuneteitta or go will be used.
Examples (30a) and (31a) are acceptable because in each case the individual with the
PIVOT role - Takasi in (30) and he- in (31) - is the one towards whom the action is
directed, and the 'come' form is used; (30b) and (31b) are unacceptable or only marginally
acceptable because the 'go' form is not normally allowed in such cases.12
In at least two places (p.463 n20, p.465 n23) Sells claims that the judgements reported for
the Japanese examples also hold for their English translations, and in fact it is to be
supposed that for his analysis to-stand up at all, it must in certain key respects admit
crosslinguistic generalisation. Yet at least with respect to the English translations of his
examples, his arguments on the basis of evaluative phrases and deictic expressions do not
seem to hold. It seems to me that it is always possible to attribute the evaluative content
of expressions either to the current speaker or to an internal protagonist. In illustration, see
example (22), repeated below.
(22) [Baka no Yosiko ga zibun- o
[fool GEN Yosiko SUBJ self OBJ
oikake-mawasiteiru koto] ga Mitiko- o
chase-around-be COMP] SUBJ Mitiko- OBJ
zetuboo e oiyatta
desperation to drove
That that fool Yosiko was following her- drove MitikOj to desperatioa
Sells says that in this example evaluation of that fool must go to the external speaker
SOURCE, not to Mitiko, which is SELF and PIVOT. This seems to me to be simply
untrue of the facts in English, since although this may be the more natural interpretation,
one can fairly readily imagine a situation in which the speaker may be taking Mitiko's
point of view, eg. in telling a story, and where evaluation of that fool must be relative to
Mitiko. Similarly for the examples with beloved, and mysteriously. Coulmas (1985:4)
12 Sells also argues for a separate PIVOT role on the grounds that whereas assignment of SOURCE and
SELF roles are lexically specified, the role pf PIVOT is not The relevant contrast is between example (5)
above and the same example with the complementiser toki, 'when'; the exact structure of Sells' argument is, I
am afraid, opaque, and these examples can equally well be explained by saying that 'because' introduces a lo-
gophoric context but 'when' does not.
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discusses such evaluative phrases, and mentions John asked me to dance with his
hysterical wife, where, he says, one would be most likely to attribute this evaluation to the
external speaker, exactly the opposite to Sells' predictions. Preferences may obviously be
affected by diverse factors in the linguistic context, including the type of evaluation, linear
order and whether the sentence is positive or negative.
For the deictic verbs, similar criticisms may be made. Both 'come' and 'go' examples
seem fine to me in English, and even Sells admits that his informants' judgements are not
consistent. One of the problems with Sells' definition of the PIVOT role is that it does not
take account of the fact that it is always the case that some deixis is to evaluated from the
point of view of the current speaker: in fact, the current speaker is always the centre of
deixis, though it is possible to have a temporary secondary centre of deixis in a local
context. Were he to revise his definition to take account of this, it would start to look less
distinct from the SELF role.
Preliminary work with Japanese informants supports the criticisms made at least for
sentences containing evaluative expressions. Attribution of evaluative expressions was
generally less restrictive than reported by Sells. For example, attribution of the evaluative
expression baka, 'fool', did not differ for logophoric, psychological and third person point
of view predicates: in all cases, both attribution to an internal protagonist and to the
external speaker were accepted, with a general preference for the former. Similarly for
attribution of the expression hukakainimo, 'mysteriously'. For the expression itosii,
'beloved', very interesting results were obtained, indicating the complete reverse of the
judgements reported by Sells: he says that this expression is like hukakainimo in being
attributed always to the SELF, an internal protagonist for logophoric and psychological
predicates and the external speaker for third person point of view predicates: my
informants indicated that there was a general restriction on attribution to an internal
protagonist for this expression, which may be due to aspects of its social meaning.13
So, the machinery which Sells introduces to handle the phenomena ends up looking not
merely slightly ad hoc, but in fact unnecessarily complex.
13 The informants were Yuko Kondo and Katsumasa Shimizu, both standard Japanese speakers, the form¬
er from Tokyo and the latter from the Kansai area. The results of the questionnaire administered were more
complex than the remarks above suggest, and the informants differed from each other in certain respects.
Clearly, further work needs to be done in this area. Nevertheless, the results are suggestive.
- 261 -
6.4 An alternative DR Theory account for logophoric phenomena
In section 6.3, I identified several problems for Sells' account. In particular, I suggested
that it may not be necessary to distinguish three semantic primitives. It is implicit in Sells'
paper that the most important of the three predicates in accounting for logophoric and LDR
phenomena is SOURCE. However, even if we restrict ourselves to this one primitive,
difficulties still arise. Some of these were mentioned earlier as original motivations for
defining further predicates: the fact that SOURCE is not a very good description of the
role of the participant in psychological examples, and the problems with negation. In this
section, an alternative DR Theory account is proposed, which does make do with just one
semantic primitive, defined differently from Sells' SOURCE primitive, and which
overcomes these difficulties.
f
By making the one-dimensional distinction between SOURCE, SELF and PIVOT, Sells
tries to account for what are in fact two separate phenomena: the interpretation of deictic
elements, and the assignment of responsibility for 'validation' of a proposition. Very
generally, one can take 'validation' of a proposition to mean confirmation or corroboration
of its truth. The proposal below assumes that a reasonable account for these two
phenomena will give rise to an account for logophoric and LDR anaphora as well as the
other phenomena discussed by Sells, including the interpretation of phrases with evaluative
content, and grammaticality judgements about deictic verbs. In what follows, I shall
concentrate on giving an account for validation, and shall have little to say about the
interpretation of deictic elements.14
The main idea of the proposed account is that we need to introduce into Discourse
Representation Structures just one extra role, which I shall call that of 'assigned epistemic
validator' (henceforth, 'validator'). The validator is (informally) defined as the individual
to whom the speaker linguistically assigns responsibility for the discourse in question. In
specific cases it may be most accurate to see this responsibility as being for the truth of a
proposition, or the actuality of an eventuality, or the accuracy of the linguistic expressions
used in asserting the proposition or describing the event. In order not to prejudge the issue,
I shall for the moment simply say that the validator is the individual to whom the speaker
linguistically assigns responsibility for validating a Discourse Representation Structure.
14 Interestingly, Sigurdsson (1986) independently arrives at a very similar conclusion about the kind of
account which is required.
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The notion of epistemic validator is formally encoded as a discourse marker v. Recall that
the version of DR Theory we are using encodes ontological types as sorted discourse
markers, where a sort is a bundle of features associated with a particular DM, and specified
DM letters are used for some standard sorts. The discourse marker v is to be regarded as
sorted in this sense, and is similar to the 'special' DMs which have been proposed in
various versions of the theory for the current speaker T, for the current addressee 'you',
or for the time of utterance 'now'.
In effect, the features associated with a sorted DM place restrictions upon its satisfaction in
the model which amount to an implicit predication or condition. Insertion of v into the
universe of a DRS is semantically. equivalent to insertion of an individual DM x into the
universe, plus addition of the condition validator(x) to the set of conditions in the DRS
(although as we shall see these two alternatives are arguably different from a processing
point of view). I treat the validator as a sorted DM rather than a role predicated of a DM
(as Sells does his semantic primitives) for reasons of notational convenience, and to
emphasise the fact that the validator DM is a member of the universe of the DRS and is
thereby available for the resolution of anaphoric NPs.
A further reason for handling it in this way is that it is not entirely clear at this point what
the appropriate truth conditions for a validation condition would be. We saw in chapter 4
that the definition of truth in the standard version of DR Theory, assumed in this thesis,
says (informally) that a DRS K is tree relative to a model M iff there is some embedding
function / such that it provides a proper embedding of K within M (i.e. if assignments can
be found within M for the DMs in the universe of K, which satisfy all the conditions in K).
In some sense, the truth conditions for validator(x) would have to be that the condition is
satisfied if some assignment to x can be found such that the speaker has linguistically
assigned this entity the role of having responsibility for validating the DRS. The metalevel
1
or discourse nature of the condition thus makes it less appropriate to see it as a predicate to
be satisfied in the model in the same way that a condition such as cat(x) would be. In
recent verbal presentations, Kamp has suggested that two types of discourse representation
conditions need to be distinguished to account for similar cases: descriptive conditions
which are the noimal predicates to be satisfied in the model, and formal conditions which
are the kind that apply to the distinct markers for 'I' and 'you', and to other sortal markers
such as those distinguishing eventualities from objects.15 The DM v would fall into the
15 I am indebted to Ewan Klein for this information.
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latter category.16
Current speakers of a discourse have three options:
1. To accept the role of validator (the default);
2. To dis-assign themselves as validator,
3. If 2, to re-assign the role to some specified other.
Thus, where the validator DM has a specific referent, this will be either the current
speaker, or the referent of some discourse marker which has previously been introduced
into the universe of the DRS. It is also possible for speakers to simply dis-assign
themselves as validator, without- re-assigning the role to a specific referent. These
possibilities of assignment are encoded formally by an anaphoric condition linking the DM
v with some other DM in the universe of the DRS. There are three possibilities, parallel to
the three assignment possibilities listed above:
1. v = i'
2. v * i'
3. v = x
Where as will be recalled, j" is the sorted DM used for first person reference, i.e. the
current speaker of the DRS, and x is some other accessible DM in the universe of the
DRS. Notice that it is assumed that i' is always accessible within the universe of the DRS,
whether or not the speaker has explicitly referred to herself.
Anaphoric conditions of this kind will thus be true iff there is some assignment in the
model for i' or x which satisfies all the conditions previously predicated of i'/x, and which
in addition satisfies the condition that i'/x is assigned responsibility for validation of the
DRS K in the universe of which it appears.
The introduction of anaphoric conditions linking v to some other DM and thereby
assigning the role of validator to some referent is due either to lexical rules or to a default
rule. Basically, grammatical constructions may include items with lexically specified
properties which refer to the role of epistemic validator. If not, the default is for the role
16 In fact, it seems likely that a version of DR Theory with a different semantics might solve some of
these problems. See Stirling (forthcoming) for some ideas about the form of an alternative semantics. Notice
that an Intuitionistic semantics (see Dummett 1975, 1976, 1977), which takes the notion of proof as basic rath¬
er than that of truth, intuitively offers a nice way to incorporate the concept of the validator.
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to be assigned to the current speaker. In particular, predicates which are capable of
triggering a logophoric context form a coherent set united by the following two lexical
properties:
(i) They are subcategorised for a clausal complement;
(ii) The validator for the clausal complement is constrained to be the referent of
some subcategorised for nominal argument of the matrix clause, usually the subject
NP.
The effect which this achieves is that the epistemic validator of a clausal complement of a
verb of communication, thought, psychological state or perception, will be the subject
(usually) of that verb, i.e. the individual who uttered the speech, had the thought,
experienced the psychological state, or experienced the sensory perception. This is as one
would wish, since these very individuals are the best (perhaps the only) witnesses to the
truth, actuality or accuracy of description of the content of what was said, thought, felt or
perceived.
More formally, the lexical entry for a logocentric verb, whose subject is the logocentric




[a^] [pred'(aj,x,a2) & valfa^ = x & [a^A]
Here, we introduce a function val which applies to DRSs of index a and gives as value the
validator DM for that DRS.




[aj] [say'(apX,a2) & val^) = x & [a^A]
In the template and the actual lexical entry given above, the unsorted DM a2 is used in the
semantics for the clausal complement. In fact, we need to make distinctions between DMs
of at least two sorts, which will be introduced for the DRSs representing clausal
complements. I assume that an appropriate semantics for predicates which take such
complements will result in some of them requiring their clausal argument to be a
proposition, whereas for others it will be required to be an eventuality. For example, the
object of predicates of communication, consciousness and thought would seem to be a
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prepositional entity. The object of predicates of perception would seem to be an
eventuality. Prepositional entities will themselves involve reference to an eventuality.
Hence, we will use the DM letters Pj-—Pn for prepositional sorts of DMs, and the DM
letters e-....en for event sorts of DMs (we leave state types of DMs out of account here).
The semantics for a sentence such as (32a) will look something like (32b), such that (32b)
entails (32c). The semantics for a sentence like (33a) will look like (33b).
(32a) John believes that Tom kicked Fred.
(32b) [a] [believe'(aj,p) & john'(j) & p = [e] [kick'(e,t,f) & tom'(t) & fred'(f)]
(32c) [a] [believe'(aj,[e] [kick'(e,t,f) & tom'(t) & fred'(f)]) & john'(j)]
(33a) John saw Tom kick Fred.
(33b) [a] [see'(a,j,e) & [e] {kick'(e,t,f)]
Note that a prepositional DM can thus be anaphorically linked either to another
prepositional DM or to an event DM. It seems a reasonable constraint to add that an event
DM may not appear on the left hand of an anaphoric condition linking it to a prepositional
DM on the right hand side.
The distinction between prepositional and eventuality variables is an important part of the
account. As we saw in 6.3, Sells uses prepositional DMs in the representation of
embedded clauses; however, he distinguishes prepositional predicates, for which he defines
logophoric contexts, from psychological predicates, for which a different discourse
environment is defined, on the basis of whether it is the SOURCE role or the SELF role
which is assigned to an internal protagonist: this is one of the reasons for distinguishing
the two roles, and is motivated by differences in the meaning of the different types of
predicates, and evidence from evaluative expressions. I argue that this distinction is
epiphenomenal upon the distinction between prepositional types of entities and event types
of entities, and hence between what it means to be able to validate a proposition and to
vouch for the actuality of an event. For prepositional predicates the epistemic validator is
the 'source' of the speech or thought. Thus in the example Takasi told Taroo that Yosiko
was following him, the validator is Takasi. For psychological predicates the epistemic
validator is the 'self experiencing the psychological state. Thus in the example That
Yosiko was following her drove Mitiko to desperation, the validator is Mitiko. By using
just the role of validator, we can generalise over these two cases, and thus explain why it
is possible to use logophoric pronouns in the clausal complements of both types of
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predicate, something which Sells has no account for.17
At present, the machinery we have introduced will support the following type of DRS
(again, using an Ewe example). Here, each DRS 'box' represents a distinct prepositional






Kofi, said that he- left.
kofi be e-dzo _
Kofi say PRO-leave








The question which logophoric systems are designed to answer concerns the assignment of
reference to the DM x in the embedded DRS. As we have seen, many logophoric
languages, including Ewe, require a logophoric pronoun to be used if x is coreferential
with Kofi, and a normal third person pronoun to be used otherwise. In our account, we say
that a logophoric pronoun must take (or share) the reference of the epistemic validator in
17 Note that Sells does not talk about events at all, since he does not discuss temporal reference; if one
did incorporate temporal reference into his account, it would be necessary to define his prepositional entities as
incorporating reference to eventualities, as specified above.
18 For ease of exposition and comparison with Sells, we use standard DRS notation here, which is com¬
pletely convertible into the indexed language used in UCG.
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the universe of its DRS. That is, v2 and x must have the same referential assignment in
the model. In this way we indirectly require that the reference of the logophoric pronoun
must be the same as that of the subject of the matrix verb.
Hence, to complete the DRS in (35) for example (34a), we need to add the anaphoric
condition x = v~; and to complete it for example (34b), we would need to add an^ .1
anaphoric condition linking x to some other DM in the universe of a higher DRS.
The account suggests an explanation for why logophoric pronouns generally do not have
first person forms. In a situation where the current speaker is reporting her own speech,
the default assignment of reference, to the validator of the embedded DRS, and the lexically
required assignment, will be the same. We rule out the possibility of a logophoric pronoun
nevertheless occurring in the embedded clause, coreferential with a validator linked to the
current speaker, through the assignment of incompatible person features: logophoric
pronouns are required to be —<[1], i.e. either second or third person; since the current
speaker is inherently first person, the two will fail to unify or to be co-assigned in the
model.
The lexical entry for a logophoric pronoun or a LDR will have the following general form:
w
NP[—i[l],SG,J
[Xj] [Xj = V]19
Thus, the entry for the Ewe logophoric pronoun ye will be:
ye
NP[—t[l],SG,J
[Xj] [Xj = V]
These are the basic elements of the account Clearly, the notion of epistemic validator is
rather like that of SOURCE. Both are semantic primitives introduced into DRSs via
lexical rules or a default rule; and, as defined, SOURCE and validator roles will have the
same reference assignment on all occasions. The main difference is in their definition. The
defined role of epistemic validator allows a more coherent account of the data than Sells'
defined role of SOURCE, or the combined roles of SOURCE, SELF and PIVOT. Validator
19 It may specify other conditions about number and gender as well.
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is more satisfactory than SOURCE because it gets round the problems of generalising the
SOURCE role, which seemed to be one of the reasons for Sells proposing two additional
roles. These problems are listed below.
(i) The role SOURCE strictly speaking applies only to predicates of communicatioa In
order to generalise it to other logophoric predicates, it is necessary either to postulate
'implicit acts of communication', as Hagfcge (1974) and Clements (1975) do, or introduce a
separate role SELF, as Sells does; except that Sells simply does not account for the
possibility of logophoric pronouns occuring in the clausal complements of psychological
predicates. In contrast, the role of validator is given a uniform definition for all logocentric
predicates.
(ii) Examples in which the logocentric verb is negated are an unresolved problem for
accounts relying on the role SOURCE, or for that matter, SOURCE, SELF and PIVOT.
Such examples involve the explicit denial that some individual has the role SOURCE, yet
it remains possible to use logophoric pronouns in clausal complements of these negated
predicates. This is not a problem for an account using the role of validator, since even in
the case where the individual in question did not utter the speech, or have the mental,
psychological or physical experience, it still makes sense to think of her as responsible for
the validation of the content of the speech or experience, even if just to confirm its non¬
existence.
%
I will now give some more detailed analyses for the different kinds of examples mentioned
by Sells and quoted earlier in this chapter.
We have already looked at the paradigmatic type of example, where a logocentric predicate
takes a logocentric NP subject and a clausal complement which is its logophoric context
(see (34), (35)). As we have seen, however, there are other ways of triggering a logophoric
context, although in all cases, the syntactic relationship between the clauses is one of
subordination, and it is an argument of the matrix verb which is the logocentric NP.
First, in some languages the logocentric NP may be the object of the logocentric predicate
- or possibly some other argument, but all the examples we have looked at have involved
subjects or objects. Within the UCG framework we are using, it is simple enough for the
lexical entries for the individual verbs to pick out the correct NP argument as anaphorically
linked to the v of the embedded clause. Thus, the lexical entry for the Japanese verb
yuutunisita, 'distressed', as in example (36), might look something like (36').
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(36) Yosiko ga zibun. o musisita koto ga Taroo- o yuutunisita




[a] [distress'(a,p,x) & val(p) = x & [p]A]
That is, a is an eventuality in which p distresses x.
Note that in all cases the logocentric NP is another subcategorised for argument in the
clause in addition to the clausal complement Usually, it is the only other such argument,
and in any case, it is the NP argument which is most 'animate' on some 'animacy
hierarchy' of capacity for being an agent or experiencer such as that proposed by
Silverstein (1976); equivalently, highest on a hierarchy of thematic roles such as that
proposed by Jackendoff (1972)). That is, the logocentric NP is the agent if there is one,
and the experiencer if there is no agent role. Of course, all arguments in the clause are
more 'animate' than the clausal complement20
Second, the logophoric context may be triggered by some element of the subordinate
clause itself, a complementiser, a conjunction (like Japanese node) or a relative clause
marker, in such cases the logocentric NP is the subject of the previous verb. These are all
cases where the logophoric context has been grammaticised. We can account for such
cases by having the lexical entry for the complementiser introduce an anaphoric condition
linking the validator of the complement clause with the relevant NP of the previous clause.
We can draw on the notion of 'protagonist' introduced in chapter 5, and appropriately
defined for the language in question, to allow us to make reference to the logocentric NP.
The lexical entry for node could look something like this (leaving aside problems of linear
order);
20 Cf. also Hellans' (1986) notion of role-command as discussed by Sigurdsson (1986:39f.). He notes
that reflexives of all kinds in Icelandic must link to the highest NP on a hierarchy of roles, and must not be
higher on the hierarchy than their antecedents. This explains the grammaticality judgements on the examples
Brefid sarwfaerdi Mariu um ad Olafur hefdi gleymt ser, 'The letter convinced Mary that Olaf had forgotten
*it/?her/himself and petta vandamal krafdist pess ad vid hugsudum stodugt um pad/*sig 'This problem
demanded that we were constantly thinking about it/*self'.
node
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Alternatively, in Ewe it seems that subjunctive mood is both necessary and sufficient to
trigger a logophoric context in the absence of a logocentric predicate. I propose that the
general form of the rule covering such cases will make reference to the parameter Actual
which it was argued in chapter 5 is part of the eventuality index. Basically, such rules will
state that if the value of Actual for (the eventuality index of) a subordinate clause is {non-
actual}, then the validator of the subordinate clause is anaphorically linked to the matrix
subject.
We have seen that subjunctive mood is often required within logophoric contexts triggered
by other means, as in Icelandic. Clearly, for a language such as Icelandic, where
subjunctive mood is required in all logophoric clausal complements,21 we now have two
mechanisms available for accounting for the introduction of the logophoric context and the
establishment of a logocentric NP. The partial overlap of function of the two mechanisms
does not seem to be a problem. For any individual language, the most elegant solution will
be chosen. In Icelandic, at least in some common dialects (see Sigurdsson (1986),
Rognvaldsson (1986)), subjunctive mood is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
establishment of a logophoric context. Subjunctive mood may arise for other reasons and in
examples like these (eg. (37)) - mainly adverbial clauses - LDRs may not occur. So for
Icelandic, the best solution is to say that logophoric contexts are triggered lexically by
logocentric predicates, and that whenever the condition v * j" holds, subjunctive mood is
required. In Ewe, in contrast, we need both mechanisms to give a comprehensive account
of logophoricity, since logophoric contexts may be triggered by both logocentric predicates
and by the complementiser be plus subjunctive mood.
(37) a. Maria er her enn po ad eg kyssi *sig/hana.
Maria is here still though I kiss (S) *self/her.
b. Olafur segir Maria er her enn po ad eg kyssi sig/hana
Olafur says that Maria is here still though I kiss (S) self/her.
It could be argued (and is implicit in eg. Popowich's (1988) account) that use of a [+log]
feature is motivated precisely by the desirability of avoiding inconsistency both
crosslinguistically and within languages such as Ewe. However, notice that although two
mechanisms for triggering logophoric contexts are postulated above, the account given for
21 Except marginally, for some speakers, with otherwise 'logocentric' verbs which just don't require the
subjunctive in their clausal complements; cf. Sigurdsson (1986), also noted in Maling (1984:n5). The variation
occurs in 'semifactive' verbs like 'know' and 'see'.
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the logophoric pronoun is consistent throughout, and it seems to me entirely reasonable to
expect some lack of consistency in accounting synchronically for a context which has
clearly been expanded and somewhat grammaticised due to diachronic processes, from an
initial complement of the verb 'say'.22
Notice that so far, we have not needed to use a [+log] feature at all. The correct results
have followed from the semantics of the logocentric triggers, and of the logophoric
pronouns, both of which make reference to the single addition to the theory: the epistemic
validator. The account predicts, therefore, that in languages with logophoric pronouns or
LDRs, in any case where the validator is assigned to some entity other than the speaker, it
will be possible to use a logophoric pronoun or LDR to refer to that validator. In order to
confirm or disconfirm this prediction, it would be necessary to look for examples in a
logophoric language in which it was clear for independent reasons that the validator role
had been assigned to some entity other than the speaker, and check whether or not
logophoric pronouns could occur in that context. If they could not, this would suggest, at
the least, that introduction of a 'logophoricity' feature [+log] may be necessary.
We have now discussed the way in which the establishment of a logophoric context and a
logocentric NP is handled. In the outline of the account given above, we also saw
examples of the lexical specification of logophoric pronouns, and of the anaphoric
conditions which they introduce, to link them to the validator of the DRS whose universe
they belong to. We considered only singular logophoric pronouns, but it is a simple matter
to extend the account to plural ones. We need to cover two cases, that where the set
referred to by the logophoric pronoun is completely coextensive with the set referred to by
some previous plural pronoun, and that where the logophoric pronoun merely includes in
its reference some previous singular referent. To do this it is necessary to make use of the
a (superset or equal to) anaphoric linking relation introduced in chapter 4. The lexical
entry for a plural logophoric pronoun will therefore look like the following, for the Ewe
plural pronoun yewo.
22 It must be acknowledged, however, that this way of handling in UCG the triggering of a logophoric
context and establishment of some argument as the logocentric NP, does lack generality in certain respects.
For instance, instead of having two rules or types of lexical entry to cover cases (i) and (ii), it should be possi¬
ble to generalise over these by making reference to thematic roles and the animacy hierarchy. It is clear
enough how this could be done informally, but the formal mechanisms for handling it in UCG await develop¬




[XJ] [X. 3 V]
As in chapter 5, the lower case letter is treated as neutral as to number, so that this v could
unify with a singular DM or an upper case DM specified as plural.
Examples (38a,b) and their DRSs illustrate the two types of plural linking.
(38) (a) ^ (rfri) w6 ga tf sa:ra tjl s?:ra
PRO (say) PL COMP head LOG(PL) hurt LOG(PL)
Theyj said that they- had headaches. (Tuburi)
(b) kofi kpo be yfewo-do go
Kofi see COMP LOG_PL-come out
Kofi saw that they (including Kofi) had come out (Ewe)



















Three other aspects of logophoric phenomena need to be taken into account: multiple
embedding of complement clauses, logophoricity across sentence boundaries, and
optionality of logophoric pronouns.
Example (39) from Icelandic is an instance of multiple embedding. Given the account so
far, it would have the DRS in (40).








(40) j m h b vi pi
vi = i' Haraldur (h)
Jon(j) Billi (b)
Maria (m) say(j,pi)









So far, we have said just that the anaphoric constraint on logophoric pronouns states that
they must be linked to v. The case where v was the current speaker was ruled out by
feature incompatibility. For examples like (39), Icelandic speakers apparently judge any of
the subject NPs, Jon, Maria, Haraldur, or Billi, to be acceptable antecedents for the LDR.
This actually follows from the account as it stands: all we require is that the logophoric
pronoun DM be linked to some DM which is of the sort v, provided it is not first person:
given the definition of accessibility in DRT stated in chapter 4, any v DM accessible, i.e.
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any one higher in the DRS, will be a possible antecedent23
However, there are two types of example which on the surface are problematic for this
account.
For languages such as Mundang, where the depth of embedding at which a logophoric
pronoun can occur is restricted to the immediately subordinate clause, a further restriction
must be placed on the anaphoric condition for logophoric pronouns, to the effect that the
link must be to the nearest accessible v. The type of restriction to be required would
presumably be similar to that required for normal reflexive and reciprocal pronouns such as
are found in English. 24
In Icelandic, when the most deeply embedded clause is an adverbial clause rather than
another noun clause, an LDR may not be used coreferential with the immediately
dominating matrix clause subject, but only with a higher subject The relevant examples
are (40)-(42).
(40) *Jon yrdi gladur ef Sigga bydi ser













(42) a. Jonj truir [ad hanm verdi alltaf
jon. believes [that he^ will-be forever
23 It is uncontroversial for Icelandic that all intervening verbs must take subjunctive mood whether or not
they do so usually, and that as long as all the intervening clauses are subjunctive, the logocentric NP may act
as antecedent to a deeply embedded LDR. What is more controversial is the status of the intervening subject
NPs. In some accounts, such as Anderson (1986) and Maling (1984), it is claimed that all intervening subjects
become accessible as antecedents for the LDR whether or not they would be possible antecedents in isolation
(i.e. whether or not we would normally analyse them as introducing a validator). However, the judgements
are controversial, as Rognvaldsson (1986) and Sigurdsson (1986) show. If the judgements are sound, then we
would point out first that the verbs which are involved are archetypal logocentric predicates (such as 'know'),
even though we would not normally count them as such in Icelandic. It may be that some grammaticisation is
in progress, and that the presence of the 'dripped down' subjunctive for some speakers just about licences the
use of the LDR.
24 There is no scope in this thesis to explore such an account, however, see Stirling (1988b).
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froskur [nema konungsdottir kyssi sig.]].
a-frog [unless a-princess kisses selh]].
Jon- believes that he^ will remain a frog forever unless a princess
kisses hirm.
b. *pvi er truad [ad harnij verdi
it is believed [that he- will-be
alltaf froskur [nema kommgsdoittir kyssi sig.]].
forever a-ffog [unless a-princess kisses selh]]
It is believed that hej will remain a frog forever unless a princess
kisses hirm.
In (42), this higher subject is in fact the only NP that fits the requirement of being a
logocentric NP ('source'). In any case, these present no difficulties for the proposed
account, as their DR Structures (given in (43)-(45)) indicate.
(43) h vj p j s
Haroldur (h)
vx = i' don (j)


















->kiss (y, z) w = u
z = V
- 277 -






princess (y) remain_frog (w)
-•kiss (y, z) w = u
z = ?
In (41)/(44), the only possible antecedent for the logophoric pronoun is the validator DM,
assigned to Haroldur. This is accessible to the LDR because it is in a higher DRS
universe. There is no way in which another validator DM could be introduced, set equal
to Jon, because Jon is not the subcategorised for argument of a logophoric predicate.
Notice that on an account where one tries to handle mutiple clausal complements by
claiming that any subject NP between a logocentric NP and a logophoric pronoun is a
possible antecedent, this example is problematic (see Sells (1987) and Maling (1984) for
examples of such accounts). However, it is not a problem if the claim is only that any
validator is a possible antecedent
Example (42b) is interesting because the question arises as to what happens when the
logocentric predicate appears as a passive, in particular as a truncated passive. The active
(42a) causes no problems. In (42b), the passsive version, there is no explicit mention of a
believer. In such a case I shall say that the validator is assigned to ARB, meaning some
arbitrary or unspecified individual, which could be or include the current speaker.
Assuming that Jon has been mentioned elsewhere in the discourse, and hence is accessible
to the normal personal pronoun as an antecedent, the question is whether it is possible to
find an interpretation for the DM z introduced by the LDR. Anaphoric linkage to the v
assigned to ARB can be ruled out by an additional specification on the logophoric pronoun
that it must have specific reference: this can be done by using a feature DEF with values
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{definite,indefinite}; not only is this feature presumably required anyway to distinguish
definite from indefinite NPs, but it is in fact necessary to put such a constraint on the
validator to rule out examples like *Skodun sumra Islendinga. er ad sig. vanti haefileika
'Some Icelanders have the opinion that they lack talents'.
We also saw that in many languages, once a logophoric context is set up, it may extend
across sentence boundaries and be maintained for some considerable stretch of discourse:
this is not unconstrained, however, since in the examples given the chunk of discourse
concerned is the content of the reported speech, thought or experience; i.e. it is correct to
see it as all falling within the responsibility of the same assigned validator (just as with
multiple complement clauses it is correct to allow higher validators to be accessible to
lower clauses).
These extended logophoric contexts are trivially easy to represent within DRT: we simply
treat all additional material as falling within the DRS set up by the original logocentric
verb.25 Thus, we are able to avoid solutions such as that proposed by Maling
(1984:239,n27), who assumes that in such circumstances, 'the matrix verb of saying is
(presumably) elliptical'.
The final aspect of logophoric phenomena which we need to look at in more detail is the
optionality of the use of logophoric pronouns of which we have seen examples of from
many languages, and which we saw was in each case associated with a meaning
distinction: if the current speaker accepts the proposition in question, a normal personal
pronoun may be used; if the speaker does not accept it, a logophoric pronoun will be used.
The account proposed here not only allows this degree of optionality, but also gives us the
relevant meaning distinction for free - in contrast to Sells' account, or an account based
purely on a SOURCE role, where several further inferential steps are required. The
optionality is allowed by saying that as a general rule, it is always possible for a validator
to be current speaker, so that the lexical assignment of validator by logocentric predicates
is in effect optional. In languages which do not allow this optionality, we simply say that
lexical assignment of validation cannot be overruled by default assignment. When the
speaker is chosen as validator of a clausal complement of a logocentric predicate, the use
of a logophoric pronoun is ruled out: feature incompatibility prevents it being linked to any
25 However, it is not trivial to ensure that such a representation is constructed, cf. Roberts (1984).
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accessible validator, and there is no other way in which it can be linked to the relevant
matrix NP, so only a normal personal pronoun is possible. The meaning distinction
follows straightforwardly from assignment of responsibility for validation. The following
two DRSs show the different analyses given to the two choices for the examples in (46).26
(46) a. e nyo na ama be ye a dyi vi
that is good Ama COMP LOG SBJV bear child
b. e nyo na ama be wo a dyi
that is good Ama COMP PRO SBJV bear child
It pleases Ama that she is with child.


















26 Sigurdsson (1986) notes an example which makes this account more complex: in Icelandic, one can
have an LDR referring to the subject of a main clause and a personal pronoun referring to the some other su-
perordinate subject, in the same subjunctive clause:
Jon. taldi ad Mariaj hefdi sagt ad eg hefdi skilad hennij bokunum simum.
Jon believed that Maria had said that I had returned his books to her.
I have seen no convincing examples where there is an LDR and a personal pronoun in the same clause core-
ferential with the same antecedent.
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6.5. Generality of the account
Like Sells, I have been trying to find a semantic/discourse framework which will not only
account for logophoricity but also for lexical and syntactic choices which may be
determined by the same or similar factors, such as evaluative phrases, subjunctive mood,
etc. I have shown that the account proposed in 6.4 can handle the full range of logophoric
phenomena, and that it is therefore at least equivalent to Sells' account in observational
adequacy. I have also argued that the proposed account is preferable to Sells' in terms of
elegance and descriptive adequacy. In order to properly evaluate it, however, we need to
consider further how well the account given generalises to related phenomena. I shall
briefly consider the topics listed below.27
27 As Stirling (1988b) shows, my account can be modified to handle the logophoric system in Gokana as
well. I believe that it also offers a potentially coherent account for evidential markers. Both of these are to¬
pics which Sells does not address.
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(i) LDRs and clause-bound reflexives
(ii) attribution of evaluative expressions
(iii) interpretation of deictic expressions
(iv) binding
LDRs and clause-bound reflexives
I shall use data from Icelandic in illustration. Other LDR languages do not seem to be
interestingly different for purposes of this discussion.
On the basis of the discussion so far, we would assign the following lexical entries for the
LDRs sig and ser (we shall not discuss the possessive form sin).
sig
NP[—i [ 1 ],SG,ACC]
[Xj] [Xj = v]
ser
NP[-i[l],SG,DAT]
[Xj] [Xj = v]
Where, as we saw in 6.4, there is no further restriction on the anaphoric condition, i.e. the
v could be any compatible (non-first person) v accessible to the DM.
However, both these pronouns can also be used coreferentially with the subject of the
clause containing them, whether or not it is a validator, and whether or not the clause is in
a logophoric context. For some speakers, they may also be used coreferentially with
nonsubject NPs in the same clause, see Maling (1984, 1986) and Rognvaldsson (1986).
If Icelandic did not allow logophoric pronouns to be coreferential with any accessible
validator, not just the validator in the clause containing the pronoun, then we could
generalise over the two uses by saying simply that reflexive pronouns must find an
antecedent in the (DRS for) the current clause. This might be the subject DM, or it might
be the validator DM. As it is, we need to have two lexical entries for each pronoun, or
equivalently a disjunction in the semantics to the effect that an accessible antecedent for
the reflexive pronoun must be either a (subject) NP in the current clause or any validator.
Nevertheless, the proposed account allows a more uniform treatment than is proposed by
Hagege and Sells, who claim that LDRs and clause-bound reflexives are homophones, the
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one to be accounted for syntactically and the other semantically. In addition, the fact that
the validator DM is an accessible antecedent within a local context may explain the initial
historical extension of function of the reflexive pronoun.
Attribution of evaluative expressions
Sells argues for his proliferation of semantic primitives on the basis of giving correct
attribution to the evaluative content of expressions such as beloved Mary, that fool Yosiko,
mysteriously, etc.
My account for such expressions states that they are lexically specified to introduce a new
validator DM, which will be anaphorically linked to some other accessible validator DM.
So one of the conditions introduced by such a phrase will be = v. Usually, any validator
to which v. is linked will itself be assigned to the current speaker. Within a logophoric
context, however, there will be a choice between the nearest accessible validator, assigned
to the logocentric NP referent, and the current speaker. The apparent general preference for
the former can be explained in terms of relative accessibility. This analysis is supported
by intuitions that in multiple clause complement structures, again any one of the accessible
validators may be attributed the evaluative content of such a phrase. In illustration, see the
following DRSs for example (47).






Taroo- got wet because that fool Yosiko spilled water on hiim.
no Yosiko ga mizu
GEN Yosiko SUBJ water
ue ni kobosita node]
on LOC spilled because
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w V2 Z ei: w v2 z
ei: V2 = u
water (w)











Interpretation of deictic expressions
A further argument which Sells gives for distinguishing a PIVOT role in addition to
SOURCE and SELF roles is to account for linguistic judgements about the possibilities of
use of deictic expressions. For example, he says that the grammaticality contrast between
the two sentences in (48) is explained because in these examples Takasi is PIVOT (as well
as SELF) and the verb 'came' must be interpreted as describing direction towards PIVOT,
whereas the verb 'went' must be interpreted as describing direction away from PIVOT.
Regardless of questions about the grammaticality judgements used here (even Sells admits
they are not universal), there seems to be no reason for introducing a separate primitive to
handle the data. In the proposed account, the DRS in (49) would be given for (48).
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(48) a. Takasi. wa [Yosiko ga zibun. o
Takasij TOP [Yosiko SUBJ self OBJ
tazunete-kita node] uresigatta
visit-came because] happy
Takasi. was happy because Yosiko came to visit hiim.
b. *Takasi. wa [Yosiko ga zibun. o
Takasij TOP [Yosiko SUBJ selfj OBJ
tazunete-itta . node] uresigatta
visit-went because] happy
Takasij was happy because Yosiko went to visit hiim.
(49) u vi si ex y
VI = i'
Taroo (u) happy (si, u)





It seems very natural to state the deictic conditions on verbs like 'come' and 'go' in terms
of the validator, and this achieves the correct results here: 'come' must involve movement
towards the validator and 'go' must involve movement away from it. I will say nothing
further about this here, since evaluation of whether this is an appropriate account will
depend on further work in two areas: first, checking whether consistent accounts can be




Sells (p.467f.) claims that logophoric pronouns, or more generally, any role-predicates,
always have a variable binding interpretation when involved in anaphoric relations. The
evidence given for this are pairs such as the following:
(50)a. Adeins Jon telur ad Maria elski hamy
Only Jon- believes that Maria loves him-.
b. Adeins Jon. telur ad Maria elski sigj.
Only Jon- believes that Maria loves self.
If Jon believes that Maria loves Jon, and Olaf believes that Maria loves Olaf, (a) is true
and (b) is false.
In my account, the distinct interpretations of these two sentences arise naturally from the
mechanisms already described, without the need for stating any special constraints. The
DRSs for the two sentences would be something like the following (satisfactory accounts
for quantifiers like only are still to be developed; informally we treat only x believes p as,












28 It may be possible to define the validator role wholly or partially in indexical/contextual terms; this
also connects to the questions of accounting for direct and indirect speech which I have also ignored here.
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z = v -
6.6. Logophoricity and switch-reference
In the last two chapters, working within UCG, a grammar formalism which incorporates a
DR Theory semantics, we have looked at two kinds of phenomena which both involve
reference constraints across clause and sentence boundaries.
In chapter 5, it was argued that in order to handle switch-reference phenomena, an account
is needed which meets the following specifications:
(i) it has a way of distinguishing the subject NP referent of a following clause
without having to know the subcategorisation frame of the verb of that clause.
(ii) it can specify that this is not just the subject but an agentive subject.
(iii) in order to account for functional extensions, it can make reference not just to
the subject but also to information about mood and location.
To meet these specifications, we proposed that the index [a] for an eventuality be






Here, Id is an integer identifying the eventuality and from which its temporal reference can
be determined, and Parameters is itself a triple <Protagonist, Location, Actuality>, where
Protagonist is the protagonist of the eventuality (in Amele, the agentive/experiencer subject
referent), Location is locational reference and Actuality is a parameter with possible values
{actual,non-actual).
In the present chapter, it has been argued that to handle logophoric systems, we need an
account which incorporates a way. of constraining the logocentric NP to be a validator as
well as being either grammatical subject or highest on some thematic hierarchy. To do
this, we introduced the additional mechanism of sorted validation DMs.
I will now attempt to draw together these two strands.
First, notice that the accounts given differ in their nature crucially due to the different
syntactic relation between the clauses. Let us use the term 'marked clause' to mean the
switch-reference marked clause or the logophoric context, and the term 'controlling clause'
to mean the finite clause of a switch-reference relation or the matrix clause of a logophoric
relation. The switch-reference systems we have looked at have involved either clause
chaining structures, or adverbial clause adjuncts.29 We have thus treated switch-reference
marked clauses as functors which take a grammatically more fully specified clause as
argument, and unify with it in certain respects. In contrast, logophoric systems invariably
involve marked noun clauses which are the subcategorised for arguments of predicates, and
the logophoric relationship crucially involves semantic characteristics of the predicate. We
cannot treat the marked clause as a functor, it is treated as an argument.
However, in each case, the crucial NP in the controlling clause is the protagonist NP
defined either just as subject, or just as agent, or as both. For switch-reference, we need to
put this condition in the eventuality index because of the marked clause's status as a
functor: we can't require too much of its argument. In fact, the same thing happened in
accounting for logophoric contexts introduced by complementisers. Normally, however,
with logophoricity, we do not need to do this because all the necessary information is
29 Of course, there are some switch-reference systems in which marking is on relative clauses or comple¬
ment clauses.
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available within the sign for the functor which is the controlling clause. It could be that
this difference is at the heart of the differing maikedness characteristics which we noted for
switch-reference and logophoricity. We said that for switch-reference, disjoint reference is
marked, whereas for logophoricity, coreference is marked, and also noted that the two have
different properties with respect to cases in which only one of the NPs is plural.
Further, in both cases, modality is important. For switch-reference, one of the things that
can force use of DS marking even if the protagonists are coreferential, is a switch in the
value for the parameter Actual, between {actual} and {non-actual}. For logophoricity,
logophoric pronouns are coreferential with the clausal validator set up by the higher NP.
We also saw that logophoric contexts are coextensive with contexts in which subjunctive
mood is used.
We further noted that there is some evidence to suggest that logophoric systems may have
the potential to develop into switch-reference systems. This is the hypothesis underlying
Comrie's (1983) presentation of the Gokana data as a young switch-reference system. In
addition, it is likely that something similar has happened in Imbabura Quechua, where one
of the two switch-reference systems, a fairly recent innovation occuring only in this dialect
of Quechua, is restricted to subjunctive noun clauses mainly embedded under predicates of
the kind we have been calling logocentric (Cole 1982, 1983, Jake 1985).
i
It is straightforward to incorporate the account presented in this chapter into the one given
for switch-reference in chapter 5.
First, we must include the validator in the structured eventuality index of the semantics for
the clause rather than in the predicate conditions introduced by the clause. As we saw,
assignment of the validator role involves a 'formal' condition rather than a 'descriptive'
one, and in fact we have effectively been treating validation in this way in our definition of
the function val, i.e. referring to it separately from the predicate conditions of the relevant
DRS.
Second, we must clarify the relationship between the validator and the parameter Actual
defined in chapter 5. We already suggested that this parameter may be useful in
accounting for logophoric contexts triggered just by special complementisers. We can
define the following biconditional for the languages we have looked at:
val(a) * i' <=> Actuality(a) = {non-actual}
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This accounts for the restriction on use of logophoric pronouns to clauses with subjunctive
mood in some languages, and also for the conditions of use of logophoric pronouns in
languages in which they are optional.
In fact, it is 'with' the parameter Actuality that the validator belongs, since it too pertains
to modality. So we define an inclusive parameter Modality which is a pair, <Actuality, v>.
Then, the relevant generalisation is that logocentric verbs require:
Prot(a-) = val(aj), where a^ is the index for the matrix clause and aj is the index for the
subordinate clause.
Having incorporated the account for logophoricity into the account proposed for switch-
reference, we need to consider what implications this has for the account given for switch-
reference.
In particular, the strong claim made in chapter 5 was that crosslinguistically, there is
potential for using DS marking wherever some element of the eventuality index of one
clause departs from that of the other clause. If we incorporate the validator into the
eventuality index, the prediction is that DS marking may be used in some language in
some cases where the two clauses differ just in having distinct epistemic validators. The
sorts of cases where this would occur are, as we have seen, cases where the validator in
one clause is the current speaker and that in the other clause is the agent/experiencer
involved in an act of communication, or a mental, psychological or perceptual experience.
One way to constrain this might be to say that where the validator of the clause is not the
current speaker, then no statement about actuality is made, or even that {non-actual} is
implied; in contrast, though, it is not the case that {actual} entails that the validator is not
the speaker. We saw that DS could be used if the clauses have distinct actuality values.
This would cover some of the cases where they would have distinct validators: the only
case it would not cover would be a case where both clauses were {non-actual}, but one
had this value due to having a different validator, and the other for some other reason. We
could deal with this difficulty by saying that a distinct validator implies no value for
actuality. In such cases the two clauses would automatically have different actuality values
whenever the validators were different. These kinds of predictions need testing against




In this thesis, I have examined two types of clause linkage: switch-reference and
logophoricity. Both involve restrictions on the anaphoric relation between a pivot NP in a
dependent clause and a pivot NP in a controlling clause. Yet, I have shown that neither is
amenable to an account in terms of syntactic binding. Furthermore, in both cases,
functional extensions of the markers suggest that it is better to describe the systems as
indicating relationships between clauses rather than simply between NPs.
I have proposed a formal account which captures this idea in a grammar formalism with a
semantic component based on Discourse Representation Theory. The key element of the
new account and the major theoretical innovation is the notion of structured eventuality
indices incorporating eventuality parameters, and the idea that languages have formal
devices to indicate agreement or dis-agreement between these indices. This gives formal
expression to an intuition that there are global semantic and discourse-related properties of
the eventualities introduced by clauses which are independent of the prepositional content
of the clause and which are important to the way the clause fits into the discourse
structure.
The work reported contributes to our understanding of switch-reference systems in drawing
together numerous reports of 'unexpected' uses of switch-reference from a wide range of
languages and showing that these uses are similar and can be incorporated into a unified
and coherent theory of the semantics of switch-reference markers. It contributes to our
understanding of logophoric systems by making explicit the connections between
logophoricity and modality, in particular the marking of evidential meaning. It also makes
some progress toward determining the relationship between switch-reference systems and
logophoric systems, and identifying the universal constraints on these systems.
More specifically, it provides additional support for a number of theoretical proposals
which have been made by other researchers. These include the need for an 'animacy',
'agentivity' or 'thematic role' hierarchy such as has been proposed by numerous
researchers, including Silverstein (1976), Jackendoff (1972) and Hellan (1986), and the
usefulness of the notion of 'unaccusative verbs' as proposed by Perlmutter (1978) and
further developed by many investigators. In addition, the work in this thesis suggests that a
rather sophisticated notion of aspectual classification and textual structure is necessary, and
so supports work by Zeevat (1987), Webber (1987) and Moens (1987), as well as work on
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transitivity from a rather different theoretical standpoint, by Hopper & Thompson (1980).
Clearly, a good deal of research remains to be done on the topics covered in the thesis. I
consider the following questions to be the most important to pursue on the basis of the
work reported here.
First is the interaction between impersonal constructions and switch-reference. It would be
useful to have data for a greater number of languages on which to base crosslinguistic
generalisations: just how common is it for switch-reference systems to treat impersonal
controlling clauses as triggering SS marking? More importantly, there is the theoretical
question of whether these seemingly aberrant uses of SS marking should be added to our
list of diagnostics for unaccusative verbs, and whether current work on unaccusativity can
shed any light on the account we should give for the switch-reference pivot in such
languages. These questions were touched on in the thesis but need further theoretical
investigation. Finally we must ask what the interaction is between the impersonals
phenomena, which clearly implicate a notion of agentivity, and the kind of functional
extension of switch-reference marking which occurs in Eastern Pomo, which also
implicates a notion of agentivity and indeed unaccusativity, since Split-S marking is taken
to be an indication of this.
A related point is that the ideas presented in the Appendix about verb orientation in Amele
should be followed up. Even if the orientation distinction turns out to be unconnected to
the behaviour of the switch-reference system in that it does not explain unexpectes uses of
DS marking, it does seem related to unaccusativity, and that in itself raises interesting
questions about the interaction between this phenomenon and impersonal constructions in
Amele. What is the 'object marker' which occurs on some seemingly intransitive Amele
verbs? Can an unaccusativity analysis help us explain it?
The second major question to be pursued is the relationship between switch-reference and
logophoricity, and the analysis of the latter. Many interesting typological and diachronic
questions would be illuminated by a more systematic examination of languages in which
both kinds of system are reported to occur than I have had scope for in this thesis. Again,
further work needs to be done on the theoretical mechanisms proposed to account for
logophoricity in chapter 6. Is the concept of the validator more generally useful?
Research on evidential markers and on verbs of propositional attitude may go some way
towards answering this question. I also mentioned that additional thought was needed on
on the semantic basis for DR Theory and the semantic interpretation of the validator DM;
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in connection with this possible alternative analyses involving an account for direct/indirect
speech and indexicality may be explored.
Finally, we need to consider what other grounding and motivation there is for the notion of
the structured eventuality index. Again, it would ( be useful to have more extensive
crosslinguistic data from switch-reference languages on other cases which might be seen as
involving functional extensions of DS marking of the kind the structured eventuality index
was designed to handle. We also need to consider the place of such an account for switch-
reference within a broader notion of DR Theory, which includes such matters as anaphoric
resolution and text cohesion. The account suggested in chapter 5 for cases of unexpected
DS marking indicating episodic cpmpletion deserves much more detailed consideration. I
noted the close association between nominal and temporal cohesion indicated by switch-
reference systems and pointed to the foregrounding and backgrounding functions they may
have throughout a text as possible explanations for the way they interact. A lot more work
needs to be done on this, and we need to see whether the information encoded for each




'Agent-oriented' and 'goal-oriented' verbs in Amele.
Object agreement facts in Amele are complex (Roberts 1987:278ff.). Agreement marking
for direct and indirect objects is restricted to animate NPs. Furthermore, verbs are
distinguished according to whether object agreement marking is obligatory, optional or
disallowed. The range of possibilities is represented in the following diagram.
object agreement marking obligatory I
object agreement marking optional II
object agreement marking disallowed III
Verbs of Type I, which require object agreement marking, include verbs where the subject
causes a physical change to the object, such as peel, tear, burn, embrace, or where the
subject has a psychological effect on the object, such as provoke, bless, desire.
Collective/reciprocal predicates and idiomatic expressions with an incorporated object are
also included in this class. In general, the object is the experiencer of the action or state.
Verbs of Type III, which prohibit object agreement, are verbs whose subject undergoes a
physical or psychological experience: verbs of motion or location such as return, lie,
follow; verbs of physical change such as open mouth, vomit, blush; and verbs of
psychological state such as be proud, fear, yearn. Here, the subject participant is the
experiencer of the action or state.
Verbs of Type II are ones in which object agreement may or may not occur depending
upon whether there is an animate object. They include some which describe the subject as
bearing a psychological attitude to the object, such as forgive, hate, confess to, and some in
which the subject affects the object physically, such as untie, poke, wrap.
Of verbs describing linguistic acts, some are Type I and others are Type III, possibly
depending on the extent to which the act has an implicit product.
The interesting fact about this classification of verbs is that it seems to be independent of
the verb's valency. Verbs of Type I, which require object agreement, may actually be
'intransitive', with only one semantic argument and hence no overt object NP. Similarly,
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verbs of Type HI, which prohibit object agreement, may actually be 'transitive', with two
semantic arguments and an overt object NP.
Roberts (1987:289) suggests that these facts can be explained if we assume that Amele
grammar incorporates a distinction between 'goal-oriented' and 'agent-oriented' verbs
independent of the distinction between transitive and intransitive verbs. Goal-oriented
verbs are ones where the effect of the action is on the participant referred to by the object
NP, while agent-oriented verbs are ones where the effect of the action is on the participant
referred to by the subject NP. The claim is that object agreement marking indicates goal-
orientation, and lack of object-agreement marking indicates agent orientation. Evidence for
this distinction is provided by two kinds of minimal pairs. In the first type, the verbs have
similar meanings but different orientation. See the examples in (1). In each pair the first
verb is goal-oriented and must take object agreement and the second verb is agent-oriented
and may not take object agreement1
(1) (a) isicol-doc filicit-ec
to surprise someone to be surprised
(b) lahi-doc qelel-ec
to shake someone to tremble
(c) tuli-doc seel-ec
to wake someone up to awake
The second type of evidence involves verbs of Type II. The same verb is used with
different meanings depending on whether or not it takes object agreement, i.e. on its
orientation. See the examples in (2). Again, in each case the first member of the pair is
goal-oriented and takes object agreement while the second is agent-oriented and does not
take object agreement.
(2) (a) basec-doc bas-ec
to give birth to pour out
1 Verbs with different orientation are also distinguished by the form of the infinitival ending they take,
with goal-oriented verbs taking -doc and agent-oriented verbs taking -ec.
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(b) fulul-doc fulul-ec
to flap (wings) to fly
(c) wilic-doc wilic-ec
to stir (something) to wag
There are obvious analogies between this pattern of object marking and the Split-S marking
which occurs in languages such as Eastern Pomo, and it may be that a notion of
unaccusativity will be useful in accounting for these facts grammatically. My concern here
is whether there is any interaction between the proposed orientation distinction and switch-
reference marking. It was noted in chapter 5 that certain difficulties arise in trying to
match the data involving unexpected uses of DS marking with an analysis of the kind that
Roberts suggests. In effect, in a few examples, it is not clear why DS marking is used,
because although there does seem to be a change in time, place or mood in the clause, the
change does not happen on the unexpectedly DS marked verb, as it does in the other
examples we looked at. The reader is referred to section 5.4.2 for discussion of this
difficulty, especially with respect to examples (38) and (39), which are repeated below.
There are various possible explanations for it, some of which were mentioned there. The
hypothesis to be explored here is that an interaction between syntactic orientation of verbs
and switch-reference marking might explain the full range of cases of unexpected DS
marking, including these puzzling examples.
(38) Od-i-me-ig eu na cuha fe-ce-bil
do-PRED-SS-2p that of Sunday see-DS-2p
hib na age meen qaig gaban-du-me-ig
later 2p stone shoot gather-3s-SS-2p
ihoc f-i-me-ig
enough see-PRED-SS-2p
Do that and then later take a look and you will see that the money you
have collected will be enough ... [304, (619)]
(39) Aria meme-g eu mado-n, "Cois
all right father-3s that say-3s-RemP OK
eu mado-co-min 1-ig eh-i 1-i
that say-DS-ls go-(SS)ls take-(SS) go-(SS)
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m-ih-ig-en," d-on. Odo-co-b li-me-i dana
put-2s-ls-Fut say-3s-RemP do-DS-3s go-SS-3s man
co cafa q-oc eu mado-n,
mouth-3s close hit-INF that say-3s-RemP
"Cois caja eh-i 1-i
OK woman take-(SS) go-(SS)
m-ud-ih-ig-en," do-a
put-3s-2s-ls-Fut say-3s-RemP
All right the father told her, "OK I say I will take you and give you to
him." Then he went to the man with the closed mouth and told him,
"OK I will bring the woman and give her to you." [305, (627)]
The hypothesis is that DS marking might sometimes be used to indicate a switch in the
orientation of the verb, rather than a difference in any other characteristics of the clause,
such as different subject reference, or any of the other possibilities which we considered.
There is a strong form and a weak form of the hypothesis: on the strong form, we might
expect to be able to account for all aberrant uses of DS in this way, and not need to make
recourse to mentions of time, place and mood at all; on the weak form, we could include
switch in orientation as just one of the factors which might trigger DS marking, along with
the others already identified.
The possible combinations of verb-orientation which we would expect to find are the
following:





For each of the four cases, there is the further parameter of variation that the subjects of
the two clauses may either be coreferential or have disjoint reference. Assuming for the
moment that there are no other factors which interact to trigger unexpected markings of
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switch-reference, i.e. ignoring the possibility that time, place and mood intervene, the
following logical possibilities exist:
(1) Switch-reference operates just in terms of co/disjoint reference and there is no
interaction with orientation; in which case we would expect to find both SS
marking and DS marking for each of the above cases, entirely dependent upon
whether there was coreference or not.
(2) If SS indicates same orientation and DS indicates different orientation, then we
would expect cases (a) and (d) to trigger SS and cases (b) and (c) to trigger DS;
but it seems unlikely that switch-reference would operate just in terms of
orientation (in fact as we shall see it does not), and a more likely possibility would
be to expect something like what happens in Eastern Porno, i.e. SS indicates
coreference and same orientation, and DS indicates disjoint reference and/or
different orientation. So we would expect to get the following pattern:
SS: agent agent; coreference
goal goal; coreference
DS: agent agent; disjoint reference
goal goal; disjoint reference
agent goal; coreference
agent goal; disjoint reference
goal agent; coreference
goal agent; disjoint reference
We would anticipate the 'unexpected' cases of DS marking to all fall into one of the
following two patterns:
1. agent goal; coreference
2. goal agent; coreference
We test whether the strong or weak form of the hypothesis is correct as follows. For the
strong form to be correct, we would expect to find that not only do all cases of unexpected
DS marking fall into one of these two groups, but all cases which exhibit one of these two
patterns take DS marking. For the weak form to be correct, neither of these would need to
be the case, but we would expect that at least some of the difficult examples of unexpected
DS marking which we could not account for any other way would fit one of the two
patterns above, and we would expect to find some greater than random correlation between
orientation and switch-reference marking (i.e. an uneven distribution of SS and DS
marking vis-k-vis same/different orientation).
I looked again at all the examples of aberrant DS mariting which appear in Roberts (1987,
- 298 -
1988), which represent a total of 29 cases of switch-reference relations. Of these, 13 had
unexpected DS marking. As we saw above, for a few of these cases, it was difficult to
establish what was triggering DS marking.
Out of these 29 cases, 19 conformed to the hypothesis that DS would be used if there was
a switch in verbal orientation, regardless of whether the subjects of the two clauses were
coreferential or not This is roughly 65.5% of cases, which indicates a pattern which is not
random. If we check the examples for whether or not they conform to the canonical
hypothesis that SS indicates coreference and DS disjoint reference, we find that 16 out of
29 do, so the orientation hypothesis actually does rather better than the canonical theory,
although the difference between the two is probably not statistically significant, and the
sample of data used is biased because it concentrates mainly on cases which don't conform
to the canonical theory. The account of unexpected DS marking which was described in
chapter 5 still covers the fullest range of cases, however, since only the few puzzling
examples mentioned there do not conform to it.
Assuming that a weak version of the orientation proposal is true the expectation is that at
least the puzzling examples which do not seem to fit the theory in chapter 5 will be among
the 19 which conform to the hypothesis that DS indicates a switch in orientatioa
Unfortunately this is not the case.
The numbers of examples of each type of pattern which occured were as follows:
A-A : 11 (38%)
G-G : 1
A-G : 8 (27.6%)
G-A : 9 (31%)
If we look at the 10 cases which do not conform to the orientation hypothesis we find that
examples of all four patterns occur. Some of these are cases which actually do fit the
canonical theory.
We could modify our hypothesis to say that when there is coreference, and no switch in
orientation, SS must be used, and when there is disjoint reference, regardless of orientation
facts, DS is used, but when there is coreference but a switch in orientation, either SS or
DS may be used. This modified hypothesis accounts for 6 of the 10 counterexamples (i.e.
those where SS was used where there was coreference even though there was a switch in
orientation).
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This leaves us with four counterexamples, which are all cases where DS is used
unexpectedly, because there is coreference, but we can't account for this by saying that DS
is used because there is a switch in orientation, because there is not in fact a switch in
orientation. In this brief report of results I will not discuss these examples in detail, but
two of them are actually somewhat problematic for other reasons.
For comparison, the following figures give the breakdown of the number of agent-oriented
verbs which occurred in this sample in total, as against the number of patient-oriented
verbs which occurred: out of 51 verbs, 32 (63%) were agent-oriented, and 19 (37%) were
patient-oriented. It is not surprising that there are more agent-oriented verbs. Note that the
proportion of agent-oriented verbs to patient-oriented verbs is roughly the same as the
proportion of cases which fit the theory to cases which do not; whether this is significant is
not clear at this stage.
What conclusions can be drawn from this brief preliminary investigation? In the absence of
further data all that can be said is that the theory proposed here is worth following up, and
that it is certain that there is some interaction of orientation with switch-reference marking
which is available as an explanation of unexpected DS marking in some cases, including a
number of cases which cannot be explained by the theory outlined in the rest of this
chapter. This having been said, given the restricted data and the fact that a strong version
of the orientation hypothesis fails, there seems every reason to retain the analysis proposed
in chapter 5 whereby DS is triggered by some change in the parameters of the eventuality.
Further investigation of verb orientation in Amele may show that these cases can be
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